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Abstract
This thesis presents original evidence of a previously undisclosed dark side to China’s 
Hong Kong policy after 1982. It documents a covert program of immigration from the 
mainland to Hong Kong which was designed to put in place a classic fifth column of 
Communist loyalists to be used if all other institution-based arrangements for the power 
transfer of the British colony to Chinese rule failed.
This finding is revealing and important in its own right as a contribution to study of the 
Hong Kong transition. But the thesis focuses more on the broader significance of the 
motivation of such a fifth column policy for both the study of Chinese foreign policy 
and international relations theory.
Studies of international affairs regularly impute motives to states or their leaders. Yet, 
when it comes to analysis of the imputed motives, most scholars see that as nearly 
impossible given the difficulty of penetrating the minds of the individual leaders 
concerned. However, a small number of scholars have taken up the challenge. They 
believe that foreign policy motivation can be studied despite its apparent complexity 
and elusiveness. They see the study of motivation of a given foreign policy as the only 
way of grasping its essence and, therefore, of ascertaining clues about its future 
development.
These scholars of foreign policy motivation have tried to break new ground by 
establishing tangible theoretical parameters to account for the dynamic nature of such 
motivation. Unfortunately, their voices have largely been ignored and their approaches 
have been marginalised by the mainstream schools of international relations. For 
example, the various schools of realism refused to acknowledge the richness and 
diversity of the motivation approaches. The Marxist-Leninist theoretical paradigm 
emphasised class struggle as the basic unit in projecting international relations.
This thesis argues that motivation study advances our understanding of Chinese foreign 
policy. Drawing on an investigation of existing theoretical studies of motivation, the 
thesis identifies and synthesises three approaches to the study of motivation that seem 
particularly relevant to the Chinese case: perception; personality; and
structural/situational constraining factors. This thesis analyses the historical, political 
culture, ideological and structural sources of Chinese policymaking to illustrate how 
these three elements can elucidate Chinese foreign policy motivation.
Its conclusion is then tested against the case of China’s fifth column policy in Hong 
Kong. The findings from the Hong Kong case study reflect two parallel but 
contradictory lines of motivation in the reform era of Deng Xiaoping: a dynamic 
adjusting and learning process on the one hand, and a strenuous effort to retain its 
traditional practice on the other.
This thesis concludes that, despite increasing pressures for adaptation from constant and 
tremendous changes in global and national settings, Chinese foreign policy motivation 
could not in the final analysis overcome the constraints imposed by its underlying 
doctrines and practices, which had been so firmly embedded in the minds of the 
Communist leaders that it became a traditional mode of responding to the unknown and 
uncertainty—a culture of Chinese foreign policy.
V/
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Note: The pinyin system, the official romanisation system in the People’s Republic of China, has been 
adopted by the United Nations and other international organisations. It has become the system most 
universally used in scholarship and journalism in the West. This thesis uses pinyin whenever appropriate, 
with some familiar exceptions for well-known place names and personal names that would be difficult to 
recognised in pinyin. For example, Hong Kong, Tibet, Taipei are retained in preference to Xianggang, 
Xizang, and Taibei; and Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Lee Teng-hui are used rather than Sun 
Zhongshan, Jiang Jieshi and Li Denghui.
INTRODUCTION
On 24 September 1982, China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, explained to the 
British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, that he could not let the British continue to rule 
over Hong Kong after 1997 because he would not allow himself to become another Li 
Hongzhang, the high official of Qing emperor’s court who signed the 1898 treaty that 
leased Hong Kong’s New Territories to the British.1
This seemingly innocent comment was truly remarkable. On the one hand, it crystallised 
the fundamental Chinese sense of history and the reference point of the Chinese foreign 
policy perceptual framework—the continuity of the past and the weight of history. On 
the other hand, by juxtaposing events of the late nineteenth century that signed away 
Hong Kong with those of the late twentieth century that would recover Hong Kong’s 
sovereignty, Deng unequivocally declared the great symbolic role of Hong Kong in the 
minds of Chinese leaders. Deng’s comment was a powerful statement that challenged 
traditional international relations theories in understanding foreign policy 
motivation—factors other than narrowly-defined national interests and security 
considerations might play pivotal roles in foreign policy formulation under certain 
circumstances of specific historical and cultural settings. This comment was also a sharp 
reminder that although politics of sovereignty and national reunification could override
1 With the publication of the third volume of Deng Xiaoping’s Selected Works in October 1993, the official Chinese 
account of Deng Xiaoping’s talk to Mrs Thatcher on their first meeting on 24 September 1982 was released for the 
first time. It was significantly titled ‘Our Basic Position on the Question of Hong Kong’. Deng said: “On the 
question of sovereignty, China has no room for manoeuvre....If China failed to recover Hong Kong in 1997, when 
the People’s Republic will have been established for 48 years, no Chinese leaders or government would be able to 
justify themselves for that failure before the Chinese people or before the people of the world. It would mean that the 
present Chinese government was just like the government of the late Qing Dynasty and that the present Chinese 
leaders were just like Li Hongzhang!...If we failed to recover Hong Kong in 15 years the people would no longer 
have reason to trust us, and any Chinese government would have no alternative but to step down and voluntarily 
leave the political arena.” Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping, Vol. Ill (1982-1992) (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1994, p. 23). It can also be found in Deng Xiaoping, On the Question o f Hong Kong (Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1993, pp. 1-2). Both are translations from the Chinese edition published in October 1993.
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everything else, including economics,2 in China’s Hong Kong policy, this very policy 
was also founded on some personalised dimension, closely related to the leadership 
motivation at an individual level.
The observation of this significant incident gives rise to two important questions: What 
are the determinants of China’s Hong Kong policy motivation? And what does China’s 
Hong Kong policy say about China’s foreign policy motivation in general? These will 
guide the research agenda of this thesis.
Not only has the study of motivation been controversial, but attempts to include it in the 
study of Chinese foreign policy have often been treated with suspicion and hostility. 
Clearly foreign policy motivation is a difficult subject for academic study given the 
inherent limitations of social science. But if there is such a thing as foreign policy 
motivation, then it is essential to go beyond the comfort zone of what is already known 
to explore this frontier of possibility.
Since 1980 a number of monographs have addressed many aspects of Chinese foreign 
policy, but very few have tackled China’s foreign policy from a motivation perspective. 
Most scholars assume and assert a set of motives for Chinese foreign policy but make 
little effort to understand how these motives come into being. This means that, in spite 
of greater interests and a wider agenda being pursued in the study of Chinese foreign 
policy, scholars in general are still reluctant to address foreign policy motivation. What, 
then, could a serious and comprehensive investigation of motivation say about Chinese 
foreign policy? This interesting question has recently inspired a group of scholars to
2 Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China ’s Challenge (London: Routledge, 1996, p. 112)
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apply some elements of motivation theories in their studies of Chinese foreign policy. 
However, what has been lacking is a conscious and systematic effort to analyse all the 
key variables of motivation in the study of either a specific or general Chinese foreign 
policy.
This thesis is based on the following assumptions:
First, no foreign policy can be made without motivation. But motivation—no matter 
how important it might be—is only one component of action. While the secrecy and 
complexity of foreign policy decisionmaking processes might prevent observers from 
articulating directly the underlying motivation, it nonetheless can be inferred indirectly. 
There is rarely a single motivation operating to the exclusion of all others. Rather there 
is a configuration of motives, which cluster together in a related course of actions. This 
configuration of motives is inevitably found in institutions and political culture.3 4 That is 
because at any one time, though seemingly random, there will be an order of relative 
dominance among these motives. Since there is always more than one motive, other 
overarching, supportive and even conflicting motives also appear. Motive conflict is 
probably the rule5 which involves competitive demands for attention.6
Second, the effect of motive conflicts on decisionmaking and the effect of resolution of 
such conflicts can give clues to consistency of direction.7 The making of foreign policy
3 Motivation interacts with other components like perception, choice, value, belief, strategy, immediate and long­
term goals, and ultimate aims etc.
4 Robert Franken, Human Motivation (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1987, pp. 23-40)
5 ibid.
6 D. G. Winter, The Power Motive (New York: Free Press, 1973, pp. 83-102)
7 ibid.
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is an organised activity where the system of dispositions is exceedingly complex
o
because of the wide range of influences at work on the participants. Groups and 
individuals responsible for making foreign policy bring to the process different sets of 
values—each moulded differently by the particular political culture.
Third, instead of being static, the motives of actors can change in dynamic ways in order 
to allow for repositioning and accommodation in the light of emerging agendas.
Last, but not least, because of limitations imposed by internal or external circumstances 
and institutional, resource or personal constraints, not all motives can be satisfied 
equally or simultaneously.8 9
This thesis identifies four reasons for applying a motivation approach to the study of 
Chinese foreign policy. First, it seems necessary to investigate the role of motivation in 
foreign policy initiatives because motivation is the absolute foundation for any country 
to behave as it does. It is impossible to probe state behaviour without taking into 
account the motivation of decision makers10—be it an individual or a group. Richard 
Snyder and his colleagues argue that to assume motivation begs many of the most 
significant questions which arise in the study of international politics. 11
Second, if properly conceived and executed, motivational analysis ought to provide a 
much more satisfactory basis for linking the specific historical and internal social
8 Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin eds., Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: The Free Press 
o f Glencoe, 1962, pp. 141-143)
9 ibid.
10 ibid. pp. 133-138
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settings within which foreign policy decision makers operate.
Third, a comprehensive theory of motivation might serve to synthesise discrete concepts 
such as perception, personality, values, learning, attitudes and external constraints, 
which have been constantly used in decisionmaking analysis12 but have not been linked 
together consistently and effectively in much of the literature.
Fourth, since the foreign policy motivation of any country is fluid, variegated, 
interactive and sometimes contradictory, no single theory can fully and adequately 
explain the motivation of that foreign policy as a whole—its hypothesised ‘logic’.
The intention of this thesis is to identify and amalgamate the core elements of various 
competing foreign policy motivation theories in relation to the study of Chinese foreign 
policy from 1982-1997. At the heart of this thesis, there is a case study of the Hong 
Kong transition, which is chosen to test motivation theories.
The value of selecting Hong Kong as a case study of Chinese foreign policy lies in the 
unusual nature of the colony’s circumstances and its unique status in Chinese leaders’ 
decisionmaking. The Hong Kong case straddled domestic and foreign policy much 
more explicitly than other issues in Chinese foreign affairs—it directly linked China’s
11 ibid.
12 ibid.
13 This can be understood by China’s negotiation process of recovering Hong Kong. While dealings with Great 
Britain over Hong Kong followed standard diplomatic protocol, the Chinese government granted Hong Kong policy 
a status separate from other foreign policy issues. The most obvious evidence o f this was that the policy for Hong 
Kong was formulated primarily in the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO) rather than 
in the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office under the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. The twist, however, was the fact 
that Qian Qichen, then Foreign Minister, was the most senior Chinese official actively involved in the whole process
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national and international policy considerations. Indeed, it encapsulated in a nutshell the 
dilemma of Chinese foreign policy in Deng’s reform era—preserving sovereignty as the 
ultimate question of principle while recognising economic benefit as the foundation of a 
necessary pragmatism. China’s dealings with Great Britain over Hong Kong held 
significant implications for other foreign policy areas. Because the Hong Kong issue 
was treated by the CCP with extreme sensitivity, deliberation and caution, China’s 
Hong Kong policy can be seen as embodying the country’s highest foreign policy 
objectives as well as manifesting the CCP’s deepest concerns over the regime’s survival 
in the modernisation process. This policy therefore would serve as a perfect case for a 
broader investigation of Chinese foreign policy motivation under Deng Xiaoping.
Structure of the Thesis
The thesis comprises three parts. Part I is the theoretical investigation which establishes 
two fundamental premises of this dissertation: 1) that motivation is central to foreign 
policy decisionmaking process; and 2) that such motivation can be studied by observing 
its conceptual and analytical components. Perception, personality, structural/situational 
constraints and the course of interactions among them are identified as the major agents 
in the dynamic process of foreign policy motivation process. The complex and changing 
nature of the motivation is stressed.
International relations studies so far have treated the foreign policy motivation approach 
with two distinct views—simplicity or suspicion. These views are represented by
of political settlements with the British government. He was also the head of the Hong Kong Preparing Working 
Committee—the main body charged with the selection of the future Chief Executive in Hong Kong after 1997.
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mainstream political theories, which address foreign policy motivation in the most 
general and simplified terms. They take it for granted that motivation is itself a 
fundamental analytical unit which does not need to be further dissected. For example, 
realism/neorealism have regarded power as the ultimate motivation of a foreign policy; 
liberalism/neoliberalism have claimed the moral ground and economic equality to be the 
foundation for interstate relations; and Marxism has insisted on historical materialism 
and class struggle as primary sources for foreign policy. In emphasising their own 
theoretical paradigm, these theories tend to be biased against other alternative 
explanations and, therefore, have not provided adequate insight into the complexity and 
dynamics of the foreign policy motivation process.
Study of motivation as a theory of foreign policy, however, has not been totally ignored 
by the international relations discipline. A group of scholars have been engaged in the 
research to establish foreign policy motivation theories. They have succeeded in the 
sense that their investigations have deliberated on and stressed the role of individual 
motivational elements, but arguably have failed to link the discourses of these building 
blocks in a cohesive manner.
This unsatisfactory situation partly explains why motivation theories are often viewed 
with suspicion in the field of international relations studies. Concepts such as perception 
and personality, generally taken as referring to the inner psychological state and quality 
of actors in explaining overt behaviour, are more likely to be criticised simply because 
of the inherent circularity of such explanations: one seeks power because of a need for
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power. 14 However, this view only scratches the surface. This thesis identifies 
perception, personality and situational constraints to be the key motivational elements in 
the formulation and implementation of a given foreign policy. While the huge 
complexity of the motivation issues may tempt scholars to resort to just one of several 
motivation theories, it remains important not to lose sight of the complementarity and 
mutual enhancement of each of the elements in the overall assessment of motivation 
intensity and tendency.
The three chapters in Part I form the intellectual scaffolding of the thesis. Chapter One 
outlines the ‘pillar’ theories of the three classical political philosophies (realism, 
liberalism and Marxism) in their approaches to foreign policy motivation. Chapter Two 
investigates other scholarly works on foreign policy motivation to identify elements that 
are particularly relevant to the study of Chinese foreign policy. Chapter Three evaluates 
the significance of a newly emerging trend of taking motivation as the research focus in 
the study of Chinese foreign policy.
Part II of this thesis seeks to test the applicability and viability of motivation theories 
presented in the previous Part in understanding the thrust of communist China’s foreign 
policy motivation in general, and, in particular, the nature of the transformation of such 
motivation under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. It does so by drawing on an existing rich 
body of literature on Chinese foreign policy. It argues that each of the three main 
elements of foreign policy motivation—perception, personality and structural/situational 
constraints—plays a distinct role in the formation of Chinese foreign policy motivation 
over different historical periods and issues. However, it is the intrinsic relationship
14 D. G. Winter, The Power Motive (New York: The Free Press, 1973, pp. 51-53)
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among them and the delicate changes of balance between them that decide the final 
motivation for choices and preferences.
There are four chapters in this Part. Chapter Four traces the historical sources of the 
perception of various regimes affecting Chinese Communist foreign policy motivation. 
It goes back in time to understand one of the essential ingredients in the CCP’s 
perception melting pot. It contends that it is the competing notion of China’s inherent 
cultural superiority coupled with its fundamentally insecure and besieged mentality that 
has put China in an uneasy relation with the established world order. And it is also this 
tremendous sense of history and the loss of empire that has been the primary historical 
source of Chinese foreign policy perception. Ideological components are also discussed 
to illuminate the lingering utility of ideology in the process of transformation of CCP’s 
perception of outside world.
Chapter Five sketches the personal attributes of two paramount Chinese leaders, Mao 
and Deng, in reshaping the discourse of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. This 
paves the way to discuss their influence in instilling and reinforcing the political culture 
of ‘rule by man’ in China’s foreign policy thinking. It contends that, as a logical 
extension and natural spill-over of the practice of personalised politics in much of the 
Chinese political history, the CCP has always had a high expectation of the readiness 
and reliability of its cadres to fulfil its goals and to serve its best interest. As such, the 
roles of the cadre system as an organisational input in the foreign policy deliberation is 
also discussed to identify the aggregate characteristic of the CCP cadre contingent. This 
is an important step because, with the disappearance of paramount leaders from the
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Chinese political scene, more and more practical power has been passed to the broader 
political elite, of which the CCP cadres are the major beneficiaries.
Chapter Six assesses the impact of structural changes and systemic transformation on 
the formation of the CCP’s core values in its foreign policy motivation in both the Mao 
and the Deng eras. It examines the constraining effect of the CCP dominance within a 
party-state structure in setting policy priority, as the party positions and adjusts itself in 
domestic and international affairs. The major structural transformation under Deng is 
analysed to reveal how the structural framework itself had to change rapidly to 
accommodate the motivation process.
Chapter Seven highlights the dynamic and changing nature of Chinese foreign policy by 
incorporating the analytical outcomes of the previous three chapters. This dynamic 
interaction is further supported by reflecting upon three issues: pragmatism in Mao’s 
foreign policy; changing priorities in the reform era; and the origin of ‘one-country two 
systems’ policy.
Part III takes Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong during the transition period 
from 1983 to 1997 as a case study. It is intended to inject new empirical rigour to 
further test the validity of motivation theory in observing Chinese foreign policy 
motivation. The fresh evidence and ensuing comprehensive analysis of the so far little 
known fifth column operation in Hong Kong reveal a dark side of Chinese foreign 
policy in Deng’s open and reform era.
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There are two chapters in this Part. Chapter Eight first outlines the CCP’s official 
representation in Hong Kong, then records the fifth column operation against this 
background to set the scene for later unveiling of the policy motivation in Chapter Nine. 
Chapter Eight engages three basic questions: How was the fifth column policy 
formulated? How did it evolve? And how was it being implemented? Chapter Nine 
examines the intimate relationship between the fifth column policy in Hong Kong and 
Chinese foreign policy motivation more broadly. It does so by returning to the original 
theoretical paradigms set out in Part I to canvass the findings and evidence. On the basis 
of this, a conclusion of the motivation of Beijing’s Hong Kong policy during the 
transition, and indeed, China’s overall foreign policy motivation can be drawn.
Methodologies
The methodology used is a combination of traditional inductive and deductive 
reasoning. It avoids excessive quantification of data and complex behavioural jargon. 
The thesis does not limit itself to one particular social science. Insights are drawn, 
whenever possible, from the fields of political science, history, culture, psychology and 
philosophy.
This thesis is essentially a diagnosis, based on the discussed theoretical premises. It 
seeks to demonstrate how perception, personality and structural/situational 
considerations affect the Chinese foreign policy motivation processes, and why they do 
so. Facts are usually quite complex in international relations, even more so in the study 
of Chinese foreign policy motivation. But when one is willing to learn to respect them
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and is prepared to take different approaches to observe them, nuances appear instead of 
black-and-white or good-and-evil dichotomies. It is this complexity and intricacy that 
make the motivation proposition such a tempting approach.
The methodology of Part I is largely descriptive. By reviewing and analysing the 
existing international relations theories, it crystallises three core elements that dominate 
foreign policy motivation process.
Part II applies a deductive method to test the validity of the parameters established in 
the theoretical chapters of Part I. It identifies the general thrust of Chinese foreign 
policy motivation under both Mao and Deng. This is accomplished in two steps. Firstly, 
it uses theoretical paradigms derived in Part I to analyse Chinese foreign policy from the 
perspectives of perception, personality and structural/situational constraints. Secondly, 
these concepts are synthesised against a wider spectrum of Chinese foreign policy 
behaviours to uncover the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy motivation.
The case study in this thesis constitutes what Theodore Lowi calls “one of the more 
important methods of political science analysis” . 15 Part III uses an inductive 
methodology and relies heavily on field work findings to extract a policy rationale. 
Chapter Eight is largely narrative, but this artificial abdication from the theoretical 
domain is useful at this stage to allow the evidence and subsequent diagnoses to speak 
for themselves. The subsequent return in Chapter Nine to the theoretical framework of 
the thesis ensures the structural and theoretical consistency from which a final balanced
15 Theodore Lowi, ‘American Business, Public Policy, Case-studies, and Political Theory’ World Politics (Vol. 16, 
No. 4, July 1964, pp. 686-688)
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conclusion on the viability of motivation approach as a theory in understanding Chinese 
foreign policy behaviours can be elicited.
The Hong Kong case study is largely based on interview notes and other 
information/data collected during field work in London, Washington, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and mainland China in 1996 and 1997. The interviewees include some senior 
Chinese and Hong Kong government officials, politicians, leading China scholars and 
28 participants of China’s fifth column in Hong Kong.
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PARTI
THEORETICAL CONTEXT —
MOTIVATION IN FOREIGN POLICY AND CHINA STUDIES
This Part investigates general propositions about the role of motivation in foreign policy 
decisionmaking and how it can be studied.
The three chapters in Part I are intended to establish the research direction, 
methodologies and theoretical framework of the thesis. Chapter One overviews three 
influential classical schools of thought (realism, liberalism and Marxism), in particular 
their understanding and approaches to foreign policy motivation. Chapter Two 
examines other scholarship on foreign policy motivation to identify elements that are 
pertinent to the study of Chinese foreign policy motivation process during the periods 
this thesis concerns. Chapter Three places the general motivation theories in context 
with current emerging trend of motivation approach in the study of Chinese foreign 
policy.
Part I therefore serves as the theoretical backbone which will sustain the deliberation of 
dynamics vs tradition in Chinese foreign policy motivation in Part II and Part III.
Chapter One
Classical Approaches
This chapter first examines and defines the concepts of foreign policy and motivation in 
the context of this thesis. It then reviews the three classical and most influential political 
theories—realism, liberalism and Marxism—to ascertain their positions on the subject 
of motivation. As it will be noted later in the chapter, none of them directly confronted 
the issues of foreign policy motivation, but nor did they overlook the importance of 
motivation in the foreign policy process. Instead, all of them made sweeping and 
implicit assumptions, taking motivation as a given and as a basic analytical unit in their 
observation of the international affairs.
Foreign Policy Defined
A policy may be taken to mean a formulated program designed to achieve a specific 
objective by the use of authority. Therefore, policy may take the form of a statement of 
priorities, a call for support, an explanation or a claim to consistency. 1 23 Foreign policy 
means the deliberate framing of a program to achieve the best possible position for a 
state in the world beyond the territorial jurisdiction of its government. Or as Hugh 
Gibson defines it:
... a well rounded, comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and experience, for 
conducting the business of government with the rest of the world. It is aimed at 
promoting and protecting the interests of the nation.... Anything less than this 
falls short of being a national foreign policy.
1 Roy Jones, Principles o f Foreign Policy {Oxford: Martin Robertson & Company Ltd. 1979, pp. 77-78)
2 Kurt London, How Foreign Policy Is Made, 2nd ed. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1950, p. 12)
3 Hugh Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy (reprinted by Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1944, p. 9)
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A number of questions arise from these two definitions. The most obvious one is that 
the world beyond domestic jurisdiction is made up mostly of other domestic 
jurisdictions.4 A policy towards this outer world is therefore in large part about what 
goes on, or may go on, within these other domestic jurisdictions. Reciprocally, it 
follows that other governments must have policies relating to what goes on, or may go 
on, within one’s own domestic jurisdiction. Foreign policy as a whole is then 
substantially about what goes on within the domestic jurisdictions of other 
governments. It must therefore be the case that foreign policy is not only about conduct 
directed towards external jurisdictions but is also about conduct within those other 
internal jurisdictions, which is part of the material of other foreign policies and which 
not only affects them but is also affected by them.5
From this, it can be stated that much domestic policy, both within one sovereign state 
and within other sovereign states, is thus logically a concern of ‘ foreign policy’. In this 
sense, this definition of foreign policy contradicts itself because it contains terms whose 
effect is to destroy the distinction it intends to make plain.6 Given this, the wall dividing 
domestic and foreign policy collapses. Foreign policy cannot be a program aimed at the 
achievement of an external objective only. It should contain many programs of varying 
degrees of clarity and obscurity, open and covert, many of whose objectives are both 
internal and external at the same time.7 It likewise follows that there can be no single 
motive for framing foreign policy as such, since foreign policy cannot be reduced to a 
specific domestic or external activity, although the specific policy may warrant certain
4 Roy Jones, Principles o f Foreign Policy (Oxford: Martin Robertson & Company Ltd. 1979, pp. 55-67)
5 ibid.
6 Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. pp. 100-116)
7 ibid.
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emphasis and priority in the minds of decision makers.8
Motivation Defined
Any act includes perception, decision and performance, which are often elusive and 
difficult to document. The concept of motive can tie them all together, and this is true 
both for the individual and the state.9 Although a government’s foreign policy can be 
presented in many and diverse ways, it is nonetheless possible that there exists a motive 
pattern—a sequence of behaviour characterised by consistency of goal orientation and 
policy direction10 in a government’s foreign policy deliberation.
From this, foreign policy motivation can be defined as:
a) the central foundation (perception, values, belief system, leadership personality and 
external constraints) and impulse of a given foreign policy, which encapsulates diverse 
group activities presented as a single foreign policy articulation; and
b) a mental inclination and readiness of the political leadership, in which efforts and
resources are organised to take actions towards objectives, * 11 with cognisance of
12processes essential to their achievement.
Definition a) suggests the inherent complexity of foreign policy motivation because of
8 ibid.
9 Theodore Newcomb, Social Psychology (New York: Rinehart & Winston, 1950, p. 96)
10 ibid. pp. 56-58
11 ibid. pp. 74-75
12 R. D. Seward, ‘Dialectic in the Psychology of Motivation’ Psychological Review (Vol. 59, 1952, p. 406)
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its reference to mental tendencies and willingness.13 Definition b) emphasises its choice 
to preparative and promotional acts which help mobilise energy to achieving goals. 14
In commenting on these two definitions about motivation, Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck 
and Burton Sapin note that the ‘motivated state’ of the actors is in response to needs and 
tensions arising in the operating settings which impel the actors to seek actions for 
policy satisfaction. 15 Necessarily, these needs will not be simple and separate, but 
complex and grouped in a system. Tensions are relative and a minimum level is always 
present. 16 They believe that these definitions also imply that one course of action may 
be the result of several motives, and one motive may lead to several courses of action, 
too. 17 Causation is larger than motivation. They stress that foreign policy motivation 
and behaviour of a given country can be fluid, variegated, interactive and sometimes 
contradictory. The psychological, cultural and systemic state of leadership’s preference 
to act and their political willingness to adopt necessary decisions in motivation process 
remain a focus of major interest to this thesis.
Realist Approaches
Although there were many schools of realism, all realists shared the same core value of 
‘state’ and ‘power’ in the international relations. And despite rhetorical opposition to 
motivation analysis, realist schools did not omit foreign policy motivation. Instead they
13 ibid. pp. 406-407
14 ibid. These mediating processes o f motivation, in effect, account for the interaction of the actors and the stimuli 
which form part of a particular situation. The response of actors would be expressed in the tendency to acquire certain 
objectives and to seek their achievement.
15 Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: The Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1962, p. 141)
16 ibid.
17 ibid. pp. 141-143
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made simplified and crude assumptions about it—the realist concept of power provided 
them with an all-inclusive motivation for every government’s foreign policy.
There were at least three basic assumptions by realist schools. First, states were seen as 
primary actors in world politics because they made the crucial decisions with the aim of 
furthering their own state interests.18 Realism typically insisted on a continuity of 
international behaviour with the state at the forefront of interaction, at least since the 
beginning of the modem state system in 1648.19 Second, the state system was 
anarchic—meaning that no global government was superior to the states and states did 
not subordinate their self-interests to the good of humanity or any supranational 
culture.20 Third, states were rational actors chiefly engaged in enhancing power and 
pursuing security interests.
These three basic assumptions were the start and end points of understanding foreign 
policy motivation in realist schools of international relations. Closely related to state 
supremacy was the realist concept of power, which was defined by Singer, for example, 
as the ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise have done and to 
prevent them from doing the same to you.21 Or, alternatively, it was defined as national 
interest. The basic rationale of this realpolitik dictated, then, that power would be most 
avidly pursued when it was vital to influence others or to minimise their influence on
18 Frank Wayman and Paul Diehl, ‘Realism Reconsidered: The Realpolitik Framework’, Frank Wayman and Paul 
Diehl eds. Reconstructing Realpolitik (The University of Michigan Press, 1994, pp. 3-28)
19 ibid.
20 Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson and Alexander George eds. Changes in the International System (Colo.: Westview 
Press, 1980, pp. 2-3)
21 David Singer, ‘Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model’ American Political Science Review (Vol. 57, 1963, pp. 
420-430)
22 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 58-87)
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you23—and it was often narrowed down to imply naked military coercion to the highest 
form of power.
Although the concept of state and security motives were no doubt important in any 
country’s foreign policy, they were far from being inclusive in describing the range of 
state behaviour. Realism’s emphasis on power enhancement as the end product and the 
sole goal of state efforts denied the possibility of states’ diverse motivation in the 
international systems. World politics in the 1990s has clearly showed that it was 
misleading to say that states merely responded to those situations that could enhance 
their power,24 because, as Most and Starr pointed out, that gave far too much weight to
25the ‘opportunity’ to do so and relatively little to the ‘willingness’ dimension.
The realists, explicitly or implicitly, used the individual as analogue. Collective man 
appeared to be interested in exercising optimal influence in interstate relations just as 
individual man did in interpersonal relations. For example, George F. Abbott contended, 
in commenting on Thucydides’ approach to the Peloponnesian Wars, that under all 
surface diversities, mankind possessed the same attributes, mental and moral, either 
2,500 years ago or today in the twentieth century. The external conditions varied only 
within limits.26 Hence it followed that, by studying the present, the past could be 
understood and the future anticipated, since the factors shaping history—circumstances 
and human nature—did not change in essence. The future would, in effect, repeat the
23 Conventional wisdom equated power with the ability to influence others. But at least two other concepts—force 
and authority—were frequently used more or less interchangeably with that of power. Robert Dahl designated such 
concepts as influence, deterrence, persuasion, coercion and compulsion to add to the list. See Robert Dahl ‘Power’ in 
International Encyclopedia o f the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968,
pp. 405-418)
“4 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962, pp. 32-34)
25 Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1989, pp. 110-152)
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present.27
This single-minded power driven motivation was given its most extreme expression by 
William Riker. He noted that: “What the rational political man wants, I believe, is to 
win, and this is a much more specific and specifiable motive than the desire for 
power.” 28 This belief in motivational monocausality and universality constituted the 
theoretical parameters of realist schools in their understanding of world politics. Foreign 
policy motivation was therefore assumed and given simple treatment as being power- 
driven and about power-fulfilment.
Given this motivational simplicity and immutability, realist schools clearly pointed to a 
simple power determinism in which behaviour flowed inexorably from the relative 
power potential of various actors. If the “strong do what they can and the weak do what 
they must”, weak powers would naturally seek to appear morally self-righteous as an 
obvious defensive device. Strong powers, capable of expanding their influence, were 
likely to wrap this national-interest objective in ideological garb such as fascism,
30Marxism, or even liberalism—the process of ‘nationalistic universalism’.
Realists thus focused narrowly on gross patterns of foreign policy behaviour and paid 
little attention to the individual state’s decision process31 or personal inputs to deduce 
foreign policy motivation. Realist schools often sought to produce grand theories which
26 George F. Abbott, Thucydides: A Study in Historical Reality (New York: Russell & Russell, 1970, pp. 70-75)
27 ibid. p. 75
28 William Riker, The Theory o f Political Coalitions (New York: Yale University Press, 1962, p. 22)
29 Thucydides, History o f the Peloponnesian War Thomas Wiedemann ed. (Rtistol: Bristol Classical Press, 1985, V: 
86)
30 Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946, pp. 178-182)
31 Margaret Hermann, ‘Foreword’ Eric Singer and Valerie Hunson ed. Political Psychology o f Foreign Policy 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. p. 3)
Chapter One 24
relied on the concept of national power as the underlying explanation for foreign policy 
behaviour, but which did not investigate motivation, a step that would have given much 
credibility to such theories.
However, realist notion of national power itself was not a single concept. As Hans 
Morgenthau conceded, realism included such unknowable and unmeasurable elements 
as ‘national character’, ‘national morale’, ‘the quality of diplomacy’, and ‘the quality of 
government’ .32 Ultimately, Morgenthau admitted that the calculation of national power 
was “an ideal task but incapable of achievement”. Therefore, ‘power’ could mean 
different things and matter in different ways to different countries, regimes and cultures. 
For example, in the period leading up to the World War II, politicians of Britain and the 
USSR could not anticipate Hitler’s moves that repeatedly refused to conform to the 
realist formula of balance of power.
Later, when neorealism suggested the utility of a system-level approach to 
understanding international politics, it did not change the notion in realism that the state, 
as a unitary operator whose status was defined primarily by the distribution of power or 
capabilities, remained the core explanatory variable.34 Exemplified by the writings of 
Kenneth Waltz, unit-level analysis of the factors internal to the state was omitted. In his 
book Theory o f International Politics, Waltz argued that realism was a theory of the 
market, not the firm.35 He viewed states as unitary, purposive actors whose internal 
characteristics did not vary, just as micro-economists assumed the unitary, rational, 
undifferentiated nature of firms. He went on to defend his neglect of unit-level analysis
32 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 5th ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1973, pp. 134-155)
33 ibid.
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as a conscious and necessary choice:
...The behaviour and practice of states and of statesmen are omitted from 
international-political theory not because of their unimportance but because 
their exclusion from the systems structure requires a distinct theory dealing with 
the politics and policies of states. I see something problematic about this only 
for those who think that domestic and international politics must be combined in 
one theory...The theoretical separation of domestic and international politics 
need not bother us unduly.36
However, at a practical level, the realist schools suggested how problematic the 
disjunction of their state- and power-based assumptions of the systemic theory were. 
For example, Hans Morgenthau, while rejecting the study of perception and motivation 
of statesmen as unknowable, nevertheless paid a great deal of attention in Politics 
Among Nations to drawing distinctions between the motivation and cultures of various 
states and the international implications of the rise of nationalism within them. And as 
Inis Claude observed, Morgenthau's preemptive position in realist scholarship gave him
T O
a psychological advantage and great influence in the motivation debate. Similarly, 
Kenneth Waltz, too, ultimately succumbed to explanations of international behaviour in 
terms of subunit-level phenomena.39 Ironically, then, the realists’ choice to omit unit- 
level variables was undone by the analysis of their own theoreticians.
34 Eric Singer and Valerie Hudson, Political Psychology and Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 
219-246)
35 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 71-73)
36 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics’ Robert Keohane ed. 
Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 339-340)
37 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 5th ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1973, pp. 125-129)
38 Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962, p. 37)
39 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory o f International Politics: A Response to My Critics’ Robert Keohane ed. 
Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 333-334), where the nonexercise of 
power was explained by a lack of concern by the state’s officials instead o f state itself.
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Liberal Approaches
Within domestic society, liberalism as a domestic ideology largely restricted the role of 
government to legislation, law enforcement and adjudication. In the society of states, by 
contrast, given that no supemational government existed, nor was there an economic 
order to obey the self-equilibrating laws of nature, liberalism believed that foreign 
policy, or indeed any policy, should be based on moral justification, economic utility 
and harmony of interests.40
Like realism, liberalism did not directly address foreign policy motivation issues. The 
relevance of liberalism to this subject was mainly expressed through its challenges to 
realist power polities. From a theoretical point of view, the liberal philosophy presented 
a departure from those realists who denied that morality possessed any authority in the 
realm of international affairs. As discussed earlier in this chapter, realists insisted that 
the pursuit of national interest provided the only legitimate guide to conduct in an 
autonomous political realm of foreign policy. All too often the national interest was 
identified with an uninhibited pursuit of national security and of national economic 
advantages. Contrary to this, liberals argued that, as a general principle, foreign policy 
must be founded on moral considerations, although they differed in what morality 
actually required.41 Because of its basic values, liberalism was rejected by some on the 
ground that its strong commitment to moral equality was simply irrelevant to the
40 Jeremy Bentham wrote three major essays on international affairs: ‘Objects o f International Law’, ‘War 
Considered in Respect of Its Causes and Consequences’, and ‘A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace’. These
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conduct of foreign affairs.
From a practical point of view, however, liberal governments often subscribed to the 
same policies which the realists would favour, and often these were accomplished by 
violation of liberal principles.42 It was therefore open to speculate that many liberals 
who employed moral language were in fact realists, and especially so about 
international affairs.43 Marshall Cohen observed that Hobbes and the realists were 
correct when they argued that in the international realm, moral language could only be 
used ideologically and strategically, but there was little doubt that it often was so used.44 
Many who availed themselves of moral language were certainly indifferent to moral 
considerations or actively sceptical about their pertinence to international affairs.45
Another major theoretical difference between liberalism and realism was the liberals’ 
commitment to universal application of its basic principles in national and international 
arenas, while the realists concluded that nations acted not on ethical but on political 
grounds, and that the conduct of international affairs was exempt from morality.46 In the 
naked power supremacy tradition, it was maintained by many realist theorists that 
nations existed in a state of nature, and that in a state of nature there could be neither 
justice nor injustice because there lacked a sovereign whose commands established right 
and wrong. Viewed from this theory, in international politics, the ultimate goal of a
were all written in the late 1790s and collected in Principles o f International Law, which was included in Bentham’s 
Collected Works (1843), Vol. 2, pp. 531-561
41 Colin Gray and Keith Payne, ‘Victory Is Possible’ Foreign Policy (Vol. 39, Summer 1980, p. 21)
42 Marshall Cohen, ‘Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy’ Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills eds. Liberalism 
Reconsidered (New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld Publishers, 1983, pp. 68-69)
43 pp. 70-73
44 ibid.
45 ibid.
46 Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’ Philosophy & Public Affairs (Vol. 12, Nos. 3 & 4, 
Summer and Fall 1983, pp. 218-236)
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government’s foreign policy was to enhance its power in order to survive and to create 
conditions for extending such survival. Such a theory left little room for pursuing a 
liberal foreign policy.
Basic Values
The classic version of liberalism was a continuation and elaboration of the major themes 
of the Enlightenment with such concepts as equality, rationality, liberty and property. 
The reformulation of the old idea of the moral equality of man into more abstract social, 
economic and human rights at the turning of the eighteenth century lay at the heart of 
John Locke’s political philosophy of government, Immanuel Kant’s idea of autonomy 
and John Stuart Mill’s opposition to coercion even of nonautonomous actions, as long 
as such actions were compatible with the autonomous functioning of other individuals.47 
Essential to liberalism were the moral criticism of dictatorship, arbitrary power, 
intolerance, repression, persecution, lawlessness and the suppression of individuals by 
entrenched orthodoxies.
The basic assumptions of different versions of liberalism were that a liberal state should 
a) be guided by values that reflected a plurality of conceptions of a good life; b) 
guarantee the freedom and equality of its citizens; and c) maintain a just distribution of 
the goods its citizens needed to pursue their conceptions of a good life.49 And it was 
assumed that citizens not only could but also should make decisions for themselves 
about the conceptions of a good life as they acted autonomously within the private
47 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, 
pp. 50-94)
48 Steven Lukes, Moral Conflicts and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991, pp. 53-55)
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sphere of their rights.50 The basic liberal values were then identified as pluralism, 
freedom, rights, equality, enabling individuals and states to live autonomously. The aim 
of liberalism was to create and maintain political institutions that fostered these values 
and, through them, autonomy.51
Challenges from Neoliheralism
The most powerful challenge to realism/neorealism was mounted by neoliberal 
institutionalists, who brought liberalism closer to the discourse of international politics 
and injected new life into the liberal tradition. The term ‘neoliheralism’ distinguished 
itself from earlier varieties of liberalism, such as commercial liberalism, republican 
liberalism, and sociological liberalism.^2 The immediate intellectual precursors of 
neoliheralism were theories of international regimes.
As discussed in the previous section, various schools of realists emphasised power, 
international anarchy, reliance on self-help, the utility of military force, and the 
importance of balance of power calculations. Likewise, various liberalists emphasised 
international economic interdependence, international law and institutions, international 
communication, and societal norms.
49 Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism (San Franscisco: Cobden Press, 1985, pp. 10-14)
50 ibid.
51 ibid.
52 Joseph Nye, ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism’ World Politics (Vol. 40, January 1988, pp. 235-251). Joseph Grieco, 
‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’ International 
Organisation (Vol. 42, August 1988, pp. 480-507). Robert Keohane, ‘International Liberalism Reconsidered’ John 
Dunn ed. The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 165-194). 
Commercial liberalism referred to theories linking free trade and peace; republican liberalism referred to theories 
linking democracy with peace; and sociological liberalism referred to theories linking transnational interactions with 
international integration.
53 Stephen Krasner ed. International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 3-5)
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Perhaps the closest counterpart of the modem debate between realism and neoliberalism 
was found in the works of some of the French philosophers at the end of the eighteenth 
century. These works attacked almost all the assumptions embraced by realists by 
espousing the concepts of a world civilisation and world citizenship, promoting the idea 
of the primacy of domestic affairs over foreign affairs, denouncing military alliances, 
and disputing the theory that maintaining the balance of power could ensure peace.54 
They emphasised the mutual interests of states and advocated free trade which, they 
argued, would help prevent war.55
In the early twentieth century Woodrow Wilson propagated the idea that free trade 
could promote peace if there was an international organisation to promote the same 
goal.56 The period between the two world wars in the first half of this century was 
described by William Fox as characterised by the assumption of an underlying harmony 
of international interests coupled with a belief that improved understanding and 
international institutions could rid the world of the scourge of war.57 However this 
optimism was tarnished by the invasion of Manchuria, the signing of the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop agreement, and the failure of League of Nations’ sanctions against Italy,
CO
which planted the seeds for the resurgence of modem realism.
Although two fundamental concepts used by both neoliberalists and neorealists were
54 Joseph Nye, ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism’ World Politics (Vol. 40, January 1988, pp. 241-242)
55 See Frank Russell, Theories o f International Relations (New York: Appleton Century, 1936, pp. 110-115); Filex 
Gilbert, ‘The ‘New Diplomacy’ of the Eighteenth Century’ World Politics (Vol. 4, October 1951, pp. 1-38), and To 
the Farewell Address: Ideas in Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 69- 
72); F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit o f Peace (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963, pp. 162-163)
56 Filex Gilbert said: “intellectually, a straight line leads from the enlightenment to Wilson’s concept. His ideas about 
a ‘new diplomacy’ were definitely dependent on and influenced by the ideas which the eighteenth century had 
developed on this subject.” Filex Gilbert, ‘The ‘New Diplomacy’ of the Eighteenth Century’ World Politics (Vol. 4, 
October 1951, p. 37)
57 William Fox, Tnterwar International Relations Research: The American Experience’ World Politics (Vol. 2, 1949, 
pp. 67-79)
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anarchy and power, they had different connotations to each of them. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, the debate between neorealism and liberal institutionalism began to take 
more definite shape. Three especially important works on the liberal side were 
‘Transnational Relations and World Politics’ by Keohane and Nye in the special issue 
of International Organisation in 1971; Keohane and Nye’s Power and Interdependence 
in 1977; and ‘International Regimes’ by Krasner on the special issue of International 
Organisation in 1982. The first raised the questions about the state-centric focus of 
realism and discussed such non-state actors as the Roman Catholic Church, the Ford 
Foundation, and multinational business enterprises. In the second, Keohane and Nye 
explicitly challenged realism with respect to the state-as-actor assumption, the relative 
importance of military security on foreign policy agenda, the role of military force in 
international politics, and the replacement of power resources among issue areas. In the 
third, Stephen Krasner discussed and compared both realist and liberal views on 
international cooperation and institutions.
The following six points not only summarise the terms of debate between neoliberalism 
and neorealism, but also highlight the terms of reference to foreign policy motivation 
from a liberal’s perspective.
i) The Nature and Consequences of Anarchy
Although neither side denied that the international system was anarchical in some sense, 
there was disagreement as to what this meant and why it mattered. Arthur Stein 
distinguished between the ‘independent decision making’ that characterised anarchy and
58 Colin Gray and Keith Payne, ‘Victory Is Possible’ Foreign Policy (Vol. 39, Summer 1980, pp. 22-24)
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the ‘joint decision making’ in international regimes, and then suggested that it was the 
self interests of autonomous states in a state of anarchy that led them to create 
international regimes.59 Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane emphasised the 
importance of anarchy defined as the absence of government but argued that this 
constant feature of world politics permitted a variety of patterns of interaction among 
states.60 Helen Milner identified the “discovery of orderly features of world politics 
amidst its seeming chaos” as “perhaps the central achievement of neorealists”, but she 
indicated that the idea of anarchy was overemphasised while interdependence was 
neglected.61 Duncan Snidal viewed Prisoner’s Dilemma situations as examples of the 
realist conception of anarchy, while Grieco associated Prisoner’s Dilemma with 
neoliberalism.62 In general, neorealists saw anarchy as placing more severe constraints 
on state behaviour than did neoliberals.
ii) International Cooperation
Although both sides agreed that international cooperation was possible, they differed as 
to the ease and likelihood of its occurrence. According to Grieco, neorealists viewed 
international cooperation as “harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more 
dependent on state power” than did the neoliberals.
59 Arthur Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration Regimes in an Anarchic World’ International Organisation (Vol. 
36, Spring 1982, p. 324)
6(1 Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, ‘Achieving cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’ World 
Politics (Vol. 38, October 1985, pp. 226-254)
61 Helen Milner, ‘The Assumption of Anarchy in International relations Theory’ Review of International Studies, 
(Vol. 17, January 1991, pp. 70, 81-82)
62 Duncan Snidal, ‘Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation’ American Political Science Review, 
(Vol. 85, September 1991, pp. 701-726); Joseph Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique 
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’ International Organisation (Vol. 42, August 1988, pp. 485-507)
63 Joseph Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’ 
International Organisation (Vol. 42, August 1988, pp. 485-507)
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iii) Relative vs Absolute Gains
Although it would be misleading to characterise one side as concerned only with 
relative gains and the other as concerned only with absolute gains, the neoliberals 
stressed the absolute gains from international cooperation, while the neorealists 
emphasised relative gains.
Stein depicted the liberal view of self-interest as one in which actors with common 
interests tried to maximise their absolute gains.64 Lipson suggested that relative gain 
consideration was likely to be more important in security matters than in economic 
affairs.65 Grieco contended that neoliberal institutionalism was preoccupied with actual 
or potential absolute gains from international cooperation and overlooked the 
importance of relative gains. He suggested that “the fundamental goal of states in any 
relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities.“ 66 
Snidal disputed the neorealist contention that concerns about relative gains inhibited 
cooperation except in the special case of bipolar relationships between states 
preoccupied with relative gains. He also suggested that the distinction between relative 
and absolute gains was not as clear-cut as it might seem. The relative gain problem 
could be stated in terms of trade-offs between long and short-term absolute gains.67 This 
view was echoed by Keohane, acknowledging that neoliberal institutionalists 
underestimated the importance of relative gains in world politics under certain
64 Arthur Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration Regimes in an Anarchic World’ International Organisation (Vol. 
36, Spring 1982, p. 318)
65 Charles Lipson, ‘International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs’ World Politics (Vol. 37, October 
1984, pp. 15-18)
66 Joseph Crieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’ 
International Organisation (Vol. 42, August 1988, p. 498)
67 Duncan Snidal, ‘Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation’ American Political Science Review 
(Vol. 85, September 1991, pp. 701-726)
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conditions. The important thing, according to Keohane, was to specify those conditions.
He noted that this might be difficult since the behaviour of states pursuing relative gains
68might be very similar to the behaviour of states pursuing absolute gains.
iv) Priority of State Goals
Neoliberals agreed that both national security and economic welfare were important. 
Lipson argued that international cooperation was more likely in economic issue areas 
than in those concerning military security. Powell constructed a model intended to 
bridge the gap between the neoliberal emphasis on economic welfare and the neorealist 
emphasis on security. In his model, states were assumed to be trying to maximise their 
economic welfare in a world where military force was a possibility.69 For the most part, 
neorealists or neoliberals treated state goals by assumption. As Keohane pointed out,
70neither was good at predicting interests, 
v) Intentions vs Capabilities
The classical realist Hans Morgenthau depicted concern about the motives of statesmen 
as a fallacious way to understand foreign policy. Instead he advocated assuming that 
statesmen “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” ,71 which would enable 
analysts to understand the actions and thoughts of statesmen better. Although
68 Robert Keohane, ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War’ David Baldwin ed. 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 269- 
300)
69 Robert Powell, In the Pursuit o f Power and Plenty (Berkeley: University o f California, 1991)
70 Robert Keohane, ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War’ David Baldwin ed. 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 269- 
300)
71 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1967. pp. 5-6)
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contemporary neorealists were unlikely to take such an extreme position, they were 
likely to emphasise capabilities more than intentions. Grieco was of the view that 
uncertainties about the future intentions and interests of other states led statesmen to pay
7?close attention to capabilities, “the ultimate basis for their security and independence.”
In a similar vein, Krasner criticised the neoliberals for overemphasising intentions,
73interests and information, but underemphasising the distribution of capabilities. 
Keohane argued that the sensitivity of states to the relative gains of other states was 
significantly influenced by perceptions of the intentions of such states. Thus states 
worried more about relative gains of enemies than of allies.74 Stein explained 
international regimes in terms of the pattern of preferences of member states. In Stein’s 
analysis, capabilities counted only insofar as they affected the preference and intentions 
of states.75
vi) Institutions and Regimes
Both neorealists and neoliberals recognised the number of international regimes and 
institutions that had emerged after 1945. They differed, however, with respect to the 
significance given to such arrangements. “Much of the contemporary debate,” according 
to Keohane, “centers on the validity of the institutionalist claim that international
12 Joseph Crieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’ 
International Organisation (Vol. 42, August 1988, pp. 498-500)
73 Stephen Krasner, ‘Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier’ World Politics (Vol. 
43, April 1991, pp. 336-366)
74 Robert Keohane, ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War’ David Baldwin ed. 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 269- 
300)
75 Arthur Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration Regimes in an Anarchic World’ International Organisation (Vol. 
36, Spring 1982, pp. 299-324)
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regimes, and institutions more broadly, have become significant in world politics.” 76 
The neorealists agreed that this was an important point of contention. They believed that 
neoliberals exaggerated the extent to which international institutions were able to
}77“mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation.”
These six points show that it was obvious that liberalism/neoliberalism and 
realism/neorealism were not at opposite ends of a spectrum. In practice, these two main 
theoretical schools were not sharply demarcated. Rather, they interacted and 
overlapped. Sometimes it was difficult to determine where realism ended and where 
liberalism began.
Marxist Approaches
Classical Marxist theory was considered to be inadequate or insufficient by mainstream
no
international relations theorists for the task of explaining global politics for one simple 
reason: it did not take inter-state relations as the primary focus of its theories. Instead, 
Marxist theory took class as a basic analytical unit in presenting its own methodology, 
namely that of historical materialism by using the dialectics both as a form of logic and 
as a crucial tool in the analysis of society through time.79
76 Robert Keohane, ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War’ David Baldwin ed. 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 269- 
300)
77 Joseph Crieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’ 
International Organisation (Vol. 42, August 1988, p. 485)
78 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, pp. 28-29). Martin Wight, 
‘Why is There No International Theory?’ H. Butterfield and M. Wight eds. Diplomatic Investigations (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1966. pp. 17-34)
79 Tony Thorndike ‘The Revolutionary Approach: The Marxist Perspective’ Trevor Taylor ed. Approaches and 
Theory in International Relations (New York: Longman, 1978, pp. 54-66)
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For Marx, politics was merely a function of economics. Classical Marxist tradition 
accorded such prominence to economic determination that other motivational factors 
were almost omitted.80 Marx viewed the state apparatus itself as no more than a 
reflection of the balance of economic classes in society. Marx saw the political system 
and the state as part of the ‘superstructure’ built upon the economic ‘base’. In almost 
all of his major works, Marx articulated the recurrent thesis that the state was only an 
instrument of class rule and political conflict was a manifestation of class struggle—be 
it between classes or within the class. For Marx, the economic conditions determined 
the balance of political forces in the struggle for state power as well as the institutional
83structure of the state over which political struggle was waged.
In this sense, Marxism was fundamentally revolutionary, not so much because of the 
concerns to which it drew attention, but because it did not accept the traditional state­
centric model of world politics.84
However, although Marxist theory did not adopt state as the focal point of its theory, it 
developed a notion of man and international relations, which insisted on placing man,
o  c
history, state and relations of production within a ‘world historical’ context. Therefore, 
an ‘intra-national’, if not an ‘inter-state’, perspective was arguably central to the theory
80 Susan Strange, ‘International Political Economy: The Story So Far and the Way Ahead’ W. Ladd Hollist and F. 
LaMond Tullis eds. An International Political Economy, Yearbook, Vol. 1 (Boulder, Westview Press, 1985, pp. 13- 
25)
81 ibid.
82 Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories o f Imperialism: A Critical Survey 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1990, pp. 53-62)
83 ibid
84 B. K. Gills, ‘Historical Materialism and International Relations Theory’ Millennium (Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1987,
pp. 265-272)
85 See Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruikshank, Marxism and International Relations (Oxford and New York: 
Clarendon, 1985, pp. 55-71); also ‘The New Cold War in Critical International Relations Studies’ Review o f 
International Studies (Vol. 12, No. 3, July 1986, pp. 163-185)
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of Marx and Engels. In defending the relevance of Marxism to international relations, 
Howard Williams contended that Marx’s political theory was inherently an international 
theory,86 because what Marx and Engels offered was a theory of international relations, 
with its philosophical, methodological and conceptual foundation based in historical 
materialism.87 Martin Shaw bolstered this view by stating that both Marx, and 
particularly Engels, concerned themselves with the central problems for international 
relations—peace and war.
The third of the trinity of classical Marxism was Leninism. Lenin’s work on 
imperialism89 seemed to bring Marxism closer to the discipline of traditional 
international relations. Lenin used concepts formulated and articulated by Marx and 
Engels to discuss the integration of industrial and financial capital and to explain the 
consequent division of the world by the great powers.90 For Lenin, imperialism was the 
monopoly and last stage of capitalism. His work on imperialism formed the intellectual 
baseline for later theorists to explore the interrelationship of capital and class on an 
international scale.91 Lenin showed a much clearer perception of the nation state and its 
behaviour. He didn’t further elaborate on it because he saw it as a temporary
09phenomenon, likely to be gone by 1930.
86 Howard Williams, International Relations in Political Theory (Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open University 
Press, 1992, pp. 81-85)
87 ibid.
88 Martin Shaw ed. War, State and Society (London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984, pp. 63-75)
89 Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage o f Capitalism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982)
90 See Anthony Brewer, Theories o f Imperialism: A Critical Survey 2nd. ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1990, pp. 51-52); D.K. Fieldhouse, The Theory o f Capitalist Imperialism (London: Longmans, 1967, pp. 104-107); 
James Petras, Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1978, pp. 191-201); Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer o f Capitalism (London: Verso and NLB, 1980, pp. 21- 
32)
91 James Petras, Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1978, pp. 191-201)
92 ibid.
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However, it was the essential denial of the primacy of the state as the basic unit of 
analysis that put the Marxist perspective into a category of international relations theory 
on its own. The Marxist contribution to the understanding of foreign policy motivation 
theory could be appreciated in its broadest context. This included the dialectical 
historical materialism paradigm and class as the basic unit of analysis.
Historical Materialism Paradigm
Fundamental to Marxism were its materialist philosophy and its emphasis on 
materialism, rather than nationalism or idealism, as the basis of society. Marx opposed 
Hegel’s idealist philosophy which stressed the motive force of ideas in society, seeing 
history as a series of existence determined by different modes of comprehending the 
world; or that social reality was ancillary to the mind.94 Marx, on the other hand, 
strenuously argued that it was the other way around, with the existence of matter being 
independent of human consciousness. In other words, one’s consciousness was 
substantially determined by the objective conditions of social and material existence. In 
Marx’s own words:
The mode of production of material life conditions the general character of the 
social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of 
man that determines their existence but, on the contrary, their social existence 
that determines their consciousness.95
9i The word “paradigm” has developed a range of meanings as Lakatos and Musgrave in their Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971) pointed out. For the purpose of this analysis, 
Rosenau’s interpretation was used: “A general orientation towards all events, a point o f view or a philosophy about 
the way the world is.” See James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Nichols Publishing Co. 
1980, p. 107)
94 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy ed. by Maurice Dobb and translated by S. W. 
Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970, pp. 45-57)
95 ibid. p. 84
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In international relations, the Marxist tradition was primarily treated as an ideology in 
the formation of the foreign policies of some countries. In the true spirit of Marxism, to 
reduce its theories to a system of ideas in order to rationalise and justify a foreign policy 
process or the emergence of revolutionary movements was fundamentally against 
Marx’s basic principles. Paradoxically, for a long time, the heritage of Marxism was 
treated as a dogma by its believers in countries with a socialist system, notably the 
former USSR and China. The international relations literature in China, for example, 
thus concerned itself largely with explaining the relationship between Marxist-Leninist 
thought and foreign policy. This literature utilised Marxist approaches to develop 
ideological perspectives which shaped both domestic and foreign policy.96
Class as a Basic Analytic Unit
As mentioned earlier, one of the fundamental differences between Marxism and realism 
was classical Marxist theory’s emphasis on the basic unit of analysis being class, not 
nation.
But giving class such a distinctive status in Marxist theoretical deliberation was itself an 
historical phenomenon. When Marx recognised the immense growth of productive 
forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution, which was accompanied by rapid 
polarisation of society, he was more concerned with conflicting class interests than with 
the nation itself. The dominant class, the bourgeoisie, made strong by industrialisation,
96 Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruikshank, Marxism-Leninism and Theory o f International Relations (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 59-71). Other examples include Margot Light’s work The Soviet Theory o f 
International Relations, 1917-1982 (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1988) on Soviet Union, Edward Carr’s work The 
Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1966) on early Bolshevik and Michael Yahuda’s work 
China's Role in World Affairs (London: Croom Helm, 1978) on China—all of them studied the foreign policies of 
these most influential socialist states.
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was responsible not only for intensifying exploitation because of the increased 
opportunities, but also for constantly expanding the overseas markets for its products. 
Above all, this class, while stoutly retaining its national identity, had “through its 
exploitation of the world market, given a cosmopolitan character to production and 
consumption in every country.” 97 On the other hand, a new class of proletarians was 
bom out of this process, whereby,
Big business created everywhere the same relations between the classes of 
society, and has destroyed the peculiar individuality of the various 
nationalities...while the bourgeoisie of each nation still retained separate 
national interest, big industry created a class, which in all nations has the same 
industry and within which nationality is already dead.98
Two features could be drawn from this: a) the transnational characteristic of class, 
especially that of the proletariat, which led Marx provocatively to state that, as the 
human victims of capitalism, it knew no particular country; and b) the interdependence 
of nations. The implication of these two features was in complete contradiction to the 
realist framework of nation-states. By adding to class the observation of the 
transnational and international characteristics of capital and its immutable link with the 
capitalist state and the development of imperialism, the essential framework of the 
traditional Marxist paradigm of international relations was made. This was a framework 
of a dialectic relationship among production, class, capital and the state which was an 
effect of class, and not its cause.99
97 Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, Manifesto o f the Communist Party (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1972, p. 
83)
98 Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, The German Ideology ed. and with introduction by C. J. Arthur (New York: 
International, 1970, p. 78)
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Marxism-Leninism and Foreign Policy Motivation
Classical Marxist tradition never directly addressed the theory of international relations, 
nor did it specifically mention foreign policy motivation. As discussed above, although 
Marx formulated the theories of a world capitalist system and of a world market, and 
later Lenin developed Marx’s thought into theories of imperialism and of world 
revolution, neither of them articulated a well-argued theory of international relations. 
This was probably due to the fact that only at the turn of this century did international 
relations become a separate teaching and research discipline.
Classical Marxism was a structured attempt to understand the dynamics of the social 
system that encompassed the world. As Martin Wight observed, in terms of the debates 
between three groups of thinkers: the Machiavellians, the Grotians and the Kantians, the 
traditional Marxist perspective represented a fundamentally different choice. 100 In this 
context, Marxist tradition occupied a unique place to the extent that the theoretical 
concepts developed by Machiavelli and Kant and used so extensively by subsequent 
realist and liberal scholars needed to be amended to account for it.
In the Marxist tradition, it was only at a superficial and transient level that international 
politics was about relations among states; at a deeper level it was about relations among 
the human beings of which states were composed. “The ultimate reality was the 
community of mankind, which existed potentially; even if it did not exist actually, and
99 Margot Light, The Soviet Theory o f International Relations, 1917-1982 (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatwheaf, 1988, pp. 
165-181)
100 Martin Wight, Power Politics ed. by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester : Leicester University Press, 
1978, pp. 151-153)
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was destined to sweep the system of states into limbo.” 101
The above discussion clearly suggested that the Marxist tradition rejected psychological
1 Q2
moods, ideas or moral principles as the determining factors in international relations.
It could therefore be inferred that classical Marxism would also reject taking these 
elements as parameters in determining foreign policy motivation of a government.
Conclusion
This chapter first set out the terms of reference for both ‘foreign policy’ and 
‘motivation’ in this thesis. By definition, foreign policy motivation in this study referred 
to persistent mental inclination and political will of government leaders to take actions 
towards achieving their foreign policy objectives.
This chapter then examined the three main schools of political thought—realism, 
liberalism and Marxism. Particular attention was given to their possible reference to 
foreign policy motivation. It concluded that although all of these schools gave some 
consideration to the motivation of international actors, be it individuals, nations or 
classes, the fundamental theoretical assumptions of their approaches precluded a need to 
further investigate motivation issues. The realist supremacy of state and power, the 
liberal moral standards and notion of freedom, and the Marxist emphasis on class and 
historical materialism were boundaries where classical approaches to the question of 
motivation of states ended. The theoretical paradigms of these three schools of thought
101 Vladimir Ilich Lenin, ‘The Right of Nations to Self-Determination’ Selected Works ofV. I. Lenin, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 
Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 567)
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fundamentally rejected the value of foreign policy motivation study, and their 
methodologies did not easily accommodate alternative ways of elaborating the subject.
102 Chris Brown, ‘Marxism and International Ethics’ Terry Nardin and David Mapel eds. Traditions o f International 
Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 225-249)
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Three Alternative Approaches Addressing Motivation
The previous chapter outlined the theories of three major schools of political thought 
(realism, liberalism and Marxism) and their influence on international studies. Special 
attention was given to their treatment of foreign policy motivation. The chapter revealed 
the inherent limits and problems of the realist, liberalist and Marxist approaches in 
developing their theoretical premises and prototypes.
The task of this chapter is to widen the investigation of motivation beyond the 
approaches taken in the classical schools of international relations. This chapter will 
address more comprehensive approaches to the study of foreign policy motivation, and 
will identify motivation elements potentially important to the study of Chinese foreign 
policy in particular. Since the list of all the motives of all participants under all 
circumstances in foreign policy decisionmaking process is almost inexhaustible—a task 
far beyond the scope of this study—this chapter focuses only on those essential building 
blocks which are considered to have the most direct impact on foreign policy 
motivation. This will be achieved by examining the works of a group of scholars using 
different methodological imperatives in their research agenda.
Contrary to the classical approaches, which tended to treat foreign policy motivation as 
monolithic and a simple analytical unit, the approaches revealed in this chapter explored 
the basic components of foreign policy motivation by breaking down this abstract 
concept into manageable and tangible parts for further investigation. In other words, the 
approaches move beyond simple monocausative and rational traditions to examine
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foreign policy motivation by emphasising its complexity and diversity.
Foreign policy motivation is, above all, a process, and many factors contribute to its 
formation and presentation. However, only those basic elements which are identified to 
represent the major research contributions to the study of foreign policy motivation are 
to be contested in this chapter. Or more specifically, three basic determinants of 
motivation (perception, personality and structural/situational constraints), which are 
considered to be most relevant to the inquiries of this thesis, are selected for analysis in 
this chapter. The theoretical sustainability and viability of these three propositions in the 
study of Chinese foreign policy motivation will be tested in the subsequent analysis of 
this thesis.
Perception
Perception is not a new concept to the long quest of human beings to understand 
themselves. Many profound thinkers in history attempted to develop a comprehensive 
idea of perception. Aristotle, for example, was among the first to explore the nature of 
perception. He formulated the idea of laws of association in an attempt to explain how 
some ideas were linked together in memory while others were discarded. 1 Today the 
important role of perception has been widely studied in many disciplines. As Lloyd 
Kaufman predicted, “the future will have a science of perception as one of its 
cornerstones.” 2
1 Otto Klineberg, The Human Dimension in International Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, 
pp. 35-37)
" Lloyd Kaufman, Perception: The World Transformed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 6)
Chapter Two 47
To many, the meaning and understanding of perception appeared simple and obvious, 
but to grasp its essence often required critical discipline. Although many scholars have 
conceded that perception had an important role in international relations study, only few 
actually applied it to foreign policy motivation analysis.
In the opening sentence of his book Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, Robert Jervis asked a simple yet important question: Did the decision makers’ 
perceptions matter? 3 4 He argued that it was often impossible to explain crucial policies 
and behaviours without reference to the decision makers’ beliefs about the world and 
their images of others.5 He believed that this level of analysis was necessary because 
decision makers in the same situations behaved differently, due to their different 
perceptions of the world in general and of other actors in particular. How was 
perception linked with motivation? Jervis contended that the cognitive process of 
perception was part of the proximate cause of the relevant motivation, which other 
levels of analysis could not replace.6
To fully appreciate Jervis’ comment, it would be necessary to first address a preliminary 
question in the context of foreign policy motivation—what is perception?
3 R. H. Knapp, ‘Achievement and Aesthetic Preference’ L. W. Atkinson ed. Motives in Fantasy, Action and Society 
(New Jersey: Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Co. 1958, pp. 377-372)
4 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1976, p. 13)
5 ibid. p. 28
6 ibid. pp. 25-31
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What Is Perception?
Perception study in international relations has essentially been concerned with the 
psychodynamics of individuals, groups or nations in the day-to-day exercise of their 
autonomy which must take into consideration the total environment.7 Perceptions were 
formed by subjective and objective variables, both conscious and unconscious. Some 
scholars, such as David Winter, conceded that subjective inputs to the formation of 
perception were very complex and were jointly determined by processes that could not 
always be lucidly and precisely explained.8 The key to understanding perception was 
that people projected their own interpretation, meaning and structure onto an 
experience, which was itself the outcome of the previous round of similar processes. 
Perception, therefore, was as much influenced by a subjective as by an objective 
mechanism.9 In other words, people designated meanings to their experience, and not 
the other way round. Perceptions were also strongly influenced by expectations.10 When 
the environment did not conform to expectations, new information that disagreed with 
beliefs was frequently ignored or dismissed, resulting in further misperceptions. * 11 
Another important characteristic of perception was that once formed, it acquired a 
strong inertia which was not easily compromised.
From this observation, it could be understood that although people were always 
confronted with a great amount of information and the task to observe and classify that 
information, only a select few would become the ‘facts’ through perception filters. Facts
7 David Winter, The Power Motive (New York: The Free Press, 1973, pp. 96-101)
8 ibid.
9 ibid. pp. 156-161
10 ibid
11 E. Ted Gladue, Jr., China's Perception o f Global Politics (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America, Inc. 
1982, pp. 1-22)
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did not emerge naturally from reality, but were screened pieces of information gleaned 
from reality because they were considered important. 12 People’s understanding of 
reality did not flow directly from the nature of reality itself. Knowledge, therefore, 
possessed both subjective and objective components. Facts were subjectively defined on 
the basis of previously held perceptions which had themselves been formed at a much 
more fundamental level. 13 Therefore, a fact could be said to be a selected ordering of 
reality used to support a particular theory.
In this sense, perceptions could be construed as the first and basic line of reaction when 
one undertook to judge and interact with others and the outside world. Also in this 
sense, perceptions could be understood not to become policies in themselves. Rather 
they provided the cognitive link in the motivation chain upon which decisions and 
policies were conceived, and at times they reacted directly with these decisions and 
policies.
The Role o f  Perception in Foreign Policy
As foreshadowed in the Introduction, while the importance of perception in foreign 
policy decisionmaking was widely acknowledged, study of the role of perception was 
often avoided by scholars because of its elusive nature. Robert Jervis was one among 
the few who announced that he had attempted to explore the decisionmaking process in 
international politics by utilising all the psychological tools available. 14 He analysed the 
foreign policy operational environment not only through his extensive research into
12 F. Matthew Bonham and Michael Shapiro eds. Thought and Action in Foreign Policy (Basel: Birkhauser Verlag, 
1976, pp. 51-53)
13 ibid. p. 52
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diplomatic history, but also, importantly, by assessing the psychological environment of 
the actors. As a result, he offered the study of politics valuable insights drawn from 
psychological investigations on attitudinal change, social psychology, cognitive 
psychology, and visual perception. Through experimental psychological studies at the 
international politics level, Jervis made an important contribution to the foreign policy 
motivation studies. He believed that perceptual formulation took place within the 
process of interactive relationships involving belief systems and the environment as a 
whole. Nothing should be excluded in such an environment—everything must be 
considered as a potential input into perceptual formulations.15
While Jervis’ vision of perception study sounded daunting, Richard Cottam undertook a 
more moderate study of foreign policy motivation. In his book Foreign Policy 
Motivation—A General Theory and A Case Study, the only book exclusively devoted to 
the study of foreign policy motivation in the existing literature, he defined foreign 
policy motivation as “a compound of factors that predispose a government and people 
to move in a decisional direction in foreign affairs.”16 He stressed that the critical word 
in this definition was ‘predispose’. Cottam’s major contribution to foreign policy 
motivation study was that he systematically criticised the interpretation of single- 
minded foreign policy motivation by bringing into his own motivation analysis political, 
historical, cultural, group and individual dimensions. However, despite his repeated 
denunciation of the realist version of foreign policy motivation as being simplistic and 
self-serving, Cottam refused to incorporate analysis of perception of individuals into his
14 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1976, pp. 5-7). Also The Logic o f Images in International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970)
15 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1976, pp. 13-31)
16 Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (London: Feffer and Simons Inc. 1977, p. 31)
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foreign policy motivation inquiry. 17 He warned the peril of giving motivation a 
psychological definition and the danger of seeking to include the motivation of 
individuals into the foreign policy decisionmaking scheme. In his view, the risk of 
doing so was that it would put endless probabilities into the often limited analytic 
process, thereby making it almost impossible to reach a convincing scientific 
conclusion. 19
Despite the obvious differences with Jervis’ view on the degree of individual 
participation, Cottam also laid great emphasis on perception as the central element in 
forming foreign policy motivation. He believed that the most important requirement for 
foreign policy formulation was an accurate understanding of the motivation of other 
governments and peoples, which was rarely articulated by them, if at all. But because of 
the essential importance of such knowledge in foreign policymaking, the decision 
makers of a given government had to rely on available information to postulate its 
counterpart’s motivation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the interpretation of fact 
itself was very much subject to the previously held perceptions of the interpreters. If 
that was the case, then it must rely even more on perceptions for a government to 
speculate other governments’ foreign policy motivation. This being the case, Cottam 
suggested that foreign policy motivation of a government could only be inferred by
17 Cottam said that “individual differences can generally be disregarded at the level o f foreign policy analysis 
because they can be included in the larger assumption in nonindividual terms. For example, if  a motivating force 
behind tribal imperialism is the desire for loot, analysts need not look into the range o f individual intensities of 
interest in loot within the tribe.” ibid. pp. 31-32
18 Cottam was quoted as saying that to address motivation in a psychological dimension was ‘self-defeating’ and 
“underscores the pessimism of those who see no promise in this approach.” See William Gamson and Andre 
Modigliani, Untangling the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, pp. 22-24)
19 However, Cottam did concede that some very important individual's role, like that o f Adolf Hitler's and Winston 
Churchill’s, in directing foreign policy, “must be looked at separately and individually”, but he did not believe that 
“individual motives and motives ascribed to a collective are sufficiently parallel to be used even homomorphically.” 
Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (London: Feffer and Simons Inc. 1977, pp. 29-33)
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what he called a ‘world view, ’20 or a series of perceptions.
Cottam’s study found that a given country’s prevailing world view in each decisional 
area might differ, but it was remarkably consistent and congruent with the choice among 
policy alternatives that a decisional group made. Presidential-level and bureaucratic- 
level policies would differ because implicitly, and only rarely explicitly, they were 
based on differing estimates of the situation, including especially the intent of 
governmental friends and adversaries.22
Cottam also strongly believed that from the policy adopted by a given state, one could 
infer a prevailing perception approximating that held by a hypothetical decision maker. 
Different perceptions might be held by different leaders or groups of leaders within a 
country often with the most dominant position being that which was most congenial 
with the particular foreign policy patterns pursued by the state. Thus, those individuals 
or groups having the closest representation to the prevailing perception were taken to be 
instrumental in policy formulation. The motivation behind a particular policy line could 
then be inferred from an analysis of the objectives of those actors closest to the decision 
process.24
To further pursue the relationship between perception and motivation, Cottam’s study 
hypothesised that the perception of threat and of opportunity would affect the images of 
a decision maker and that the types of decision patterns were the products of these
20 Cottam’s definition of world view was that construction of reality within which an individual perceived and chose 
among policy alternatives, ibid. p. 10
21 ibid. pp. 4-11
22 ibid. pp. 14-25
23 ibid.
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images. He noted that if one country perceived that it was threatened by another 
country, and if that other country was regarded as approximately equal culturally and in 
capability, then a stereotyped enemy image would soon surface. This example 
showed, he said, that an image in this context possessed three dimensions of perception: 
threat and opportunity, cultural similarity or difference, and similarity or difference in 
capability.26 Moreover, the greater the intensity of the perception of threat or 
opportunity, the more inclined the actor was toward stereotyped images.
This finding led Cottam to a more general inquiry into what actually were the makings 
of perception. In his study, Cottam identified the following five key considerations to be 
in the perception process. They were:
economic (population, loot, trade, investments abroad, domestic investments) 
communal (grandeur, participant excitement, frontier dynamics) 
messianic (religious messianism, cultural messianism, ideological messianism) 
governmental (bureaucratic vested interests, military vested interests, 
domestic personal power drive, external personal power drive) 
and defence27
This list, Cottam argued, was a reasonably inclusive taxonomy of factors, with each 
having clear connotation of perception, which entered into the compound that formed 
the predispositional base of foreign policy motivation.28
24 ibid. Cottam was contradictory here in his account of the relations between the unitary actor—government, and 
important individuals in the making of foreign policy motivation.
25 ibid. pp. 54-92
26 ibid.
27 ibid. pp. 31-35
28 ibid.
Chapter Two 54
Cottam claimed that his intention in formulating this list was to construct a scheme later 
in the book for making both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of these ingredients 
that went into a particular foreign policy motivational compound. However, a
”3 A
‘motivational compound’ was far more than just a simple sum of its parts. Rather, as 
Cottam pointed out, it resembled a chemical compound, a dynamic reaction process. 
Though simplified, he said, the list nevertheless summarised the most relevant factors 
and saved the motivation research from falling into a dilemma of wrestling with endless 
possibilities. More precisely, the list eliminated those ‘endless possibilities’ in order to 
more effectively concentrate on the few more pertinent conditions.
Interestingly, despite his constant warnings of the disastrous consequences of letting the 
sub-national factors into the analytical process of motivation, Cottam nonetheless 
suggested that finding out information on who were involved in the foreign policy 
decisional process, what they said and what they did, would greatly assist to clear the 
picture about a specific foreign policy motivation of a given country. It seemed that in 
order to present an adequate perception approach to foreign policy motivation study, 
Cottam had to address individual perception attributes in addition to his governmental 
level of analysis, despite his rhetorical criticism to inclusion of such a dimension.
Cottam conceded that the determinants of individuals’ perception were 
manifold—historical experience, community values, political relevance, role interests
29 ibid. p. 44
30 ibid. p. 43
31 ibid.
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and idiosyncratic socialisation patterns.32 These factors were all at work, with different 
intensities, in responding to different times and issues. When an individual was 
compelled to choose among alternatives in any given situation, only a fraction of the 
values he/she held would be affected or, in other words, would for that decision have 
any particular salience. For example, an individual might be a nationalist and place a 
primary value on his/her national community, but only the rarest of decisions that 
individual made would reflect that fact. In day-to-day life, only a fraction of the 
decisions an average citizen made had any political affiliation after all, even though 
most individuals held some politically relevant values at the primary intensity level.34
However, for leaders on decisionmaking positions, the simple notion of threat and/or 
opportunity had much to offer in political value analysis. Cottam observed that a 
particular politically relevant value and belief became salient for an individual if he/she 
perceived either a threat or an opportunity associated with it. Beliefs and experience 
influenced perception through their relation to expectations and interpretations. Beliefs 
set up expectations, and experience could either reinforce or reduce them. When an 
event occurred, individuals were likely to interpret the event in relation to their 
expectations. These expectations had three prominent effects that were noted: they 
permitted rapid identification of the expected object or event; they admitted a relatively 
wide range of objects or events as fulfilling the expectation, a characteristic that 
produced misidentification as well as identification of the target object; and they might 
lead to a failure to observe significant nonexpected objects or events. On this issue,
32 ibid. pp. 54-92
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
35 Perception of threat and perception of opportunity were foci that served the same analytic function in this question 
area as did the deprivation and gratification foci for the much broader question with which Talcott Parsons was
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Cottam shared the same view as Jervis’ and he provided a number of examples to show 
how beliefs could influence a person’s perception.
Based on the five types of underlying considerations of perception, Cottam proposed a 
‘motivation system’ as a structure to assess a given foreign policy motivation. In this 
system, a number of perceptual elements were present with different intensity. Within 
each system, the intensity of perceptual patterns decided motivation tendency and they 
differed in accordance with the order. Since the list of the motivation types could be 
extended, so the combination of them (motivation systems) could also be formulated on 
a larger scale.
For example, Cottam took the American foreign policy motivation as seen by a 
supporter in the mid 1960s. The motivation system thus formed was as followed:
A. (1st intensity)
B. (2nd intensity)
C. (3rd intensity)
Defence
Economic vested interests: domestic investments 
National grandeur, cultural messianism
In each system, the nature or orientation of the foreign policy motivation was 
determined by the factor with dominant intensity, ie. A. Cottam explained that in this 
particular system shown above, foreign policy motivation would essentially be seen as
concerned. See Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds. Toward a General Theory o f Action (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1951, pp. 3-11)
36 For example, during WWII, British flyers hunting for the German battleship Bismarck bombed a British ship, the 
Sheffield, by mistake, even though the two ships did not look alike. Similarly, when Washington officials contacted 
General Walter Short in Pearl Harbour about the need to expect “hostile action”, he interpreted the message as 
referring to sabotage rather than the way it was intended, that o f an attack from external sources. This interpretation 
apparently occurred because sabotage was an issue of concern at Pearl Harbour. Robert Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 13-28)
37 Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (London: Feffer and Simons Inc. 1977, p. 46)
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status-quo, not imperialism. That was because it firstly reflected the belief that 
American involvement in the affairs of others was primarily for the peace and security 
of, or ‘defending’, the American people. Second down the list was the economic factor, 
since a healthy domestic economy was regarded by most American people as a 
legitimate objective which necessitated a foreign policy to safeguard it. Although there 
was a concern for the prestige and dignity of the nation, most Americans saw little 
threat to American prestige and dignity—thus it was conferred a third place in this 
system.38 The motivation system allowed generous room for flexibility to accommodate 
different views and situations in different countries at different times—the elements 
could be added, reshuffled to form new system orders or be restructured to serve the 
different intensities.39
Despite the apparent fluidity and freedom in the selection and combination of 
perception, motivational types and motivational systems, and despite the different 
interpretations which could be placed on a given foreign policy, Cottam argued that his 
motivation systems had some definite advantages.40 Although the number of possible 
combinations of the motivational types was high, he believed that “only a few 
motivational elements would ever be depicted as being present in three parts, and the 
element or combination of elements granted would suggest the flavour of the resultant 
foreign policy.” 41 Most important of all, Cottam insisted that the motivational system 
approach had immediate utility for dealing with the perceptual base of conflict—it 
permitted a systematising of the motivational assumptions on which different policy
38 ibid. pp. 43-46
39 ibid.
40 ibid. pp. 43-49
41 ibid. p. 45. In a variation of intensity, Cottam used 3,2,1 instead A,B,C to indicate the strength. So here he referred 
‘three parts’ to A— the most intense one.
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preferences were based.42
Cottam’s study on foreign policy motivation confirmed Jervis’ proposition that 
perceptions must be inferred if motivation was to be understood at all.43 Based on his 
five perceptual patterns, Cottam further proposed five world views: enemy, allied, 
complex, imperial, and colonial,44 “in response to a perception of threat to or 
opportunity for something intensely valued which has relevance at the interstate level, 
most commonly the nation itself.” 45 These five world views correlated with the 
perceptual patterns and motivation systems Cottam proposed earlier. And it was these 
three sets of variables that reacted and interchanged at three layers of policy 
environment that produced a particular foreign policy motivation.46
Personality
Like perception, personality study of foreign policy has always been a controversial 
subject. But unlike perception, the personality approach seems to have encountered a 
more hostile audience in the field of international relations than the treatment of 
perception, to which both its proponents and opponents disputed in degree rather than 
substance. Is personality an accountable element of foreign policy motivation study? Or 
is it just a residual issue with little role in motivational inquiries?
There is no easy answer to these questions. The bureaucratic politics approach rejected
42 ibid. pp. 43-53
43 ibid. p. 59. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1976, pp. 15-16)
44 ibid. pp. 62-64
45 ibid p. 63
46 ibid. pp. 63-74
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the importance of personality analysis in the motivation study. The proponents of 
personality analysis explored how an individual’s particular personality traits could 
relate to that person’s foreign policy position in a particular political cultural setting, 
while the bureaucratic approach argued that such analysis might be unnecessary given 
the possible dominance of organisational position in the system. However, the 
bureaucratic approach had two distinct weak points. First, it assumed the bureaucratic 
politics to be the dominant administrative form of government for most states, which 
was far from being the case. Second, even within a bureaucrat-dominant political 
system, statistics showed that personality was often used to explain a relatively large 
percentage of the variance in foreign policy behaviour when a leader had the command 
of absolute power, or had capacity to allocate resources.47 This would apply particularly 
if the leader was the head of a government with ultimate responsibility for foreign 
policy decisions; when there was an international crisis; when the policy situation was 
ambiguous and in situations in which vested interests, organisational imperatives and 
standard operating procedures were in a state of flux. Some studies found that what 
political leaders were like could vitally influence what government did in the foreign 
policy arena.49 These scholars admitted, however, that exactly how personality impacted 
on government foreign policy decision was not straightforward, especially when 
different political cultures were taken into account.50 They also found that the weight of 
personality in foreign policy differs significantly in different sets of political cultures.
47 ibid.
48 Margaret Hermann, ‘Personality and Foreign Decision Making: A Study o f 53 Heads o f Government’ D. A. Sylvan 
and S. Chan ed. Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 53-80)
49 For example, Lawrence Falkowski ed. Psychological Models in International Politics (Colo.: Boulder, Westview 
Press, 1979, pp. 53-57); Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy (Colo.: Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1980, pp. 71-73); Margaret Hermann ed. A Psychological Examination o f Political Leaders (New 
York: Free Press, 1977, pp. 61-65)
50 ibid.
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This session intends to address the role of personality in foreign policy motivation 
through analysis of works by Margaret Hermann, Charles Hermann, Richard Snyder 
and his colleagues.
Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann
Margaret Hermann was a strong proponent of personality analysis in foreign policy 
motivation. She believed that the personality approach could shed light on foreign 
policy study because it could complement the bureaucratic approach.
To prove her point, in her work ‘Personality and Foreign Policy Decision Making’, 
Hermann first hypothesised that political leaders had an interest in foreign affairs to 
enhance the effect of their personality on government policy. This interest acted as a 
motivating force, increasing the attention a leader paid to foreign policy issues and 
increasing the leader’s participation in making foreign policy decisions. The interested 
head of government would then want to be consulted on decisions and to be kept 
informed of developments in foreign affairs.51 Hermann found that the reasons behind a 
head of government’s interest in foreign policy—political influence, economic and 
security benefits, value system, desire for a peaceful environment, fear of competitors 
and enemies, seeing foreign policy as a leverage to strengthen domestic position—might 
predetermine the course of action such a leader sought to implement. With little 
interest in foreign affairs, heads of government were more likely to delegate authority to 
their aides and other staff, thereby negating the effect of their personality on the
51 Margaret Hermann, ‘Personality and Foreign Decision Making: A Study o f 53 Heads o f Government’ D. A. Sylvan 
and S. Chan ed. Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1984, p. 56)
52 ibid. pp. 62-63
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resultant policy.53
Hermann observed that leaders’ sensitivity to the policy environment affected the 
consistency of the relationship between other personal characteristics and foreign 
policy. This sensitivity, which referred to how important incoming information was to 
the political leaders in determining what they would try to influence their governments 
to do, should therefore be treated as an effective indicator in motivation study.54 The 
less sensitive political leaders were to information, the more fixed was the impact of 
their other personal traits on foreign policy motivation. Such leaders paid less attention 
to, and were less likely to request, information from the sources that might force them to 
change their goals and attitudes or the foreign policy strategies they had always used.55 
In other words, their policy motivation would be largely determined by their habitual 
rationalisation and tended to be stereotyped.
On the other hand, the more sensitive leaders were to information, the more likely they 
were to follow what was happening and to seek out data about the changed situation.56 
Generally, they tended to be more open-minded and willing to adapt to the environment. 
Sensitive leaders were interested in accommodating themselves to the situation, 
perceiving that there was often political gain in such a compromise. Thus, the 
relationships between the more sensitive leaders’ personality traits and their foreign 
policy motivation might be less consistent than those less sensitive leaders. Hermann 
also found that as a logical extension, the less sensitive policy makers tended to adjust 
incoming information to fit a certain set of viewpoints, while the more sensitive policy
53 ibid.
54 ibid. pp. 71-72
55 ibid
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makers attempted to deal with the environment, changing their views if incoming
58information suggested such adjustment was required.
In their 1989 joint study of ‘Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An 
Empirical Inquiry’, Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann further polished their 
view on the role of personality in the foreign policy decision process. They observed 
that if the predominant leaders were the ultimate decision units59 in a political system, a 
single individual had the power to make the choice for the government.60 When such a 
leader’s position was known, those with differing points of view generally stopped 
voicing alternative positions either out of respect for the leader or out of fear of political 
reprisals.61 In this type of decision unit, to leam about the personality of the dominant 
leader became particularly important in foreign policy motivation study. The leader’s 
personal attributes might shape their initial inclinations and determine how they would 
regard different views and advice from others, and how they would react to information 
and assess the political risks associated with various actions.62
They argued that of particular relevance in explaining a predominant leader’s reaction to 
a foreign policy problem was knowledge about the leader’s orientation to foreign 
affairs—his/her composite set of views about how governments should act in the 
foreign policy arena. This orientation defined the leader’s conception of his/her nation’s 
role in the world and presupposed a specific political style in dealing with foreign policy
56 ibid. p. 73
57 ibid. pp. 73-74
58 ibid. pp. 74-77
59 It referred to leaders or ruling parties who had the ability to commit the resources o f the government and the power 
to prevent other entities within the government from reversing their position. Margaret Hermann and Charles 
Hermann, ‘Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry’ International Studies Quarterly 
(Vol. 33, No. 4, December 1989, p. 365)
60 ibid. p. 367
61 ibid.
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problems.63 Most importantly, orientations indicated how sensitive the leader would be 
to advice and information when making a foreign policy decision.64 If a leader’s 
orientation suggested that he/she had a strong view of the world and used this view as a 
lens through which to select and interpret incoming information, then the leader was 
likely to be looking only for cues that confirmed his/her beliefs when making foreign 
policy decisions. They were guided by their dispositions, taking an ‘inside looking 
outward’ perspective and selectively using incoming information to support their 
predispositions.65
However, there were predominant leaders whose orientation led them to be sensitive 
and open to others’ opinions and to incoming information. In this case knowledge of the 
environment in which the predominant leader was operating helped to predict what the 
government was likely to do. Because such leaders were more ‘pragmatic’—more 
guided by the situation and interpersonal influences—the contextual implication must 
be taken into account.66 The sensitive leader would want to ascertain where others stood 
with regard to the problem, to consider how other governments were likely to act, and to 
examine conflicting information before making decisions. They would tailor their 
behaviour to fit the demands of the situation.
They concluded that when the ultimate decision unit was a predominant leader, the key 
question to understand its foreign policy motivation was whether or not the leader’s 
orientation to foreign affairs would lead him/her to be relatively sensitive or insensitive
62 ibid. pp. 361-363
63 ibid.
64 ibid. pp. 364-369
65 ibid.
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
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to information from the political environment. If the leader was relatively insensitive, 
knowledge about the leader’s personality would provide cues about what the 
government’s foreign policy behaviour was likely to be. The insensitive predominant 
leader was more or less a self-contained decisionmaking unit. If the leader was more 
sensitive, then other aspects of the political system needed to be studied in order to 
suggest what the government was likely to do in terms of foreign policy. In the words of 
the Hermanns, the sensitive predominant leader “became an externally influenceable
/TO
decision unit.”
Margaret Hermann also found that the personality of political leaders appeared to have 
varying degrees of impact on foreign policy motivation according to political cultures. 
She suggested that Western democratic systems seemed to encourage political leaders to 
be more open and responsive to information in their foreign policy process, while such 
an incentive was dampened in the leaders of more authoritarian governments.69 The 
strongest relationship between the leaders’ personality and the governments’ foreign 
policy behaviour was found when sensitivity to information and interest in foreign 
affairs on the part of the leaders were combined.70
68 ibid.
69 Margaret Hermann, ‘Personality and Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Study of 53 Heads of Government’ 
Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan ed. Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1984, p. 76)
70 ibid. p. 77. One other work on the importance of the analysis of personality for understanding foreign policy was 
concerned with those personality traits that may affect perceptions of the policy environment. Lloyd Etheredge 
generated a typology of the characteristics that might be incorporated into such an analysis—the components 
including cognitive complexity, tolerance of ambiguity, level of distrust, self-esteem, neurosis, and proclivity toward 
dominance in interpersonal relations. See Lloyd Etheredge ‘Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898- 
1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalisation Theory’ American Political Science Review (No. 72, 1978, pp. 434- 
451). Also A World o f Men: Private Sources o f American Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978). Etheredge 
found that personality traits could be associated with distortions in the processing of information owing to individuals 
injecting their personal motives and fears into the interpretation of other actor’s intentions. In addition, personality 
could influence the range of policy options considered as viable responses to an external challenge—for example, 
dominant individuals were more likely to use force.
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Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin
The book Foreign Policy Decision Making by Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton 
Sapin represented yet another perspective of personality approach in the study of 
foreign policy motivation. They pointed out that the important thing to understand in the 
study of motivation was that it was a concept, not a thing or a datum.71 Motivation was 
not behaviour but inferences drawn from behaviours. Likewise, personality was a 
concept, and its role in motivation process could be indirectly observed by examining a 
range of variables. As human beings were bearers of motivation, their personalities 
could play a critical role in the motivation system.
The study by Snyder and his colleagues showed that motivated behaviour had an inner- 
outer connection: there was a condition internal to the behaving actor and something in 
the external situation which was wanted, and the two were linked. In other words, 
motivation was initiated within one’s mind, but was stimulated by and interacted with 
the environment. They argued, however, unlike the study of human psychology, foreign 
policy motivation was concerned mainly with motivation that was socially acquired and 
learnt. Because of this characteristic, it could be said that two main attributes of foreign 
policy motivation were durability and persistence.74 Being motivated to take a foreign 
policy decision was not a momentary state, although other contingent elements could 
accelerate or delay the process. Motivation might be reinforced through the continued 
performance of an act. Reward, familiarity, and feedback from success may all
71 Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, Burton Sapin eds. Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: The Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1962, p. 139)
72 ibid.
73 ibid.
74 ibid. p. 142
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strengthen a motivational orientation.75
Snyder, Bruck and Sapin further elaborated this point by drawing a distinction between 
because o f and in order to motivation. In order to referred to an end state of affairs 
envisaged by the actor. Such motivation thus referred to the future. On the other hand, 
because o f reflected the actor's past experience, to the sum total of factors in his/her life 
which determined the particular course of action selected to reach a goal.76 They argued 
that such simplification was helpful, given the impossibility of tracing every act back to 
an ultimate cause. As they explained:
Were we required to account for 'because of motivation we should have to 
explain a particular act in terms of a sequence of past behaviours.... Whereas in 
the case of'in order to' motivation, we are concerned with the future 
consequences of an act—its relationship to an ultimate end from which motive 
can be inferred.77
In order to explain why foreign policy motivation exhibited the characteristics of 
durability and persistence, Snyder and his colleagues introduced two subsidiary notions: 
attitude and frames of reference in their inquiry. Attitude was defined as the “readiness
no
of individual decision makers to be motivated” with close connotation to personality, 
and the frame of reference included “perception, valuation and evaluation as analytical
,,79components.
For Snyder and his colleagues, a leader’s personal perception, which was included in 
the frame of reference, was a vital aspect of motivation, too. They contended that being
75 ibid. pp. 142-144
76 ibid. pp. 133-138
77 ibid. p. 138
78 ibid. pp. 149-152
79 ibid. pp. 142-143
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motivated meant that the individual's energy and attention were selectively directed, and 
a motivated action brought a set of values to any situation.80 In this sense, a motivated 
action was not the end result of perceptions and values, rather, an agent embodying such 
perceptions and values. Therefore a motivated action had an active role to play in the 
situation. In the same way, valuation, as an accompaniment of perception, was a
O 1
behaviour directed toward the establishment of preferences. Although valuation 
basically concerned the nature and range of objectives which would be injected into the 
situation, it also concerned the preferred paths or strategies which directed specific acts 
toward the objective or objectives selected. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin concluded that 
the frame of reference became a determinant of behaviour after an attitude or an attitude 
cluster was triggered by stimuli.
However, they emphasised that this artificial separation of motivation, attitude and 
frame of reference was made only for analytical purposes. In reality, a sequence of 
behaviours defied any strict categorisation. Yet, Snyder and his colleagues regarded it as 
a necessary step to observe the actual deliberations of foreign policy makers as they 
grappled with a specific problem.84 They believed that crucial questions needed to be 
addressed in the study of the role of personality in foreign policy motivation including:
What purposes and attitudinal sets did they bring to it? What habits of selection 
and relating information and previous experience affected the sense they made 
of the situation? What values did they think were involved in the situation? How
o c
did they calculate a proper integration of objectives and techniques?
80
81
82
83
84
85
ibid.
ibid. pp. 149-156 
ibid. pp. 150-152 
ibid. pp. 149-156 
ibid.
ibid. p. 152. It is interesting to compare this set of questions with those raised by Cottam in the previous section.
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Snyder and his colleagues recognised that the paradox of personality in foreign policy 
motivation was that people were often either sceptical about linking personality with 
decision process, or were attracted to the great-man-making-history explanation. They 
also admitted that to face up to personality as an aspect of motivational analysis was 
akin to opening Pandora's Box.87 But one way to solve the dilemma of using the 
personality approach seemed, they argued, to differentiate what mattered and what did 
not matter among the government leaders and top foreign policy decisionmaking 
elites.88 Although this sounded utilitarian, they believed it nonetheless to be the most 
effective way of solving the problem.
As a practical way of furthering this argument, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin presented a 
threefold division of personality structure. They hypothesised that human personality 
consisted of three separate components: the physiological organism, the psychic
o n  • •structure, and the social being. In a study of motivation, however, only the 
sociological aspect of personality was significant, because it was this component which 
was shaped and changed by interactions with other ‘actors’ in a social setting.90 This 
social personality, which was a product of interaction between the individual and 
society during a relatively long period of time, possessed a comparatively stable nature 
and, therefore, should be a more thoughtful reference for motivation study. In Snyder
86 However, it was not a reliable analytical parameter for the study o f the role o f the individual in the foreign policy 
motivation. Analysis o f the motivation of Franklin Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler and 
Mao Zedong would not automatically provide the motivations o f foreign policy of the U.S., Russia, Britain, Germany 
and China in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Although1 the diplomacy o f the world m the-1930&-and dös wer« -full o f the 
- imprints - of  these ■ important historical- figures— R-oosevelt’-s calculation, Stalin ’s suspicion .Chusch-iW-V -first
indisputably-decisive contributions to the final otrteome  of the  World War 11. The typioality-ef-the time and events 
themselves limited-the- conditions for a generalisation to be extended freely-into overall-analytical-methodolog-y. 
Except in some extraordinary historical moments, foreign policy motivations would reflect the outcome o f individual, 
bureaucratic and institutional bargaining processes.
87 Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, Burton Sapin eds. Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: The Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1962, pp. 160-173)
88 ibid. p. 171
89 ibid. p. 160
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and his colleagues’ view, it was the social personality, shaped by its interactions with 
other actors and by their place in the system, that really mattered to their study. 
However, they qualified the role of this social personality by accepting to take into 
account the influence of other needs and tensions, but they insisted that the behaviour of 
the decisionmaking actor be explained f i r s t  in terms of personality factors relevant to 
his/her membership and participation in a decisionmaking system.91
Snyder and his colleagues also explored another three factors closely related to the 
personality analysis. They were: intellectual skills, interpretation of competence and 
personality types in decisionmaking. They argued that since the key features of 
decisionmaking were deliberation, choice, and problem-solving, the question of what 
kinds of intellectual operations were performed by decision makers in a given decisional 
system became vital.93 Decision makers analysed situations, estimated needs, defined 
problems, established ranges of alternatives, assigned relevancy and significance to 
events and interpreted information. In this exercise, the decision makers' intellectual 
inclinations would be expressed. This intellectual property would be affected, then, by 
the training and professional experience inside or outside the decisionmaking 
organisation: namely through their continued professional affiliations and working 
theories of knowledge.94
Hence, for Snyder and his colleagues motivational analysis should start at the level of
90 ibid.
91 ibid. p. 161
92 ibid. pp. 160-173
93 ibid.
94 Which referred to: “ideas, concepts, formulas, and proverbs concerning human nature and behaviour which 
circulate in any given culture and which may not be inculcated through specialised training and experience, but are 
absorbed in normal adult socialisation.” ibid. pp. 162-163
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the individual decision maker rather than at the level of the decisional system.95 They 
had strong views that the intellectual qualities—certain personality traits relevant for 
decisionmaking—were extremely important in foreign policy motivation and they 
would be affected by the group process of decisionmaking.96 That was because for 
decision makers, a group decisionmaking process represented the possibility of both 
pooling and modification of intellectual skills. If an individual decision maker was 
making a decision alone, he/she might be inclined consciously or unconsciously to push 
his/her professional perspective to the limit. On the other hand, in a group setting, the 
interplay of specialisation would result in some modifications.97 This kind of interplay 
did not necessarily reduce the importance of personality in decisionmaking. On the 
contrary, since a wider range of alternatives might be considered and a more thorough 
exploration of consequences might result, the leaders could broaden or narrow the 
actual impact of intellectual skills of other participants in the decisionmaking process.98 
Viewed from this perspective, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin concluded that “the whole 
notion of personality in foreign policy motivation study did not at least open up the 
possibility of either unexplainable or a hopelessly wide range of behaviour patterns.” 99
Snyder and his colleagues concluded that the role of personality in foreign policy 
motivation was not without problems. It was constrained by a few factors. Group 
dynamics, for example, could reduce the weight of personality in the decisionmaking 
process. Even when a single individual had the authority and ability to commit a 
government’s resources, he/she was likely to have two incentives to involve other
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
97 ibid
98 ibid
99 ibid. p. 169
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people in the decisionmaking process. Firstly, the inclusion of others could enhance a 
decision’s legitimacy. Political leaders wanted to be able to say that their decisions were 
based on the best advice available, thereby giving them an incentive to seek the counsel 
of experts. More broadly, because political leaders wanted to be able to say that they 
governed on behalf of the governed, they had an incentive to include at least a few 
representatives of the governed in the policy making process.100
Secondly, the inclusion of others could help reduce the psychological strain of 
decisionmaking with a ‘shared-burden’ expectation if things ever went wrong. Political 
leaders often faced foreign policy issues involving great complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity,101 and found it difficult to reconcile the multiple and competing values 
embedded in a particular issue. They also frequently lacked the information needed to 
achieve the best outcomes when faced with a range of alternatives. Given these 
circumstances, solace and certainty could be sought by obtaining support from other 
people.
Structural and Situational Constraints
Some scholars have fruitfully explored the question of the role of structural and 
situational factors on foreign policy decisionmaking. For example, as early as the 1960s 
Harold and Margaret Sprout observed that:
environmental factors (both nonhuman and human) can affect human activities 
in only two ways. Such factors can be perceived, reacted to, and taken into
100 Fritz Gaenslen, ‘Decision-Making Groups’ Eric Singer and Valerie Hudson eds. Political Psychology and Foreign 
Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp. 165-193)
101 Alexander George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use o f Information and Advice 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, pp. 26-28)
102 Gilbert Winham, ‘Negotiation as a Management Process’ World Politics (Vol. 301, 1977, pp. 87-114)
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account by the human individual or individuals...In this sense alone can 
environmental factors be said to ‘influence’, ‘condition’, or otherwise ‘affect’ 
human values and preferences, moods and attitudes, choices and decisions. 
Secondly, environmental factors may be conceived as a sort of matrix ...which
1 fHlimits the execution of undertakings.
Donna Kinder and Janet Weiss, in their 1978’s article, ‘In Lieu of Rationality: 
Psychological Perspectives on Foreign Policy Decision-Making’, maintained that 
“situational forces exert powerful influences upon a decision maker’s ability to perform 
all the complex processing tasks involved in the pursuit of foreign policy.”104 Since the 
Sprouts, Kinder and Weiss, it has been generally acknowledged that foreign policy 
actions are affected and cognitively constrained by situational factors which, in 
Carlsnaes’ words, “are intended jointly to encompass all the crucial elements in foreign 
policy decisionmaking.”1(b
But it was Walter Carlsnaes’ three-levelled analysis that provided a lucid account of 
how structural and situational dimensions could impact on foreign policy motivation. It 
was his clear elaboration of the relationship among the intentional, dispositional and 
structural/situational elements in the analysis of foreign policy motivation that made his 
theory a particularly useful reference to this thesis.
In his book Ideology and Foreign Policy, Carlsnaes held that the framework for any 
analysis of foreign policy would be best pursued in terms of a tripartite approach 
consisting of intentional, dispositional and situational dimensions of explanation.106 
This was because, he argued, these three dimensions could “be conjoined in specific
103 Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective in Human Affairs (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1965, p. 11)
104 Donna Kinder and Janet Weiss, ‘In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives on Foreign Policy Decision- 
Making ’ Journal o f Conflict Resolution (Vol. 22, December 1978, p. 732)
105 Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986, p. 107)
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ways to render increasingly exhaustive explanations of the motivation of political 
actions.”107 Carlsnaes strongly believed that the explanation of foreign policy 
motivation lay, first of all, in a thorough understanding of the interplay among personal, 
cultural and societal elements. As perception and personality factors have been 
discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, this section will pay greater attention 
to his third element, ie. structural/situational component, in the context of foreign policy 
motivation.
Intentional Dimension
Carlsnaes’ intentional dimension embraced two conceptual categories which he 
considered to be essential to all explanations of foreign policy action: 1) the particular
1 ORchoice implicated in a policy; 2) the motivation underlying its pursuit.
Carlsnaes observed that often when motivation was described as a force that led to a 
particular policy being pursued, people always had in mind the aim, the goal or the 
objective which the policy in question was intended to accomplish.109 But in ordinary 
usage, motivation and choice tended to be used interchangeably to mean both ends and 
means.110 Often the two were conflated, usually in the sense that ends were 
used—consciously or not—to legitimise or rationalise means in one way or another.* 111
106 ibid. pp. 84-85
107 ibid. p. 84
108 ibid. pp. 85-87
109 ibid. pp. 95-116 
uoibid.
111 For example, this was the case, Carlsnaes argued, when a decision such as that o f bombing Hanoi was defended by 
referring exclusively to the need for vouchsafing American security (ibid. p. 85) (yet American security was in no 
way directly at risk). Because there was no direct link between the bombing and American security in any common 
notion, we were impelled to distinguish between the choices involved in taking particular actions, and the motivation 
underlying these actions. Or as Martin Hollis wrote, “the actor...needs to be found good reasons for his choice of 
goals. The enquirer looks for further goals to which the immediate goals are a means” Martin Hollis, Models o f Man
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Carlsnaes warned against mixing these two quite different concepts of choice and 
motivation. On the basis of the two conceptual premises mentioned above, Carlsnaes 
gave the following specification of the nature of, and distinction between, the two. He 
argued that although both choice and motivation belonged to intentional dimension in 
his analysis, the role of each was different. Choice referred to the reasons for an actor's 
decision in the face of a particular decisionmaking situation, while motivation pointed 
to a condition or state of affairs which an actor intended either to change or to 
maintain. Choice indicated why an actor opted for a particular course of action in the 
pursuit of an intended state of affairs, while motivation described this intention itself. Or 
in other words, a particular action was motivated by some purpose or other, which in
• 113turn implicated a choice (or a series of choices) with respect to its pursuit. 
Motivation, in this explanation, was thus a given factor, while the range of possible 
choices was limited by it.
Dispositional Dimension
The second component in Carlsnaes’ scheme was the dispositional dimension. 
Carlsnaes also included two elements in this dimension: perceptions and values, which 
he saw belonged to cultural explanation. Carlsnaes related perceptions and values to the 
notion of dealing with the ‘national interest’ in particular, and with the role of values in 
general in the formulation of foreign policy. He proposed that ‘values’ could, in a 
crucial sense, be seen as determining foreign policy interest, either in the sense that such
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. p. 140). The concern for American security might be involved in 
bombing Hanoi, it could at best only have been implicated as a motivating reason for the particular choice, but not the 
goal itself, ibid. pp. 71-116
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interests were essentially the form that values took in this context, or because values 
‘stood behind’ such interests. 114
Carlsnaes contended that the advantage of this type of explanation was that the factors 
characterising the intentional dimension could themselves be further explored in terms 
of concepts belonging to this dimension. 115 More specifically, it was suggested that the 
particular motivation and choices, which determined why a particular policy was 
pursued, could in turn be explored in order to answer a question that the intentional 
framework itself could not accommodate. He argued that this allowed us to pursue the 
query why a decision maker was cognitively disposed towards a particular intention 
rather than towards some other state of affairs. 116
Carlsnaes confirmed that perceptions and values were causal notions to motivation. 
More specifically, he indicated that values belonged—both logically and 
empirically—to a different and antecedent dimension in the decisionmaking process. 
For while in the intentional dimension motivation and the range of available choices 
were given, in the sense that they were themselves unproblematic descriptions of actual 
intentions, the same did not hold for the nature of values. 117
In Carlsnaes’ view, once value was conceived in a causal manner, the determinants of 
particular motivation and choices could be explored, together with the reasons for 
possible incompatibilities between them. These could then be analysed as a
112 Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986 pp. 82-91)
113 ibid. p. 81
114 ibid. pp. 90-95
115 ibid.
116 ibid.
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consequence of values, as “values applied in the light of situations as they appear to 
people involved in them.” 118 From this it followed that, if and when there was a conflict 
or a contradiction between motivation and a particular choice, then this was the result of 
a prior condition of value-complexity. Carlsnaes believed that the same must be said for 
the case where conflicts of this kind remain unresolved: in such instances the 
explanation ultimately rested on incompatible values, not on incongruous motivation 
and choices. 119 Intentional motivation and choices operated within the dimension of 
dispositional perceptions and values.
Situational Dimension
Carlsnaes placed a greater emphasis on the situational dimension in relation to the first 
two, and indeed, to the whole of his theory. He believed that a well-addressed 
situational dimension allowed his analytical framework to have acquired a systematic 
wholeness to fully function, despite the semi-autonomy of its constituent dimensions.
Carlsnaes’ situational dimension contained the type of analysis that posited all 
situational factors as indirect and cognitively mediated rather than in the form of 
directly causal variables. Foreign policy decision makers of a given state were seen as 
being cognitively constrained by factors and processes such as the economic system, 
political interaction or bureaucratic procedures as independent structural variables in 
foreign policy motivation. Carlsnaes’ point of emphasising the constraining factors in
foreign policy motivation was consistent with the fundamental premise by Anthony
ni bid. pp. 98-101
118 Alexander George and Robert Keohane, ‘The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations’ Alexander 
George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo. 1980, p. 221)
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Giddens that motivation and the resulting behaviours were closely linked to the type of 
structure characterising the decisionmaking system. 121
Having emphasised the cognitively mediated character of all situational and 
environmental factors, Carlsnaes then proceeded to place this dimension within his 
framework as a whole by offering two congruent concepts, which, he claimed, were 
intended jointly to encompass all the crucial structural/situational factors in catalysing 
foreign policy motivation and decisionmaking process. These two concepts were the
. 1  9 9objective conditions and the organisational setting.
Objective conditions characterised the situation within which a foreign policy maker 
was placed to act. 124 Suffice to note, he argued, that these conditions knew no 
international or domestic boundaries, and their pervasiveness was such that no country 
could escape their steady and enduring grip, although this grip itself had many forms 
and degrees of intransigence. 125 Carlsnaes argued that being both socio-economic and 
physically concrete, these conditions were as much man-made as a product of natural 
history and other seemingly implacable forces. 126 Carlsnaes warned against the putative 
effects of objective conditions to be over-stressed, and that they should not be
# 127
underestimated or ignored in the study of foreign policy motivation.
119 Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986, pp. 90-101)
120 ibid p. 107
121 Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 73-85)
122 Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986, p. 107)
123 ibid. pp. 110-116
124 ibid.
125 ibid.
126 ibid. pp. 108-109. In Kenneth Waltz's notion, for example, they pertained equally to the supply of colonisable land 
during the heyday of the imperialist scramble, to the economic conditions o f the Great Depression, and to the 
geographic and market vagaries o f the oil supply today. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Mass.: 
Reading, 1970, pp. 69-72)
Chapter Two 78
While the concept of objective conditions referred to the concrete givens of a situation 
(be they political, economic, social, demographic, geopolitical, technological), the type 
of constraints from the organisational setting were viewed by Carlsnaes as structural for 
the reason that this was a different and wholly abstract type of notion. He emphasised 
that although both objective and organisational factors acted as constraints on foreign 
policy motivation, their constraining propensities differed fundamentally in so far as the 
first referred to the multitude of materially objective elements characterising the 
situation of a state (or society) in the international system, while the second related to an
129abstract notion that was used to characterise the policy situation of particular actors.
Carlsnaes found the difficulties about determining the organisational setting, or 
structural constraints, lay in the fact that there was no neat organisational chart with 
formally defined hierarchies and powers available, and this setting only operated in 
terms of the various factors—formal and informal—interrelatedly structuring the
i or \
motivation and decisionmaking system.
However, Carlsnaes contended that because of this, the organisational setting could be 
characterised structurally in terms of two broad functions which impacted on 
motivation. The first of these had a dynamic import, while the second constituted a 
conservative process sustaining the status quo. If the dynamic view of the organisational 
setting stressed the notion of a tough game with high stakes and powerful players, then
127 Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986, p. 108)
128 ibid. pp. 104-116
129 ibid.
130 ibid. Also, as William Bacchus wrote: “participants in the policy-making process do not inhabit a neatly defined 
and regularised world, although much of what they do is determined and channelled by bureaucratic norms and 
operating patterns. Rather, the characteristics o f this complex and untidy process define the context in which each 
participant functions.” Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974, 
P-38)
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the static or conservative model of such setting quite openly played down the active role 
of rival players. Instead it emphasised the impact of the organisational factor per se on 
the structural character of the decisional setting.
Carlsnaes believed that this did not mean that the concept of situational setting was a 
causal factor in the analysis of foreign policy motivation, in the same sense that 
perception, personality and cultural structures could be said to ‘cause’ anything in the 
dispositional or intentional dimensions previously discussed. Although 
‘paradigmatic’, both functions could probably be said to have empirical reference to 
most organisational settings, although the mix in each particular case undoubtedly 
showed variation both over time and across different settings.
Diagrammatically, Carlsnaes presented his argument on structural/situational constraints 
on foreign policy motivation as follows:
Foreign 
policy 
action „
Values
Choice
Motivation
Perceptions
Objective
conditions
Organizational
setting
^ ......7 Reciprocal relationship
1 = Intentional dimension * Teleological relationship
2 = Dispositional dimension ^Causal relationship
3 = Situational dimension ..........* Relationship of constraint
Source: Walter Carlsnaes 'Ideology & Foreign Policy', p. 108
131 Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986, pp. 104-116)
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This diagram presented the key structural properties in supporting Carlsnaes' approach 
to the analysis of foreign policy motivation. While the relationship between 1 and 2 was 
causal, the relationship between 3 and the other two was one of constraint, limitation or 
intervention, or ‘intervening variable’.132 In terms of organisational setting, this model 
showed that under certain structural conditions, certain types of perceptions and values
133might be fostered or present while others were suppressed or absent.
The crucial predication of Carlsnaes argument was that ‘mind encounters organisational 
settings’, not the other way round. Emphasising constraining effect in foreign policy 
motivation and behaviours was to expose the role of volatile and sensitive structural and 
situational changes in the system. By in depth analysis of intentional, dispositional and 
situational dimensions of foreign policy motivation, Carlsnaes justified the prominent 
role of structural/situational dimension in his foreign policy motivation analysis.
Conclusion
The consensus of the scholarship reviewed in this chapter suggested that far from being 
a monolithic analytic unit, such as power, economic measures or class struggle, foreign 
policy motivation was a product of a complex process involving perception, leadership 
personality and structural/situational elements. These scholars undertook in-depth 
studies of such elements to establish the viability and analytical power to challenge
132 ibid. p. 115
133 Or in John Steinbruner’s words that: “if stable features of the mind encounter stable features o f organisational 
settings, it should produce coherent, recurring patterns o f behaviour in the organisational decision process, other 
things being equal.” John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory o f  Decision (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1974, p. 124)
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classical theories in explaining foreign policy motivation. These alternative approaches 
also provided a theoretical framework upon which the analysis of Chinese foreign 
policy motivation could be conducted in the later chapters.
It should be noted that the views of scholars with these alternative approaches to foreign 
policy motivation often converged over some fundamental components such as 
perception, values, beliefs and personality. While the arguments of each alone might not 
be adequate to fully account for the complexity of foreign policy motivation, they, taken 
together, could offer a new point of departure for the study of foreign policy motivation 
with their complementarity and combined strength.
This chapter concluded that it was difficult to articulate a definite answer to a 
hypothetical motivation of a country over a specific foreign policy initiative—mostly 
because the choice was inevitably a matter of judgement. Nevertheless, the study of the 
three elements highlighted in this chapter would provide a rich yet focused conceptual 
repertoire for drawing relevance. And on the basis of this, an impulse of foreign policy 
motivation of a given country at a given time could be diagnosed.
The perception argument placed at the centre of motivation inquiries its predispositional 
base, which, as Richard Cottam contended, was reflected in the decisional process and 
resulted in a particular foreign policy decisional thrust. This approach emphasised that a 
focus on motivational attribution was vitally important for prescriptive international 
relations theory, because a policy based on an accurate assessment of its target's 
motivation was more likely to achieve its own objectives than the one based on illusory 
or fantasised estimates. The reason behind this was, Cottam claimed, that what emerged
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as a foreign policy resembled only the tip of an iceberg. The vast majority of decisions 
were made subsurface in a routinised, repetitive manner by a huge and self-interested 
bureaucracy, who could be driven by a range of motivations. But in foreign policy 
decisionmaking, only the motivation of the state leaders acting in the ‘national interest’ 
had the command of both authority and capability to translate it into foreign policy 
actions.
Sometimes, Cottam’s view on perception was very general, perhaps too broad in 
describing on-going complexity within a ‘government’, since it was obvious that the 
sub-components, such as the above-mentioned bureaucracy, possessed widely varying 
interests, and therefore a variety of motives. Cottam’s omission of the role of sub­
groups in his study resembled the realist approach on this subject. As it became obvious 
that the state was not, and indeed had never been, a unitary actor, it could never have 
monopolised the motivation process although it might appear to make foreign policy 
decisions on behalf of its people. Therefore while a foreign policy decision mechanism 
might remain the same, the substance was changed.
The personality approach advanced its argument by avoiding the fallacy of ‘great-men- 
making history’. Instead it focused on the intellectual quality and social formation of 
decision makers. The Hermanns, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin emphasised the prominence 
of the social dimension and the importance of the structural environment in shaping 
meaningful personality in foreign policy motivation.
The Hermanns and Snyder and his colleagues contributed to the personality approach by 
adding a poignant dimension of political culture to the study. They believed that the
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persistence and durability of such political culture in foreign policy motivation varied in 
different political systems, but were more robustly displayed in a system where a 
political culture had a long history and was well entrenched. This persistence and 
durability of motivation in foreign policy did not have to depend on the continued 
presence of the original drive or stimulus. New motivation could grow out of old ones 
by the simple process of turning objectives into desirable outcomes—even in the 
absence of the original need which gave rise to the selection of the particular objective. 
In other words, when a certain motivation was repeatedly adopted over a relatively long 
period of time, it could gather a momentum of its own and become a habitual tendency 
regardless of the changing circumstances. Means employed to satisfy a given motivation 
through the achievement of an objective might become an independent source of 
satisfaction and therefore displaced the original motivation. This could explain why 
nations pursued objectives which no longer made sense in terms of their original 
interests, or needs.
While admitting the importance of perception and personality attributes in foreign 
policy motivation, the structural/situational constraint argument emphasised the role of 
objective conditions and organisational settings in the motivation process, and claimed 
these were the most dynamic force indirectly affecting the configuration of the foreign 
policy motivation. The essence of Carlsnaes’ explanation of foreign policy motivation 
was couched in terms of the structural/situational dimension, ie. with reference to 
objective conditions and organisational settings which constrained the motivation in 
foreign policy options of actors. Carlsnaes believed that, given that situational factors 
exerted a constraining influence on the intentional and dispositional levels of 
understanding of foreign policy motivation of decision makers, they should be treated as
Chapter Two 84
a fundamentally authoritative source of dynamics in the motivation system.
There were at least two implications of Carlsnaes’ structural/situational explanation. 
First, it showed that the three explanatory dimensions (intentional, dispositional and 
situational) were not clearly distinguished from one another. They were logically 
interrelated. Second, it highlighted the supremacy of objective conditions and 
organisational settings in foreign policy motivation explanation—when it was expressed 
in terms of the link to the intentional and dispositional dimensions. Being neither causal 
nor teleological, a situational explanation alone could by definition never rival either 
perception or personality explanations. However, the three elements were interrelated, 
not mutually exclusive. Carlsnaes urged that scholars should first determine the 
decisional environment for a foreign policy choice before attempting to explain foreign 
policy motivation in terms of such causal factors as leadership perception, belief, values 
and personality, if a given foreign policy motivation would be correctly understood at 
all.
The paradox of this methodology, however, was that the constraining factors could only 
be introduced into the explanatory position once the causal factors were identified. 
Given this logic, although a full explanation of a foreign policy motivation must of 
necessity always contain a structural/situational dimension, it should not, and would 
not, replace intentional and dispositional variables in the analysis. And only by giving 
this balance, the three competing elements of foreign policy motivation could be fairly 
assessed.
Part II and Part III of this thesis will test the applicability of these approaches in the
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study of Chinese foreign policy motivation.
Chapter Three
The Place of Motivation in Scholarship on Chinese Foreign Policy
The previous two chapters have established the theoretical premises for this thesis. The 
scholarship on the roles of perception, personality and structural/situational constraints 
in foreign policy motivation process have set parameters against which foreign policy 
motivation could be analysed and judged. These two chapters were projected to serve 
dual purposes. On the one hand, they will be the theoretical guides that steer the 
analytical course of the subsequent inquiries into Chinese foreign policy behaviours; 
and on the other hand, their own applicability and validity as a credible methodology in 
the study of Chinese foreign policy will be rigorously tested.
This chapter, as a necessary step to bridge the gap, surveys the current state of the art in 
the study of Chinese foreign policy, and makes links between the observed motivation 
theories with trends of scholarship in Chinese foreign policy. More specifically, this 
chapter seeks to establish the scope and depth of the influence of the ‘rational actor’, 
cooperation and revolutionary war and peace models on the study of Chinese foreign 
policy, and to find out how the concepts of perception, personality and 
structural/situational factors were applied to the understanding of Chinese foreign policy 
motivation in the existing literature.
After the second World War, a general interest focusing on the study of China in turn 
rapidly developed into a scholastic inquiry centred on the study of contemporary 
Chinese foreign policy. During the 1950s, this study spawned a rich sub field in the
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international relations discipline.1 Especially from the late 1970s through to the early 
1990s, a dramatic increase in Western scholarly monographs accompanied by a 
mushrooming of Chinese scholarship on foreign policy greatly boosted the status of 
Chinese foreign policy study and further augmented its potency.2 3This unprecedented 
intellectual diversity in China's foreign policy somehow compensated for the previously 
more rigid and simple-minded scholarship, which tended to regard Chinese foreign 
policy as either too peculiaristic or too subtle to be granted serious study within the 
modem European international relations discipline.
This myth of China's uniqueness and the stereotyped analytical framework have been 
successfully challenged from many fronts, especially by the current scholars on Chinese 
foreign relations since the 1980s. These scholars have enjoyed access to new research 
materials and opportunities quite unlike the relative paucity of data that characterised 
the Fairbank generation.4
Literature on foreign policy, following the founding of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949 to the late 1970s, fell into some fairly distinctive genres. Until the late 1960s, 
the literature was divided among three schools: the traditionalist, the Maoist ideology 
and the rational actor. During the late 1960s and late 1970s two new schools of 
thought—the strategic triangle and factional politics—came to prominence as offering a
1 Allen Whiting, ‘Foreign Policy of China’ Roy Macridis Foreign Policy in World Politics (New Jersey: Prentice- 
Hall International, 1992, pp. 222-266)
2 Michael Hunt, “ Normalising' the Field’ (Paper presented at the Wilson Center Conference on ‘CCP External 
Relations’, Washington D. C. June 1992, pp. 2-3)
3 For example, John Fairbank commented on the role that traditional China had in the thinking o f Western scholars: 
“Until very recently, premodem China has remained so different from the rest of the world, so cocooned in its 
distinctive culture and writing system, that it has seemed like a galaxy apart, a single Chinese nebula in the Western 
world's firmament.” John Fairbank, ‘The State that Mao Built’ World Politics (Vol. 19, July 1967, pp. 665-666)
4 Michael Hunt, “ Normalising' the Field’ (Paper presented at the Wilson Center Conference on ‘CCP External 
Relations’, Washington D. C. June 1992, pp. 2-3)
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better way of understanding China's domestic and foreign politics.
By the end of 1980s, scholars had grown dissatisfied with these five approaches, which, 
in their view, were either too simplistic, deterministic (traditionalist/Maoist/realist 
approaches), or had suffered too much from the “Zhongnanhai (factionalist) 
syndrome”.5 There was a growing interest in the more nuanced micro policymaking 
mechanisms (mostly below the top-level decision makers), and in pre-policy making 
processes which primarily drew on the roles of perceptions.6 These five approaches 
were the point of departure for scholars taking on the institutional and perceptual 
approaches. The last two approaches gave greater emphasis to China's foreign 
policymaking structural environment and the mind-set/perceptions of those who worked 
in these structures.
Indeed, with more data available, scholars of Chinese foreign policy produced more 
discriminating studies than ever before.7 More recently, scholars such as Alastair 
Johnston, Michael Swaine, Thomas Christensen, Greg Austin and Lu Ning seemed to 
have outgrown the existing explanatory paradigm of Chinese foreign policy by the 
perceptual and institutional schools, and have started to explore new frontiers in the 
research field.
For this particular group of scholars, the existing mainstream theories appeared to have 
limited expository power in the study of Chinese foreign policy, which was further
5 Robert Ross, ‘From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China's US Policy’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 
118, June 1989)
6 Michael Hunt, “ Normalising’ the Field’ (Paper presented at the Wilson Center Conference on ‘CCP External 
Relations’, Washington D. C. June 1992, p. 3)
7 See Michael Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report 
on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 120, December 1989)
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obscured by some distinct characteristics of Chinese foreign policy behaviours. The 
range of explanatory capacity of the mainstream theories failed at least one of the two 
criteria for a theory—the capability to forecast future trends and events. In addition, 
both foreign policy decisionmaking and implementation were constantly in a dynamic 
process. The theories widely applied in the study of Chinese foreign policy seemed to 
be relevant in the study of a specific single incident, or a group of events, of what was 
essentially a series of laterally related motion pictures of China’s foreign policy 
motivation. The rational actor, bureaucratic politics and organisational process models, 
for example, only captured segments of the dynamic process. This group of scholars 
regarded the existing mainstream theories as providing necessary leads for a better 
understanding of some of Chinese foreign policy motivation and as a useful, though not 
always reliable, tool for prognosis purposes. This inadequacy of the existing theoretical 
paradigm challenged this group of scholars and resulted in the growing trend by these 
scholars to rekindle interest in motivation study. As a logical step further, they 
committed themselves to the study of motivation in search of a more satisfactory 
explanatory norm for Chinese foreign policy.
There are three sections in this chapter. The first section assesses the achievements in 
the field of study of Chinese foreign policy, against the background of the Western 
theories outlined in Chapter One. The second section deals with the new generation of 
scholarship of institutional and perceptual schools which emerged in the last twenty 
years or so. The last section summarises current trends in the study of Chinese foreign
8 Peter Self, Political Theories o f Modern Government: Its Role and Reform (London, Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985, 
pp. 12-13)
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policy by identifying the place of motivation approach in Chinese foreign policy study.
Conventional Wisdom
In line with the classical schools of international relations, there were roughly five 
conventional streams of thought that for some time dominated the study of 
contemporary Chinese foreign policy: the traditional/historical, the Maoist/communist 
ideology, the realist/rational actor, the factional and the triangular.9
Traditional/Historical Approach
The traditional/historical approach tried to understand the foreign policy behaviour of 
the new China largely in terms of its past.10 John Fairbank, as a key proponent of the 
approach, argued that to “deal with a major power (like China) without regard for its 
history, and especially the tradition in foreign policy, is truly to be flying blind.’’11
In other words, he suggested that without a deep understanding of China's 5,000 years 
of history, little insight could be gained into its foreign policy. The foreign policy under
9 The following review on the study of Chinese foreign policy relies largely on the comprehensive survey on the 
subject by Bin Yu in ‘The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospect’ World Politics (Vol. 46, January 
1994). It also takes in some other works, such as Samuel Kim, ‘China and the World in Theory and Practice’ Samuel 
Kim ed. China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994); and James Rosenau, ‘China in a Bifurcated World: Competing Theoretical Perspectives’ Thomas Robinson 
and David Shambaugh ed. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)
10 See Mark Mancall, ‘The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Annals o f the American Academy of 
Political and Social Sciences (No. 349, September 1963); C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View o f Their Place in the 
World (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Francois Geoffroy-Dechaume, China Looks at the World (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1967); Norton Ginsberg, ‘On the Chinese Perception of a World Order’ Tang Tsou, ed. The China 
in Crisis (Vol. 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); John Fairbank, ed. The Chinese World Order 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); idem, ‘China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective’ Foreign 
Affairs (No. 47, April 1969); Albert Feuerwerker, ‘Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary 
China’ Annals of the American Academy o f Political and Social Science (No. 402, July 1972); J. Cranmer-Byng, ‘The 
Chinese View of Their Place in the World: An Historical Perspective’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 53, January-March 
1973)
11 John Fairbank, ‘China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective’ Foreign Affairs (No. 47, April 1969, p. 449)
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the Communist regime represented a continuation of the practice of traditional 
Sinocentrism according to which the world, as perceived by the Chinese rulers, was not 
one based on the concept of sovereign equality of nation/states, but one structured in 
hierarchical terms.12 Under such a world system as perceived by the Chinese rulers, 
China—the ‘Middle Kingdom’—was the preeminent power that maintained a suzerain- 
tributary relationship with the rest of the world. A nation’s status within this system 
depended on its level of sinicisation. The primary sources of Chinese foreign policy 
were to be found in such traditional philosophies as Confucianism, Taoism and 
Buddhism.13
This general approach was accompanied by a method of inquiry which tended to be 
equally grandiose and ambitious in its selection of topics, breadth of inquiry, and time 
span. This research tradition regarded China as a colossal and frequently exhausted 
giant, lurching slowly toward modernisation and reacting to the outside world either 
sluggishly or violently.14 The core of this thought stressed China’s centuries-old 
mindset of self-centredness and cultural superiority.
Maoist/Communist Ideological Approach
China’s uniqueness was challenged by the Maoist/communist ideological school of the 
early 1950s. The challenge coincided with the onset of the politics of the Cold War and 
American military involvement in Asia. This school argued that the historical and 
cultural legacy of the past was less relevant than the principles of orthodox Marxism-
12 ibid. pp. 450-451
13 ibid.
14 Francois Geoffroy-Dechaume, China Looks at the World (London: Faber and Faber, 1967, pp. 34-36)
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Leninism and its Chinese derivative—Maoism—in understanding contemporary 
Chinese foreign policy behaviour. It suggested that China interacted with the rest of the 
world based largely on the ideological belief of its political elite as personified in Mao 
Zedong, some of whose ideas often appeared antithetical to Chinese tradition. 15
This approach argued that the Maoist/communist ideology resulted in unique foreign 
policy tactics that differed both from the strategy derived from China's traditional past 
and from orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideologies. As a result, some specific features of 
Chinese Communism, like the ‘people's war’ and ‘united front’, developed rapidly and 
successfully during the CCP’s revolutionary period, and have strongly influenced the 
making of PRC's foreign policy ever since. 16
Despite obvious differences between the traditional and Maoist approaches, they both 
tended to contend that the key factor in China's foreign behaviour was China itself, 
acting from a traditional stance or a Communist stance. In other words, China was 
unique and had to be understood on its own terms.
15 See Benjamin Schwartz, Communism and China: Ideology in Flux (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); 
idem, ‘China and the West in the Thought of Mao Tse-tung' Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou eds. China in Crisis Vol. 1, 
Book 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1972); John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Rowe, 
1974); idem, ‘The Statesman’ Dick Wilson, ed. Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales o f History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977); Michel Oksenberg, ‘Mao's Policy Commitments, 1921-1976’ Problem o f Communism (No. 
25, November-December 1976); Lucian Pye, ‘Mao Tse-Tung's Leadership Style’ Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 
91, Summer 1976); Maurice Meisner, Mao's China: A History o f the People's Republic (New York: Free Press, 
1977); Greg O'Leary, The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980)
16 Tang Tsou and Morton Halperin, ‘Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behaviour’ 
American Political Science Review (Vol. 69, March 1965); Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1967); David Mozingo, Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949-67 (New York: Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1972); James Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front 
Doctrine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)
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Realist/Rational Actor Approach
While both the traditional and ideological schools stressed the significance of the 
subjective ‘psychomilieu’ of China’s power elite in the formulation of the nation’s 
foreign policy, the realist/rational actor school focused its attention on the objective 
‘operational condition’. Instead of viewing China through its own imperial lens or a 
Sinified version of Marxism-Leninism, realist scholars applied the prevailing Western 
realist notions of power, national interests, and international containing power to the
1 7study of China's foreign policy, especially to its crisis behaviour.
Some realists maintained the view that Chinese foreign policy makers, like their 
counterparts in the West, always took into account the military and economic power of 
their allies and adversaries.18 This, they believed, was evidenced by some major shifts in 
China's foreign policy, such as its honeymoon with Moscow in the 1950s and the later 
rapprochement with Washington and Moscow in the late 1970s and 1980s—shifts that 
reflected, at least in part, political, economic and strategic imperatives imposed by 
fundamental changes in China's internal development and global environment.19
In his landmark study China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, 
Allen Whiting was able to reconstruct the events that led to the Chinese decision to 
intervene in the Korean War.20 By carefully analysing US intelligence information and 
sifting through Beijing’s public pronouncements at the time, Whiting concluded that the
17 Bin Yu, ‘The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy’ World Politics (Vol. 46, No. 2, January 1994, pp. 238-240)
18 Kun-shuan Chiu, Chinese Policy Toward the United States Under Deng Xiaoping, 1979-1988 (Washington D.C.: 
The George Washington University, UMI, 1990, pp. 42-57)
19 ibid.
20 Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1960, pp. 52-81)
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Chinese action of entering the Korean War was largely reactive, and the motivation was 
self-defence. This explanation therefore did not he in an aggressive communist ideology 
or a traditional impulse to pacify its periphery, but in the same realism to be found at the 
heart of mainstream Western theories on international relations. Whiting argued that 
China's decision to enter the war was motivated by its national security concerns 
sparked by American rhetoric and actions, especially those of General Douglas 
MacAxthur from Tokyo,21 and Washington's refusal at that time to heed explicit Chinese 
warnings against crossing the 38th parallel.22 This calculation was based on the high 
stake of the regime’s ability to continue its existence and nation’s survival, which
23eventually led to China's audacious decision to intervene before it was too late.
Given the operational environment, the realist/rational actor school argued that the 
Chinese foreign policy behaviour was not very different from other countries. Chinese 
foreign policy could be viewed in traditional Western theoretical paradigms of balance 
of power, national interests and domestic economic, military and systemic 
manipulation.
These arguments, whether of the China-unique school or the realist ‘gross variable’ 
approach,24 interpreted China's foreign policy orientations in only the broadest strokes. 
Only few of them concerned themselves with the timing and content of particular 
initiatives and major decisions in China's foreign policy; and few of them looked at the 
management of certain sensitive issues and relationships that were influenced by more
21 ibid. pp. 59-65
22 ibid. pp. 12-14
23 ibid.
24 For a critique o f realist theory, see Robert Keohane, ‘Theory o f World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’ 
Ada Finifter, ed. Political Science: The State o f the Discipline (Washington D. C : American Political Science 
Association, 1983)
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dynamic domestic variables. The need to take account of internal politics when 
examining foreign policy eventually led some scholars to proposing the factional and 
triangular approaches.
Factional Approach
In the early 1970s, scholars consistently started to emphasise elite politics. Some earlier 
studies of this type in the late 1960s analysed the internal debates among top Chinese 
elites and policy institutions, due to the publically available flood of accusations and 
revelations made during the Cultural Revolution. Instead of looking at China as a 
unitary rational actor, the factional approach placed greater emphasis on the influence of 
domestic variables on China’s top decisionmaking elite in the formulation of its foreign 
policies.25 In an era of open and fierce factional infighting during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, it was only natural to assume that factions in dispute over domestic policy 
orientations would also have different approaches to foreign policy.
The significance of this school was its contribution to demolishing the concept of a 
monolithic unified Chinese state and initiating the search for group attributes in the
25 There was a rich literature on this subject. See, for example, Uri Ra'anan, ‘Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate', 1965- 
1966’ Tang Tsou, ed. China in Crisis Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Allen Whiting, Chinese 
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1970s (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese Studies, 1979); Melvin 
Gurtov and Harry Harding, Jr. The Purge o f Luo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics o f Chinese Strategic Planning (Calif.: Santa 
Monica, RAND Corporation, Report R-548-PR, 1971); Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, ‘The Chinese 
Political Spectrum’ Problems o f Communism (Vol. 23, March-April 1974); Michael Yahuda, ‘Kremlinology and the 
Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-66’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 49, January 1972); Thomas Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign 
Policy Factionalism and the Origins o f the Strategic Triangle (Calif.: Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, Report R- 
1902-NA, 1977); Steve Chan, ‘Rationality, Bureaucratic Politics and Belief System: Explaining the Chinese Policy 
Debate, 1964-66’ Journal o f Peace Research (Vol. 16, 1979); John Garver, ‘Chinese Foreign Policy in 1970s: The 
Tilt toward the Soviet Union’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 82, June 1980); idem, China's Decision for Rapprochement 
with the United States (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘The Foreign Policy Debate in 
Peking as Seen through Allegorical Articles, 1973-76’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 71, September 1977); Jonathan 
Pollack, The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Chinese Security Debate (Calif.: Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, R-2907- 
AE, October 1982); Peter Van Ness, ‘Three Lines in Chinese Foreign Relations, 1950-1983: The Development 
Imperative’ Dorothy Solinger ed. Three Visions o f Chinese Socialism (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984)
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process. The significance of the factional school’s contribution was impugned in recent 
years, notably by diplomatic historians. For example, according to Michael Hunt, new 
archival material from both sides of the Pacific indicated that the factional model 
offered “little to support even a circumstantial argument for the existence of factions.” 
And at worst, “the model tells us as much about them (those who used the factional
9 Amodel) as it reveals about China.”"
Triangular Approach
Unlike the factional approach that focused on the internal setting within which decision 
makers had to operate, the triangular approach that came into vogue in the early 1970s 
stressed the big-picture global environment, particularly the foreign policy behaviours 
of the United States and the Soviet Union in relation to China and each other. Instead 
of examining a broader operational field, they narrowed their study to an examination of 
China’s relationship with the other two key players only, and concluded that the so- 
called strategic triangle was critical to understanding China’s foreign policy behaviour. 
Many theories were advanced concerning what was essentially perceived as a three- 
power game.28
The triangular approach was largely a variant of the earlier realist, unitary-actor school.
26 For a detailed critique of the factional model, see Michael Hunt, “ Normalising’ the Field’ (Paper presented at the 
Wilson Center Conference on ‘CCP External Relations’, Washington D. C. June 1992)
27 Ilpyong Kim, ed. The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States and the Soviet Union (New York: Paragon 
House, 1987)
28 ibid. Gerald Segal, The Great Power Triangle (London: Macmillan Press, 1982); Douglas Stuart and William Tow 
ed. China, the Soviet Union , and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1982); Stobe Talbott, ‘The Strategic Dimension of the Sino-American Relationship: Enemy of Our Enemy, or 
True Friend?’ Richard Solomon ed. The China Factor (Englewood Cliffs: Pretice-Hall, 1981); Lowell Dittmer, ‘The 
Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis’ World Politics (No. 33, July 1981); Kenneth 
Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle (Calif.: Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 1978); Min Chen, The Strategic Triangle and Regional Conflicts: Lessons from the
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Part of the ambiguity and confusion surrounding this concept lay in the failure of 
scholars to see that the notion of triangular politics was in itself a complex and 
fragmentary pattern of political/strategic interaction among the three players. It was a 
specific form of strategic alliance or rivals which had been employed often in the first 
half of this century by the European regimes for the political and military balance of 
power which culminated in the two World Wars. According to Joseph Nogee, the 
China, US and USSR triangle differed essentially from the notion of tripolarity, which 
was both a more static concept based largely on the distribution of power among 
relevant actors and a basically structural feature of the world system or subsystem in the 
modem world political history.29 Despite this, with the highs and lows of the Sino-US 
and Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and its increasing impact 
on the world, the triangular perspective was able to maintain its scholastic relevance and 
attracted supporters for quite some time in the 1980s in the Chinese foreign policy 
study.
In summary, despite their focus on different key variables, these five theoretical 
frameworks, established under the conventional wisdom of Chinese foreign policy 
study, attempted to apply the classical theories of foreign policy to China’s state 
behaviour in terms of its position in world affairs. Foreign policy choices were viewed 
as the more or less purposive acts of a unified state based on logical means of achieving
Indochina Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Harvey Nelson, Power and Insecurity: Beijing, Moscow, and 
Washington, 1949-1988 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989)
29 Joseph Nogee had a useful discussion on the concept of polarity, and he saw the inherent difficulty of measuring 
polarity and defining a system's structure. See Joseph Nogee, ‘Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept’ Orbis (No. 18, 
Winter 1975)
Chapter Three 98
given objectives.
The conventional study of Chinese foreign policy stressed the rationality of 
decisionmaking, sourced either from China’s own history or from a realist’s calculation 
of its own interest. This was a reflection perhaps of the Western intellectual’s faith in 
the essential rationality of human behaviour, inherited from the Enlightenment. With a 
gradual erosion of this belief, scholars in recent years shifted their attention from 
decisionmaking as mere rational choice among possible maximum-utility alternatives to 
decisionmaking as an incremental process containing partial choices and compromises 
among competing organisational considerations, bureaucratic pressures and group 
interests.
New Scholarship
Many scholars became dissatisfied with the earlier conventional models, viewing them 
either as too simplistic or deterministic.30 From the mid 1980s to early 1990s, therefore, 
greater emphasis has been given by scholars to China's foreign policymaking structures 
and the mind-set/perceptions of those who work in these structures. Substantial interest 
and efforts were devoted to the more nuanced micro policymaking mechanisms (mostly 
below the top-level decision makers), and in pre-policy making processes. This new 
trend of the scholarship could be understood in terms of institutional and perceptual 
perspectives, which drew on some of the elements from the conventional wisdom, but
30 Robert Ross, ‘From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China's US Policy’ The China Quarterly 
(Vol. 118, June 1989)
31 Michael Hunt, “ Normalising’ the Field’ (Paper presented at the Wilson Center Conference on ‘CCP External 
Relations’, Washington D. C. June 1992, pp. 3-5)
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went well beyond it in proposing methodologies and models to explain Chinese foreign 
policy behaviours in world politics.
This focus was largely the outcome of three developments. Firstly, there had been 
considerable expansion in research and education in international relations in China in 
the post-Mao period. Secondly, the opening of China to the outside world had made a 
vast array of information on the foreign policymaking structure available to Western 
scholars. Finally the cognitive/decisionmaking approach in favour in mainstream 
international relations and foreign policy studies32 was being integrated into the 
previously more or less self-contained field of Chinese foreign policy.
Institutional Approach
While the rational actor model was still deemed useful, the institutional approach in the 
1980s offered two useful frames of reference that focused on the governmental machine 
instead of state actors: the organisational process model and the bureaucratic politics 
model.34
The organisational process model regarded governmental behaviours less as a matter of 
deliberate choice and more as independent outputs of several large, key organisations 
which were only partly controlled and coordinated by government leaders. The
32 As embodied in works of such scholars as Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1956); and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976)
33 See Samuel Kim, ‘New Directions and Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the 
World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 188-193)
34 Bureaucratic politics model as discussed by Graham Allison. See Graham Allison, Essence o f Decision (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1971)
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behaviour of these organisations was primarily determined by standard or routine
35operating procedures with only gradual, incremental deviations.
The bureaucratic politics model, on the other hand, hypothesised intense competition 
among decisionmaking units with foreign policies resulting from bargaining among the 
different units within a bureaucracy.36 At times, the players were guided less by 
conceptions of national or even bureaucratic and personal goals. Sometimes, it was a 
win-or-lose game, but more frequently the result was a decisional compromise, less than 
what was sought by any individual or group, but the best achievable outcome. The 
outcome depended not on the rational justification for the policy nor on routine 
organisational procedures, but rather on the relative power positions and negotiating 
skill of the bargainers.37
Well before the rise of the institutional approach in decisionmaking theories, some 
scholars had shifted their focus from the power elite to the study of bureaucratic 
institutions and structures that supported political power.38 In his trail-blazing study 
Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China, Doak Barnett for the 
first time unequivocally highlighted the importance of perception and bureaucratic
35 Studies on this topic include: Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1967); The Making of Foreign Policy in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); 
Harry Harding, Organising China: The Problem o f Bureaucracy, 1949-1976 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1981); David Lampton, The Politics of Medicine in China: The Policy Process, 1949-1977 (Boulder: Westview: 
University of California Press, 1977); John Lewis and Xue Litai, ‘Strategic Weapons and Chinese Power: The 
Formative Years’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 112, December 1987); Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton eds. 
Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); 
Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leader, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988); Michel Oksenberg, ‘Methods of Communication Within the Chinese Bureaucracy’ 
The China Quarterly (Vol. 57, January-March 1974); John Garver, ‘China's Push through the South China Sea: The 
Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 132, December 1992)
36 Graham Allison, Essence o f Decision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 95-107)
37 ibid
38 For example, Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1967); and Michel Oksenberg, ‘Methods of Communication Within the Chinese Bureaucracy’ The 
China Quarterly (Vol. 57, January-March 1974)
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institutions in China’s domestic policymaking mechanism. These early works relied 
heavily on official documents, both public and internal, and on interviews with 
mainland refugees elsewhere in the world. In the early 1980s, as China embarked on 
economic reform and opening to the outside world, Western scholars took the 
opportunity to access the vast Chinese bureaucratic system hitherto closed to outsiders. 
This increased availability of research materials led to a new crop of studies on the 
Chinese bureaucratic institutions in the domestic policy process, but most of them were 
limited to specific fields such as economy or education where interaction with the 
outside world was relatively intense, reflecting an uneven degree of openness in the 
Chinese system.
Despite China’s commitment to a more open and transparent system, foreign affairs 
remained a field that was jealously guarded by the elite and carefully shielded from 
scrutiny by outsiders due to Chinese sensitivity over the formulation and process of the 
nation’s foreign policies. China’s increased political, economic, military and academic 
exchanges across a wide range of fields, however, created many opportunities too for 
Western scholars to penetrate Chinese government organisations and institutions, 
including China’s top institutes of international studies.40 As a result, the preemptive 
roles of these institutions and structures in Chinese foreign policymaking were firmly 
established supported by convincing data.41
39 Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1967, pp. 5-7)
40 Works devoted to the study of the structures of Chinese institutes of international studies include: David 
Shambaugh, ‘China's National Security Research Bureaucracy’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 110, June 1987); David 
Shambaugh and Wang Jisi, ‘Research on International Studies in the People's Republic of China’ Political Science, 
(No. 17 Fall 1984); Li Fan, ‘The Question of Interests in the Chinese Policy Making Process’ The China Quarterly 
(Vol. 109, March 1987); Douglas Murray, International Relations Research and Training in the People's Republic o f 
China (Stanford, Calif.: Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy, 1982)
41 ibid.
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About 20 years after his work on China’s domestic policymaking process, in 1985 Doak 
Barnett published the first major study on Chinese foreign policy bureaucratic system 
decision procedures. The Making o f Foreign Policy in China42 was the first successful 
attempt of this kind to examine, in considerable detail, the major sector of the Chinese 
foreign policy system. This was followed in 1988 by a more comprehensive and in- 
depth study of the whole policymaking structure conducted by Kenneth Lieberthal and 
Michel Oksenberg.43
In summary, the new institutional approach believed that the traditional (historical, 
ideological, rational actor, factional and triangular) models failed to accommodate the 
evolution of Chinese foreign policy reality in the new era, and they did not capture the 
important roles of the essential players in the process. The institutional approach 
believed that the key factors affecting the final outcome in Chinese foreign policy 
deliberation were organisational processes, bureaucratically based institutions as well as 
group inputs.
Perceptual Approach
Another strand in the new scholarship emphasised the images or perceptions44 held by 
Chinese leaders and foreign policy makers at different levels.45 There were also a
42 See Doak Barnett’s book, The Making o f Foreign Policy in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985)
43 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Process (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988)
44 The new interest in how Chinese leaders and scholars viewed the world was also a reaction to the traditional and 
Marxist ideology approaches of the earlier generations o f scholars. While all argued that images matter, the 
traditional approach argued that the images were based on Chinese traditional and imperial thinking; the 
Marxist/ideology school held that the relevant images came from ideology; the scholarly focus on images was more 
complex and certainly incorporated those perceptions that came from day-to-day political reporting and analysis.
45 Some o f the major works include David Shambaugh, ed.: The American Study o f Contemporary China (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); idem, ‘China's America Watchers’ Problems o f Communism (No. 37, May- 
August 1988); idem, ‘Anti-Americanism in China’ Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Sciences
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number of studies that focused on the perceptions and particular groups of Chinese 
foreign affairs experts on specific countries in an attempt to shed new lights on China’s 
policies toward major powers.46
The perceptual or cognitive/image orientation to the study of Chinese foreign policy 
was best exemplified by three scholarly works in the late 1980s and early 1990s: Gilbert 
Rozman's The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985,47 Allen Whiting's 
China Eyes Japan, and David Shambaugh's Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives 
America, 1972-1990,49 These studies focused on some principal concerns for 
contemporary Chinese foreign policy—the relations with the former Soviet Union, 
Japan and the United States. Taken together, these works broke new ground that led to a 
deeper understanding of Chinese thinking and its impact on China's foreign policy 
conceptualisation.
These three studies were quite different both in scope and findings. Rozman and 
Shambaugh examined the mind-set of those in China who occupied important policy 
positions and who focused on the former Soviet Union and the United States. Whiting
(No. 497, May 1988); Gilbert Rozman, The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985 (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1987); idem, ‘China's Soviet Watchers in the 1980s: A New Era in Scholarship’ World 
Politics (No. 37, July 1985); Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); 
Michael Hunt, ‘Mutual Images in US-China Relations’ Wilson Paper (No. 32, June 1988); Banning Garrett and 
Bonnie Glaser, ‘Chinese Estimates of the US-Soviet Balance of Power’ Wilson Paper (No. 33, July 1988); Harish 
Kapur, ed. As China Sees the World: Perceptions o f Chinese Scholars (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987); 
Michael Yahuda, ed. New Directions in the Social Sciences and Humanities in China (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1987); Yaacov Vertzberger, Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: the Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959-1962 (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1984)
46 Examples include: David Shambaugh, ‘China’s American Watchers’ Problems o f Communism (No. 37, May- 
August 1988); ‘Anti-Americanism in China’ Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Sciences (No. 
497, May 1988); Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991); Gilbert Rozman, ‘China Soviet Watchers in the 1980s: A New Era in Scholarship’ World Politics (No. 37, 
July 1985); The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); 
Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Harish Kapur ed. As China Sees 
the World: Perceptions o f Chinese Scholars (London: Frances Printer Publishers, 1987)
47 Gilbert Rozman, The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1987)
48 Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)
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probed a broader socio-historical context, examining the popular images of Japan dating 
back to the turn of the century, and especially those developed in World War II.50 All 
three scholars emphasised importance of the recent past when China began to pursue a 
pragmatic and ‘independent’ foreign policy, but their findings revealed that there were 
major differences in China's perceptions of these three countries.
Rozman discovered that the Chinese had been developing more positive perceptions of 
the former Soviet Union from the late 1970s to early 1980s, which paved the way for 
the eventual normalisation of relations with Moscow.51 He found that China’s negative 
perceptions of the Soviet Union gradually declined after more than twenty years of 
hostility between the two countries, and this generated momentum to improve relations
c ?
with Moscow during the early 1980s.
Whiting found that an underlying negative image of Japan remained basically 
unchanged across all levels of the society and policymaking elite due either to historical 
animosity or to current ignorance of Japan.53 According to Whiting, most Chinese still 
had strong negative feelings about Japan dating back to the Japanese invasion of China 
in the 1930s, but these were often counterbalanced by China's admiration for 
contemporary Japanese economic efficiency and high-quality consumer products.54 
Mixed feelings among top leadership and vast bureaucrats alike tended to give rise to a 
poorly orchestrated policy toward Tokyo, which, in Whiting’s view, frequently worked
44 David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991)
50 Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)
51 Gilbert Rozman, The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1987, pp. 24-34)
52 ibid.
53 Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, pp. 123-125)
54 ibid. pp. 87-92
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against China's interests.55 This attitude jeopardised China's interests because better 
relations with Japan would serve China's modernisation needs. This perception also 
created difficulties for the Chinese government at home, ranging from spontaneous 
student-led anti-Japanese demonstrations in the 1980s to reshuffling of top-level elites 
under the pressure of popular sentiment.56
Shambaugh's book was very thorough in documenting the perceptions of China's 
America watchers over an extended period of time. The work systematically explored 
both the structure of, and interrelationship between, various agencies of China's foreign 
policymaking community based on his earlier work57 and the perceptions of the US by 
those who worked in these institutions. His main contribution lay in his effort to bridge 
both institutional and cognitive approaches in the field. In terms of scope and accuracy, 
Shambaugh’s study surpassed Barnett's 1985 study on the same subject and had no 
parallel in the books by Rozman and Whiting.58 Shambaugh’s depiction of China's 
community of America watchers could also be extended, to a certain degree, to China's 
foreign policy and international study communities as a whole.
Shambaugh's conclusions, however, were somewhat unexpected and controversial. 
Despite his concession that there was a learning curve among China's Americanists,59 he 
believed that “with a few exceptions, the vast majority of America Watchers in China
55 ibid.
56 For example, the removal of Hu Yaobang, the party's general secretary, in 1987 for his softness toward Japan, 
which Whiting noted was not the only reason that he was removed. But the Japan factor did contribute to the 
outcome. See Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, pp. 150-153 and 
p. 184)
57 See David Shambaugh and Wang Jisi, ‘Research on International Studies in the People’s Republic of China’ 
Political Science (No. 17, Fall 1984)
58 Bin Yu, ‘The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospect’ World Politics (No. 46, January 1994)
59 David Shambaugh, ed. The American Study o f Contemporary China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1994, p. 41)
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do not understand the United States very well” .60 If this finding was fair, a significant 
‘perceptual gap’ on the Chinese side would continue to contribute to the fluctuating 
nature of Sino-US relations.61
This finding was quite different from the observations by Rozman and Whiting in their 
respective studies of China’s images of the Soviet Union and Japan. Both of them 
detected some general perceptual characteristics and trends among decision makers, 
scholars, and the general public that could find roughly corresponding patterns in the 
main thrust of China’s policies toward the Soviet Union and Japan.
However, David Shambaugh's argument that China's America watchers were ignorant 
and critical of the United States might well be superficial—their public views might 
well be suppressed and might not necessarily reflect their true views about the US. 
Indeed, opinions publicly expressed by these scholars were frequently different from 
their writings for internal circulation at various classified levels. The latter tended to be
TOmore factual and less ideologically or politically oriented.
It was almost a cliche to say that policy, especially foreign policy, was made on the 
basis of both perceptions and misperceptions, and that the latter may be more 
important.63 The making of China's foreign policy was no exception. Harry Harding 
speculated that even if China in the future developed political and economic systems
60 David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991, p. 304)
61 David Shambaugh, ed. The American Study o f Contemporary China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1994, p. 41 and p. 283)
62 See Wang Jianwei and Lin Zhimin, ‘Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era’ Asian Survey (No. 32, October 
1992, p. 904)
63 See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976, pp. 176-181)
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comparable to that of the US and other major powers—therefore closing up gaps in 
material terms, the different perceptions, culture/values, historical experiences and 
geopolitical locations would still make for some unavoidable and necessary differences 
on the same issues.64
By the same token, the image of China in the minds of its foreign counterparts would 
continue to be rooted deeply in China’s history as a whole rather than judged in terms of 
its more recent development. In this regard, there would still be a tendency to view 
China in terms of “simplistic, exaggerated, and emotional images...as ally or adversary, 
as willing student or as ideological antagonist” .65
Among other works addressing the relationship between perception and foreign policy, 
the book by Chih-Yu Shih The Spirit o f Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psycho cultural View 
stands out for its unique research methodology. Chih-Yu Shih examined Chinese 
diplomatic history from a cross-level ‘psychocultural-cybemetic’66 perspective. He 
focused on the cultural-historical context of Chinese leaders such as Li Hongzhang, 
Yuan Shikai, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Zedong, in order to establish linkages between 
the underlying motivation and the making, implementation, and outcome of foreign 
policy. He believed the key factor in China's diplomacy was “to maintain the integrity 
of the national face in front of the world, the internal citizenry, and statesmen 
themselves.” This ‘face-saving diplomacy’, he claimed, was the common denominator 
among all prominent Chinese foreign policy makers—from the last emperors to the
64 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The Untied States and China since 1972 (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1991, pp. 18-19, p. 359)
65 ibid. pp. 360-361
66 Chih-Yu Shih, The Spirit o f Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990)
67 ibid. p. 190
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nationalist generalissimo and finally to the communists.68 All of them were the products 
of the distinctive Chinese mix of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and traditional 
values.69
Shih's book was based on his impressive knowledge of China's cultural heritage and 
marked by the distinctive methods he employed to argue the case. He conducted an in- 
depth study into the mind-set of some important foreign policy players in China’s 
diplomatic history, viewed from the perspective of the Chinese cultural context. 
However, his use of the contemporary Western psychological technique of cybernetics 
did not seem to advance understanding of contemporary Chinese foreign policy at a 
more general level.
Gradual Emergence of Motivation as the Main Focus
The above review showed that despite the increasingly rich and diverse literature on 
Chinese foreign policy and foreign relations since China's opening to the outside world, 
despite the newly available research information and opportunities, and despite 
indisputable advance in both the quantity and quality of scholarship, no single existing 
'model' seemed to have possessed sufficient analytical power to fully cover the 
complexity and magnitude of Chinese foreign policy. Precisely because China's sheer 
physical size and its complex social, historical, cultural, ethnic and demographic 
dimensions were so diverse, any theoretical attempt must give its object a capacity to 
absorb strength from other relevant disciplines.
68 ibid. p. 18
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The new generation of scholarship on Chinese foreign policy discussed in the previous 
section not only demarcated new lines of inquiry, but also opened up possibilities for a 
more comprehensive and thoughtful understanding of China's foreign policymaking 
institutions and individuals. Its achievements, both in scope and depth, were necessary 
stepping-stones for the emergence of the current trend of scholarship on the study of 
motivation of Chinese foreign policy.
In recent years, quite a number of academic works on Chinese foreign policy chose to 
use interrogative titles.70 These choices could be said to be deliberately put to convey a 
growing sentiment of dissatisfaction and perplexedness among scholars as they found 
inadequacy of theories in the study of Chinese foreign policy. Despite the enormous 
advance in the study of Chinese foreign policy, as discussed in this chapter, a theory 
that was capable of handling the magnitude and complexity, the nature and scope of 
China’s foreign policy was still lacking.
This state of affairs nurtured an interest in taking motivation analysis as the main focus 
in the study of Chinese foreign policy, and a group of scholars took the challenge. This 
trend was exemplified by such works as Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The 
Micro-Macro Linkage Approach, 71 ‘Motives of the People’s Republic of China in 
Contemporary International Relations’ ,72 The Role o f the Chinese Military in National
69 ibid.
70 This kind o f interrogative titles are typified by Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 essay ‘End o f History?’ in dealing with 
more generic issues o f the international relations, and David Shambaugh’s book Greater China, The Next 
Superpower? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) in dealing specifically with Chinese foreign policy.
71 Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkdage Approach (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1996)
72 Greg Austin, ‘Motives of the People’s Republic of China in Contemporary International Relations’ Greg Austin, 
China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force, and National Development (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1998)
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Security Policymaking, 73 China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy,74 Useful 
Adversaries, 15 The Dynamics o f Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China.16 What 
differentiates these scholars from their predecessors was the attention being paid to the 
Chinese leadership perceptions of the political obstacles to their grand strategies. Their 
refocus on the Chinese decision makers’ calculation of high domestic hurdles and 
international pressure, and on the intense interactive process among all of these factors 
to manipulate resources to reposition themselves, projected a new insight to the study of 
Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking process.
Allen Whiting welcomed this new phenomenon by giving it his personal support and 
encouragement in his recent review essay on Christensen’s Useful Adversaries. Whiting 
observed that motivational analysis was a tentative option and a valuable research 
methodology under certain conditions. He argued that motivation approach was 
especially necessary when “the event is long past, the evidence is partial, and the actors 
are unavailable.” 77 The study of Chinese foreign policy constantly faced the same 
dilemma and was often handicapped by the unavailability or partial availability of 
evidence. Whiting predicted that motivation study would prove to offer a special 
theoretical insight and empirical value to the study of Chinese foreign policy.
The newly emerged trend of taking motivation analysis as main focus in the study of 
Chinese foreign policy was a welcoming sign in the field of Chinese foreign policy
73 Michael Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking (Calif.: Santa Monica, 
RAND, 1996)
74 Michael Swaine, China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (Calif. : Santa Monica, RAND, 1995)
75 Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996)
76 Lu Ning, The Dynamics o f Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997)
77 Allen Whiting, ‘Leaping over the Great Wall Between Security and China Studies’ Security Studies (Vol. 6, No. 4, 
Summer 1997, p. 188)
78 ibid.
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study. There was evidence that the motivation approach has expanded its influence and 
has gathered momentum to become a significant analytical paradigm in the field of 
Chinese foreign policy study.
Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the literature on the Chinese foreign policy in the broad context 
of international relations theory. Particular attention was paid to the new scholarship of 
institutional and perceptual approaches and the emergence of a trend that took interest 
in investigating Chinese leadership motivation as a crucial analytical variable.
This chapter argued that the complex and dynamic nature of Chinese foreign policy 
required that concepts or theories posited to explain it should reflect the magnitude of 
the task and should be robust. However, the immensity of the unknown, the volatility of 
political developments, the elusiveness of values in quantitative analysis, the intricate 
interaction between domestic/societal and extemal/systemic factors and the continuous 
shifts and changes in the contemporary international system compounded the difficulties 
in formulating a comprehensive theoretical framework.
This chapter demonstrated that despite indisputable advances in the study of Chinese 
foreign policy in the last two decades, and despite significant contributions to Chinese 
foreign policy literature, the limitations of existing analytical methodologies led some 
scholars to redirect their attention to perceptual/motivation analysis as a more effective 
alternative in the study of Chinese foreign policy. With newly available evidence and 
archival information, these scholars produced some fruitful research outcomes that
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started to affect the general study of Chinese foreign policy.
This chapter concluded that unlike in democratic systems, politics (especially foreign 
policy) in China was always conducted in a highly secretive manner with little 
transparency. This reality made the motivation approach a particularly attractive tool—a 
way of inferring what was otherwise enclosed and hidden. The newly emerging trend in 
motivation study tended to confirm the practicality and relevance of this approach. 
Indeed, one of the principal advantages of adopting the motivation approach was its 
ability to enhance the visibility of the studied object, thereby making the forecast of 
future policy directions possible.
PART II
DYNAMICS AND LIMITS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
TRANSFORMATION FROM MAO TO DENG
Part I has identified three elements, ie. perception, personality and structural/situational 
constraints, as central to the study of motivation in foreign policy. Part II, by applying 
deductive methodology, tests the viability and rigour of these examined motivation 
theories. It does so by reviewing pivotal elements of communist China’s foreign policy 
considerations in general and the nature of the transformation of the motivation under 
Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in particular.
There are four chapters in this Part. Chapter Four traces historical and cultural sources 
of perception that have affected Chinese Communist foreign policy motivation. Chapter 
Five probes personal attributes of Mao and Deng in shaping contemporary Chinese 
foreign policy. Chapter Six assesses the impact of structural changes and systemic 
transformation on the formation of the CCP’s core values in its foreign policy. And 
Chapter Seven highlights the dynamic nature of Chinese foreign policy by incorporating 
the analytical outcomes of the previous three chapters. By drawing on existing literature 
from history and political science, this Part evinces more specifically than has been done 
previously the way in which perception, personality and structural/situational factors 
have moulded Chinese foreign policy motivation over different periods and issues.
The main aim of this Part is to hypothesise that in spite of the dramatic transformation 
in the appearance of Chinese foreign policy in the last 20 years, the central motivation 
legacy of Mao’s foreign policy remains in place in Deng’s much-championed open and 
reform era. Part III will provide an empirical case study to verify that general 
hypothesis.
Chapter Four
Perception—from Besieged Mentality to Pragmatic Global Player
The analysis of motivation theories in Part I has established that there were at least three 
elements that were essential building blocks of a given country’s foreign policy 
motivation—perception, personality and situational constraints. This chapter examines 
one of the trio—the role of perception in Chinese foreign policy motivation under both 
Mao and Deng.
The importance of perception in foreign policy motivation was identified by many 
scholars, but exactly how much weight perception would exert in a given policy 
environment depended much on how such a perception itself was formed. Historical 
sources and political ideology could be two crucial moulding forces that cast leadership 
perception. For example, Robert Jervis suggested that the principal source of perception 
or ‘image’ was stereotyped interpretations of significant historical incidents, particularly 
wars and revolutions. 1 23 Both Jervis and Cottam argued that historical experience could 
be one of the most important ingredients in the crystallisation of perception. The 
Hermanns concluded that perception based in past experience, if combined with an 
extended political culture, would have an enduring effect. It was also widely 
acknowledged that perception was largely grounded on past experience, pressures from 
current development and the knowledge and inspiration of the leadership.4
1 Robert Jervis, ‘Hypotheses on Misperception’ World Politics (Vol. 20, April 1968, p. 458). He argued that it was 
impossible to explain important foreign policy decisions without understanding decision makers’ beliefs about the 
world and the motives of other actors in it. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 93-105)
2 ibid, and Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (London: Feffer and Simons Inc. 1977, 43-49)
3 Margaret Hermann and Charles Hermann, ‘Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry’
International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 33, No. 4, December 1989, pp. 363-365)
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The magnitude and speed of changes in China’s foreign policy decisionmaking and 
behaviour from 1978 to 1997 were widely acknowledged as a distinctive transformation 
in China’s foreign policy posture, but scholars remained divided over the question of 
whether Beijing had abandoned its revolutionary foreign policy philosophy which 
viewed the world with suspicion and hostility, or whether the changes were merely 
pragmatic adjustment with the underlying motivation remaining unchanged.4 5 This 
chapter suggests that some light can be thrown on the motivational foundations of the 
transformation of China’s foreign policy through an analysis of the concept of 
perception elucidated in Chapter Two.
This chapter looks at the historical sources and ideological underpinning of the 
perceptions of various regimes which affected Chinese communist foreign policy 
motivation. It goes back in time to understand one of the essential ingredients that 
impacted on the CCP’s perception of world order and its uneasy relations within it. It 
argues that it was China’s embedded sense of insecurity and siege mentality that were 
the primary historical sources of Chinese foreign policy perception. This historical 
heritage was exemplified by the dynastic rulers’ tremendous effort in building the Great 
Wall throughout thousands of years of the feudal reign, and which was reinforced by 
another century or so of national humiliation imposed by the Western powers on the 
modem China. This chapter contends that although China’s pragmatic policies in the 
last two decades of the twentieth century marked a significant departure from the 
encircled and isolated mentality in its foreign policy presentation, this historical 
obsession was nonetheless still a recurring feature in China’s handling of sensitive
4 Lloyd Kaufman, Perception: The World Transformed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 112-118)
5 For example, see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Learning Versus Adaption: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control 
Policy in the 1980s and 1990s’ The China Journal (No 35, January 1996)
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issues such as sovereignty.
This chapter analyses changes in the perception of Chinese leaders by examining four 
basic questions: What was the historical and ideological foundation of the CCP’s 
perception in relation to its foreign policy thinking? What were the stimuli that 
reinforced or reduced the perception intensity in terms of China’s positioning its 
relations with other countries under different circumstances by the same historical 
events? How did the regime’s perceptions affect motivation? And finally, how did 
motivation in turn impact on the leadership’s perceptions?
There are two sections in this chapter. The first deals with historical sources of foreign 
policy perception by focusing on the single most prominent event in Chinese history— 
the building of the Great Wall—to demonstrate how at different historical junctures 
actual and perceived threats could impose enduring effects upon the conceptualising 
process to produce a threatened and siege mentality. By surveying the political, strategic 
and military rationales that lay behind the ‘wall-building’ practice in China’s long past, 
the impact of the rulers’ fixation on a deep-seated dichotomy of ‘others’ vs ‘us’, and 
their uncompromising attitude to ‘enemies’, are made clear. The second section deals 
with ideological components and transformation. It investigates China’s more recent 
communist history by analysing the ideological foundation of the CCP’s foreign policy 
and the diminishing role of communist ideology in foreign policy perception in the last
two decades.
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Historical Sources
The diplomatic historian Michael Hunt observed in his 1996 book The Genesis of 
Chinese Foreign Policy that “history is essential and central, not optional and incidental, 
to an understanding of Chinese foreign policy.”6 78He argued that a more sophisticated 
historical approach had returned to the centre of focus in the study of Chinese foreign 
policy after decades of dispute over its real value because such an approach did provide 
a sense of the enduring pulse of Chinese interaction with the world. According to this 
view, China’s rich and colourful historical legacy should therefore be unapologetically 
taken as the logical starting point in understanding the perception of Chinese leaders in 
their approaches to external relations.
However, the notion of historical sources of Chinese foreign policy perception should 
not be taken as equating to a single-strand determinism. Instead an inclusive 
connotation of historical approach should make it possible to accommodate various 
perspectives. In addition to the presumptuous ‘middle kingdom’ mentality and the 
indignity of more than a hundred years ‘humiliation’ at the hands of imperialists, 
ruthless power struggles and constant wars within the interstate system were also 
important in the Chinese historiography. As shown in such classics of Chinese history
n
as the Chronicle o f the Warring States and in popular tales such as the Romance o f the 
Three Kingdoms,9 the arts of the polity were displayed in full: temporary
6 Michael Hunt, The Genesis o f Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p.
3)
7 ibid.
8 Sima Qian, Chronicles o f the Warring States (Beijing: Shangwu chubanshe, 1922). This is a history book, recording 
wars and politics in the Chinese warring states period from 480-222 BC.
9 Luo Guanzhong, San guoyanyi (Romance o f the Three Kingdoms), translated by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor (Rutland, 
Vermont: C. E. Tuttle, 1959). It is a story about politics, military strategies and diplomacy in the three kingdoms 
period.
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accommodation, alliances made and abandoned, ambush and treachery, the careful 
cultivation of domestic resources, morale, psychological warfare and raw military 
power all occupied important places in the arsenal of the statesmen who wanted to rule 
and maintain power.10
With such a rich and diverse repertoire of prolonged war, peace, court politics and 
governing arts, and with recurring behaviour patterns towards the outside world, it is 
clear that China’s historical development had an enduring impact on its overall foreign 
policy thinking. With a few exceptions,* 11 until the mid nineteenth century when 
Western powers forced open the door of China to the modem world system, the Chinese 
ruling houses demonstrated inward-looking, culturally superior attitudes in dealing with 
foreign relations. When a ‘threat’ arose, they quickly returned to the defensive posture 
by resuming to build the Great Wall in order to ‘keep out’ enemies, instead of looking 
for other options.12
The establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 was claimed to be a fundamental 
revolution in the sense of breaking away from these ideological constraints and adapting 
to a new world system of states. However, before China’s open door policy in the late 
1970s, China had remained a reluctant player in the international system with rules laid 
down by the Western powers (or ‘others’), and had largely isolated itself outside the 
increasingly interdependent world. Even in its ambitious attempt to integrate China with
10 ibid. Chpts. 2 and 3
11 For example, the Yuan (1271-1368) and the Qing. All these dynasties conquered China by force, but they could not 
culturally transform it. In fact, the conquerors were forced to assimilate into the Chinese culture for their own 
survival and expansion.
12 See Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross eds. The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1997). The Great Wall has given China an unequivocal landmark that finds no easy parallel in other civilisations. The 
gradual decline and final fall of the Great Wall during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries and its dramatic 
resurrection to the status of national symbol from the beginning of the twentieth century by both the KMT and the 
CCP speak profusely of the symbolic importance of the Great Wall to the Chinese political leadership.
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the rest of the world in the reform era, the theme of China’s humiliation at the hands of 
the West and Japan in the last two hundred years was, on many occasions, used 
successfully by the CCP to manipulate public anti-foreign sentiment. The CCP’s 
obsession with history tightly linked China’s present to the past.
This paradox meant that the study of historical influences on the Chinese leadership’s 
foreign policy perceptions must be pursued on two fronts. First, the impact of 
extraordinary historical occurrences on perception should be highlighted in order to 
better understand the relationship between an historical event and its present-day policy 
implications. Second, the reverse effect of a deeply entrenched perception reinforced by 
the prolonged and repeated practice (eg. building of the Great Wall) on the Chinese 
rulers’ strategic thinking and foreign policy choices should be analysed and compared.
Others, Threats and Wall-building
The flourishing and decline of ancient Chinese civilisation was paralleled with perpetual 
apprehensions over national security and actual armed conflicts across the northwest 
frontiers. Various nomadic tribes followed a pastoral way of life, subsisting on the 
products of their flocks, and usually moved with the seasons from one place to 
another. 13 Yet until modem weaponry finally shifted the balance, nomads possessed a 
powerful military advantage over settled peoples, and from one end of Eurasia to the 
other, they were treated as the most dangerous of adversaries. 14 In addition, China’s
13 See Encyclopedia Britannica (Vol. 16, 1969, pp. 558-559). Also Edwin Seligman ed. Encyclopedia o f the Social 
Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933, Vol. 11, pp. 390-392)
14 ibid. Edwin Seligman pointed out that “certain pastoral people have built up military organisations formed on 
democratic lines, without slaves or social stratification but with rigorous discipline exercised by the elders...The 
Manchus, Turks and Mongols not only dominated central Asia in this way but also invaded surrounding regions. In
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geographical proximity and relatively advanced agrarian system producing abundant 
food and other products made it a natural target for nomad’s plunder.
While some might have exaggerated the military prowess of the nomads, ancient 
Chinese writers were quite correct when they pointed out the disproportionate military 
effectiveness of nomadic forces when compared with the Chinese. 15 The Chinese, like 
other settled peoples in most of the Eurasian continent, had no reliable military solution. 
To assault the nomads on their own terms was difficult: logistically, horses did not 
flourish in China and peasants made poor cavalrymen. 16 Yet defence was also not a 
fully satisfactory option either: it was hard to hold a long perimeter in the face of a
17mobile foe, and it was very costly.
This dilemma forced the ruling classes to opt for two strategies in order to thwart the 
menace—moral campaigns to condemn the injustice of aggression and building a 
defence line in China’s northwest to maximise its military capability and to stop the 
invaders from trespassing.
The traditional Chinese moral campaigns aimed at implanting a perception of inferiority 
of nomads and ingraining this image in the whole Chinese society. Typical Chinese 
views usually depicted nomads as making war on settled societies simply because it was
some cases these military nomads merged with agricultural groups and formed stratified societies, as in the case of 
the Manchu conquerors and the Chinese peasants.” p. 392
15 Ban Gu, Han Shu (.History o f Han Dynasty) 94A. 3759. Translated by Burton Watson in his Records o f the Grand 
Historian o f China (New York and London: Columbia University Press, Vol. II. 155 , 1961)
16 Gerald Segal, Defending China (London: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 55-57)
17 ibid
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in their nature. Shi Ji,s had the following paragraph describing the Xiong-nu19:
It is their custom to herd their flocks in times of peace and make their living by 
hunting, but in periods of crises they take up arms and go off on plundering and 
marauding expeditions. This seems to be their inborn nature.
From the first few centuries of the first millennium, nomads were attacked for their 
physical lowliness to stress their moral unworthiness. For example, Han Shu defined the 
same people as “covetous for gain, human-faced but animal-hearted.” Just as their 
nature marked the limits of human character, so their homeland was thought of as the 
edge of the world. The Xiong-nu were believed to dwell in the north where the harsh 
climate and austere living conditions matched their cruelty and barbarism. Shi Ji 
repeatedly called the Xiong-nu’s lands “unfit for habitation; they were nothing but 
swamps and saline wastes.” 24 In military skirmishes, when ‘chased’ by Chinese troops, 
the Xiong-nu would hide in “the north of the desert in a cold bitter land where no other 
lives exist.” 25
It is interesting to compare these stereotyped description of Xiong-nu with those of the 
Westerners from overseas in Qing time. Wang Chung Yang portrayed the British as 
having “the beaks of eagles, the eyes of cats, red beards and hair, and long legs which
18 Shi Ji (The Record o f the Historian) was one of the earliest Chinese history books by Sima Qian more than 2000 
years ago. Burton Watson Records o f the Grand Historian o f China, I. 133 (New York and London: Columbia 
University Press, 1961)
19 Xiong-nu referred to nomads in today’s Mongolian areas, or ‘barbarians’ as they were called.
20 Shi Ji (The Record o f the Historian) 110. 2879. Translated by Burton Watson in his Records of the Grand 
Historian o f China (New York and London: Columbia University Press, Vol. I. 133, 1961)
21 Ban Gu, Han Shu (History o f Han Dynasty), 94B.3834 . Translated by Burton Watson in his Records o f the Grand 
Historian o f China (New York and London: Columbia University Press, Vol. II. 112, 1961)
22 ibid
23 Ruth Meserve, ‘The Inhospitable Land of the Barbarian’ Journal o f Asian History (Vol. 16, No. 1, 1982, pp. 52-58)
24 Quoted in ibid. p. 53
25 ibid. p. 55
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could not bend, making it impossible for them to run or jump.” 26 These derogatory 
images were comparable to those of fierce-looking Xiong-nu described above. The 
physical and cultural inferiority formed the Chinese rulers’ perceptions, and popular 
perceptions, o f ‘others’.
The ruthless attacks on the moral worthlessness of the enemies paved the way for the 
Chinese ruling houses to justify their defence strategy of building the Great Wall as a 
military means to ward off danger. The Great Wall was designed not only to protect 
Chinese territory, but also to safeguard the civilisation from moral decay. These 
perceptions about nomads, and later, Westerners, were central to construe the dilemmas 
of the wall-building syndrome by the dynasty rulers, whose handicapped military 
capability had to rely on moral righteousness for justification. On the one hand, the 
military advantage of nomads was extremely difficult to challenge; on the other hand, 
the willingness on the Chinese side to meet and manage nomadic conditions for peace 
and to reduce the threat of aggression were often at odds with fundamental cultural 
norms.27 Under these circumstances, wall-building, with its overriding motivation to 
keep out the nomads was the logical solution to the quandary.
Mark Mancall observed that before they adopted their predecessors’ old tactics of wall­
building, almost all dynasties went through the cycle of appeasement/accommodation 
with and confrontation of the nomads: the former tried to meet many of the basic needs 
from both sides, but almost all accommodation policies were gradually displaced by a 
more uncompromising attitude because of the inevitable intensification of court politics,
26 Quoted from Yen-p’ing Hao and Erh-min Wang, ‘Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations’ Denis Twitchett 
and John Fairbank eds. The Cambridge History o f China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, Vol. 11, p. 
152)
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which often resorted to increasing cultural pressures to crush the opponents. Once 
further concession was ruled out as a means of dealing with the on-going danger, the 
choice facing dynastic rulers was limited to either attempted conquest or exclusion. As 
discussed above, since offensive warfare was extremely costly and almost impossible, 
the ultimate choice, at the end of each cycle, was usually to return to consolidation of 
the northern frontiers by repeated efforts to continue wall-building.
The pivotal question, however, was why a more accommodating policy could not 
prevail and persist, if it seemed to be in the practical interest of the ruling house. This 
provoking question was constantly asked by Arthur Waldron in his book The Great 
Wall o f China.29 He maintained that to understand the chronic wall-building syndrome, 
the civilian politics and the fundamental cultural orientation in defining it beyond the
O A
border held the key. He argued that the Chinese rulers’ belief, which was cultivated 
by cultural traditions, had been well established long before the nomads appeared. This 
belief system provided no intellectual framework to deal with people as different in 
every respect as the nomads. Furthermore this belief system simply could not 
accommodate the degree of equality and reciprocity required for a smooth working
32relationship with the nomads and their increasing demands on the Chinese empire. 
These policy choices lay at the heart of Chinese concepts of morality and cultural 
superiority. As a result, while accommodation could be practised temporarily, it could 
never legitimately be elevated to become a strategy without also violating moral
28
27 Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the Present Day (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975, pp. 98- 
102)
28 Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years o f Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984, pp. 56-61)
29 Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall o f China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
30 ibid. pp. 132-135
31 ibid
32 ibid.
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norms.33 And as long as the Chinese dynastic rulers continued to perceive ‘others’ and 
their ‘threats’ from these perspectives, to build and reinforce the Great Wall along the 
northern border seemed to be the only rational option for them.
The Effect o f  Wall-building on Perception
So far it has been made clear that one common theme that ran through Chinese dynastic 
foreign policy thinking was that the rulers’ perception of enemies and their perils often 
led to the recurring policy of building or reinforcing the Great Wall as a last defence. In 
Part I of this thesis, it was established that a perception could be strengthened by a 
repeated policy or action. What was, then, the consequent effect of the strategy of wall­
building on the Chinese rulers’ foreign policy perception, past and present? This section 
concludes that although the wall-building syndrome was the direct result of the 
perception of the dangers posed by ‘barbarians’ on the part of the dynasty rulers as well 
as the indirect consequence of a combination of moral self-definition and military 
incapability, the chronic practice of seeking refuge behind the Great Wall over a long 
period of time had a crippling effect on the ruler’s strategic thinking, and it reinforced 
the original Chinese sense of besiegement and distrust in its foreign policy motivation.
More importantly, this reverse effect on China’s foreign policy perception seemed to 
outlast the wall-building activities. Arthur Waldron recapitulated that, in the later years 
of China’s long feudal reign, the building of the Wall became a symbol rather than 
having any military utility.34 For example, when the construction work was still 
proceeding on the Great Wall in the Ming period, the dynasty fell into the hands of
33 ibid. p. 156
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Manchu state, initially a typical frontier polity, which grew up like others on the 
margins of China.35 The Great Wall, like the French Maginot Line, turned out to be of 
little use when real invasion occurred.
The real value of the Great Wall’s building was, however, lying more in its 
psychological potency of moral inimitability than in military raison d ’etre. It was 
arguable that had the Ming taken an active interest in steppe politics, they might have 
been able to control the Manchu threat before it grew too strong. This could have been 
achieved by using trade and diplomacy to cement a bilateral relationship, while 
simultaneously seeking to develop some Mongol military counterweight to the Manchu 
threat.36 The political problems that earlier beset the court policy toward the nomads 
from Mongolia were applied toward the Manchus as well. The same kind of political 
squabbles and moral controversy contributed to the effective elimination of this 
option.37 The various dynasty rulers’ intellectual ability for policy judgement regarding 
peace or war, concession or confrontation, hostility or ‘kinship-making’ (he-qin) was 
severely circumscribed by the same overwhelming perceptual bias, which at once had to 
uphold the belief of Chinese moral supremacy and respond to the insurmountable 
military hegemony from the outside. The cycle of wall-building practice in turn further 
reinforced this sense of isolation and siege. The Manchu conquest in the seventeenth 
century eventually brought down the Great Wall and forced China to open its frontier to 
foreign partition. This was the beginning of China’s modem chapter of ‘humiliation’
34 ibid. pp. 211-223
35 Joseph Fletcher, ‘Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800’ John Fairbank ed. The Cambridge History o f China (Cambridge 
University Press, 1978, Vol. 10, pp. 38-39)
36 Thomas Barfield, ‘The Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy: Organisation and Foreign Policy’ Journal o f Asian 
Studies (Vol. 41, No. 1, 1981, p. 31)
37 Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall o f China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 211-212)
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38history which the Wall was designed to prevent in the first place.
The upshot of this historical event left a profound impact on the CCP’s foreign policy 
perception, with different intensities, in both the Mao and Deng eras. The CCP inherited 
at least two unmistakable historical legacies in its foreign policy thinking. One was the 
siege mentality, the other a deep suspicion and distrust of ‘others’.
i) The Siege Mentality
As discussed above, for almost all Chinese ancient rulers, the decision of ‘to build’ or 
‘not to build’ the Great Wall did not come automatically as the first and only option to 
deal with domestic and foreign problems. As Owen Lattimore found, court politics was 
also ridden with political contention, disagreement and policy stalemate rather than 
commanding a cohesive and unified wall-building policy consensus.39 Just as there was 
no single, enduring border established in ancient times, so there was no single fixed 
security policy for each and all dynasties.40 Rather, at various times, a whole series of 
policy possibilities were adopted and tried out, such as offensive military action, 
diplomatic persuasion and economic integration.
Although wall-building often won the debate within the ruling classes as an ultimate 
measure for dealing with the problems in political, ideological and military conflicts 
with nomads, it was by no means the only policy choice. The realisation that the
38 Thomas Barfield, ‘The Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy: Organisation and Foreign Policy’ Journal o f Asian 
Studies (Vol. 41, No. 1, 1981, p. 33)
39 Owen Lattimore, ‘Origins of the Great Wall of China: A Frontier Concept in Theory and Practice’ Studies in 
Frontier History: Collected Papers 1928-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 112-198)
40 James Geiss, ‘The Chia-Ching Reign, 1522-1566’ Frederick Mote and Denis Twitchett eds. Cambridge History o f 
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, Vol. 7, pp. 466-479)
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nomads could not simply be defeated led the Tang and Han, for example, to develop 
policies that sought to manage the threat either by economic and diplomatic exchanges, 
or by using these in combination with military pressures.41 The Han model of this 
approach was called “he qin”, meaning literally “peaceful and friendly relations”, and 
was followed for nearly sixty years.42 It combined the establishment of kinship and 
blood ties with the opening of markets on the borders and the payment of subsidies to 
the nomads by the Chinese.43 A treaty was signed between Han and Xiong-nu declaring 
that a Chinese princess was to be married to the nomadic ruler.44
However, the influence of these gestures on the Chinese diplomatic record was almost 
negligible compared with the dominant besieged world view. Even the much-used 
tributary system45 in the fifteenth century, with its more open economic relationship 
with the peripheral peoples in the following centuries, did not change the Chinese
41 Kwang-chih Chang, Art, Myth, and Ritual: the Path to Political Authority in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983, pp. 123-125)
4* Yu Ying Shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967, p. 10)
43 ibid. pp. 15-18
44 ibid. pp. 41-42. However, “he qin" policy was not a complete success. Hostility continued while the dynasty 
suffered material loss. Most importantly, it was viewed with deep disapproval from moral stand: to recognise the 
leader of the nomads as a brother, to marry even a very minor royal princess into his line, to deliver Chinese goods to 
the “barbarians”—all flew in the face of attitudes about Chinese culture that were deeply entrenched even in this 
early period of the imperial state. It is worth quoting Jia Yi’s criticism on such a policy at length, because it was 
revealing that what really upset some in the Han court was its incompatibility with Chinese ideas of hierarchy. He 
said: “The situation of the empire may be described as like that of a person hanging upside down. The Son of Heaven 
is the head of the empire. Why? Because they should remain on the top. The barbarians are the feet of the empire. 
Why? Because they should be placed at the bottom. Now, the Xiong-nu are arrogant and insolent on the one hand, 
and invade and plunder us on the other hand, which must be considered as an expression of extreme disrespect 
toward us. And the harm they have been doing to the empire is boundless. Yet each year Han provides them with 
money, silk floss and fabrics. To command the barbarian is the power vested in the Emperor on the top, and to 
present tribute to the Son of Heaven is a ritual to be performed by the vassals at the bottom. Hanging upside down 
like this is something beyond comprehension.” ibid. pp. 10-12
45 The tribute system was a structure of fictive kinship through which non-Chinese rulers accepted a position of ritual 
subordination to the Chinese emperor. This relationship was expressed through periodic missions, in which the 
tributary or his envoys would present goods and perform required rituals, in return for Chinese patronage and gifts. 
See John Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer, East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960). 
Tributaries might call for Chinese help if attacked, while the exchange of tribute and gifts amounted to a form of 
trade. Modem scholars have drawn on Qing’s practice of tribute system and argued that this system and belief in it 
pretty well defined pre-modem international relations in East Asia, in a Sino-centric way. Furthermore such a mental 
tendency was said to have significantly influenced the contemporary outlook of the Chinese foreign policy. See John 
Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary Framework’ The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968, 
pp. 1-19)
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fundamental rejection of the outside world, either.46 The final return to an enclosed and 
inward-looking wall-building posture at the end of almost every dynastic cycle reflected 
the persistence and dominance of the siege mentality among the ruling classes. As 
Arthur Waldron incisively pointed out:
the failure to reconcile pragmatic and idealised visions of the world, and the 
tendency to inject morality into political controversies, are two of the policy’s 
most enduring characteristics.47
When in 1644 the Manchus seized the throne of China, the Great Wall finally collapsed 
and lost its economic, political and military functions. No longer did it mark a military 
or even a national boundary: the Qing held the territory on both sides of the Wall. And 
whatever abstract philosophical significance the Wall might once have had as a dividing 
line between ‘barbarism’ and ‘civilisation’ was also necessarily expunged.
As mentioned above, the siege mentality did not dissipate with the end of feudal rule in 
China. On the contrary, the nationalist and communist regimes in the twentieth century 
fortified the siege mentality in their foreign policy conceptualisation. For example, by 
providing a set of strong self-sufficient and self-reliant political, ideological, military,
46 For example that Ming’s tribute system worked was to some extent due to the fact that the nomads had their own 
rationalisation of the concept of ‘tribute’, one which gave them a high status in a way that mirrored what the Chinese 
saw in the system. Thus the Mongols believed that because they had helped the Ming in its empire building, they 
were entitled to the goods derived from tribute presentation. See John Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer, East Asia: 
The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960). According to Henry Serruys, Mongol chronicles were “poor 
witnesses to the exact nature of the events, but they clearly reflect a tradition among the Mongols that return gifts for 
their tribute were a tribute to them, non-payment of which was apt to trigger instant retaliation.” See Henry Serruys, 
‘Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming, II. The Tribute System and Diplomatic Missions (1400-1600)’, quoted in 
Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall o f China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 85). So for the Ming 
system to work, it required accommodation from both sides, and when unwillingness prevailed over the court to 
simply let tribute be the rubric for trade, conflicts inevitably occurred. It was also this unwillingness to trade with the 
Mongols and being unable to defeat them militarily that, by the middle of the sixteen century, the Ming had no policy 
choice left but to resume large-scale wall-building activities in an attempt to exclude the nomads by artificial barriers. 
Thus from then on to the end of the century witnessed the heyday of wall-building in China. The Great Wall now 
visible is the remain of the defence system of that era. This self-besieged and isolated mentality in the Chinese part 
showed the insurmountable hurdle in a clean breakaway from that tradition. In other words, the ‘spell of the Great 
Wall’ (Lu Xun’s description of the suffocating historical burden of the Great Wall on the Chinese) seemed to have 
fast fixed on the Chinese minds.
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social and economic nation-building arguments, the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution demonstrated this inclination to be a powerful source to have 
continuously influenced the CCP’s foreign policy deliberation process.
ii) Suspicion and Distrust of ‘Others’
Closely related to the siege mentality was the warily suspicious nature and easily- 
indulged distrust of ‘others’ in traditional Chinese communist foreign policy. Strong 
suspicion and distrust of various Chinese regimes had certainly existed prior to the 
CCP, and it seemed to deepen with the decline and final fall of the Great Wall as the 
Manchus successfully expanded to both sides of the Wall in the north, and as the 
Western powers infiltrated Chinese territories in the southeast from the nineteenth and 
the early twentieth century.48 From the Chinese communist perspective, China had 
experienced nothing but subjugation and disparagement by the international conspiracy 
of imperialist forces from then until 1949. All these events further cemented an already 
deep-rooted suspicion and distrust in the minds of the Chinese communist leaders 
regarding the motivation of any Western powers towards China.49 This became an 
essential point of departure for Chinese communist foreign policy and lay at the heart of 
Chinese foreign policy conceptualisation.
The Western presence in China ushered in great changes in the mid nineteenth century. 
This new situation was also characterised by the military superiority of the 
enemy—only this time it was much more powerful. The ominous Western threat caught
47 Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall o f China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 172)
48 Yen-p’ing, ‘Changing Chinese Views of Western Relations, 1840-95’ Denis Twitchett and John Fairbank eds. The 
Cambridge History o f China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, Vol. 11, pp. 156-198)
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China unprepared, not only because of the direction from which it came, but also 
because of its indisputable military strength.50 The fundamental difference lay in the 
fact that the West was not a nomadic power, but rather a maritime one. Li Hong Zhang, 
a high official of the Qing court who signed the third treaty which ceded the New 
Territories to the British rule in 1897, was reported as saying that the awesome military 
power of the West was demonstrated by its devastating cannon which could destroy 
China’s ‘strongest positions’, leaving coastal and inland strongholds ‘defenceless’. He 
thus concluded that the West was the most powerful enemy that China had ever faced 
during the past several thousand years.51 When comparing modem Westerners with the 
nomads, he noted that:
China’s frontier problems usually occurred in the northwest where the strength 
of China equalled that of the invaders. Besides, there was a demarcation line in 
the Great Wall between China and the foreign land. But today our southeast 
coast of more than ten thousand li is open to foreigners for commercial and 
missionary purposes...This is indeed a changed situation which we have not seen 
dunng the past several thousand years.
Indeed, that experience in China’s modem history, beginning with the Opium War 
against Britain and ending with the Yalta concessions to the USSR, was essentially one 
of humiliation and a one-sided struggle. The late Qing and the Republican eras in the 
early 1900s witnessed China’s loss of strategic control over its periphery, the imposition 
of a series of unequal treaties, invasion by Western forces with the capital falling twice, 
a carving up of China proper into spheres of foreign influence, and finally occupation 
by Japan. This long string of setbacks no doubt imprinted even deeper a distrust of
49 ibid.
50 Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall o f China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 211-221)
51 Immanuel Hsu, ‘Late Qing Foreign Relations, 1866-1905’ John Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu eds. The 
Cambridge History o f China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, Vol. 11, pp. 70-77)
52 ibid p. 158
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‘others’ on the perceptions of Chinese revolutionary leaders towards international 
affairs.
Although the CCP official line was that the only past that was meaningful was the 
recent one, defined in terms of oppression and struggle against Western powers over the 
last century and a half, the historical impact in reality went back much further and 
deeper as demonstrated from the above analysis. Built into mythical proportions, this 
orthodoxy contributed to the rise of a revolutionary spirit, the triumphant eradication of 
imperialist influence within China. It led to the emergence of a post-1949 foreign policy 
with the principles of full and formal reciprocity and equality in dealing with others, and 
of opposition to great power dominion/3
This officially sanctioned history reserved an important place in Chinese history 
textbooks to articulate the CCP’s interpretation of the pivotal relations between history 
and its foreign policy. It also provided ‘hard evidence’ to be repeatedly denounced of 
the atrocities committed under foreign imperialists. Although the emotional power of 
anti-imperialism drained away substantially as the pre-1949 period faded away in the 
broad canvas of Chinese history, to be replaced by a more pragmatic economic and 
modernisation program, the deep-seated distrust of ‘others’ from those particular pages 
of historical feuds was a persistent element in the Chinese leadership’s perception of the 
outside world.
53 Michael Hunt, The Genesis o f Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 
pp. 55-57)
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Ideological Components and Transformation
The motivation theories by Jervis, Cottam and Carlsnaes also gave much emphasis to 
the role of ideology in foreign policy motivation through the perception process. They 
argued that ideology often could be manipulated by political leaders to mobilise public 
sentiment and popular mental readiness which were needed to support a specific foreign 
policy. Ideology was also often important in selecting and accepting assumptions, 
expectations, views and preferences that formed part of conceptualising process.54
In much of the Chinese communist history, including foreign policy, ideology played a 
crucial role. Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought was once elevated to a divine 
status during the radical Cultural Revolution years. Ideology was empowered with 
magic force that was said to be able to overcome any difficulty. However, ideology as a 
main variable for explaining Chinese politics began to lose significance not long after 
the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Superseded by various more sophisticated social 
science models, ideological justification seemed to quickly become outmoded under 
modernisation pressures from Chinese society.55 When Deng consolidated his power, 
he pragmatically proclaimed an end to the ideological politics of the Mao era, and 
declared that the party’s work focus should shift to the more urgent tasks of building 
national wealth and strength.56 However, even in the heyday of relative political 
freedom before June 1989, when an unprecedented ‘liberal*, open and reform consensus 
prevailed within the party, Deng and the CCP top leadership were quite unprepared to
54 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1976, pp. 52-59). Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation (London: Feffer and Simons, Inc. 1977, pp. 54-92). 
Walter Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK, 1986, pp. 145-171)
55 Wang Jisi, ‘International Relations Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chinese Perspective’ 
Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994, pp. 481-505)
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relinquish Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought entirely, or to permit the 
proponents of other ideologies to challenge the party’s authority as the highest arbiter of 
power. After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, there was a panicky effort by some party 
conservatives trying to restore a unified ideology as a regulatory mechanism within the 
party and society. Although it was never again restored its previous glory, such attempts 
indicated that the CCP leaders valued a continuing role for ideology in their policy 
considerations and recognised its importance in legitimating their political rule.
In seeking to define the ideology that inspired and guided the CCP’s policy approaches 
to its external relations, scholars came to no simple conclusion about one single line of 
ideology being adhered by the CCP. As Steven Levine pointed out:
Many of the ideas that the leaders of the People’s Republic of China consciously 
brought to the foreign policy arena derived from the ideology of Marxism- 
Leninism, a formal system of ideas which provided a perceptual prism through 
which they viewed the world and which, they believed, explained reality. An 
additional cluster of ideas, values, assumption, and prejudices—an informal 
ideology which often operated at an unconscious level—also shaped the 
external outlook and influenced the foreign policy choices of Chinese elites.57
Represented by Mao and his comrades, the CCP’s ideological foundation began with a 
youthful preoccupation with restoring the nation’s proud past that in turn gave way to a 
formal party orthodoxy derived from the Comintern. The ideology of Marxism- 
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and Deng’s socialism with Chinese characteristics were 
by no means fixed nor static. Orthodoxy itself was in turn subject to constant revision,
56 Deng Xiaoping: Speeches and Writings (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987, pp. 209-210)
57 Steven Levine, ‘Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds. 
Chinese Foreign Policy— Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 30)
58 Peter Berton, ‘A Turn in Sino-Soviet Relations” James Hsiung ed. Beyond China’s Independent Foreign Policy 
(New York: Praeger Publisher, 1985, pp. 55-70)
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reinterpretation and transformation to satisfy situational sine qua non. In Deng’s reform 
decades, virtually all of the specific features of radical Maoism were in practice 
jettisoned by the CCP leadership, but at the same time the party insisted on the 
continuing validity of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. This, along with the 
socialist road, the people’s democratic dictatorship, and the leadership of the 
Communist Party, were proclaimed as the Four Cardinal Principles, the unshakeable 
political pillars of China’s course of modernisation.59 In this sense, ideology functioned 
as both an embellishment and as an essential basis of policy legitimacy.
The century of humiliation was always a favoured point of reference, both within China 
and outside, for explaining the CCP’s basic policy stance toward foreign culture and 
powers. Some scholars contended that this explanation, with excessive emphasis on 
China’s abasement seemed incomplete. Humiliation and subjugation were themselves 
hardly unique in history, as they were the sorry experience of many peoples and cultures 
in the three centuries of Western colonisation and domination over large sweeps of the 
rest of the world. Suffering humiliation did not predetermine behaviour—it resulted in a 
range of responses from capitulation and/or collaboration to desultory resistance to 
persistent, organised struggles for cultural or national revitalisation.60
The narrowly defined terms of reference of this humiliation-revolution formula 
accentuated the Chinese intolerance of and indignation at foreign domination and to 
define the course of actions in causal and absolute terms, as discussed in detail in the
59 Deng Xiaoping, ‘Peace and Development Are the Two Outstanding Issues in the World Today’, 4 March 1985, 
Deng Xiaoping, Fundamental Issues in Present-day China ( Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987, pp. 46-47, 97-99)
60 Steven Levine, ‘Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds. 
Chinese Foreign Policy— Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 32-34)
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previous section of this chapter. However, this approach would only make sense in the 
case of China if this experience was put into the context of a tradition of a strong and 
continuous state.61
In addition to the Marxism-Leninism, the formal founding of the CCP in 1921 started 
the process of creating a party creed which brought together the strands of patriotism 
and nationalism, and gave expression to a lasting and deep-seated commitment to the 
state. It helped the CCP to speak across political lines and unify them. Patriotism and 
nationalism themselves served as a kind of bridge for the first generation of Chinese 
communists, including the survivors of the numerous unrelenting power struggles 
within the party who later led the party to power. This generation of communists came 
to the conclusion that rebuilding the Chinese state was inextricably tied not just to 
revolutionising China but also to transforming the international order.63
In the 1930s and 1940s, when the CCP confronted a number of vital foreign policy 
issues directly concerned with its own quest for power, the Leninist concept of a united 
front provided a basic ideology for foreign relations, a set of axioms to be used in 
analysing China’s relations with particular foreign actors, and a vocabulary of 
discourse.64 Ideology gave a general framework within which the CCP leaders could 
evaluate relations with other powers and states. Some scholars believed that rather than 
providing a set of prescriptions that the CCP could follow blindly, Marxist-Leninist 
ideology actually empowered the party. Its commitment to Marxism-Leninism inspired 
a high degree of confidence in the party leaders’ ability and gave them a methodology
61 ibid.
62 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Gove Press, 1961, pp. 55-58)
63 ibid pp. 123-132
Chapter Four 136
to identify and unite with optimal coalition partners.65 Notably, after the establishment 
of the People’s Republic, in foreign policy arena, China played largely by the 
conventional international rules, apart from a brief aberration in the height of the 
Revolution in the 1960s.
The disparity between formal ideology and the specific foreign policies the CCP 
pursued characterised the role of ideology in post-1949 Chinese foreign policy. The 
towering ideology of Marxism-Leninism served a dual purpose in these early years of 
the People’s Republic. As an international linking mechanism, it connected China with 
the socialist camp through a range of interest commonalities, symbols, political rituals 
and slogans.66 At the same time, it served as a boundary marker, demarcating the inner 
world of socialism from the outer world of China’s ideological adversaries across in the 
imperialist camp.67
In the early 1960s, Mao’s polemic assaults against Khrushchev’s ‘revisionist’ policies 
were carried out in the name of defending the revolutionary legacy of Lenin and Stalin. 
The breakaway from the Soviet Union demonstrated the profound commitment of Mao
/:o
and his lieutenants to defend their ideological principles. The ideological conflicts 
between the two communist giants were not an abstract philosophical disputation. They 
impacted directly on quite a number of issues concerning domestic and foreign policies 
that affected the redistribution of power and authority inside China and within the
64 Samuel Kim, ‘New Directions and Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the World: 
New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989, pp. 4-6)
65 For example, see Steven Levine, ‘Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Thomas Robinson and 
David Shambaugh eds. Chinese Foreign Policy— Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 
pp. 35-36)
66 Arif Dirlik and Maurice Meisner ed. Marxism and the Chinese Experience: Issues in Contemporary Chinese 
Socialism (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1989, pp. 24-35)
67 ibid
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international communist movement.69
This ideological high was in sharp contrast to the subsequent and distinct lowering of 
China’s international ideological profile in the post-Mao period. The revolutionary, 
transformative rhetoric of Maoist ideology was shelved in favour of a much softened 
language in correspondence with China’s effort to be a rule-playing member in the
70prevailing world system.
As Samuel Kim noted, the expression of China’s foreign policy ideology in the reform 
era was largely cautious and pragmatic, aiming at the long term need to establish and 
maintain a placid external environment conducive to continued economic growth and 
prosperity.71 Such a policy outcome was marked by the maintenance of positive 
diplomatic, political and economic relations with virtually every foreign country, 
especially with nearby Asian neighbours.72 It involved recognition of the importance of 
a comprehensive security strategy that combined political, cultural and economic 
means, not just military power, and a belief that China faced no pressing external 
military threat. China’s foreign policy pragmatism also suggested the need to preserve 
continued good relations with the United States and to provide limited support for 
multilateral efforts in UN initiatives and other regional activities. Chinese involvement 
in regional activities was intended to promote a more acceptable pattern of behaviours
68 ibid. pp. 18-19
69 ibid. pp. 33-34
70 Harry Harding, ‘China’s Changing Roles in the Contemporary World’ Harry Harding ed. China’s Foreign 
Relations in the 1980s (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 176-179)
71 Samuel Kim, ‘New Directions and Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the World: 
New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989, pp. 11-14)
72 ibid.
73 Michael Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking (Calif.: Santa Monica, 
RAND, 1996, pp. 19-21)
Chapter Four 138
in the region, and to convey an image of Chinese cooperation.74
However, ideology died hard in China. Instead of disappearing as a contending factor 
from the perceptual process of Chinese foreign policy motivation, ideology was 
redefined many times to compete for its place in the new explanatory paradigm. The 
concepts and language of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought continued to inform 
the thinking of Chinese political leaders, and they continued to justify their foreign 
policy choices in ideological terms, albeit in a more moderated way.
During the 1980s and the 1990s, CCP leaders consistently claimed that Marxism- 
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought was China’s long-term ideological framework within 
which, over many decades, fundamental social values and a developing economy were 
constructed.75 This official ideology was extended to the realm of foreign policy. In the 
same period of time, Chinese leaders discarded the old jargon of class struggle and 
world revolution, but kept Marxist peace and development theories to justify their use of 
conciliatory leverage in pragmatic diplomatic manoeuvre. It was this change in 
ideological emphasis that paved the way for Beijing to gradually normalise its relations 
with two of its major adversaries of the preceding decades, the Soviet Union and India. 
But it should be noted that the salience of ideology in China’s actual foreign relations 
varied with respect to countries, issues, geographical areas and time periods. As Steven 
Levine observed, the erosion of ideology transformed it from a sacred guide to 
something like a catalogue from which the CCP leadership could pick and choose those
74 ibid. pp. 27-31
75 Steven Levine, ‘Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds. 
Chinese Foreign Policy— Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 42-43)
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items to suit its purposes.77 In general terms, he pointed out, ideology continued to form 
the perceptual foundation of Chinese political leaders and to have both prescriptive and
78proscriptive functions in Chinese foreign policy.
The CCP’s accomplishment as a mature and skilful ideology operator was encapsulated 
in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union in early 1990s. Although the 
event stunned the CCP leadership, Deng Xiaoping and his team did not prematurely 
retreat to the easy alternative of returning China to Mao’s isolated socialist orthodoxy. 
Instead, Deng paradoxically issued a series of warnings to the party officials reaffirming 
that to accelerate and deepen the reform process was the only hope for China if it 
wished to avoid the same fate of disintegration and disunity of the Chinese nation. This 
incident manifested the CCP’s renewed commitment to a prudently balanced ideology 
in China’s domestic and foreign affairs. In this context, ideology was again defined 
within a Chinese context as the value framework for conducting internal and external 
affairs.
Conclusion
This chapter examined two important variables that induced the Chinese foreign policy 
perceptions: its long cultural tradition with a Chinese specific cognition, and its 
ideological crusade and transformation. The analytical parameters based on these two 
fundamentals helped to clarify the perceptual procedures of the making of the CCP’s
77 ibid. p. 45
78 ibid. pp. 46-47. For example, the gloss for the debate within the system over the nature of the world environment in 
1989 were these two kinds: a) a peaceful, benign perception and, b) hostile, conspiratorial forces engaging in peaceful 
evolution.
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foreign policy motivation, against a background of rapid changes in political, economic, 
military and social contexts in both domestic and international scenes. It argued that 
although perception was not and did not equate to foreign policy motivation, this policy 
motivation, nonetheless, was built on the perceptual source, and at times could be 
identified to be directly related to foreign policy itself.
This chapter found that one significant commonality in foreign policy practice in 
imperial China was the repeated effort by rulers to erect a boundary to protect Chinese 
unity. The prolonged practice of this political, diplomatic and military strategy 
profoundly shaped the view through which the world was configured by the Chinese 
ruling classes. The deep-rooted siege mentality and distrustful nature of the Chinese 
foreign policy proved to be a consequence of the reverse effect of the cognitive 
process—the practice of wall-building on the Chinese perception of ‘others’ and its 
relations with them in the international setting.
It remained much the same in terms of ideology. In one form or another, ideology 
played a role in the perceptual system of foreign policy motivation of every state. This 
chapter confirmed that what distinguished the CCP from many other countries, 
particularly in the early years, was the elevation of the highly articulated and systematic 
ideology of Marxism-Leninist in the realm of foreign policy. However, the application 
of ideology was flexible and often open to different interpretations as demonstrated by 
China’s foreign policies towards the USSR and the US in the 1960s and the 1970s. The 
relative decline of ideology in the Deng era reflected a weakening of orthodoxy and 
rigidity in the interpretation and application of ideology to Chinese foreign policy 
analysis. As a consequence, the importance of ideology was reduced and it played a
Chapter Four 141
diminished role in setting the Chinese foreign policy agenda. Instead, ideology in 
Deng’s reform period tended to function as an ad hoc or interim measure to serve the 
multiple and changing needs of the CCP as it pursued a wider range of interests in 
economic domain and the world affairs. China’s extended cultural background and its 
own path of modernisation, compounded with indigenous and imported ideologies, were 
accountable for advancing a comprehensive understanding of the role of perception in 
its foreign policy motivation process.
Chapter Five
Personality—Leaders and the Role of the Cadre System
In Chapter Two the role of political leaders and political elites in the motivation process 
of foreign policy was explored. Margaret Hermann and Richard Snyder, among others, 
argued that the qualitative input by such leaders or groups was important, sometimes 
critical. 1 23 Personal attribute variables interacted within a certain political setting and 
cultural context, and could increase pressure on the overall motivation system. They
emphasised that weight of the personality in a given foreign policy environment could
. . .  . . 1  be determined as much by individual effort as by political culture.
This chapter examines Chinese foreign policy motivation from a personality perspective 
as defined above. It focuses primarily on the personalities of two Chinese paramount 
leaders—Mao and Deng, and the aggregate character of the CCP cadre system, through 
which those individual political leaders stamped their personality on the policymaking 
and implementation process. The intimate link between the individual leaders and the 
structure or system highlights the ultimate statecraft of ‘rule by man’4 in China’s 
political system. The CCP cadre system not only formed the backbone of the massive
1 See Chpt. 2 of this thesis.
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 ‘Rule by man’ (renzhi) as a traditional governing art was opposed to the concept of ‘rule by law’ (fazhi). It was the 
predominant philosophy of social notion of status and control that have prevailed in Chinese society. The Chinese 
political system not only produced some specific individual personalities, but also created this elite class with a 
distinctive and recognisable characteristic to support the smooth running of the state apparatus. The Confucian origin 
of ‘rule by man’ could be noted that rule by example by a virtuous ruler was held in higher esteem than rule that 
depended on fear of punishement. Hence shame gave rise to li (rules of proper conduct) and fear to fa  (law). The 
Analects o f Confucius (11:3) provides the classical context: “The Master said, ‘Guide them by edicts, keep them in 
line with punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them 
by virtue, keep them in line with the rites (li), and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform themseleves.” 
However, for many CCP leaders, ‘rule by man’ equated ‘rule by power’, and it was a given that was inherently 
enshrined in their rulers’ status. The function of this ruling system was different from that of the bureaucratic 
structure in Western democracies, which was supposed to be politically neutral and regulated by law.
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Chinese state apparatus, but also was the political powerbroker and lieutenant to smooth 
the paths for the party to achieve policy objectives. In this sense, this cadre system was 
a special variant of the institutional form of Chinese leadership’s personal power and 
was the embodiment of an extended political culture of ‘rule by man’.
This chapter is comprised of two sections to further investigate these two aspects of the 
role of personality in Chinese foreign policy motivation. The first section reviews the 
personalities and work styles of Mao and Deng, and their personal imprints on Chinese 
foreign policy decisionmaking. It explores their personal attributes, in particular, Mao’s 
deep distrust of bureaucracy and institutional arrangements in managing political and 
economic affairs, and Deng’s predominant pragmatism in framing Chinese foreign 
policy.
In the second section, the aggregate features of the ruling CCP cadre system are 
analysed against the backdrop of the Chinese political culture of ‘rule by man’. As a 
logical extension and natural spillover of the practice of personalised politics in much of 
Chinese political history, the influence of the CCP cadre system through its 
organisational and structural controls and its evolution in the Chinese political system is 
assessed.
This chapter concludes that despite the great changes that have taken place during the 
reform era, the CCP remained jealous of its own state power and was determined to 
continue tight control over the nation’s high political process. It is argued that past 
revolutionary practice and the top leadership’s expectation of a strong and reliable cadre 
contingent dictated that changes in the CCP’s cadre system could only be gradual. This 
state of affairs weighed heavily on the social personality formation of CCP leaders, and
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contributed to the leaders’ mental preparedness and preferences within which Chinese 
foreign policy was conceived and implemented.
Leaders
The most important characteristic of China’s foreign policy decisionmaking was that it 
was highly centralised and that, in terms of key decisions, it was very much 
personalised.5 This was true both in the Mao and Deng eras, despite steady 
institutionalisation in the reform period. The degree and extent of this personalised 
political process was both deep-seated and pervasive, not only when compared with the 
general practice in the West but also when compared with decisionmaking in China 
over matters purely of domestic concern.6 The key foreign policy decisions included 
those that concerned questions of the basic orientation of national strategic posture, 
decisions over military operations that involved actual or potential conflicts with foreign 
powers, decisions in the formulation of regional policy and policies towards key world 
powers like the United States, the former USSR and Japan.7 8
In referring to the role of leaders’ personality in Chinese domestic and foreign policies, 
no one rivalled Mao or Deng. In other words, in terms of analysing personality and the
o
CCP’s external policy, there is little need to look beyond those two men. The two 
paramount figures possessed very different personalities, and they impacted on the 
Chinese foreign policy discourse in very different manners. For example, Mao’s view of
5 David Shambaugh, book review of Suzanne Ogden, China 's Unsolved Issues: Politics, Development, and Culture, 
The China Quarterly (Vol. 121, 1990, pp. 133-134)
6 ibid.
1 ibid.
8 Benjamin Yang, From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March (Boulder: Westview Press 
1990, pp. 82-101). Of course, many others might hold the view that Zhou Enlai should be included in the discussion. 
However, although Zhou played a very important role in Mao’s foreign policy, he nonetheless was often shadowed 
by Mao, and therefore was more a chief administrator rather than a final arbitrator in some crucial policy decisions. 
See Shao Kuo-kang, Zhou Enlai and the Foundation o f Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996)
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the world was very much that of a dichotomy—friend and foe, good and evil, ‘us’ and 
‘them’ .9 He was widely reported to have suddenly abandoned those comrades whom he 
was close to, often following political and emotional disputes. Mao made a lot of 
dramatic policy changes, always with an intuitive justification and usually in the context 
of fighting ‘enemies’ . 10 Deng’s style, on the contrary, was said to be less emotional and 
much more detached. * 11 Judged by the Chinese standard of political loyalty, Deng was 
surprisingly impersonal and often cold and distant in his personal dealings with his 
associates. 12 He had no truly close friends or deeply-hated enemies within the party. 
Over the years Deng went through many sudden policy reversals, especially as he 
vacillated about the speed of economic reforms and even more about the degree of 
political liberalisation. 13 Thus anyone who committed himself to Deng at one point 
could have been made an outcast at the next if not being able to change swiftly with the 
tide. 14
However, despite these obvious differences in individual approaches, the personal 
authority of both Mao and Deng left profound impacts on Chinese foreign policy 
decisionmaking. Mao and Deng shared the same fundamental beliefs and were strongly 
committed to Communism. They both inherited traditional Chinese political values and
9 Benjamin Yang, From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Lons, March (Boulder: Westview Press 
1990, pp. 82-101)
10 ibid.
11 David Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994, pp. 58-72)
12 For more detailed account about Deng’s handling with his close associates, see He Zi, ‘ Yangjiajiang shishi neimu' 
(The Inside Story about General Yang’s Decline in Power), Zhongguo shibao zhoukan (China Times Weekly) 
(American edition, No. 44, 1992, pp. 9-12)
13 ibid.
14 For example, the dismissals o f Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang from top party positions. This point was made clear 
by Liu Binyan, eminent Chinese dissident overseas, in his essay in the Ming Bao. Liu Binyan made the point that 
people could not identify with Deng because o f his elusive character and policy contradictions. This significantly 
reflected in the succession struggle that none of the potential heirs publicly made a point o f being a close personal 
follower of Deng. Several identified themselves with the reform policies which Westerners associated with Deng, but 
they all seemed to distance themselves from Deng as an individual. This was partially in response to Deng’s detached 
manner, and to his erratic ‘pragmatism’ in policy directions. See Min Bao 4 June 1992, p. 5
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the art of ‘rule behind the scene’ and ‘rule by man’. Their practice of personalised 
politics contributed contemporary relevance to the continuation of these traditions. 
Although personal upbringing, work experience, powerbase, political skills, bargaining 
leverage, opportunity and timing had a lot to say about the particularities of the 
paramount status of Mao and Deng in Chinese foreign policy, this section largely 
concentrates on the role of personality of Mao and Deng as paramount leaders in 
reinforcing the concept and culture of ‘rule by man’ in policymaking process.
Mao and Chinese Foreign Policy
In his position as top Chinese leader with absolute power in foreign policy 
decisionmaking, Mao was first and foremost regarded as a patriot. 15 His concept of 
internationalism was always firmly situated within a border of distinctly China-centred 
outlook. 16 In his view, other revolutionary movements were without question part of a 
global process of transformation that was also carrying the CCP forward. However, any 
sacrifice made for those movements should be in proportion to their salience to his 
party’s success and to China’s revival as a nation. 17
Mao’s personal influence on foreign policy arena came foremost from his dominant 
position in domestic politics. Mao had a leadership style of his own, and this was also
15 Pei Jianzhang et al eds. Xin zhongguo waijiao fengyun I (New China Diplomacy I) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi 
chubanshe, 1990, pp. 3-9). Pei explained that in his quest to understand China, Mao was, like his contemporaries, 
prompted by strongly patriotic feelings. Like them, he was concerned with the revival of state power and all that 
implied: above all the restoration of China’s prestige and power in the world. Also like those contemporaries, Mao 
drew on a rich, robust and complex Chinese intellectual tradition—into which he sought to assimilate foreign ideas 
and foreign models. Mao possessed very strong patriotic instincts which was essential to his revolutionary practice.
16 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Gove Press, 1961, p. 129)
17 See Mao Zedong, In Memory o f Dr Norman Bethune (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1965). Mao’s thinking 
on international affairs appeared initially to have drawn on the statecraft school which emphasised China’s revival 
and security. Mao also at times toyed with the balance-of-power expedient that had been a mainstay of late-Qing 
policy discussions.
18 ibid. It was during Mao’s rise to prominence in the early 1930s that he laid down a series of basic policies, which, 
with his ascendancy to paramount leader status, exerted important implications for foreign relations. See also Mark 
Seiden, China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 122-132)
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important to the course of the CCP external relations. 19 Mao was said to have been “an 
obsessive worker capable of abrupt shifts in interest.” Contrary to common belief, 
Mao also took a particularly strong interest in the wide-ranging and important party 
work in foreign policy and in the related areas of propaganda and military affairs.21
Michael Hunt found that the intellectual framework that guided Mao was a complex and 
unstable set of broad but somewhat paradoxical theories and models, home and 
abroad. His thinking consisted of multiple strands twisted uneasily together, and his 
explicitly experimental style gave considerable play to combining ideas in different 
patterns as he faced changing circumstances. Mao created his own popular posture by 
cultivating an image as an aloof, reflective figure/ 4 He presented himself as a man of 
many talents—Marxist theoretician, inspired propagandist, military genius, rural 
sociologist. As his stature grew and the deference to him deepened, he easily won 
acceptance of questionable policies and implemented them in the face of sometimes
19 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Gove Press, 1961, p. 112)
20 Michael Hunt, The Genesis o f Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996,
The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Mass.: Harvard East Asia Studies, 1971, pp. 22-24). Mao 
was said to be assertive, using hands-on approach to project assurance and secure deference from his associates. In 
the early stage of power building, in order to win political support and consensus among his comrades, Mao used to 
move patiently and informally, putting in long hours in private chats that allowed him to convey to colleagues an 
understanding of the calculations and assumptions behind his policy. This practice allowed Mao to use his closest 
associates as sounding boards to test his own evaluation of unfolding national and international developments. Only 
after a leadership consensus had taken form would Mao seek formal endorsement from the Political Bureau, the 
Central committee, or even a party congress. The priority Mao gave to the creation and maintenance of this 
consensus, at least in his early years as party leader, was evident in a number of important foreign-relation related 
cases: the redefinition of the united front, the positions endorsed by the Seventh Party Congress, and the shifting line 
pursued from the end of the Pacific War down to 1949. After 1949, especially in his late years as the party chairman, 
Mao increasingly adopted an one-sided, patriarchal relationship with colleagues at odds with his commitment to 
internal consensus. The dominance derived from a commanding personal confidence, and it was reinforced by the 
myth-making machine within the party. Success of CCP gave the party unprecedented appeal and legitimacy which 
carried it to power. This added to Mao’s preeminence, and the connection to the domineering, hypersensitive leader 
that emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s was clear.
22 Michael Hunt, The Genesis o f Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996,
p. 205)
21 Mark Seiden,
pp .205-210)
-3 ibid.
24 Stuart Schram, ed. The Scope o f State Power in China (London, School of Oriental and African Studies, University 
of London, 1985, pp. 115-134)
25 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Gove Press, 1961, pp. 152-153)
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substantial doubts and great human cost.26
It was M ao’s emphasis on practical knowledge on the one hand, and repeated refusals to 
open his mind to foreign cultures and the capitalist world on the other, that presented an 
unbridgeable gap in his comprehension of international relations. This in turn often 
made him an incompetent decision maker in foreign policy when international 
relations became more complex after the establishment of the new China, as Carol Lee 
Hamrin observed. By his own logic, as long as he could concentrate on what he knew 
best (China and especially the countryside) and on what he was passionate about 
(China’s revolution), Mao proved to be a knowing and effective political leader in his 
early years. But when later his revolution impinged on international relations and 
became involved with the great powers as it did in the late 1940s, Mao found difficulties 
in formulating a perceptive picture of friends and foes in a complicated international 
setting.29
In his persistent pursuit of a communist world for all, Mao was said to have derived his 
strategic thinking on international affairs largely from the Chinese classics such as 
Romance o f the Three Kingdoms, Chronicle o f the Warring States and the writings by 
Sun Zi. He showed particular fondness for coalition building and diplomatic 
manipulation and manoeuvre— all well suited to the hard-pressed position often 
occupied by the weak.31 He was also guided by a strong, widely shared faith in the 
power of personal cultivation and personal deals to make a difference in handling
26 Stuart Schram, ed. The Scope o f State Power in China (London, School of Oriental and African Studies, University 
of London, 1985, pp. 115-134)
27 ibid.
28 Carol Lee Hamrin, ‘Domestic Components and China’s Evolving Three Worlds Theory’ Lillian Harris and Robert 
Worden eds. China and the Third World (Mass.: Auburn House, 1986, pp. 56-61)
29 Michael Hunt, The Genesis o f Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996,
pp. 115-128) 
ibid pp. 205-210
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foreign affairs.
It was noted by Stuart Schram that Mao’s voluntarism was central to his foreign, as well 
as domestic, strategy.33 Mao firmly believed that by developing and exercising will 
power, China could stand up to its enemies. Conversely, a failure to resist and fight 
would only embolden enemies to continue their abusive and overbearing treatments of 
China. This same voluntarism led Mao to think of China’s liberation from foreign 
imperialists and their Chinese allies as an immediately realisable project in the 1930s 
and 1940s. Once he had essentially completed that task in 1949, he turned with equal 
impatience to the task of national revival. He demanded quick results and depended 
above all else on the great enthusiasm and energy of the Chinese people.3* Mao’s 
unequivocal belief in self-reliance and self-study—a faith that knowledge could be 
generated through personal effort even in unpromising circumstances—led to a 
tendency to despise bureaucratic procedure and institutional approaches.35 He believed 
that fighting imperialism meant, first of all and above all, grasping “the characteristics 
and facts of China”36 and that “all genuine knowledge originates in direct experience.”37 
Anything beyond these was distinctly secondary.
By establishing the PRC, Mao retained some of the most essential values and practice of 
the traditional Chinese ruling philosophy. For example, Mao was following the same
31 ibid.
32 Stuart Schram, ed. The Scope o f State Power in China (London, School of Oriental and African Studies, University 
of London, 1985, pp. 245-265)
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
35 Michael Hunt, The Genesis o f Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 
pp. 202-211). His rural origin stayed on throughout his career due to his lost chance for overseas exposure in the early 
years when travel might have made a considerable impact. He lacked any interest in science and had little knowledge 
about foreign cultures and languages.
36 Mao, quoted in Jerome Ch’en ed. Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography (London: Oxford University Press, 
1970, p. 22)
37 Selected Works o f Mao Zedong (Beijing: Renmin chubanshen, 1969, Vol. 1, p. 200)
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path as the centralising state rulers of the Chinese imperial past.38 He concentrated 
political power in the hands of a few: signs, Lawrence Sullivan said, anticipated that 
Mao’s imperial order was already evident before 1949. The rectification campaign in 
Yenan in early 1940s and the iron discipline imposed on subordinate units to report to, 
and follow the lead of, the party Central Committee reflected his intention of pressing 
for a single source of authority within the party. From 1949 to 1976, Mao, as Chairman 
of the CCP, of its Central Military Commission and, till 1958, State President, 
dominated China’s foreign policy formulation and decisions. Mao’s role in the key 
decisions that determined the fundamental orientation of China’s foreign policy which 
pushed China into the Korean War, as documented by Thomas Christensen, and in 
decisions concerning the implementation of key country policies, was a clear 
demonstration of his imperious and personalised work style in foreign policymaking.40
As mentioned above, Mao’s authority in foreign policy came from his dominant 
position in domestic politics. For example, in 1953 he asserted the right to have the last 
word on party directives, and the rest of the decade revealed a determination to dictate 
policy, sometimes against the wishes of his ‘colleagues’.41 Allen Whiting observed that 
contrary to the normal bureaucratic model, major foreign policy decisions during the 
Maoist era were made by the Chairman personally without consulting any relevant 
departments.42 In the case of the bombardment of offshore islands in 1958 Mao
38 Lawrence Sullivan, ‘Leadership and Authority in the Chinese Communist Party: Perspectives from the 1950s’ 
Pacific Affairs (Vol. 59, Winter 1986-87, pp. 605-633)
39 ibid.
40 ibid. Thomas Christensen’s finding of Mao’s vacillation to the last moment on China’s entry to the Korean War 
proved the importance of Mao’s role in China’s decisionmaking process. See Thomas Christensen, Useful 
Adversaries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996, Chpts. 2 and 3)
41 Lawrence Sullivan, ‘Leadership and Authority in the Chinese Communist Party: Perspectives from the 1950s’ 
Pacific Affairs (Vol. 59, Winter 1986-87, pp. 605-633)
42 Allen Whiting, ‘Foreign Policy of China’ Roy Macridis ed. Foreign Policy in World Politics (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall Inc. 1992, p. 241)
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personally assumed responsibility in admitting that he miscalculated the American 
response which stymied the attack.43 Whiting’s comment was confirmed by another 
study by Lu Ning, who also noted that Mao had a firm grip on foreign and military 
affairs decisions.44
Paralleling Mao’s patriarchal decision style was his equally intolerant attitude to his 
colleagues. Ruthless personal persecution within the party effectively silenced his 
opponents.45 This imperial court-like practice extending into international affairs meant 
that Mao could hardly compromise with disdain, abuse and threats from foreign powers. 
Nor could he pretend to be a satisfied junior partner of the USSR within the communist 
movement. US imperialism was the ‘number one’ enemy in his vision of a new 
international order which dated from the May Fourth movement in 1919. By the same 
token, unable to reconcile himself to either superpower, Mao proved ready in the 1960s, 
at least in rhetoric, to take on both at once.46
Like most other countries, China’s foreign policy was always projected to fulfil at least 
two objectives: the nation’s security and the nation’s economic development. 
Throughout the Mao era, the nation’s security was the primary concern.47 Incessant 
wars and threats to China’s security on its periphery, from Korea to Taiwan, to 
Indochina, to India and to the Sino-Soviet border, led Mao to believe that a major war 
was inevitable and imminent. Diplomacy, balance of power and military strength were 
used as important instruments to contain the perceived threats to security. Because of
43 ibid.
44 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China (Colo.: Boulder, Westview Press 1997, p. 
155)
45 ibid. pp. 150-156
46 Benjamin Yang, From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March (Boulder: Westview Press 
1990, pp. 133-154)
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
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this, economic development in Mao’s era was subordinated to the overriding concern of 
protecting the nation’s territorial integrity and peace. These constant crises created a 
situation within which Mao’s personality in foreign policy could continuously play a 
dominant role.49
Deng and Chinese Foreign Policy
The most fundamental change in the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy 
decisionmaking was the shift of focus on the part of the central leadership from the 
nation’s security to the nation’s economic development.50 Although the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1970s had caused 
considerable concern about China’s security, it soon became clear to Beijing that they 
were blessings in disguise—the overseas invasions had drained Hanoi and Moscow’s 
resources and the threats they posed to Beijing were reduced substantially.51
This shift came as a matter of objective necessity and subjective limitation, as well as 
leadership personal style. When Deng Xiaoping returned to the centre of power in 1977, 
he took over the portfolios of defence and foreign affairs. From then until the early 
1990s Deng Xiaoping was intensively involved with major Chinese foreign policy 
decisionmaking. He did more than any other Chinese leader to promote relations 
between China and the rest of the world through the ‘open-door policy’.
49 Jonathan Pollack, ‘China and the Global Strategic Balance’ Harry Harding ed. China's Foreign Relations in the 
1980s (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 146-152)
50 Samuel Kim, ‘New Directions and Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the World: 
New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations (Boulder: Westview, 1989, pp. 4-6)
51 Lu Ning, The Dynamics o f Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China (Colo.: Boulder, Westview Press 1997, pp. 
123-154)
52 David Shambaugh, ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Politician’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng Xiaoping: Portrait o f a Chinese 
Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 49-82). For example, he visited the US, Japan, France, 
East and South-east Asia, and demonstrated in a number of ways— cultural and personal, as well as political and 
economic— an openness towards the world outside China.
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The personalisation of policy did not wholly end with Mao’s death. Deng’s reputation 
as China’s key foreign policy maker coincided with his ascendancy to the paramount 
leader status.53 Allen Whiting observed that although he did not seek to use the despotic 
personal power exercised by Mao, neither did he dictate decisions to the same degree as 
Mao had done, and despite the broadening of the number of institutions involved in the 
conduct of Chinese foreign policy, Deng nevertheless managed to have the final say to 
matters that he regarded as crucial by making sure his position prevailed at key 
moments.54 Allan Whiting supported his analysis by noting that Deng personally 
claimed credit for the 1984 Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong with the formula of 
‘one country, two systems’, and for the designation of 14 coastal cities as special 
foreign investment sites in the same year.55
David Shambaugh found that Deng’s long and diverse revolutionary career made a 
simple and general summary of his personality difficult.56 His unpredictable and often 
contradictory policies in response to the changing domestic and international 
environment further complicated thisf7 Although Deng was entrusted by Mao to carry 
out a number of foreign engagements, notably in confronting the Soviet Union during 
the dispute in the early 1960s, he was unable to play a key role in foreign policy making
CO
early on because of his lack of seniority in the CCP top hierarchy. The vacuum left by
53 Allen Whiting, ‘Foreign Policy of China’ Roy Macridis ed. Foreign Policy in World Politics (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall Inc. 1992, pp. 233-241). Deng’s position in foreign policy can also be inferred by setting the terms for 
the conduct of normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union (and its successor states) and the key decisions to 
attack Vietnam in 1979. In the 1980s when Hu Yaobang and later Zhao Ziyang were the party secretaries, Deng 
remained the ultimate decision maker although he had officially retreated to the second line. Deng would get 
personally involved either on his own initiative or under solicitation by Hu and Zhao. See Lu Ning, The Dynamics of 
Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China (Colo.: Boulder, Westview Press 1997, p. 159)
54 ibid.
55 ibid.
56 David Shambaugh, ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Politician’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese 
Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 55-61)
57 ibid.
58 Michael Yahuda, ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese 
Statesman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 143-164)
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the death of Mao finally gave Deng the opportunity to articulate his views and to chart 
his preferred course without being subject to Mao’s arbitration.59
Deng’s intellectual orientation and style were in many ways in striking contrast to 
Mao’s, and this led many scholars to attribute these differences to his personality.60 His 
well cared-for childhood61 and good education—first at the local capital city, then in 
France—proved to be key factors that later differentiated him from Mao in leadership 
style and strategic thinking.62 Harrison Salisbury made an interesting point that despite 
Deng’s happy memory of his childhood, he never returned to his native village once he
Z T
left as a 12-year-old. This detached attitude towards one’s past was noted as ‘unusual’ 
in Chinese culture, yet as ‘typical’ of Deng’s general approach to politics.64 This led 
Lucian Pye to conclude that Deng, throughout his life, simply closed the book on one 
period and went on to the next, and never looked back.65 Deng’s unsentimental nature 
reinforced his tendency to concentrate on his immediate preoccupation, which became 
central to his leadership style.66
Like Mao, Deng’s world view was guided by two rather different traditions: the 
imperial Chinese way to rule and Marxism-Leninism theories. On the one hand he was 
said to consult regularly the 11th century massive compilation Zi Zhi Tong Jian (The
59 David Shambaugh, ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Politician’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng Xiaoping: Portrait o f a Chinese 
Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 49-82)
60 This difference was well documented by many scholars. For example, Michael Yahuda, ‘Deng Xiaoping: The 
Statesman’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng Xiaoping: Portrait o f a Chinese Statesman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); 
David Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994); David Shambaugh, ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Politician’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng Xiaoping: 
Portrait o f a Chinese Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)
61 For detail about Deng Xiaoping’s childhood, see Harrison Salisbury, The New Emperors (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1992, Chpt. 4)
62 ibid.
63 ibid.
64 Lucian Pye, ‘An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng 
Xiaoping: Portrait o f a Chinese Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 16-20)
65 ibid.
66 ibid. p. 18
Chapter Five 155
General Mirror for the Aid o f Government), that detailed for the emperor in 294 
chapters how his predecessors in the previous 1,300 years had handled difficult issues.67 
On the other hand, he strenuously insisted that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
/TO
Thought should be one of the cardinal pillars in China’s reform program.
Deng’s introduction to Communism differed somewhat from Mao and most other 
Chinese revolutionary leaders. Michael Hunt speculated that it was by chance rather 
than by choice that Deng became a communist and later ascended in the party 
hierarchy.69 Deng’s subsequent career progression was based on a series of ties to 
powerful patrons: first Zhou Enlai, then Mao. It was under Mao’s patronage that he 
was made the Secretary General of the party at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. It 
was during Deng’s decade as Secretary General that he intensified efforts to bind all 
cadres in patron-client networks, too.71 He was involved in the promotion and transfer 
of huge number of cadres,72 which gave him a privilege to establish his own extensive 
network within the party. It was this experience of cadre arrangement that made him 
acutely aware that in Chinese political culture, one important source of power for a 
leader stemmed from the management of party officials.73 Because Deng did not
67 Michael Yahuda, ‘Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng Xiaoping: Portrait o f a Chinese 
Statesman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 145)
68 ibid.
69 Michael Hunt, The Genesis o f Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 
pp. 201-231). In Hunt’s view, it did not call for any serious decisionmaking on his part, since he at that time was 
living with a group of Chinese in France, who were much older and who in a sense looked after him and assured him 
that he belonged to the “family” group. Nora Wang, in ‘Deng Xiaoping: the Year in France’ The China Quarterly 
(Vol. 92, December 1982, pp. 698-705) shared Hunt’s view and his research found Deng’s political association with 
Communism was just the natural thing to do at the time and under the circumstances. There were really no 
alternatives for him to consider, given the closeness and intimate relationship he shared with other Communists in a 
confined community. Similar things could be said about Deng’s early advancement into a leadership position in the 
Communist movement: In 1925 most of the leaders in the newly-established Chinese Communist Party in Paris had 
to flee France or were deported because the police were after them for their revolutionary activities. Deng simply 
moved up to fill the leadership void.
70 Lu Ning, The Dynamics o f Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China (Colo.: Boulder, Westview Press 1997, pp. 
160-163)
71 Lucian Pye, ‘An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng 
Xiaoping: Portrait o f a Chinese Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 20-24)
72 ibid.
73 ibid. pp. 32-35
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possess the absolute authority that Mao had once commanded, and he alone could not 
dictate every major decision if it was challenged within the central leadership, Deng 
realised that it was necessary for him to build consensus among his colleagues.74 While 
keeping the most critical decisions firmly in his own hands, Deng believed in delegation
*7C
of power and placed his chief lieutenants in the front line of decisionmaking. His 
distinctive leadership style was characterised by identifying the right persons for top 
jobs and then stepping back and allowing the appointees to perform—a very 
untraditional Chinese practice, indeed.76 It also suggested that Deng’s mastery of the 
behind-the-scenes craftsmanship revealed an extraordinarily self-confident and secure
77personality.
Lucian Pye’s study on the relationship between Deng and Chinese political culture also 
noted that the practical side of party work also made Deng think of communism in 
organisational rather than ideological terms. The significance of this difference from 
Mao was that, for Deng, allegiance to the party often meant defending its organisational 
structure and power base rather than preserving the purity of its ideology or adhering 
rigidly to the party line.79 Deng’s interpretation of the CCP’s role in Chinese society 
was not constructed during the reform era; instead it was formed in the early 1940s and 
remained remarkably consistent ever after. He placed considerably greater emphasis 
than Mao did on the importance of bureaucracy and institutions, as well as on the drive 
for economic modernisation. Indeed, where Mao saw mass mobilisation as the engine
74 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China (Colo.: Boulder, Westview Press 1997, p. 
162)
75 ibid.
76 Beniamin Yang, From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March (Boulder: Westview Press 
1990, pp. 56-58)
77 Lucian Pye, ‘An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng 
Xiaoping: Portrait o f a Chinese Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 4-35)
78 ibid.
79 ibid.
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for change, Deng had a more technocratic vision of China’s future. Deng frequently
O 1
criticised the ‘leftist excesses’ that came with the politics of mobilisation. Whereas 
Mao and many other Chinese leaders relied on communist ideology to draw strength, 
Deng believed that the party’s supreme imperative was not the obligation to preserve 
abstract Marxist ideology, rather it was to sustain the organisational integrity, and hence 
the power monopoly, of the party. This line of thought gave him a more pragmatic 
theoretical backing to policy initiatives, domestic and foreign, throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s.
However, pragmatic as Deng was, there were some significant limits to such 
pragmatism. Politically there were certain values which he would not sacrifice even for 
the sake of ultimate modernisation—the most important being the organisational 
integrity of the party and its monopoly of political power.83 While Deng initiated a 
series of reforms, there were limits to each of these reforms, too. Some scholars 
argued that Deng tolerated a certain degree of liberalism and some mild challenges to 
Communist Party political hegemony only because he believed such a concession to be 
a greater accommodation and facilitation to the development of economy, at no risk to 
the party monopoly at all.85 The political reform that Deng personally supervised during 
the 1980s recoiled after 1989 with the tightening of the party’s grip on the instruments
8 p.
of coercive power in the early 1990s, when such threat emerged.
80 Allen Whiting, ‘Foreign Policy of China’ Roy Macridis ed. Foreign Policy in World Politics (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall Inc. 1992, pp. 222-267)
81 ibid.
82 Lucian Pye, ‘An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture’ David Shambaugh ed. Deng 
Xiaoping: Portrait o f a Chinese Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 4-35)
83 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995, Chpts. 
4 and 5)
84 ibid
85 ibid.
86 David Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994, pp. 34-37). Deng’s highly complex personality was reflected in his often contradictory behaviours,
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On the foreign policy front, Deng took personal interest in some pivotal issues and 
important decisions, as exemplified by China’s ‘one country, two systems’ policy 
towards Hong Kong reunification. Deng Xiaoping once gave a succinct instruction to 
the conduct of foreign policy for China: “Observe the development soberly, maintain 
our position, meet the challenge, hide our capacities, bide our time, remain free of
on 9
ambitions, and never claim leadership.” Michael Yahuda commented that in many 
respects, this advice was followed in China’s major foreign policy decisions, such as 
China’s cautious use of its veto on the UN Security Council in dealing with its 
increasingly complicated positions in a range of international issues, and China’s 
discreet collaboration in the UN with Western powers in the 1990s over some important
o o
resolutions such as those concerning the Gulf War, Cambodia and Bosnia.
Role of the CCP Cadre System
So far, it has been established that the individual personalities of CCP leaders left some 
distinctive imprints on the Chinese foreign policy decision system. This conclusion was 
based on references to Mao and Deng’s upbringing, education background, intellectual 
tendency, career experience and work styles. This section examines the aggregate 
characteristics of the CCP cadre system—its philosophical underpinning, its roles in 
both the revolutionary and socialist periods and its transformation in the reform era. The 
importance of this step is sustained by Richard Snyder’s argument that a deliberation of
in particular when he was in paramount leader status. For example, he would not balk at the necessity of using force 
or coercion at Tiananmen, yet did much to curtail the arbitrary repression o f the Maoist era and to enliven the social 
and professional lives o f Chinese from many walks of life. He dramatically improved the standard of living and 
diversity of life for one-fifth of the world’s population, while denying them fundamental political and human rights. 
Similarly, he wanted to see China wealthy in a materialistic sense and strong internationally, but he also feared that 
China could be robbed o f its essence and contaminated by foreign influences. Deng’s ambivalence was thus similar to 
that o f the 19th-century first generation o f Chinese reformers who came up with the idea of adopting Western 
technology while preserving essential Chinese values. See Paul Cohen, ‘The Post-Mao Reforms in Historical 
Perspective’ The Journal o f Asian Studies (Vol. 47, No. 3, August 1988, pp. 518-540)
87 Michael Yahuda, ‘Deng Xiaoping: the Statesman’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 135, September 1993, p. 564)
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personality in foreign policy study must necessarily explore the sociological connotation 
of such a personality.89 More importantly, in many cases, the sociological aspect of 
personality can only be inferred to as it often lies beyond direct empirical monitoring.90
As foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, an intimate relationship between the paramount 
leaders and the CCP cadre establishment meant that an investigation of their 
personalities might well be superficial if the interdependence of the two was not 
subsequently considered. Furthermore, an analysis of the role of the cadre contingent 
would provide an appropriate indicator of the sociological environment to elucidate the 
individual leader’s personality.
The CCP’s personnel management system was organised according to the ‘rule by man’ 
assumption v is -a -v is  the ‘rule by law’ philosophy. This system was designed to 
effectively maintain the party’s grip over state operations. In order to achieve foreign 
policy objectives, both Mao and Deng highly valued the need to groom and nurture a 
credential force to execute them. The historical and empirical observation from the 
perspectives of the Chinese revolutionary and reform processes identified a top-down, 
heavy-handed human intervention in both goal setting and policy implementation 
regimes. The development of institutional power as a check-and-balance and of 
decentralising policymaking process was cautiously and gradually proceeded under 
Deng’s reform initiatives. Final arbitrary power for policy still firmly rested in the hands 
of a few at the top, who in turn had to rely on the massive cadre establishment for policy 
outcomes.
88 ibid.
89 See Chapter Two. Snyder emphasised that it was the sociological aspect o f personality that was meaningful in 
juxtaposing these two seemingly disparate categories. In fact, he further argued that it was this aspect o f personality 
that ‘mattered’ in the foreign policy study.
90 ibid.
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The first 65 years of the CCP’s revolutionary and socialist experience profoundly 
shaped the political terms of reference for generations of its cadres. China’s ability to 
maintain the role of ideology in setting the nation’s ultimate goals and safeguarding the 
party’s structural integrity was evidence of the effectiveness of the cadre system through 
generations of painstaking efforts. As the vanguard, agent and instrument of the party, 
the cadre system closely reflected the CCP leaders’ prevailing political tenets, 
ideological beliefs, strategic thinking and organisational preferences.
Mao ’s Party Building Strategy
The CCP was bom out of the domestic and international crises that China encountered 
at the turn of the twentieth century.91 According to Lenin’s theory, as the vanguard of 
revolution, the party should recruit its members from the industrial proletariat, and 
initially launch revolts in urban areas which would in time spread to the countryside to 
the final victory. This theory was followed in the early years of the CCP in the 1920s.
Faced with the formidable political task of unification and revitalisation of a fragmented 
and weak China, the CCP built a temporary alliance in 1924 with its rival party the 
KMT, with an immediate goal of eradicating warlordism.92 After the breakdown of this 
front, the CCP revolutionary force suffered a great loss.93 The CCP had to retreat its 
remaining force from urban areas to the countryside, where it gained valuable time and 
space to reflect and recover. The party then leamt and determined to mobilise the
91 Deeply concerned with China’s survival in the face of foreign encroachment, warlordism and social disintegration, 
Mao and twelve other intellectuals, representing fifty-seven members of the various regional Marxist groups, set up a 
national organisation of the Communist Party in July 1st, 1921. See Cao Yunfang and Pan Xianying, eds. Zhongguo 
gongchandang jiquan fazhan shi (History o f the Power and War of the Chinese Communist Party) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo renmin daxue dangan shi, 1984, pp. 11 -20)
92 This temporary alliance was known as the first united front of the CCP and the KMT cooperation.
93 For example, in Shanghai alone, the coup by Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927 reduced CCP members from 57,000 to 
10,000. See Zhonggong dangshi jiangyi (Highlight o f Chinese Party History) (Liaoning: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 
1984, pp. 57-58)
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peasant population and exploit their enthusiasm to construct an extended revolutionary 
base in the countryside.94
It was during this period that Mao discarded the Soviet model of party building and 
developed his own party building theory and strategy appropriate to the dire reality in 
China. He came to realise that because of the paucity of an industrial working class, the 
revolutionary focus should be placed on peasants under the Chinese circumstances.95 
However, this shift raised theoretical and practical problems which found no easy 
answers in the Marxist-Leninist textbook, and which were challenged from both 
international and domestic sources.96 Firstly, Mao was questioned by the Comintern 
over his authority to revise the tenets of Marxism-Leninism to fit China’s reality, and 
the CCP was under constant pressure to correct this deviation. Secondly, although the 
majority of the Chinese rural population had already demonstrated ample revolutionary 
potential in their willingness to revolt against the existing order in the late 1920s, there 
were obvious differences in the level of revolutionary consciousness between the 
Russian industrial workers and the Chinese peasants. This difference brought practical 
problems, such as goal setting and organisation, to the CCP’s working agenda.
Mao resolved these issues by, firstly, denouncing those leaders within the CCP 
leadership who echoed the Comintern’s view, and launching campaigns to remove them 
from leading positions. Secondly, he emphasised political and ideological education, 
and the inspiration and persuasion of the peasants. He argued that through education, 
peasants would obtain a ‘proletarian political consciousness’, thereby transcending their
94 ibid.
95 ibid. pp. 77-95
96 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organisation in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angels: University of 
California Press, 1968, pp. 82-85)
97 ibid.
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peasant mentality." The Confucian tradition of emphasising education thus reinforced 
the CCP’s practical need to instil peasants with a proletarian revolutionary 
consciousness.100 It was during the Jinggangshan period from 1927-1933 after the 
failure of urban revolution that Mao transformed the party from a ‘proletarian party to a 
mass party’ by recruiting ‘a large number of members from revolutionary elements 
among the peasants and petty bourgeoisie.’101
Many factors contributed to the CCP’s 1949 success, and many scholars also advanced 
different explanations from their theoretical perspective.102 But Mao himself attributed 
the success to the ‘three magic weapons’: the united front, armed struggle, and party 
organisation.
A report published in 1981 on the CCP’s party history by Peng Zhen was most 
revealing in that it detailed how the CCP established, consolidated and expanded its 
influence and controls in the 1930s through organisational arrangement and personnel 
management.103 In short, organisationally the CCP developed a multi-layered structure
98 ibid.
99 Lucian Bianco, Origins o f the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971, pp. 55-62)
100 ibid.
101 Ma Jipin and Zhou Yi, eds. Mao Zedong jiandang sixiang yu dangshi yanjiu (Mao Zedong’s Thought on Party- 
Building and Research Note on Party History) (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1984, p. 167). Mao believed 
that through political education, this transformation of the party would not necessarily lower the quality or change 
revolutionary nature of the party itself.
102 For example, Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1962); Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organisation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1966); and John Lewis, Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970).
103 Peng Zhen, Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji bianqu dangde gongzuo he juti zhengce baogao (Report on Party’s Work and 
Policies in Jin-Cha-Ji Border Areas) (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1981, p. 134-144). Peng started by 
saying that during the 1930s, when party organisation entered an unfamiliar village for the first time, it usually 
employed the following methods to establish a new power structure and party branch. First, military representatives 
used ‘administrative methods’ by ordering the leader of the village to convene a villagewide mass meeting. Even 
though appointed by the KMT, the leader was compelled to call for a mass meeting and formally to introduce party 
representatives. The representatives would explain the need to set up a mass organisation against the Japanese. 
Sponsorship by the power elite in each locality helped to legitimise the representatives and to break the ice in 
establishing contact with the masses. According to the CCP, this method was necessary because of the peasants’ 
dependency and conservatism prior to their being mobilised. Second, membership in the anti-Japanese organisation 
was open to almost anyone in the village, including ‘speculators, class enemies, and alien elements’, because ‘the task 
facing the party was enormous and urgent, whereas the available manpower was very limited. Third, the CCP 
representatives skilfully nursed the anti-Japanese organisations, letting them gradually take over functions previously
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in the countryside to consolidate its control in the ‘red’ areas.104 At the outer rim was 
the anti-Japanese association, with membership open to all; then came the peasants’ and 
workers’ associations, with membership largely determined by the members’ economic 
positions. At the core was the party branch, with carefully selected peasants who were 
regarded as being politically reliable. The party branch controlled mass organisations 
through cadres. In building up these layers, the CCP exploited the prestige and ability of 
the existing elite to mobilise peasants and establish mass organisations.105 The crucial 
role played by the party members in the 1930s and 1940s reflected the organisational 
skill and capability of the party leaders. Without this, party leaders could not have 
maximised the effect of the political, economic and social grievances of the various 
classes and groups in China, while adjusting the party programs and policies to fit the 
changing situation. As Roy Hofheinz rightly concluded, neither ‘contextual’ nor 
‘motivational’ theories that did not take into account the adaptability and capacity for 
realistic assessment of the Chinese Communists could explain the success of CCP.100 
Without flexible and skilful leadership of the party, whatever revolutionary potential
performed by village leaders, which created a ‘dual power structure’. The official guidelines contained specific 
instructions to avoid the forcible removal of the village leader; instead, he was to be drawn into the anti-Japanese 
mass organisation so that whatever legitimacy he had could be transferred to it. Fourth, once the umbrella anti- 
Japanese mass organisation had set up offices in charge of different projects, party representatives kept a careful eye 
on the active workers, hired labourers, and poor peasants who appeared to have the trust of the masses and who 
demonstrated leadership ability. Once potential candidates were selected, the party representatives told them to set up 
peasants’ and workers’ associations. Naturally, when these organisations were formed, the activists assumed 
leadership. Fifth, the representatives led the associations to discuss current socioeconomic conditions in the village, 
often explaining Marxist theory along with CCP’s policy on these problems. These specialised associations 
eventually demanded reduced rents, increased wages, and shorter working hours. As class-conflict-related issues 
arose, some of the former activists forming the economically better-off backgrounds groups withdrew. Vacancies 
were filled by persons with good class backgrounds whose interests were tied to the CCP program. Sixth, those 
original leaders with questionable motivation and backgrounds were replaced by more reliable elements who had 
proven their activism, dedication, and leadership ability. This replacement ensured that each mass 
organisation—including the original united front organisation—would operate as the party wished. Seventh, in 
selecting the cadres, the most reliable people were approached, tested, and given the option of joining the party. If 
they responded positively, they were groomed as members. After joining the party, each person was sent to a higher 
level to receive training. Then, he or she was returned to the native area to recruit other members.
104 Areas under the CCP’s influence vis-a-vis those regions under the KMT controlled.
105 Peng Zhen, Guanyu Jin-Cha-Ji bianqu dangde gongzuo he juti zhengce baogao (Report on Party’s Work and 
Policies in Jin-Cha-Ji Border Areas) (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1981, pp. 134-144)
106 Roy Hofheinz, ‘The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success’ Doak Barnett ed. Chinese Communist Politics in 
Action (Seattle: University of Washington, 1969, pp. 3-77)
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107Chinese society had would have remained as mere potential.
These CCP’s mobilisation tactics and skills graphically illustrated Mao’s party building 
theory. Mao strongly argued that in China’s circumstances, pure Leninist party 
theory—to organise urban proletarians to rise against capitalism for the victory of 
socialism—was not practical in China, which had the majority of its population 
scattered in the vast rural areas. 108 Willingness to adapt to the socioeconomic conditions 
of China and the ability to restructure party work orientation in line with China’s reality 
were the two prerequisites for the ensuing victory in China. 109 Under the Chinese 
circumstances of that time, only through rallying the rural population, guided by the 
Leninist revolutionary principles, and through cultivating the vast and solid base in the 
power-vacuum of the countryside, could the final nationwide victory be achieved. 110 
Mao continued to argue that the semi-feudalist and semi-colonial social reality of China 
necessitated the course of revolution to be from countryside to city. The party-building 
strategy should therefore be rural-based, sourcing its members from local areas. * 111
This important theoretical and practical departure from Marxist and Leninist orthodoxy 
profoundly impacted on the CCP leaders’ strategic thinking and work style orientation. 
Mao’s comments on building a solid base in the vacuum of the Chinese countryside 
during the party’s formative years cast a governing framework for subsequent CCP’s 
domestic and international politics. The mutual dependence between the party
107 ibid.
108 Mao Zedong, ‘Report on Peasant’s Movement in Hunan’ Selected Works o f Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign 
Language Press, 1969, Vol. 1); Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1962, pp. 57-96)
109 ibid.
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Action (Seattle: University o f Washington, 1969, pp. 3-77)
112 John Wilson Lewis, Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (New York: Cambridge University 
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leadership and its cadre system to create a political and physical stronghold for survival 
and expansion in the revolutionary era had a lasting effect on Chinese leaders’ 
assessment of, and their preference for, using cadres in policy implementation in the 
years to come. 113
Importance o f the CCP ’s Cadre System
The CCP cadre system reflected the CCP party building theory and practice. The 
importance and the inner working of this system held the key to understanding the 
characteristics and the role of cadres in Chinese political system, as well as its value to 
the party leaders.
Originally developed in the context of the Russian revolution, and then translated into 
Chinese, the term ‘cadre’ (,ganbu) referred to the backbone of the revolutionary 
movement—people whose high level of political consciousness qualified them to 
assume responsibility for specific political tasks. 114 The cadres in the Chinese political 
system served the structural need and as a direct link between party’s policy choice and 
its implementation. Defined as embodying sacred missions and often as a means of 
achieving specific core tasks at a given time, the cadres in turn enjoyed pervasive 
powers widely impacting on the structure, orientation, and capability of the political 
system (which included the decisionmaking process, the conflict structure and the way 
the party-state interacted with society) . 115
The CCP’s cadre building and control were achieved mainly through the mechanisms of
113 ibid.
114 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organisation in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1968, pp. 1-35)
115 ibid
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nomenklatura Ub Theoretically, before 1949, the CCP cadres were first and foremost 
inspired and mobilised as spearheads for the Chinese revolution. The cadres’ role as the 
revolutionary vanguard was expressed through their willingness to endure extreme 
hardship and dangers.117 After 1949, there was a great transformation of the cadre 
operating environment. In Mao’s era, cadres were still expected and motivated to 
continue their revolutionary functions as pillars for socialist construction. During 
Deng’s reform era, however, the roles of cadres changed considerably to reflect the 
party’s shift of work emphasis and accommodate the competing priorities. However, 
through the control of nomenklatura, the CCP managed to further consolidate and 
institutionalise the practice of the traditional ‘rule by man’ through the cadre system, 
and enhance the functional importance of its cadres in political and economic life.119
Pareto and Mosca noted that a political elite could exert enormous influence in shaping 
a political system regardless of the forms of government.120 This was also salient in 
traditional China, where a well-defined elite of scholar-bureaucrat-landlords dominated 
not only the political but also economic and cultural life. The continuous practice of 
‘rule by man’ and the all-encompassing power of the cadre system in Mao’s era
1 91reinforced this political tradition.
Ezra Vogel observed in 1965 that the Chinese socialist system, with ultimate faith in the 
rationality of human mind, substituted allegedly chaotic market control with decisions 
consciously made by the political oligarchy—the CCP cadres located in a hierarchically
116 John P. Bums, The Chinese Communist Party ’s Nomenklatura System (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1989)
117 Lawrence Sullivan, ‘Leadership and Authority in the Chinese Communist Party: Perspectives from the 1950s’ 
Pacific Affairs (Vol. 59, Winter 1986-87, pp. 605-633)
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119 For more of the significance of Chinese nomenklatura system on John P. Bums’ book The Chinese Communist 
Party 's Nomenklatura System (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1989, pp. xxxi-xxxiii)
120 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology, Vol. 1 (New York: Dover, 1965); 
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constructed organisational setting.122 And unlike the Eastern European socialist 
countries, where former revolutionaries started to co-opt technical experts into the 
ruling elite immediately after seizing political power, the elite transformation in 
China from strenuous revolutionaries to liberal-minded reform leaders took place over a 
period of almost three decades after the foundation of the PRC. Moreover, the 
prolonged and tortuous transition was frequently marked by ruthless inner party 
conflicts, purges, prosecution, and external struggles for survival.124 If “the state refers 
to all those individuals who occupy offices that authorise them and them alone to make 
and apply decisions that are binding upon all segments of the society,” as Erie 
Nordlinger defined, then the Chinese cadre system, which was cultivated by 
nomenklatura, was the ‘state’ itself. Or, as John P. Bums pointed out, the cadre system 
itself was significant “because it encourages the development among the leadership of 
patron-client relations”126—cadres depended on the system for career, promotion, 
power, wealth and status. The practice of patron-client relations, within the tradition of 
‘rule by man’, enabled these cadres to occupy important political positions and
127subsequently influence domestic and international policy orientations.
The concrete task of the CCP cadre system changed, either subtly or dramatically, 
throughout its more than 75 years history. Hong Yung Lee’s study on this change found
121 John Fairbank, The Cambridge History o f China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 1-32)
122 Ezra Vogel, ‘From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The ‘Regularisation’ of Cadres’ The China Quarterly 
(Vol.. 29, January-March 1965, pp. 36-60)
123 Juan Linz, ‘Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Regimes’ Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby eds. Handbook of 
Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975, pp. 175-192)
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29, January-March 1965, p. 36-60)
125 Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, p. 11)
126 John P. Bums, The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc. 1989, p. 
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that the transformation was accomplished mainly through a dialectic process of 
recruitment and structural adjustment within the party system. He said:
Although a political system at any given moment enjoys a certain amount of 
autonomy in selecting its main task and interests, perceptions, and preferences 
of the existing cadre corps, the choices made in recruiting cadres thus produce a 
structure that constrains the policy choices at the next stage. In this sense, the 
cadres are creators as well as agents of the state structure; the cadres create 
political, economic, and social structures that largely reflect their ideological 
vision. Once this basic structure is established, however, it operates as a 
constraint on the cadres’ behaviour.128
The shift in the regime’s main task from revolution to economic development in 1978 
resulted in a big change in the CCP’s recruitment policy for cadres, and, 
subsequently, the composition and the role of the cadres in the new reform era. With the 
replacement of senior political leaders and a large number of old revolutionary 
vanguards by better educated bureaucratic technocrats, China’s new political leaders 
tried to restructure the existing cadre system.130 New sociopolitical and economic 
arrangements were needed in this reform to balance the political needs of the Leninist
131party and the perceived structural requirements of economic and political reforms. 
Indeed, in Deng’s reform era, the party recruits were mainly sourced from those with 
better knowledge, skills and education, instead of on pure political consciousness, as 
had been the case before.
The Party-state and the Cadre System
The fact that there was no formal notion of ‘separation of powers’ between the 
executive, legislature and judiciary in the Chinese constitution revealed a poorly
128 Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
California: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 13-65)
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conceptualised relationship between the party and state. Jeffrey Pfeffer noted that the 
party-state was the ultimate form of power expansion and concentration by the 
ascendancy of the party elite over state affairs.132 In China, the party-state with a strong 
cadre system gave the CCP unlimited power and the ability to rule.
China’s party-state structure that gradually evolved in the 1950s and 1960s reflected the 
PRC founders’ experiences, particularly “their own pre-1949 experience in conducting 
revolutionary struggle and administering liberated areas”. Other factors such as the 
theoretical Leninist model o f ‘democratic centralism’, the post-Leninist model of Soviet 
society and China’s centuries-old tradition of authoritarianism, elitism and ideological
1 T Aorthodoxy also helped to shape the party-state structure of the PRC in its early years. 
These factors and visions of a concentrated power were filtered through the founders’ 
rural orientation, which, more importantly, stressed subsistence and self-sufficiency, 
moralised politics, and which exhibited poor knowledge about the functional 
prerequisites of modem society.135
The scope of activities directly regulated by the Maoist party-state in the first three 
decades of the People’s Republic was all-inclusive. In the name of the socialist 
revolution and transformation, the party-state gradually expanded its control not only 
over coercive instmments but also over all economic and human resources, including
• • • • 1 3 7the goods and services that the Chinese people needed in their daily lives. As the 
party-state took over the functions traditionally performed by social organisations and
131 ibid.
132 Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power and Organisation (Boston: Pitman, 1981, pp. 57-59)
133 Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1967, pp. 422-427)
134 ibid.
135 ibid.
136 For a characterisation of the Maoist system and its transformation by 1982, see Michel Oksenberg and Richard 
Bush, ‘China’s Political Evolution: 1972-82’ Problem of Communism (No. 12, September-October 1982, pp. 1-19)
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individuals, ordinary people’s personal autonomy shrank and dependency on the state 
increased.138 The elimination of the labour market and the introduction of a centralised 
allocation system enabled the party-state to control all social mobility. Since the party- 
state rejected exchange relations as a mode of social interaction on the grounds that they
139were capitalistic, its power and authority permeated every aspect of social interaction.
Although the CCP was not a monolithic entity, the party’s monopoly of power, in 
conjunction with the personal clout of paramount leaders, often silenced other voices 
and denied diverse views in the policy process. Despite the temporary 
intention—initially introduced in 1942 as a means of resolving the lack of coordination 
among the various organisations of the party, government and military that were 
scattered all over the guerrilla base areas140—party committees came to dominate every 
organisation, be it political, economic, social or cultural after 1949, and well into the 
socialist state building period under Mao. The party cell (dangzu) system, originally 
introduced in government ministries as a temporary unit to supervise work in 1949, 
continued to dominate government bureaucratic bodies and directly managed the 
business of functional organs in agriculture, industry, commerce, education, military 
matters, politics and party affairs.141 In response to the increasing power of party 
committees and secretaries, the boundary between the party on the one hand and state 
organs and social organisations on the other was blurred and merged. As a direct 
consequence of blending the party’s policy setting with state administrative functions,
137 ibid.
138 For the evolution of the powerful party-state in China, see Tang Tsou, ‘Reflections on the Formation and 
Foundation of the Communist Party-State in China’ Tang Tsou, Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms 
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 259-334)
139 ibid
140 'Xin shiqi dangde renwu’ (Party’s Role in the New Era) Xinhua Wenzhai (New China Digest) (No. 11, 1987, pp. 
1-5)
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the party-state’s accountability to society declined. 142 In addition, Mao’s ‘politics in 
command’ allowed a uniform imposition of the official ideology on all sectors of the 
party-state and society. 143 The Maoist version of socialism—which attached paramount 
importance to distribution rather than to production, and which stressed egalitarianism 
over efficiency in order to provide minimum material needs for all Chinese—took 
precedence in decisionmaking considerations in all functional fields. 144
In this tightly controlled party-state structure, revolutionary cadres were the movers and 
shakers. The party-state relied on them to carry out policy initiatives and they were 
expected to play conflicting roles as politicians, administrators and bureaucrats. 145 As 
agents of the state, these cadres were expected to make and implement the optimal 
economic and social policies in the best interests of state and society. But as agents of 
the party, these cadres owed not only their jobs but also their power and status to the 
CCP. As the beneficiaries of this order, they had interests to defend. 146 To the 
revolutionary cadres, dedication, obedience and diligence in exchange for their status, 
privileges and influence were more important than ability, efficiency and innovation. 147
As mentioned earlier, the new leadership in the reform era bought a new dialectic 
prospect into the CCP’s leadership style. The emergence of a new generation of party 
leaders and the shift of work emphasis to economic development during Deng’s reform 
period fundamentally affected both the structure of leadership and the composition of
142 ibid.
143 Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University o f California Press, 1991, pp. 387-398)
144 ibid.
145 For the distinction between the politician and the bureaucrat, see Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam and Bert 
Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981)
146 Tang Tsou, ‘Reflections on the Formation and Foundation of the Communist Party-State in China’ Tang Tsou, 
Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 259-334)
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the cadre system. As distinct from the old revolutionaries, China’s new generation of 
leaders jointed the party after the liberation in 1949—a group known as the third 
generation.148 David Lampton believed that the third generation leaders, not directly 
exposed to guerrilla warfare experience, were more likely to exercise flexibility and be 
more approachable than those old guards who, by virtue of their knowledge of tradition, 
values, norms or ideology, tended to act as critics of a more open system.149 The 
succession of this generation of leadership was a necessary condition for Deng’s more 
open and liberal domestic and international policies.150
Although a political qualification was still used in selecting the leading cadres, its 
contents changed substantially under the Deng’s reform initiative.131 However, as 
Andrew Wälder noted, the universal achievement-oriented criteria were not uniformly 
applied to every qualified candidate for promotion—personal connections operated and, 
to a large extent, determined the outcome. This practice resulted in the ‘unprincipled 
universalism’ as opposed to the ‘principled particularism’ of the Mao era.
Like their counterparts in Western government systems, the new Chinese bureaucratic 
technocrat leaders were less committed to political ideology—whether a broadly
148 The first generation referred to those who joined the revolution before the Long March, and the second generation, 
those who participated in the anti-Japanese war. Evolved from the best-educated segment of the Chinese population, 
most of the CCP’s new top leaders were themselves the beneficiaries of the party’s privilege and elite power which 
were extensively enjoyed by their parents or patrons. Most of them had studied natural sciences in college and 
worked as specialists in production-related fields in bureaucratic organisations before they rose to leadership 
positions, ibid.
149 David Lampton, ‘Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill’ Yu-ming Shaw Changes and Continuity in Chinese 
Communism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 186-210).
150 Alvin Gouldner, The Future o f Intellectuals and the Rise o f the New Class (New York: Seabury Press, 1979, pp. 
53-61)
151 During the Mao era, it included such ideological criteria as an understanding of Marxism-Leninism, a dedication 
to the mass line, and a willingness to sacrifice one’s private interests, ibid. Under the new leadership, it referred to 
one’s dedication to the ‘socialist principle’, which was broadly interpreted in turn to include any principle that 
brought good fortune to the people, enhanced productivity or contributed to prosperity. See ‘Xin shiqi dangde renwu ’ 
(Party’s Role in the New Era) Xinhua Wenzhai (New China Digest) (No. 11, 1987, pp. 1-5)
152 Andrew Wälder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1986, pp. 95-107)
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defined socialism or Mao Zedong’s discredited thought—than the disappearing old 
revolutionary leaders. 153 They tended to be more responsive to public demand and 
popular sentiment. Some veteran revolutionaries, therefore, openly feared that the 
obvious lack of basic understanding of the Marxist principles and the good party 
tradition would lead to a general deterioration in the party’s standing.154 Moreover, 
lacking personal involvement in the party’s ‘fine tradition’ of the Yenan period, they 
were more susceptible to new ideas and changes. If the bureaucratic technocrat leaders 
had any common ideology, it was the simple pragmatism necessary for what Ezra 
Suleiman called ‘to get the job done’ . 155
Conclusion
This chapter explored the elusive themes, yet clearly traceable marks, of personality in 
Chinese foreign policy motivation by examining Chinese paramount leaders Mao and 
Deng. The sociological aspect of their personality was confirmed by examining the 
aggregate characteristics presented by the CCP cadre system. The chapter focused on 
the importance of the CCP’s cadre system and the impacts of the party-state on China’s 
political system.
What emerged from here was that ‘rule by man,’ as the essence of the Confucian 
political philosophy and Chinese political culture, also lay deep at the heart of China’s 
political system under both Mao and Deng. It was typically expressed in the form of 
heavily relying on the political elites who exercised their power within a well defined
153 ibid.
154 iXin shiqi dangde renwu ’ (Party’s Role in the New Era) Xinhua Wenzhai (New China Digest) (No. 11, 1987, pp. 
1-5
155 Ezra Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 367-380)
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systemic structure. The difference was that contemporary Chinese political power was 
more or less shared and executed by the CCP’s cadre system under the auspices of 
paramount leaders whereas in the traditional mode power was concentrated in one ruler.
The rise of the new technocratic party elite and the change of cadre composition had 
deep ramifications in political life in China. The emergence of the new generation of 
party leaders greatly facilitated the reform process and raised expectations that 
practising socialism with a market-oriented capitalist system was feasible as the party’s 
leaders adjusted their strategies to the new international political environment.
The rapid ascendancy of the new generation of the CCP cadres to the top CCP leading 
positions, under the patronage of Deng Xiaoping, cleared the bureaucratic, 
administrative and political grounds for Deng’s reform program in China. The rise of 
the third generation of leaders had several significant effects—it not only opened up the 
possibility for Deng to carry out substantial economic and social reforms in China, but 
also helped to maintain the dominant position of the cadre system and the supremacy of 
the party-state itself. The cadres were the agents that turned the previously unthinkable 
political, economic and social changes from Mao’s era into reality under Deng, while 
still keeping the socialist banner flying through the rhetoric of the four cardinal 
principles. These new generation leaders were not old orthodox revolutionary cadres, 
nor were they advocates of free capitalism in China. The fundamental values and 
mentality from the revolutionary past did not change completely with the arrival of the 
new generation. This was because within the party-state system, the very survival of the 
leadership’s political ambitions depended on the survival of the party-state’s structure 
itself. In this sense, the cadres were limited by the structure that the old generation of
revolutionaries had created.
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This chapter demonstrated that in China’s political system, the personality of the 
individual paramount leaders, by relying on an elite group and party-state structure, had 
important leverage in both domestic and foreign policymaking processes. The 
sociological aspect of Chinese political tradition and the party-state system were 
dominant factors which empowered individual leaders. The impact of the party leaders’ 
personality and the role of the CCP cadre system on Chinese foreign policy will be 
further tested in the case study in Part III, which will provide further evidence of the 
CCP’s commitment to, and continued practice of, ‘rule by man’ in its external affairs.
Chapter Six
Structural/Situational Constraints—Limit of Organisational Setting 
and the Scope of Systemic Transformation
Walter Carlsnaes’ three-level analytical model of foreign policy motivation placed high 
priority on the role of ‘organisational setting’ and ‘objective conditions’.1 He argued 
that it was this situational dimension, not the intentional nor dispositional aspects, that 
decided the key features and main thrust of a foreign policy.2 3Given the precedence of 
this structural/situational aspect of the external operating circumstance in the 
motivation process, Carlsnaes concluded that the study of the effect of
I
structural/situational circumstances held the key to the final motivation outcome.
China’s transformation from a revolutionary power to a post-revolutionary state, and to 
a socialist state with Chinese characteristics under Deng’s open and reform policy was 
underpinned by two key features: one was Mao’s ‘revolution’, and the other was 
Deng’s ‘modernisation’. The implementation of these two major themes were 
accompanied by unique structural features or systemic transformation, which directly 
impacted on the leadership’s foreign policy motivation. This was highlighted in two 
extraordinary events in Chinese foreign policy: Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War 
in late 1950,4 and China’s reconciliation with South Korea in the early 1990s after more 
than 40 years’ hostility.5 These two seemingly incompatible foreign policy decisions 
demonstrated that the objective conditions and organisational settings were important 
considerations in shaping the Chinese leadership’s foreign policy motivation.
1 See Chpt. 2. Carlsnaes’ main argument was that among the three motivational dimensions, the situational aspect 
which included objective condition and organisational settings played a dominant role.
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
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This chapter seeks to understand how the structural condition and its mutation over 
time informed the CCP leaders’ core values and key terms of reference that largely 
determined the optimal strategy and options of their foreign policy. It explores how the 
party monopoly over the state apparatus and its dominance over all aspects of people’s 
lives was achieved, and how it affected Chinese foreign policy.
There were many factors contributing to the establishment of China’s political system 
under Mao, most notably totalitarianism. But this chapter only focuses on examining 
structural and systemic components. It first discusses the consequences for Chinese 
foreign policy of the party’s monopoly of power under Mao. Mao’s doctrine of self- 
reliance as both a central notion to mobilise domestic resources and as an extensive 
revolutionary practice in China had resulted in a particular framework for foreign 
policy decisionmaking—for a long time it had to conform to this doctrine. Under Mao, 
self-reliance often equated to isolation and prevented China from adopting more 
conciliatory attitudes towards the two superpowers in the 1960s and 1970s. However, 
Mao’s doctrine of self-reliance was often complemented with a quite contradictory 
practice—the united front, which was a strategy for the CCP to achieve effective power 
in both the revolutionary and early People’s Republic periods, even though often in an 
inferior position and outnumbered by other forces. In foreign policy, the united front 
strategy gave China flexibility through selectively allying with friends and dividing 
enemies.
The chapter then assesses some significant structural changes in Deng’s period and the
4 Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996, Introduction)
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flow-on effect on the Chinese leadership’s foreign policy thinking. The structural and 
systemic transformations under Deng reduced, in many ways, the party’s power 
monopoly over China. As a consequence, the Chinese political system evolved from 
vertical to horizontal authoritarianism, with increasing participation of the bureaucracy 
providing the necessary structural change to facilitate such a development. This account 
of structural transformation takes into consideration such elements as institutional 
inputs, the scope of the bureaucratic participation and the degree of transfiguration in 
institutional structure, rules and norms governing the formulation of Chinese foreign 
policy.
Party’s Monopoly as Structural Constraint
Under Mao, the party’s monopoly over ideology, organisation and administration in 
China provided a dominant and unified structural setting within which the policy 
makers operated and drew reference. The existence of such a monopoly gave the CCP 
unbridled power to control over both domestic and foreign policy decisionmaking. As 
the predominant governing medium, the CCP’s power monopoly in the Mao era cast a 
rigid framework to regulate policy formulation.5 6 Under Deng, although the party’s 
monopoly of the system was significantly weakened and gradually reduced by the 
increasing function of institutional mechanisms, the efforts to maintain the privileges of 
the party’s power was nonetheless a repeated theme in Chinese domestic politics. As 
such, it was directly implicated in the making of Chinese foreign policy.
5 James Cotton, ed. Politics and Policy in New Korean State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, pp. 11-12)
6 The party monopoly did not equate to a monolithic bloc. The CCP’s monopoly did not negate that there were policy 
debates within the party leadership. It is so used in this chapter to express the policy outcome rather than process. See
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The question of how the structural setting affected Chinese foreign policy would be 
best addressed by understanding this set of related issues. Domestically, the two basic 
theories and the practice of self-reliance and the united front played pivotal roles in 
putting in place a structural setting which shaped the CCP’s monopoly in Chinese 
society under Mao. But in dealing with international relations, they severely limited 
China’s foreign policy choice and expression.
Self-reliance as Foundation o f Mao ’s Foreign Policy
Self-reliance was originally a sheer necessity for the CCP’s survival in the hardship of 
the isolated Chinese rural areas. It was later consolidated into the foundation and 
guiding principle for China’s foreign policy under Mao. In discussion of the influence 
of the CCP’s power monopoly over Chinese foreign policy, one noticeable 
phenomenon was that such a policy at the end of World War II was shaped largely 
within the contours of the communists’ own political and military history.* 7 This was a 
history that centred on the political struggles between Mao and Soviet-trained party 
leaders,8 and was also firmly rooted in the revolutionary experience of the CCP.9
As demonstrated in Chapter Five, Mao differed in background, experience and basic 
policy preference from his rivals within the CCP who favoured a united front with the 
Kuomintang and its foreign supporters in the 1930s.10 Mao built his political base in the 
countryside, and favoured a strategy of relying on the peasants rather than trusting in
Li Zhisui, The Private Life o f Chairman Mao Anne Thurston ed. And Hung-chao Tai translated (New York: Random
House, 1994)
7 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Grove Press, 1968, pp. 132-167); Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung 
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1966, pp. 55-56)
8 Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends (Standford: Standford University Press, 1967, pp. 58-71)
9 ibid.
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the good will of the Chinese bourgeoisie or its foreign patrons.* 11 Mao’s political 
opponents were trained in the cities and abroad. They had control over the party 
through the intervention of Stalin and they were instructed to form a united front with 
the KMT. Such uncompromising differences and the subsequent efforts to resolve 
them influenced not only the Chinese Communist movement throughout 1930s and
IT1940s, but also its foreign policy orientation after 1949.
Stuart Schram described early Mao as conscious of the collective force of the Chinese 
people—undifferentiated between urban and rural or even classes—in fulfilment of 
China’s destiny.14 His staunch nationalism helped make him an enthusiastic supporter 
of the KMT during the 1920s and a serious practitioner of the strategy of the united 
front from that time on.15 But for Mao the turning point came in 1927 when Chiang 
Kai-shek’s bloody purge of the Left ended the First United Front. The Central 
Committee of the CCP went underground in Shanghai; Mao and a group of followers 
took to the hills.16 From then until the Communist victory in 1949, Mao viewed China 
and the world from his mobile base in the countryside, and was forced to rely solely
i o
on the CCP as an organisation to realise his revolutionary aspirations for China.
Mao’s rural orientation and sentiment reflected his choice of strategy and the preferred 
social base for the Chinese revolution. For him, the attempt to cooperate with the urban
10 ibid. pp. 112-142
11 ibid.
12 ibid.
13 ibid. Also see John Lewis, Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970, pp. 71-75)
14 Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1966, pp. 41-53)
15 ibid.
16 Harald Isaacs, The Tragedy o f the Chinese Revolution (Standford: Standford University Press, 1961, pp. 58-77)
17 ibid. pp. 132-155
18 ibid. Quite unlike the first united front with the KMT in the 1920s, the CCP’s return to the second united front in 
1935 through relying more on its own strength and leadership.
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bourgeoisie had proven to be catastrophic; and only a program of mass mobilisation in 
the countryside would enable the revolution to survive and prosper.19 “Can the 
countryside defeat the cities?” he asked. “The answer is that it is difficult, but it can be 
done.”20
The 1942-1944 party rectification campaign with its daunting slogan of self-reliance 
was the most important single enterprise in the revolutionary decades. Its central 
message—that the theory of Marxism must be made to square with the reality of rural 
China—left an imprint on all aspects of Chinese Communism. The spirit of the 
rectification movement stressed independence, and the synthesis of the Marxist- 
Leninist tradition with the real-life problems of China to create a new, uniquely 
Chinese form of Marxism.23 This theoretical redefinition of Marxist-Leninist theories 
gave the CCP the sole authority to interpret its meaning, thus paving the way for the 
CCP’s absolute right to monopolise political power in China.
Self-reliance was an accurate description of the way Yenan made its decisions. Despite 
pressures from Stalin and the Comintern, Yenan largely made up its own mind.24 The 
best evidence for the CCP’s independence came from the periods before August 1945 
and after March 1946.25
19 Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1966, pp. 71-72)
20 Mao Zedong, ‘On the New Stage’ Stuart Schram The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger, 
1969, p.288)
21 James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, Chpt. 1)
22 ibid.
23 ibid 
24ibid.
25 Sheng Hua, Zhang Xuejun and Luo Xiaopeng, China: from Revolution to Reform (Basingstoke, England: 
Macmillan Press, 1993, pp. 82-87). In both cases Moscow advised Yenan to seek a peaceful settlement with the KMT 
but the Communists opted for civil wars. During the nine-month interim, Russian influence on the Communists was 
important, in some cases even decisive. This had little to do with Moscow’s organisational or ideological hold over 
Yenan perhaps. It simply reflected the Communists’ appreciation of Russian power in China. Decision makers in 
Yenan called the shots; they weighed the Soviet factor like any other.
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Self-reliance was a virtue bom of necessity—a product of situation rather than of 
choice. Ezra Suleiman noted that as an insurgent movement before 1949, the CCP 
lacked foreign recognition, and the KMT government for the most part succeeded in 
blocking its contacts with the outside world. As a rural movement, tucked away in the 
remote hinterland, hemmed in by the KMT and Japanese armies, the CCP lacked access 
to the cities, the coast, and lines of international communication. The exigencies of 
war left the Chinese communists with no choice but to create a network of self- 
sufficient economic and military units, linked by a common ideology and a disciplined 
but slender organisation. This was in the first instance a domestic strategy, a means of 
survival in a lonely, hostile environment due largely to Yenan’s isolation, but it was
27applied to foreign policy later as well.
Self-reliance was above all a psychological and political weapon designed to 
concentrate the party’s power. Such a concentration inevitably led to monopoly. The 
Central Committee directive ‘On Diplomatic Work’ set the tone for Yenan’s attitude 
toward the outside world—the CCP would welcome foreign visitors and what they 
brought with them, but the Chinese people were never again to supplicate favours from 
abroad. ‘On Diplomatic Work ’ declared that:
We must intensify the feeling of national self-respect and faith in ourselves. This 
is what constitutes the correct national platform, this is what constitutes the
TOessence of the prototype of the new man in new democratic China.
26 Ezra Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 188-212)
27 ibid.
28 James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, Conclusion)
29 ibid.
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This message was meant to kindle national pride and stiffen backbones among the party 
faithful. It was also a selling point, a reason for following the CCP. Mao said: “We are 
not like Chiang Kai-shek. No nation needs to prop us up. We can stand erect and walk
' j  i
on our own feet like free men.”
Later on, when Mao’s preference for the rural-masses was tied to new Chinese foreign 
policy, it was articulated in the policy of self-trust or self-reliance. James Reardon- 
Anderson noted that the most significant outcome and lessons of this rectification 
campaign decreed that the CCP would not treat the world without on the basis of self- 
reliance and the creation of their own power from within.
The stress on self-reliance, however, did not equate to renunciation of external 
assistance, for Mao recognised that China’s position was too precarious and the power 
of the foreigners too great to permit a policy of blind autarky either before or after 
1949.33 Mao and other communists did their best to attract support from the Americans 
and the Russians during 1940s.34 After the victory in 1949, Beijing was quick to turn to 
the Soviet Union for assistance in defending China and rebuilding its economy. Tens 
and thousands of Soviet experts and technical personnel came to China and Soviet-built 
equipment was flooding China’s industries. Rather, the idea of self-reliance crystallised 
gradually in response to events at home and abroad. Domestically, an important turning 
point came in late 1939, when Moscow concluded the Nazi-Soviet Pact and reached a
30 CCP Central Committee Directive, ‘On Diplomatic Work’ in Collection o f CCP’s Historical Documents (Beijing: 
Foreign Language Press, p. 8)
31 Quoted by David Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944 (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1970, p. 72)
32 James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, Chpt. 1)
33 Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979, p p .63-67)
34 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Grove Press, 1968, pp. 115-124)
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cease-fire with Japan, revealing its willingness to pacify the Fascist powers at the 
expenses of other countries’ interests.35 In the spring of 1941, the signing of the Soviet- 
Japanese Neutrality Pact and the accompanying Frontier Declaration in which Moscow 
pledged to respect the territorial integrity of the puppet state of Manchuria shocked the 
CCP leadership, but confirmed the correctness and timeliness of Mao’s wisdom of self- 
reliance.36 Mao was the first to assert his leadership over the Chinese communist 
movement without the Soviet or Comintern support. He rode to power aboard a 
program of rural revolution and self-reliance which was in marked contrast to the 
policies of his predecessors.
Internationally, as Reardon-Anderson noted, there was no evidence that communist 
ideology prohibited alliance and cooperation with the USSR, the US and other powers. 
Rather, it was after the Americans had repeatedly turned against the CCP—first in 
China’s civil war in the 1940s, and later in Korean War in the early 1950s—that Mao 
used self-reliance as an instrument to mobilise public sentiment and to appeal for Soviet
T O
support. Reardon-Anderson speculated that if the American military had aided the 
CCP, then cooperation between the two sides might have developed its own momentum
I Q
quite independent of Leninist socialist-imperialist theory. This was also the view of 
Michael Schaller—although the Marxist theory prepared the CCP to take Americans as 
number one enemy, initially this was not the case at all. The CCP eagerly sought 
support and military assistance from the US in the 1930s and 1940s. Only after the US 
constantly refused to assist the CCP and persistently supported the KMT in the war
35 Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979, pp. 63-67)
36 ibid. pp. 88-91
37 ibid.
38 James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 91-95)
39 ibid.
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with the CCP did the Chinese communists come to regard it as an arch enemy.40
The success of the Chinese revolution not only proved the effectiveness of the self- 
reliance policy, but also gave Mao and other old revolutionaries profuse political capital 
to claim jurisdiction over domestic as well as international relations.41 The theme of 
self-reliance was an important part of the Chinese revolutionary legacy which placed 
little limit on subsequent Chinese foreign policy. Ultimately, the CCP learnt that the 
only sensible strategy was to rely on themselves, to expand their power and to deal with 
all outsiders from a position of strength and autonomy.42 Self-reliance was elevated to 
the status of a guiding principle in China’s domestic and foreign policy in the Mao era. 
During the first three decades of the new China, Mao often returned to the theme of 
self-reliance to draw political inspiration and authority in dealing with both domestic 
and foreign policy crises.43 As a direct consequence of this order, the thrust of self- 
reliance became an essential moulding force of the contemporary Chinese foreign 
policy.44
As a foundation of Chinese foreign policy, self-reliance served as a powerful reminder 
that when China was deprived of autonomy, it was caught among the foreign powers
40 Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979, pp. 98-103)
41 Alan Liu, How China is Ruled (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1986, pp. 233-251)
42 ibid. pp. 120-132
43 ibid. Self-reliance was evoked in some major domestic campaigns, such as the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution, when Mao sought to reassert his authority and consolidate the CCP’s rule. Internationally, the 
Soviet alliance and proletarian internationalism as main foreign policy cornerstones ended in early 1960. The CCP 
resorted to self-reliance doctrine to conduct its foreign policy after its bitter disputes with the USSR, which saw the 
withdrawal of all the Soviet technical personnel and the assistance from China.
44 ibid. The influence of this legacy on the contemporary Chinese foreign policy were deep and long-lasting. Indeed, 
it seemed that Mao had reasons to reserve his attitude. Mao and some of his comrades were suspicious of any foreign 
aid. Even the Soviet Union, a supposed communist movement ally and ‘big brother’, was giving only lukewarm 
support to the CCP’s struggle for socialism, and offered limited material assistance when its interests and Chinese 
ones coincided. The zigzag course of Russian policy towards China during the revolutionary years proved that 
Stalin’s support came only when his interest was taken into account. The Soviet had no consistent policy of helping a 
fraternal Communist party. See Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 55-61)
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and subject to decisions over which the Chinese had no control.45 It was self-reliance 
that revived China’s standing among the world nations.46 When this Yenan myth was 
brought forward as a symbol of the wisdom of the founding fathers, its lesson was that 
reliance on the elemental force of the Chinese people was a more reliable means of 
restoring China’s unity and greatness than any course which depended on foreign 
support.47 This myth therefore fulfilled the CCP’s important domestic need to 
concentrate all decisionmaking power in its own hands: it served, on the one hand, to 
prove that only the CCP could save China; and on the other hand, that the CCP had the 
legitimacy to exercise such a monopoly lest China be subject again to foreign 
subjugation and manipulation. Self-reliance did not necessarily dictate every Chinese 
foreign policy decision, but it remained a powerful instrument in the hands of those 
who wanted to retain the party’s power monopoly and chose to invoke Chinese 
nationalist sentiment in achieving the foreign policy objectives.
The United Front as Strategy in Mao ’s Foreign Policy
The CCP’s power monopoly within the party, and later over Chinese society, was 
achieved also by effective support of very successful united front work in both 
revolutionary struggles and in the socialist development. The united front, as a strategy, 
enabled the CCP to harness all potential resources to consolidate and retain its 
monopoly position in China’s domestic and its international affairs.
The CCP did not stride to power in 1949 entirely on its own two feet. From an early
45 Sheng Hua, Zhang Xuejun and Luo Xiaopeng, China: from Revolution to Reform (Basingstoke, England: 
Macmillan Press, 1993, pp. 78-84)
46 ibid.
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stage onward, at critical moments, the united front strategy was deployed as a way of 
building alliances and relationships with sympathetic non-communist groups for the 
purpose of enhancing its power and popular support, and defeating the enemy of the 
day.49 Together with the party’s leadership and the armed struggle, the united front was 
one of the three ‘magic weapons’ for the success of the Chinese revolution.
However, the CCP did not automatically assume the united front theory from its 
formation. It was during the process of revolution that it learnt to use this powerful 
weapon to great effect. In the given historical situation in which China found itself in 
the 1920s and 1930s, it was not only necessary50 but also possible for the CCP to form 
a united front with other forces, specifically that of the KMT, in order to jointly oppose 
Western imperialism and militarism.51 The usual Leninist reservations, however, were 
made as condition for such a front: the alliance was to be considered only as a short 
term expedient pending a nationalist victory, after which the party and the KMT would 
find themselves in opposition to each other.
i) United Front Theories
STThe international united front theory had its origin in the writings of Lenin. According
47 ibid.
48 ibid. pp. 111-113
49 A recurring theme in Chinese communist history was the way in which the party’s enemies were often changing. In 
the 1920s it was warlords. Next the Kuomintang. Then came the Japanese during the Second World War. After that, 
the Americans, other ‘imperialists’, and the Kuomintang again.
50 It was necessary for the fledgling communist party, fighting different enemies, to ally itself with different forces. 
Against a backdrop of numerous local warlords creating disunity in China after the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, 
the young party allied itself with the KMT in 1924. The work done by the finest cadres was able to pave the way for 
the second alliance with the KMT in 1937 in the face of Japanese invasion and colonisation.
51 Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Standford: 
Standford University Press, 1967, pp. 83-101)
52 ibid.
53 James Armstrong regarded Lenin as the true originator of the revolutionary united front theory, although Lenin 
himself cited Marx’s Critique of the Goths Program in support of his claim that temporary alliances were
Chapter Six 188
to Lenin, revolution had to be seen as a process, not as a single momentous event.54 
Given this, an important attribute of a Lenin’s party was an ability to adapt itself 
immediately to the most diverse and rapidly changing conditions of struggle.55 Lenin 
believed that the party’s alliance policy should take account of both the nature of the 
revolutionary process and the need for flexibility:
...the immediate task of our party is not to summon all available forces to the 
attack right now but to call for the formation of a revolutionary organisation 
capable of uniting all forces and guiding the movement in actual practice and 
not in name alone.56
Lenin held the strong view that permanent alliances with any party were unnecessary 
since different stages of the revolutionary process would bring to the fore different
cn
forces to which a revolutionary party might need to attach itself. The party also 
needed to be in constant readiness to take advantage of the ebb and flow of revolution 
and for this reason a key aspect of its alliance policy was what was later to be called 
‘the united front from below’ .58 This united front required a network of contacts and 
positions of influence at levels below that of the leadership of existing organisations in 
order to be able to mobilise ‘the masses’ when the time was ‘ripe’ .59
However, other theories explaining the most important reason for building up a ‘united
permissible. See Lenin, ‘What Is To Be Done’ Collected Works (Moscow: The Progress Publishing House, 1961, 
Vol. 5 p. 369). However, Marx’s intention in that work was to criticise an ally, not, as Lenin implied, to argue in 
favour o f alliances in general. See James Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California, 
1977, pp. 77-83)
54 Lenin said: “...the revolution itself must not be regarded as a single act...but as a series o f more or less powerful 
outbreaks rapidly alternating with periods of more or less complete calm.” Lenin, ‘The Assessment of the Russian 
Revolution’ Collected Works (Moscow: The Progress Publishing House, 1961, Vol. 15, p. 57)
55 Lenin, ‘What Is To Be Done’ Collected Works (Moscow: The Progress Publishing House, 1961, Vol. 5, p. 513)
56 Lenin, ‘Where To Begin’ Collected Works (Moscow: The Progress Publishing House, 1961, Vol. 5, p. 20)
57 ibid. pp. 23-24
58 Lenin distinguished between ‘struggle from below’ and ‘action from above’ in his ‘The Two Tactics of Social 
Democracy in the Democratic Revolution’ Collected Works (Moscow: The Progress Publishing House, 1961, Vol. 9
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front from below’ argued that it was due to the long term aims of Lenin’s party, which 
were not the same as those of its allies.60 Indeed, the dialectical view of history implied 
not only that any alliance would inevitably collapse at some point, but also that the ally 
of Lenin’s party in one historical stage could become its principal enemy in another.61 
Hence the party needed to build up its popular strength by means of a ‘united front 
from below’ in order to retain the real power and to prepare for the ultimate split.62
Lenin’s united front theory, especially his ‘united front from below’, had tremendous 
ramifications on the Chinese revolution strategy as Mao quickly saw its close relevance 
to the Chinese reality.63 It fitted well with the CCP’s experience in fighting with many 
powerful enemies around it. In addition, this particular version of Lenin’s united front 
theory was later applied to Chinese international relations partly because of its earlier 
success in Chinese domestic politics.64
After two attempts at cooperation with the KMT, especially after the second one in the 
1930s, the CCP claimed that the united front was a successful means of carrying out the 
Chinese revolution.65 When Mao started to advance this theory in his subsequent 
articles, he treated it as an historical law.66 This emerged clearly in the way Mao 
integrated the concept of united front into the total ideology of Marxism-Leninism in his 
principal essay on dialectics, ‘On Contradiction’.
60 O. R. Holsti, P. T. Hopmann and J. D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (New York: 
Wiley Publishing, 1973, pp. 3-9)
61 ibid.
62 ibid. pp. 27-31
63 Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Standford: 
Standford University Press, 1967, pp. 75-83)
64 ibid.
65 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and China 's Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University o f California, 1970, pp. 35-36)
66 James Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy (California: University o f California Press, 1977, pp. 31-58)
67 In this essay Mao explained the Chinese revolution with Engels’ formulation of dialectical laws. His starting point 
was the Marxist theory of history and nature: nothing was static; all things were involved in a continual process of
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ii) United Front as a Strategy
The united front as a revolutionary strategy was defined succinctly by Mao in his essay 
‘On Policy’. It was: “...to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the 
few and crush our enemies one by one.”68
As a domestic political strategy, the united front aimed to ‘win over the many’. Mao’s 
confidence in the possibilities of winning over the overwhelming majority of the 
Chinese people to a united front might in part reflect the universalistic aspects of the 
united front doctrine as it developed in China in the 1920s.69 It was also regarded by 
Mao as following logically from a correct dialectical analysis of a particular situation. 
Dialectics to Mao was essentially a matter of making distinctions, or ‘splitting one into 
two’.70 James Armstrong suggested that the CCP’s united front should be seen from 
three different perspectives: it was the actual alliance of the Communist Party with other 
parties; it was a general policy directive instructing communists to be alert to the many 
possibilities of securing allies; and it was an expression of a belief that the dynamics of
71dialectics would inevitably produce allies.
With this strategy, the enemy would be defeated ‘one by one’. Once a united front
motion and change. True comprehension of a particular thing, therefore, consisted of an understanding of it in its 
dynamic aspect—as something that was ‘becoming’ rather than something that ‘was’. Thus it was necessary to 
understand the basic law governing change, which for Marxists was found in the notion of ‘contradiction’: “The 
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external, but internal; it lies in the contradictories within the 
thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development.” See Mao Zedong, ‘On 
Contradiction’ Selected Works (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1969, Vol. 1, p. 313).
68 Mao Zedong, ‘On Policy’ Selected Works (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1969, Vol. 2, p. 289)
69 Benjamin Yang, From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March (Boulder: Westview Press 
1990, pp. 221-233)
70 ibid.
71 James Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy (California: University of California Press, 1977, pp. 50-51)
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achieved its purpose by isolating and defeating one enemy, another would emerge, this 
time directed against an erstwhile ally.72 Each defeated enemy constituted a successful 
stage in the revolutionary process. For this reason the united front strategy was 
essentially a revolutionary ‘dual policy’.
In the international context, the general principles of the united front in China’s 
domestic politics also shaped the form of its foreign policy strategy, and the purpose of 
such a strategy would be seen as a convenient way of confronting the principal 
contradiction of the time—Japan in 1937, the US in the 1950 and the promotion of 
world revolution in the 1970s.73
This was not to say that such a strategy might not also have a defensive aspect as Peter 
Van Ness argued. Indeed it could be contended that a policy of uniting all possible 
forces against an enemy pointed to an essentially defensive purpose. However, a 
genuine united front strategy would have one fundamental distinguishing feature: it 
would be a ‘dual policy’ with the aims not only of opposing an enemy but also of 
revolutionising allies.74
James Armstrong found that there was much that Lenin and Mao had in common in 
their writings on international united fronts.75 For example, both saw it as a ‘dual 
policy’ and urged communists to ‘struggle against’ as well as ‘unite with’ their allies. 
Both based their advice on a distinction between broad categories of social force.76
72 ibid.
73 Peter Van Ness, China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity (Canberra: 
Department o f  International Relations, ANU, 1991)
74 ibid.
75 James Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy (California: University o f California Press, 1977, pp. 59-61)
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However, for Lenin united fronts were ‘transitional’ policies: temporary expedients to 
be employed only during periods of communist weakness. For Mao they were an 
intrinsic and essential part of the revolutionary process, necessary even after a 
communist victory because contradictions would continue to exist, even ‘amongst the
• 77people’ and the united front was one means of resolving contradictions.
Marxist dialectics, Leninist ‘dual policy’ and Mao’s ‘win over the many’ set a general 
theme of Chinese foreign policy: to exploit contradictions between capitalist countries 
and to form a united front to achieve the CCP’s foreign policy objectives. Mao and 
the CCP leaders often stressed to the party the importance of identifying the principal 
enemy at any particular moment and forming the broadest possible united front against 
it.79 As early as 1940, Mao developed the concept of ‘limited alliances’. He contended 
that in dealing with China’s main enemy it was necessary to unite with all possible 
forces, even the enemies of China’s principal foe,80 and to treat alliances formed in the 
process as limited and temporary. He called on the party “to make use of 
contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by
Furthermore, the CCP’s united front strategy in foreign policy reflected the Chinese 
traditional practice of ‘playing one barbarian off against another.’82 During the Opium
77 ibid.
78 Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977, pp. 163- 
185)
79 ibid.
80 Interestingly, this coincided with Sun Zi's famous saying: my enemy’s enemy is my friend. Sun Zi binfa (.Military 
Arts by Sun Zi) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1961)
81 Mao Zedong, ‘On Policy’ Selected Works (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, Vol. 1, 1965-77, p. 444). Also see 
pp. 133-137
82 On traditional Chinese practice in handling foreign powers, see Earl Swisher ed. China’s Management o f the 
American Barbarians: A Study o f Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, with Documents (Conn.: New Haven, Yale 
University, 1953, pp. 3-6)
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Wars, officials of the Qing dynasty contemplated the possibility of playing the 
Americans off against other powers, especially the British. Later, in its effort to 
abolish extraterritoriality in the late 1920s, the KMT government also attempted to 
exploit contradictions between Britain, France and the United States. These historical 
parallels would not be overlooked by Mao and his comrades, who took history 
seriously. The attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and Britain became a
or
consistent goal in the CCP’s foreign policy in the 1940s, too.
The CCP skilfully manipulated the united front strategy to buy the time and space when 
it was weak and vulnerable domestically and internationally. It successfully exploited 
the united front as an effective strategy to boost its strength within China and to 
advance its position in the international relations. The continued practice of the united 
front strategy in the first thirty years of the Republic not only contributed positively to 
consolidate the CCP’s power monopoly domestically, but also greatly enhanced 
China’s international status in the world.
The Scope of Systemic Transformation
One of the salient features of the Chinese political system was the concentration of 
power in the CCP, through monopoly mechanisms discussed above. Within the party, 
power was further concentrated in the hands of one or a few leaders. Foreign affairs, 
together with military affairs and party organisational affairs, were considered to be one 
of the most sensitive areas that demanded an even higher concentration of
83 ibid.
84 ibid.
85 ibid
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decisionmaking power.86 The 1958 CCP Central Committee and State Council joint 
circular stipulated:
With regard to major policy orientation, principles and guidelines, and to 
implementation planning and supervision, government organs and their party 
groups have the power to make recommendations. But the decisionmaking 
power belongs to the Party Centre.87
This rule remained an effective description of the relationship between the CCP centre
o o
and the bureaucracy in the area of Chinese foreign policy, even under Deng.
One important characteristic of China’s reform under Deng, however, was that while 
the overall structure of the party-state remained largely intact,89 the substance within 
this structure90 underwent many drastic changes. That is to say, while nominally those 
fundamental principles governing the system, such as the supremacy of party power 
and authority with the underpinning self-reliance and united front strategies, were still 
official slogans, the applicability of them to the running of state affairs was 
considerably reduced.
It was also well documented that China’s political system and foreign policy
86 Doak Barnett, The Making o f Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 
8- 11)
87 Seng Qian, Pang Song, Han Gang and Zhang Zhanbin, Dangdai zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi fazhan gaiyao (An 
Outline o f the Evolution o f the Contemporary Chinese Political System) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 
chubanshe, 1988, pp. 91-92)
88 ibid
8Q Governing regime of the PRC consisted of three major vertical system: the Communist Party, the Government, and 
Military. At the apex of these systems was the Political Bureau of the CCP, which was often further crystallised in the 
form of a leadership core. The three major systems operated on five levels: central, provincial, prefectural, county and 
township. Horizontally, on each level there existed a set of seven standard institutions: the CCP Committee, the CC 
Advisory Committee, the CCP Discipline Inspection Committee of the party system, the People’s Congress, the 
Government, the People’s Political Consultative Conference of the government system and the Military. See Yan 
Huai, ‘Zhongguo dalu zhengzhi tizhi qianlun' (Understanding the Political System of Contemporary China) (Papers 
of the Centre for Modern China, No. 10, August 1991, pp. 2-4)
90 The basic structure for foreign policy decisionmaking remained unchanged, ie. it was in the order of the Apex, the 
paramount leader and leadership Nuclear Circle, Politburo and its Standing Committee and the CCP Central 
Committee Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group. See Lu Ning, The Dynamics o f Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in 
China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 8-13)
Chapter Six 195
decisionmaking process under Deng underwent a series of drastic changes.91 The 
reform momentum in the Deng era gathered sufficient consensus within the party to 
affect the process of foreign policymaking. Such consensus permitted significant 
departures from the rigid ideology and structural arrangement to more flexible 
approaches.92 However, China’s political system remained authoritarian in nature. This 
was particularly noticeable in the formulation of foreign policy, which continued to be 
highly centralised and, on occasions, was personalised despite the general trend of 
growing institutionalisation across the board. That is to say, foreign policy was an area 
that continued to be highly reflective of either some individuals’, or certain groups’, 
perceptions, tendencies and preferences.
Three important trends emerged in the reform era in China that directly impacted on the 
making of Chinese foreign policy. Firstly, the organisation of the Chinese policymaking 
apparatus shifted from vertical authoritarianism to horizontal authoritarianism.94 
Secondly, Beijing moved away from the Mao’s approach when a single leader 
dominated foreign policymaking to allow greater participation by the bureaucracy and
91 Mark Seiden, China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 56-92)
92 ibid.
93 A number of scholars analysed this ‘halfway change’, which stopped short of transforming the authoritarian nature 
of Chinese politics. Harry Harding called the post-Mao regime a ‘consultative authoritarian’ regime. (Harry Harding, 
China’s Second Revolution: Reform After Mao, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987, p. 200) He 
argued that China had experienced a significant departure from totalitarianism, but did not come a truly pluralistic, or 
even quasi-democratic, political system. Robert Scalapino pointed out that while “keeping a rein on political rights 
yet enabling initiatives to operate in such areas as enterprise and religion, governments achieve a mix of stability and 
dynamism suitable to indigenous conditions.” (Robert Scalapino, The Politics o f Development: Perspectives on 
Twentieth Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 127) Scalapino believed that the Asian Leninist 
states, primarily China, “are now gravitating in this direction”. Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton raised a 
‘fragmented authoritarianism model’ to describe bureaucratic politics and decision-making in post-Mao China. This 
model argued that “authority below the very peak of the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed. The 
fragmentation is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding procedures.” (Kenneth 
Lieberthal and David Lampton eds. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992, p. 8)
94 The notion was developed by Zhao Quansheng in his article, ‘Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From 
Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism’ The Annals o f the American Academy of Political and Social Science (No. 
519, January 1992, pp. 159-176)
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other interest groups.95 Thirdly, increasing levels of political tolerance allowed a degree 
of political and academic freedom to express different opinions, which more or less 
facilitated the move to a more accountable government.96
These three important changes in the policy process represented the scope and degree 
of systemic adjustment in meeting the challenge of structural reform. They also 
underpinned the significant transformation of China’s political system itself in order to 
accommodate such changes. This section examines the level and extent of the 
transformation of these three aspects and assesses these structural/situational impacts of 
foreign policy motivation.
97From ‘Vertical’ to ‘Horizontal’ Authoritarianism
In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, Mao allowed a limited degree of 
top leadership participation in some of the key foreign policy discussions and debates, 
such as the early decision to enter into a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, 
known as ‘leaning to one side’ in the new regime’s foreign policy orientation, and most 
importantly the decision to intervene in the Korean conflict in 1950.
95 Mark Seiden, China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 56-92)
96 Doak Barnett, The Making o f Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 
23-31)
97 The terms vertical and horizontal used here refer primarily to the policymaking process rather than to the nature of 
the regime itself, although the two may have a close connection. Furthermore, the terms here refer only to the scope, 
character and nature of participation in the foreign policy-making process (eg. collective decision-making vs. one- 
person domination), and not to the command channels of foreign policy. Indeed, foreign policy formulation and 
implementation in virtually every country, authoritarian or democratic, takes place within vertical command 
channels. Horizontal authoritarianism refers to a policy-making process that is essentially authoritarian and highly 
centralised, but in which several power centres at the top level represent and coordinate various interests and 
opinions. Multiple command channels, both institutional and ad hoc, exist. More players participate in the foreign 
policy-making process, and conflicting voices may occasionally represent different interests and policies. See Zhao 
Quansheng, ‘Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism’ The Annals 
of the American Academy o f Political and Social Science (No. 519, January 1992, pp. 162-165)
98 Dorothy Borg and Waldo Hemrichs, eds. Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 2-3)
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This limited involvement on the part of the top CCP leadership soon came to an end 
when Mao assumed an increasing totalitarian position after stifling dissent first in 
society (the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign) and later within the CCP (1959 Lushan 
Conference).99 By the end of the first decade of the communist victory, a strong-man 
with a small elite (vertical authoritarian) model emerged in China’s foreign policy 
decisionmaking.100 Together with high level appointments and military affairs, foreign 
policy decisionmaking became one of the three most centralised areas in China’s 
political system. Mao, as Chairman of the Communist Party and its Military 
Commission, dominated foreign policy decisionmaking until his death in 1976.101
Deng’s reform opened up China to the outside world. The political system as a result
evolved from a vertical to horizontal authoritarian model. China’s foreign policy
decisionmaking was also in the process of transformation from a ‘strong-man’ model to
1
one characterised more by bureaucratic, sectoral and regional competition.
As the Long March generation passed from the scene, the new group of political leaders 
lacked the necessary authority and charisma to dominate foreign policy 
decisionmaking. This weakness at the power centre necessitated power to be 
redistributed to, or shared with, other functional organisations. As a consequence, the 
foreign affairs bureaucracy became increasingly influential.104 At the same time, with 
the process of decentralisation and opening up to the outside world, new actors like the
99 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making o f the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 33-34)
100 ibid.
101 ibid.
102 Nicholas Kristof, ‘China Sees Market-Leninism as Way to Future’ The New York Times 6 September 1993
103 ibid.
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defence industry, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and provincial authorities, 
which had previously played little role in foreign policy decisionmaking, gained a 
stronger voice in foreign affairs. These new players formed a wider network of 
horizontal approach.1(b The increasingly important roles of these players in Chinese 
foreign policy arose from the fact that some major points of contention between China 
and the West were focused on the areas they represented: such as overseas arms sales 
by the defence industry and the PLA, the pirating of intellectual properties, textile quota 
evasion and the aggressive marketing of prison-labour products. 106
Increasing Institutionalisation
The highly centralised decisionmaking power in a few created much inertia to 
discourage the broader bureaucratic establishment from taking initiative in the 
formulation of major foreign policies.107 During the Mao period, the initiation of major 
foreign policies became almost exclusively the prerogative of Mao and Zhou. In the 
reform era, although Deng was no longer the only initiator within the nucleus of 
leadership in foreign policy decisionmaking, the basic dynamics remained substantially 
unaltered. Most major foreign policy initiatives still originated by him or from the top 
leadership. 109
However, reform in China did bring about a process of gradual institutionalisation, 
which was achieved mainly through expanding bureaucratic participation in the
104 Benjamin Schwartz, China and Other Matters (Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 125-138)
105 ibid.
106 ibid.
107 Quan Yanchi, Zouxia shengtan de Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai Desanctified) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang 
dangxiao chubanshe, 1994, pp. 7-11)
Chapter Six 199
system.110 Furthermore, such institutionalisation was not limited to the central 
government only, for beneath the structure at the apex of political power, there were a 
number of institutions which operated somewhat independently in foreign affairs.* 111 
But these different elements still had to be resolved near the top.
119In China, every major political institution is led by the Communist Party. However, 
the party and the government had separate agencies for dealing with foreign 
affairs—each with different functions. The International Liaison Department of the 
CCP, for example, was in charge of the party’s international activities, while the State 
Council controlled several ministries that had jurisdiction over foreign policy issues, 
most notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Many other institutions also had 
sections that dealt with foreign affairs.114
The administrative reforms of the 1980s brought a generation of technocrats into 
leading positions in the government bureaucracy as discussed in Chapter Five. These 
technocrat bureaucrats were relatively young, well educated, confident and assertive in 
their fields of specialisation.115 As David Bachman argued, this younger generation of 
leaders, including the State president and the party’s general secretary, Jiang Zemin and
109 ibid.
110 Lu Ning, The Dynamics o f Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 13-14)
111 Most o f them were of provincial/army ranks. In the government system, they were chiefly the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry o f Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and Xinhua News Agency. In the party system, 
there was the CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department. In the Military system, there was the PLA 
General Staff Department. The Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defence which had the 
responsibility to oversee China’s defence research and development and defence industry straddled the government 
and the military systems, ibid.
112 However, at the 13th Party Congress, the party constitution was revised to abolish the party group in the 
leadership structure o f government bureaucracies, which conflicted with the minister-responsibility system 
introduced in the PRC Constitution. Pang Song and Han Gang, ‘Dang he guojia lingdao tizhi de lishi kaochayu gaige 
zhanwang' (A Historical Review and Reform Outlook of the Party and State Leadership Systems) Zhongguo shehui 
kexue (China Social Sciences) (No. 6, 10 November 1987, p. 5)
113 Lu Ning, The Dynamics o f  Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 20-39)
114 For example the National People’s Congress had a foreign affairs committee to look after its own foreign affairs. 
ibid. pp. 12-14
115 See Chpt. 5 of this thesis for more details.
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then Premier Li Peng, had a smaller power base and less authority than the older 
generation, which included Mao, Zhou and Deng.116 As such, politics in the post-Deng 
era had to be based more on persuasion and compromise; bold, new initiatives which
• 1 1 7 *may have harmed the entrenched bureaucratic interests were less likely. This new 
generation of bureaucrats, including those working in foreign affairs, participated 
actively both in the policymaking process and in the protection of bureaucratic 
interests.
The increasing bureaucratic participation in the policymaking process was primarily
reflected in day-to-day affairs. Foreign affairs bureaucrats played an active role within
their own jurisdictions. In the Chinese Embassy in the United States, for example,
diplomats improved their efficiency by focusing on key institutions of US foreign
policy, including the executive branch and the legislature.119 In the mid 1980s, the
Chinese embassy in Washington established a division of congressional affairs to
conduct extensive research and diplomatic activities.120 The insights gained from this
allowed foreign affairs bureaucrats to have opportunities to make policy suggestions to
121the top leadership, thus enhancing their influence in the policymaking process.
The National People’s Congress (NPC) offered another example of increased 
bureaucratic participation in the policymaking process. In China, the staff of party 
central organisations, the central government and the National People’s Congress were 
all regarded as government employees; they were all part of the central bureaucracy.
116 David Bachman, ‘Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the World: New 
Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations (Colo.: Boulder: Westview Press 1989)
117 ibid.
118 Zhao Quanshen, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 80-84)
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The NPC Foreign Affairs Committee largely consisted of retired high-ranking
122
diplomats; it too could be considered a part of the bureaucratic establishment. 
Although the NPC had been regarded as a rubber-stamping body, from the 1980s it has 
increased its influence over important policymaking in China.
In summary, during the Mao era, the foreign affairs bureaucracies played little role in 
foreign policy decisionmaking. They were used mainly as instruments for information 
collection and processing, and for policy implementation.124 During the Deng era, the 
role of the foreign affairs bureaucracies in decisionmaking began to increase as China 
greatly expanded its interaction with the rest of the world, and as a result, management 
of foreign relations became more complex. The new generation of leadership was 
dominated by technocrats who had relatively narrow power bases in the political 
system and thus were more susceptible to lobbies by bureaucratic interests. Based on 
this, it could be said that as the decisionmaking process became more institutionalised, 
the significant role of the bureaucracies in decisionmaking would continue to increase.
121 ibid. 
n2ibid.
123 An interesting episode regarding the confusion of decisionmaking authority on the issue of Hong Kong took place 
in May 1984, several months before the signing of the historic Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong’s return to 
China in 1997. It was reported that Deng Xiaoping made an unplanned statement to some Hong Kong and Macau 
reporters and the delegates to the NPC. Deng made it clear that only he himself, the premier, the foreign minister, the 
director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, and the director of the Hong Kong Branch of 
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Growth of Political Tolerance
As one of the main indicators of systemic transformation in China’s political system, 
the degree of political tolerance exhibited by the leadership should also be assessed.
The existence of various factions at the top level of Chinese politics was widely
1 97documented. Early on, Mao and Zhou Enlai differed in their perceptions of the 
outside world and on foreign policy issues. Under the vertical authoritarian rule, 
however, the paramount leader was usually able to silence contrary opinions, and at 
times of differences. Zhou often suppressed his opinion to follow Mao’s decision. 
According to Doak Barnett, Mao’s influence in the making of broad strategic decisions 
on foreign policy “greatly overshadowed that of Zhou’s”. While Zhou’s remarkable 
political skills and his role as indispensable chief administrator in the Chinese 
government enabled him to escape political campaigns and purges throughout many 
decades, most other top leaders were ruthlessly dealt with and prosecuted. The 
muffling of different opinions and disagreements among the leadership meant that there 
was little room for political tolerance under the tightly-controlled vertical political 
system. 132
127 Kenneth Lieberthal identified three prominent schools of thought within the Chinese foreign policymaking 
establishment: nativists, who encouraged a closed-door foreign policy; eclectic organisers, who wanted to strengthen 
China by using foreign technology, while shielding the country from the cultural influences that accompanied 
technological imports; and the all-around modernisers, who strived to alter the fundamental nature of Chinese culture 
in favour of rapid economic development to speed up the country’s modernisation process. See his article, ‘Domestic 
Politics and Foreign Policy’ Harry Harding ed. China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s (Conn.: New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1984, pp. 44-45). Also see Carol Lee Hamrin, ‘Elite Politics and the Development of China’s 
Foreign Relations’ Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
128 Shao Kuo-kang, Zhou Enlai and the Foundation o f Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, 
pp. 23-32)
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Political tolerance grew considerably in Deng’s reform period when the party’s work 
focus shifted to economic development. In the leadership centre, the fact that Deng did 
not possess absolute authority at the beginning of 1980s also meant that it was harder to 
silence or eliminate different political voices, especially those who held different views 
but had similar power.133 Leaders with weaker power bases, such as Hu Yaobang and 
Zhao Ziyang, could still be removed quickly from leading positions.134
After the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, Deng designated Jiang as the ‘core’ of the 
CCP’s “third generation of collective leadership”.135 In eight years’ time, Jiang 
gradually built up his own power base, mainly on consensus. Because Jiang’s power 
was far from being absolute, he learnt to be more tolerant of rival opinions and to use 
consultation, coordination and compromise to reconcile the differences at the top 
level.136 This process often led to an inclination at the top leadership to maintain the 
status quo as the best temporary solution, which in turn led to other problems and 
policy stagnation.137 This was especially true in the field of foreign policy because 
foreign policy issues could appear less relevant to a top-level power struggle than 
domestic issues such as political and economic reform.138
The growth of political tolerance at the top level of the CCP leadership was conducive
133 Carol Lee Hamrin, ‘Elite Politics and the Development of China’s Foreign Relations’ Thomas Robinson and 
David Shambaugh eds. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
134 ibid.
135 While emphasising that Jiang Zemin was the core of the third generation o f collective leadership, Deng claimed 
that “the core o f our first generation of collective leadership was Chairman Mao” and “1 am the core o f the second 
generation”. See Deng Xiaoping, ‘Urgent Tasks of China’s Third Generation o f Collective Leadership’ on 16 June 
1989, Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, Vol. 3, 1994, pp. 300-302)
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to overall systemic transformation. More importantly, it provided a base for further 
structural changes and institutionalisation. The effects of changes in China’s political 
system and decisionmaking process helped move China towards a more pragmatic 
foreign policy regime and a more open society. The dialectic relationship between the 
changes and the agents for such changes formed the core of the structural/situational 
setting, within which the Chinese foreign policy motivation was modified, redefined 
and constrained.
Conclusion
This chapter contended that structural/situational factors (as constraints or catalysts) 
played an active role in modeling Chinese foreign policy motivation by highlighting the 
dynamic aspect of this influence. The transition from the party’s monopoly of power in 
the Mao era to horizontal authoritarianism under Deng fundamentally shifted China’s 
organisational settings and political decisionmaking culture. Furthermore, the 
emergence of new internal power politics, new bargains and concessions, and 
leadership succession also proved to be key structural elements in foreign policy 
considerations. In Deng’s reform period, the reform process loosened the party’s grip 
over many administration responsibilities. Greater institutionalisation and political 
tolerance enabled power to be shared horizontally within the party and government 
system.
The CCP’s power monopoly, under vertical authoritarian control, placed a serious 
organisational constraint on Chinese foreign policy motivation. This chapter argued that
138 ibid.
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concentration of power in the hands of a few was achieved in the first thirty years of the 
PRC through the practice of self-reliance and a strategy of united front. The successful 
application of these two strategies in China’s domestic politics helped to structurally 
integrate them into China’s foreign policy decisionmaking consideration.
As China’s top foreign policy priority remained “the pragmatic quest for a stable 
environment needed for effective modernisation and development” , 139 China’s foreign 
policy would ‘continue to be subordinated by its powerful desire to modernise the 
Chinese economy and the need to maintain a peaceful international environment’ . 140 
Under normal circumstance without triggers of sensitive issues, Chinese foreign policy 
motivation would be largely based on economic considerations and would be generally 
disposed towards trying to abide by international rule and practice. 141 In the reform 
decades the very system of the party-state came under serious challenge and the system 
was forced to undertake critical adjustments in response to the situation. The substantial 
reduction of party power monopoly in Chinese society paved the way for greater 
transformation of Chinese political system and its foreign policymaking regime.
As China continued its reform process, the motivation for its foreign policy became 
more complex and diversified. The process of institutionalisation helped to install a 
degree of certainty in the study of the Chinese foreign policy motivation, as the 
modernisation program required optimal utilisation of the national and international 
conditions to serve China’s central goals, while some core principles and structure were
139 Robert Sutter, ‘Implications of China’s Modernisation for East and Southeast Asian Security: The Year 2000’ 
David Lampton and Catherine Keyser eds. China ’s Global Presence: Economics, Politics, and Security (Washington 
D. C.: American Enterprise Institute in collaboration with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988, p. 206)
140 Donald Zagoria, ‘The End o f Cold War in Asia: Its Impact on China’ Frank Macchiarola and Robert Oxnam eds. 
The China Challenge (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1991, p. 11)
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still regarded as essential to the regime’s political legitimacy and survival. This 
contradictory condition brought structural/situational dilemmas to the party leadership, 
and complicated the foreign policy process by introducing a larger number of factors 
into consideration. This situation would tend to make foreign policy motivation more 
dependent and dynamic as next chapter will contend.
Chapter Seven
The Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy Motivation
The previous three chapters of this Part demonstrated the relevance of foreign policy 
motivation theories investigated in Part I to the study of Chinese foreign policy. The 
applicability and validity of the three motivation elements (perception, personality and 
structural/situational constraints) as analytical paradigms for Chinese foreign policy 
were tested in the three previous chapters of this Part. However, this artificial separation 
of the individual motivation element was done only for investigating purposes. The 
roles of perception, a strong belief in personal attributes and ‘rule by man’ and 
structural/situational constraints in Chinese foreign policy motivation did not always 
operate independently with full autonomy within a well-defined setting. The dynamic 
nature and close interplay of these three elements in each specific case determined their 
relative weight and salience in that specific motivation.
Based on the analysis of the previous three chapters, this chapter synthesises the three 
essential motivation elements against some broader aspects of Chinese foreign policy 
behaviours to appreciate the dynamic discourse of the Chinese foreign policy 
motivation. Contrary to common belief, a certain degree of flexibility and pragmatism 
in China’s foreign policy motivation existed even in the Mao era. Treatment by the new 
Communist government after 1949 of state succession and various treaties which it 
inherited from previous governments is a case in point, as will be discussed below.
However, it was Deng’s reform era that generated unprecedented flexibility and brought 
greater dynamism into Chinese foreign policy. Under Deng, almost all aspects of
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Chinese political, social and economic life underwent dramatic changes, which in turn 
created a necessary environment which called for broader thinking and offered 
possibility of handling issues differently. The innovative formulation of ‘one country, 
two systems’ towards Hong Kong and Taiwan reunification, for example, could be said 
to be a truly revolutionary breakthrough in Chinese foreign policy philosophy and 
practice. The change of priorities in Deng’s reform period and the shift in the foreign 
policy theoretical paradigm and practice, as incarnated in the ‘one country, two systems’ 
formula, will be examined later in this chapter as an illustration of the dynamic process 
at work. The emphasis, however, is not intended to provide a detailed account of that 
policy’s formulation; rather, it extracts the key policy relevance to demonstrate how 
dynamic forces acted upon this policy motivation. The focus is on the dialectic process 
of shifts in foreign policy thinking from world revolution to world peace, from isolation 
to participation, from political-military orientation to economic modernisation, from 
dogmatism to pragmatism, and finally, from an uncompromising nationalistic view on 
sovereignty to a ‘one country, two system’ approach in the recovery of Hong Kong.
There are three sections in this chapter which explore these issues. The first section 
studies two cases of the handling of treaties to accentuate the dialectic process in 
Chinese foreign policy in the Mao era. The second section reveals changing priorities 
and some fundamental departures of Chinese foreign policy thinking and practice in the 
reform era. The third section looks at some crucial variables that underscore Beijing’s 
development of ‘one country, two systems’ policy.
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Pragmatism in Mao’s Foreign Policy
The Chinese government always insisted that China was, for a long time, the victim of 
Western imperialist expansion. 1 China was not treated as an equal sovereign country by 
the Western powers and was forced to conclude various unequal treaties during the 
carving up of China in the nineteenth centuries.2 Through imposed treaties, Western 
powers enjoyed many non-reciprocal, extra-territorial rights and privileges. In 
particular, these treaties laid down a special status for several ‘concessions’, 
‘settlements’ and ‘treaty ports’ .3 They established a system of consular jurisdiction, 
under which the nationals of the foreign powers were exempted from Chinese territorial 
laws but subject to the authority of their respective consuls, in both civil and criminal 
cases.4 In the field of trade, travel rights for foreign merchants and missionaries were 
specified and a maximum limit for customs and tariffs on imports to China was laid 
down. Concessions were granted to foreign enterprises in the fields of mining, railways 
and shipping.5 Through several treaties, China was forced to cede or to lease territory to 
foreign powers, including Hong Kong to Great Britain.6 These treaties came to form the 
bases of territory and border disputes between the new Chinese government of the 
People’s Republic and those countries which acceded to the treaties.7
1 Chen Lungfong, State Succession Relating to Unequal Treaties (Conn.: Archon Books, 1974, pp. 10-15). Also see 
Chpt. 4 of this thesis.
2 ibid.
3 Wesley Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China (New York: Octagon Books, 1974, pp. 21-23)
4 ibid.
5 Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty, 1898-1997: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong’s New Territories (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 25-53)
6 ibid. See also Werner Morvay, ‘Unequal Treaties’ Encyclopaedia o f Public International Law (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. 1984, Vol. 7, p. 515)
7 ibid. When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the territory problems it inherited from the 
Qing Dynasty and the KMT governments included the special rights enjoyed by the Soviet Union in Manchuria, the 
questions of Hong Kong and Macao, the position of Outer Mongolia, and boundary issues between China and its 
neighbouring countries. All these matters stemmed from treaties signed by either the Qing government or the KMT 
government. See also Chen Lung-fong, State Succession Relating to Unequal Treaties (Conn.: Archon Books, 1974)
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On the question of state succession and the law of treaties, the Chinese government’s
o
interpretation differed from that of Western countries in many respects. Although the 
PRC government regarded itself as the successor government of the continuing state of 
China, it particularly rejected—or would at least seek to modify—the principle that a 
successor government was required by international law to perform the obligations 
undertaken on behalf of the state by its predecessor.9
Some of China’s law scholars argued that even though the PRC, being subject to 
international law, took over from the previous governments of the state of China, the 
foundation of the People’s Republic initiated a totally new state in terms of the social 
system. 10 Theoretically, they insisted that it was inappropriate for the PRC government 
to consider international responsibility and commitment borne by previous Chinese 
governments as a simple question of state succession. * 11 Arguing from this point of view, 
the Chinese government categorically refused to admit its obligations under all the 
unequal treaties. Zhou Gengsheng, a leading professor in international law, stated:
The People’s Republic, on the one hand, is the successor government of the 
continuing state of China and is naturally subject to international law, but on the 
other hand, with its socialist characteristic, the PRC does not only change the 
form of government, but also establishes a new country so that the People’s 
Republic should not recognise an international responsibility which is 
incompatible with the criteria of the new system. To those treaties imposed by
i  j
imperialist countries, the new China has absolutely no obligation to accede.
Yet, in practice the PRC objected only to some particular aspects of the general theory
8 Chiu Hungdah, ‘Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties’ Cohen Jerome 
Allen eds. China’s Practice o f International Law: Some Case Studies (Mass.: Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1972, pp. 108-152)
9 ibid.
10 Zhou Gengsheng, Guo Ji Fa (International Law) (Beijing: Beijing People’s Press, 1981, pp. 143-148)
11 ibid.
12 ibid. pp. 157-158
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of state succession.13 J. C. Hsiung found in his study on law and policy of Chinese 
foreign relations that China’s territorial claims and positions on border questions after 
1949 were actually based on rights of succession from past dynasties—notwithstanding 
that these were feudal and ‘reactionary’ systems.14 In defending its claims, the Chinese 
government often used historical evidence and records from the 18th and 19th centuries, 
when imperial China also conducted an expansionist policy against tributary states, 
seeking economic and security advantages and territorial expansion.15 Normally the 
Chinese government referred to conflicts between imperial China and these tributary 
states as ‘ethnic contradictions’ within a big ‘Chinese family’.16 Fairbank argued that 
both Nationalist and Communist China “have inherited a set of institutionalised 
attitudes and historical precedents not easily conformable to the European tradition of
17international relations among equally sovereign nation states.”
China’s reluctance to integrate into this system of international relations was also due to 
the fact that China itself was a victim of foreign expansionist policy of foreign powers, 
and was forced to enter an alien treaty system characterised by patently unequal 
relations. The PRC categorically insisted that unequal treaties existed, and that they 
were in violation of international law and therefore without legal binding force on 
China.19 The government classified all treaties signed by previous Chinese governments
13 J. C. Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study o f Attitudes and Practice (New York and 
London: Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 58-63)
"ibid.
15 ibid. pp. 115-119
16 John Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary Framework’ John Fairbank ed. The Chinese World Order, Traditional China's 
Foreign Relations (Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 18-19). John Fairbank commented that the relations of the 
Chinese with neighbouring areas were indeed different from general international relations based on the idea of the 
nation-state and sovereignty. China’s foreign relations were coloured by the concept of Sino-centrism and an 
assumption of Chinese superiority. Such relations continued until the Western powers intruded into East Asia in the 
middle of the 19th century.
17 ibid. p. 4
18 Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty, 1898-1997: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong's New Territories (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 65-71)
19 ibid.
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and foreign governments into two major groups—equal and unequal. According to the 
individual contents, the government determined whether to recognise, abrogate, revise 
or renegotiate them.20 There appeared to be no uniform rules as to how unequal treaties 
should be handled, which, deliberately or otherwise, left room for future contention over 
specific clauses of a treaty.21 As Chen Lunfong observed, this technical flexibility 
allowed China to exercise selectivity as to how best it might be used in order to serve 
particular strategic considerations.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric on the issue of unequal treaties, the PRC was adaptable in 
establishing its position over territorial claims—its position could be based on the 
concept of China’s traditional order and/or the concept of modem international law. 
Leaving the Hong Kong issue aside, two other cases help to illustrate the complex and 
dynamic internal and international forces that influenced China’s handling of pre­
existing unequal treaties in the Mao era. The case of the Soviet Union’s continuous 
presence in China after the establishment of the People’s Republic was strong evidence 
which demonstrated that the Chinese leadership was prepared to tolerate special 
privileges for a foreign power, albeit a socialist power, in its territory if that presence at 
that specific time was believed to help enhance China’s strategic position in the 
region.24 In the case of Outer Mongolia, China chose to apply the state succession 
principle in recognising the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic, instead 
of denouncing its legality. This confirmed the view that Beijing was quite flexible on 
such issues so long as it could be justified as being in its best interests to do so.
20 ibid.
21 Chen Lungfong, State Succession Relating to Unequal Treaties (Conn.: Archon Books, 1974, pp. 68-81)
22 ibid
23 J. C. Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study o f Attitudes and Practice (New York and 
London: Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 115-119)
24 ibid. pp. 131-135
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The Case o f the Soviet Union
The Soviet government, in its early years after the October Revolution, declared that it 
would abrogate all unequal treaties made by Czarist Russia, which were based on 
“territorial expansion, seeking economic and security advantages, and resorting to the 
use of force in order to gain a privileged position at the expense of weaker nations”. 
The nations concerned here were Turkey, Persia and China. In a note to the Chinese 
government on 27 September, 1920, for example, the Soviet government sought to 
conclude a new treaty with the Chinese government which was supposed to confirm that 
all agreements concluded by the former Russian regimes with China were no longer in 
force. It would renounce seizures of Chinese territory, give up Russian concessions in 
China and return to China unconditionally all that had been take away from it by the 
Czanst government and the Russian bourgeoisie.
TOThis kind of declaration remained essentially in the realm of good intentions. In 
practice, the Soviet Union did not always carry out the promises made in the early years 
of the Revolution. No agreement was ever made regarding the rectification of Russian 
territorial acquisitions gained at the expense of China. On the contrary, the Soviet 
Union regained, by the secret Yalta agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, its 
former rights in Manchuria which Czarist Russia had lost during the Russo-Japanese
25 ibid.
26 Kazimierz Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law: Doctrines and Diplomatic Practice (A. W. Sijthoff, 
Leyden, 1970, p. 385)
27 ibid. p. 384
28 ibid.
29 ibid. p. 446, p. 452
30 Jen Sun E-Tu, ‘The Lease of Wei-hai Wei’ Pacific Historical Review (Vol. 19, No. 277, 1950)
31 Dangdai zhongguo waijiao (The Contemporary Diplomacy o f  China), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 
ed. (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1987, pp. 25-26)
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war of 1904-1905.32
When the Chinese communists established a new government on the mainland in 1949, 
the Soviet Union had to make a decision on how to handle its special rights in China’s 
Manchuria, including ‘preeminent interests’ in the internationalised free port of Dairen, 
the naval base (leased) at Port Arthur, and control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and 
the South Manchurian Railway. When the two communist giants entered negotiations 
in 1949 towards an alliance, the Soviet Union agreed to abandon all special rights 
inherited from the previous treaties with the KMT government. But the PRC invited the 
Soviet Union to stay on because of its “consideration of the existing international 
situation and the need to counter the imperialists”.34 In accordance with the eventual 
agreement between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese 
government accepted a continued Soviet presence in Port Arthur and Dairen until 
19 5 2.35 Zhou Enlai later formally requested Stalin to stay on after the deadline.36 The 
two ports were finally returned to China in May 1955, following the withdrawal of the 
Soviet army.37
Various considerations were behind the Chinese tolerance of a Soviet presence for more 
than 6 years after the establishment of the new sovereign state of China. Among them, 
there were two very important reasons. Firstly, China hesitated to take any action for
32 ibid.
33 Dennis Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and 
Peace, 1965, pp. 115-153)
34 Shao Kuo-kang, Zhou Enlai and the Foundation o f Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996, 
pp. 123-130)
ibid
36 ibid  pp. 77-79
37 ibid
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fear of ‘hurting the feelings’ of the Soviet Union. When the Korean War broke out in 
June 1950, the PRC was even more in need of Soviet moral support and economic aid, 
especially as the US and its allies soon imposed an embargo on China. Secondly, the 
Soviet presence in Port Arthur and Dairen challenged American naval superiority in the 
waters off Northern China, providing a valuable counter to American military threats 
during the Korean War.40
The Case o f Outer Mongolia
The Chinese government’s recognition of the Mongolian People’s Republic represented 
an interesting case of the CCP’s ambivalent handling of bilateral treaties. Outer 
Mongolia was under China’s sovereign control before it claimed independence in 
1921.41 In 1924, the Soviet Union and the Chinese KMT government signed an 
agreement under which the former recognised Outer Mongolia as a “component of the 
Chinese Republic” under Chinese sovereignty while the Chinese side acknowledged 
Moscow’s de facto control there.42 In January 1946, the KMT government withdrew its 
previous stand of non-recognition and accepted Outer Mongolia as an independent state, 
on condition that the validity of such independence be recognised by a referendum to be 
held under international supervision.43 Such a referendum was, indeed, held in 194644 
with the expected result favouring Mongolia’s independent status. However, when the
38 Dangdai zhongguo waijiao (the Contemporary Diplomacy o f  China), the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs of the PRC 
ed. (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1987, pp. 25-26)
39 Alexei Voskressenski, The Difficult Border: Russian and Chinese Concepts ofSino-Russian Relations and Frontier 
Problems (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996, pp. 133-137)
40 ibid. A reference to this important factor was made in a communique issued by the USSR and the PRC after the 
Korean War which said that, with regard to the changes that had taken place in the international situation in the Far 
East, the Soviet Union had agreed to withdraw its military units from Port Arthur and Dairen, although such 
withdrawal did not eventuate until 1955. ibid. pp. 138-139
41 Dennis Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and 
Peace, 1965, pp. 144-172)
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KMT government was defeated on the mainland and fled to Taiwan in 1949, it 
abrogated its previous recognition of the Mongolian People’s Republic, claiming that 
the result of the 1946 referendum was manipulated by the Soviet Union 45
Before 1949, the Chinese communists had made no formal statement on the issue of 
Outer Mongolia, although Mao many times made his position of disagreement clear. In 
1936, he predicted that, once the Chinese revolution was victorious, Outer Mongolia 
would of its own accord join the Chinese federation.46 In 1939, Mao redefined the 
frontier of China so as to include both Outer and Inner Mongolia.47 After the 
establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Chinese Communists adopted a 
foreign policy of ‘leaning to one side’ and saw close Sino-Soviet relations as essential 
for safeguarding China’s security. Mao visited Moscow in December 1949 and 
concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance (signed in 
February 1950). Mao later admitted that he had a difficult time in the two months of 
negotiations with his Russian counterparts, which he saw as a ‘struggle’ with them.49 In 
these negotiations, the Chinese government made considerable concessions, one of 
which was the recognition of the independence of the Mongolian Republic. At a press 
conference in September 1965, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, claimed that in 
1945, Chiang Kai-shek’s government had concluded a treaty with the Mongolian 
People’s Republic. The new China decided to follow that commitment and recognised 
Mongolia as an independent socialist country, establishing diplomatic relations in
43 ibid.
44 ibid.
45 ibid.
46 Shao Kuo-kang, Zhou Enlai and the Foundation o f Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996, 
pp. 231-232)
4 ibid.
48 ibid. p. 233
49 ibid. pp. 197-199
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October 1949.50
In this incident, the CCP seemed to be willing to accept a fait accompli under pressure 
from the Soviet Union. Yet, the new China did not want to be seen as responsible for 
the loss of Chinese territory. Therefore, instead of directly recognising Mongolia, it 
used the principle of state succession to justify the action.51
However, the CCP’s concessions made in recognising Outer Mongolia were not without 
ambiguity. In a talk to a group of parliamentary deputies from japan, Mao said that 
during Khrushchev’s visit to China in 1954, “we took up the Mongolian question, but 
he refused to talk to us.’° 2 Mao raised the issue again with Khrushchev in 1957, 
insisting that China had sovereign rights over Outer Mongolia. According to the Soviet 
version, the Chinese leaders attempted to reach agreement with Khrushchev to make 
Outer Mongolia a Chinese province. Such an agreement did not materialise as later 
development of Sino-Soviet relations did not favour such a move.
These two cases show that even under Mao’s orthodox regime, there was enough room 
in Chinese foreign policy to exercise compromise and concession despite the seemingly 
uncompromising Chinese stand over such key principle issues as sovereignty and 
territory integrity.
50 ibid. p. 233
51 Alexei Voskressenski, The Difficult Border: Russian and Chinese Concepts ofSino-Russian Relations and Frontier 
Problems (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996, pp. 97-110)
52 Chiu Hungdah, ‘Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal Treaties’ Cohen Jerome 
Allen eds. China’s Practice o f International Law: Some Case Studies (Mass.: Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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Changing Priorities in the Reform Era
The Deng era was clearly different from Mao’s period in determining China’s national 
priorities and in its international behaviour toward the rest of the world. Mao’s 
revolutionary state supported, at least rhetorically, a ‘continuous revolution’ internally 
and externally, whereas Deng’s reform programs set economic development as the first 
priority, thereby introducing ‘a more mass-regarding political climate. ’54 While Mao’s 
revolutionary inclination treated the state as an outsider trying to change the status quo 
within the international community, Deng’s post revolutionary state acted like an insider 
seeking maximum opportunities for its own development from within the existing 
order.55 While the Mao era emphasised ideological considerations, Deng believed that 
pragmatism better served China’s national interests.56
China’s foreign policy experienced a fundamental change in Deng’s reform era. Under 
Mao, the regime emphasised revolutionary objectives: dramatic and sweeping social 
reform in the domestic arena and survival as a communist nation among the 
international capitalist hostility. This period was characterised by an emphasis on 
revolutionary ideology, hostile to the Western-controlled international norms and an 
extreme sensitivity to outside threats.57 The perception of external threats to the new 
Chinese communist regime often led the Beijing leadership under Mao to counter the
SRperceived threats to China’s security with military means.
54 Brantly Womack, ‘The Party and the People: Revolutionary and Postrevolutionary Politics in China and Vietnam’ 
World Politics (Vol. 39, No. 4, July 1987, p. 507)
55 ibid.
56 ibid. pp. 479-507. As showed earlier in this chapter in the case of treaty treatments, Mao possessed complex 
personality. It was under Mao that China took up the UN seat, and Kissinger and Nixon were invited to visit China. 
Therefore, here that Mao was characterised as such was relative and in comparison.
57 Lucian Pye, ‘On Chinese Pragmatism’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 106, June 1986, pp. 207-234)
58 Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960, pp. 
54-85)
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Deng’s modernisation program not only brought about a tremendous increase in social 
wealth and an improvement of people’s living standards, but also moved the Chinese 
leadership and the nation beyond a narrow and single-minded preoccupation with the 
concept of world revolution. ' 9 As the world became increasingly interdependent, 
particularly in terms of economic integration, the Beijing leadership recognised that the 
regime’s survival depended on many broader issues rather than on just a few. Similarly, 
national security was not only related to political and strategic issues, but also to 
economic development.60 Under Mao Beijing was, of course, also aware of the 
importance of economics, but there was the strong belief that economic development 
and security guarantees could be achieved in a self-reliant, self-sufficient and socialist 
fashion.61 Deng’s version of economic supremacy necessarily also meant China’s 
economic integration and interdependence with the rest of the world, which required a 
less antagonistic foreign policy behaviour than the Maoist ideology would prescribe. 
Deng’s repeated warnings that China would face the danger of losing its qiuji (global 
citizenship) if its economy failed to catch up with that of other developed countries 
expressed his raison d ’etre for such an urgent policy change in China.
To further illustrate the magnitude of change, it is necessary to examine some major 
aspects of foreign policy evolution under Deng—the Chinese top leadership’s 
interpretations of and practice in China’s domestic and international affairs. In 
particular, the changes in the following four pairs of themes are examined: global 
revolution and world peace; isolation and participation; ideological dominance and
59 Richard Walsh, Change, Continuity and Commitment: China ’s Adaptive Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: University 
Press o f America, 1988, pp. 73-88)
60 ibid.
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economic supremacy; rigidity and flexibility.
From Global Revolution to World Peace
In the Mao era, ‘continuous revolution’ was a guiding principle and a key strategy in 
China’s foreign policy. Mao emphasised that “our revolutions follow each other, one 
after another.” Internally, class struggle and political campaigns were emphasised; and 
externally, China pursued radical policies to promote world revolution. Furthermore, 
according to the Maoist theory of revolution, domestic and international politics were 
on an equal footing in regard to the implementation of world revolution.64
These global revolutionary theories and actions were reflected in two areas of Chinese 
foreign policy. The first was an effort to increase Chinese influence in the communist 
world, where an ideological debate was being waged concerning the nature of true 
Marxist-Leninist countries and adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles.65 This debate 
divided the communist camp and was particularly fierce from the late 1950s to the mid- 
1970s.66 The second was that China asserted its independence within the communist 
camp, and developed closer relations with Albania and later with Czechoslovakia and 
Rumania. These close relations were resented by the Moscow leadership. The 
Chinese government also attempted to play a leadership role in the communist
611 bid.
b2 Quoted from Robert Demberger, Kenneth DeWoskin, Steven Goldstein, Rhodes Murphey and Martin Shyte eds. 
The Chinese: Adapting the Past, Building the Future (Ann Arbor: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of 
Michigan, 1986, p. 184)
63 ibid pp. 194-201
64 Andrew Janos, ‘The Communist Theory of the State and Revolution’ Cyril Black and Thomas Thornton eds. 
Communism and Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 40)
65 Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross eds. The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China ’s Search for Security (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1997, pp. 77-103)
66 ibid. During this period the Soviet Union was under the leadership, first of Nikita Khrushchev and then Leonid 
Brezhnev.
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movements of the nearby countries, such as Burma, Cambodia, Japan, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Laos, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.69 The CCP made similar 
attempts to influence communist parties in Australia, New Zealand, Europe, Latin 
America and Africa.70 At the same time, Beijing projected itself as a leading 
representative of the third world interests, and played an active role in the internal
• 71politics of Asian and African countries.
In 1965, China’s then Defence Minister, Lin Biao, elaborated Beijing’s strategy for
72world revolution in his famous article, ‘Long Live the Victory of the People’s War’. 
Lin, basing himself closely on Mao, believed that the Chinese communist strategy of 
people’s war—the establishment of a revolutionary base in rural districts and the 
subsequent encirclement of the cities—could be applied equally well to world 
revolution.73 Because the Asian, African and Latin American people made up the 
overwhelming majority of the world’s population, the world revolution hinged on the 
revolutionary struggles of the third world.74 As the logic of this theory dictated, China 
gave strong support to the struggles of these third world countries and vigorously 
opposed the two superpowers, a clear departure from the ‘leaning to one side’ policy of 
the 1950s.
During this period, China was the major supporter of communist armed movements in
67 ibid.
68 ibid.
69 Edwin Martin, Southeast Asia and China: the End of Containment (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977, pp. 33-37)
70 ibid
71 Samuel Kim, ‘China and the Third World’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the World: New Directions in Chinese 
Foreign Relations (2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 256-266)
72 Lin B iao, ‘Long Live the V ictory o f  P eop le’s W ar’ Beijing Review  (3 Septem ber 1965, p. 19)
73 Quoted from Daniel Dudley Lovelace, ‘People 's War' and Chinese Foreign Policy: Thailand as a Case Study of 
Overt Insurgent Support (Calif.: Claremont, 1971, p. 122). Lin Biao analogised that Europe and North America were 
the cities, the Third World countries were the countryside.
74 ibid.
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South-East Asia, including Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. On some occasions in the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing sent military 
advisers to supervise local military activities.76 The Chinese support greatly assisted the 
Vietnamese victory in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu, which was followed by the agreement of
77the Geneva Conference that temporarily settled the Indochina conflict.
Since the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, China accused the Soviet Union of 
‘revisionism’, charging that under Khrushchev the Soviets were seeking ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ with ‘the number one imperialist country’, the United States, and therefore, 
was abandoning its ‘revolutionary’ responsibilities. Mao and his colleagues were also 
alarmed by what they perceived as the Soviet attempts to control China, such as 
Khrushchev’s proposal in 1958 to establish a joint Sino-Soviet fleet.79
At the same time, the US was viewed with no less hostility. China supported North 
Korea and North Vietnam in their respective conflicts with the United States. Those 
countries that stood with the US, such as Japan, South Korea and South Vietnam, were 
labelled ‘running dogs of American imperialism’.81 Mao’s preoccupation with world
87revolution continued even into the era of rapprochement between the US and China.
75 Robert North, The Foreign Relations o f China (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978, pp. 106-107)
76 It was no secret that several well-known Chinese generals, such as Chen Geng and Wei Guoqing, directly advised 
the Vietnamese to in their fight against the French in the early 1950s. See Han Huaizhi, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de 
junshi gongzuo (Contemporary Military Affairs o f the Chinese Army) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 
1989, pp. 16-18).
77 Zhai Qiang, ‘China and the Geneva Conference of 1954’ The China Quarterly (Vol. 129, March 1992, pp. 103- 
122). But China’s attitude towards Vietnam changed after this—Hanoi felt China betrayed it by pushing for a soft 
settlement in Geneva.
78 Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong yu heluxiaofu (Mao Zedong and Khrushhchev) (Jilin: Changchun renmin chubanshe, 
1989, pp. 108-133)
79 ibid.
80 Samuel Kim, ‘China and the Third World’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the World: New Directions in Chinese 
Foreign Relations 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 133-152)
81 Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong yu heluxiaofu (Mao Zedong and Khrushhchev) (Jilin: Changchun renmin chubanshe, 
1989, pp. 150-153)
82 David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991, pp. 42-84)
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Although Mao was the major architect of the reconciliation with the Untied States, he 
never relinquished his revolutionary ideals. On the contrary, Mao continued to advocate 
struggle against the two ‘hegemonic countries’— ‘the American imperialists’ and ‘the 
Soviet social imperialists’.83
This radical continuous world revolution position was abandoned in 1978, which 
signified the start of Deng’s modernisation undertaking. No longer did China regard 
itself as the centre of world revolution—on the contrary, it frequently vigorously denied 
such a reference, and often willingly assumed a low profile when necessary in a bid to 
obtain more economic assistance and favourable trading terms from world 
organisations. Furthermore, the Chinese leaders repeatedly claimed that the 
maintenance of international peace was one of the major goals of Chinese foreign 
policy.85 On a number of occasions, Deng Xiaoping emphasised the importance of 
world peace to China. In 1984, for example, Deng stated, “the aim of our foreign policy 
is world peace.”86 He further confirmed that “we sincerely hope that no war will break 
out and that peace will be long-lasting, so that we can concentrate on the drive to
83 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington D. C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1992, pp. 55-71). Also see Samuel Kim, ‘China and the Third World’ Samuel Kim ed. China 
and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 133-152). 
Three explanations could be found for Chinese foreign policy motivation in this period. First, with national survival 
preoccupying the Beijing leadership, China was exceptionally sensitive to outside threats, particularly when the PRC 
was fragile in the first two decades of the Republic. Second, the Chinese communists regarded their revolution as a 
part of the world revolution. After defeating the US-backed forces of Chiang Kai-shek, the Beijing leadership saw no 
reason not to continue its successful pursuit of world revolution. Third, the historical consciousness of ‘China as the 
central kingdom of the world’ remained in the minds of many Chinese leaders, especially Mao. For a long time, 
especially during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese propaganda machine vigorously affirmed that China was the 
centre of world revolution and Mao its ‘great leader and great helmsman’—an obvious echo of the middle kingdom 
mentality.
84 Kate Hannan, China, Modernisation and the Goal o f Prosperity: Government Administration and Economic Policy 
in the Late 1980s (New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1995, pp. 223-233)
85 Chen Qimao, ‘The Current Situation and Prospects for Asia and the Pacific’ Robert Scalapino and Chen Qimao 
eds. Pacific-Asian Issues: American and Chinese Views (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 
California, 1986, pp. 26-38)
86 Deng Xiaoping, ‘We Must Safeguard World Peace and Ensure Domestic Development’, on 29 May 1984, Selected 
Works o f Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994, Vol. 3, pp. 66-67)
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modernise our country.”87 This statement, compared with Lin Biao’s 1965 article on 
‘People’s War’, completed the ideological transition of Chinese foreign policy from 
global revolution to world peace.
From Isolation to Participation
China’s actions in the first two decades after the establishment of the PRC in 1949
oo
demonstrated a strong dissatisfaction with the existing international order. China’s 
bitter experience with the imperialist powers, starting from the Opium War of 1839 to 
1842, profoundly influenced the attitudes of the Chinese leadership and people toward 
the Western countries. When, in the mid 1950s, the Soviet Union began to conduct what 
Beijing perceived as ‘a chauvinistic and expansionist’ policy toward China, the Chinese
89became even more suspicious of the established powers.
In addition to fighting the two superpowers simultaneously, Beijing, under Mao’s 
leadership, also vigorously criticised existing international systems, particularly that of 
the United Nations, from which it had been excluded until 1971.90 From the early 
1950s, China emphasised its relationship with the third world countries.91 In 1954, 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharla Nehru jointly
87 ibid.
88 Samuel Kim, China In and Out o f the Changing World Order (Princeton: Centre of International Studies, Princeton 
University, 1991, Introduction)
89 Douglas Stuart and William Tow, China, the Soviet Union, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 
1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982, pp. 6-7)
90 Samuel Kim, China and the World, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 3). Only once, in November 1950 
when the General Assembly discussed the issue of Korean war, was a Beijing representative permitted to address the 
United Nations. See Wu Xieqian, Huiyiyu huainian (Memoir) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 
1991, pp. 253-283)
91 Lillian Craig Harris and Robert Worden, China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger? (Dover, Mass.: 
Auburn House Publishing Co. 1986, pp. 55-57)
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issued the well-known ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,’ which later became 
the official base of Chinese foreign policy.93
Although the PRC took up the China’s seat in the United Nations in October 1971, 
Chinese ambivalence and suspicion of the United Nations and other international 
organisations did not disappear. In the early 1970s, Mao and the Gang of Four 
continued to criticise the United Nations for its vulnerability to being easily manipulated 
by the two superpowers.94 However, it was also during this period that the PRC 
strengthened its relations with some major West European countries such as France and 
Germany.
This self-imposed isolation was discarded when China embarked on its far-reaching 
policy of reform and openness in 1978.95 China began to participate actively in 
international economic and cultural organisations, including the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank96 and other international 
events.97 China also learnt to make better use of the United Nations by enhancing its
Q O
working capacity in the UN.
As Harry Harding observed, “Beijing has secured the formal recognition of all major
92 That is mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
93 Lillian Craig Harris and Robert Worden, China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger? (Dover, Mass.: 
Auburn House Publishing Co. 1986, pp. 75-77)
94 Samuel Kim, China, the United Nations, and the World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 
518-521)
95 ibid.
96 ibid.
97 In 1984, the PRC sent teams to participate in the Olympic Games for the first time; and in 1990 China hosted the 
Asian Games in Beijing. In 1992-1993, China lobbied the international community (although ultimately 
unsuccessfully) to select Beijing as the host for the 2000 Olympic Games. See Samuel Kim, China and the World, 
3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 8-11)
98 For example, in addition to the regular members of its UN permanent delegation, the PRC greatly increased the 
number of its UN staff. The number of Chinese staff members reached 171 in 1990, ranking third only after the 
United States (466) and France (235), and ahead of Britain (166), Germany (122) and Japan (96). See Edward
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nations, occupies a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, is respected 
as a major regional power in East Asia, and is considered by some analysts to be a 
‘candidate power’ which will make an increasing mark on global issues as well.”99
China’s constructive participation in international affairs was widely recognised by
Western policy makers and scholars.100 Of particular interest to them was China’s
position on UN peacekeeping forces to the world’s troubled spots. Under Mao, Beijing
consistently opposed the establishment and dispatch of UN peacekeeping forces.101
Even after it joined the Untied Nations, China often continued this
opposition—abstaining from voting rather than vetoing outright—to authorising
peacekeeping missions. The Deng era brought a significant change to this position.
1
From 1978 onward, Beijing began to embrace a greater role for the United Nations 
and to support the UN peacekeeping forces in the Middle East in the General Assembly. 
For example, In 1985, Beijing began to explore the possibility of sending a group to join
Lincoln, Japan 's New Global Role (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993, p. 140)
99 Harry Harding, China and Northeast Asia, (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1988, p. 12). Much to 
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from 67 to 29. See Samuel Kim, ‘China and the World in Theory and Practice’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the World, 
3rd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 134-135).
100 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics o f the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996). Other 
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ASEAN a threat to its security; rather, Beijing believed that ASEAN was very important to regional stability, 
especially to the settlement of the Indochina situation. China significantly improved its relations with every ASEAN 
member state. In July 1994, China, as an invited guest, participated in the first ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok, 
which was considered a significant first step at reducing opportunities for confrontation in a potentially volatile 
region. The Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen used the meeting as an effective platform to provide a detailed 
explanation of China’s military build-up and Chinese foreign policy towards this region to his audience. See Joyce 
Kallgren, Noordin Sopiee and Soedjati Djiwandono eds. ASEAN and China: An Evolving Relationship (Berkeley: 
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the UN peacekeeping forces in the Middle East.104 The Chinese voted for 258 of the 262 
resolutions related to the Middle East that were adopted between 1982 and 1988, 
including 22 on the financing of Middle East peacekeeping forces.105 And in 1992, 
Beijing sent a small contingent of troops (consisting of some 370 military men) to 
Cambodia to join the UN peacekeeping forces there. This was the first time the Chinese 
government ever sent troops to participate in UN peacekeeping activities.106
The Chinese government appeared more flexible in other international disputes, too, 
notably in the long-standing antagonism between Cambodia and Vietnam. China’s 
efforts to become actively involved in global, regional and bilateral relationships in 
order to advance its own interests fully demonstrated that it had come out of its self- 
imposed cocoon of isolation and was ready to play an important role in international 
affairs.
From Ideological Dominance to Economic Supremacy
Under Mao Zedong, revolutionary ideology largely set the goals for and dictated
• 1 ORChinese foreign policy, often at the cost of economic development. The ambitious
104 Yitzhak Shichor, ‘China and the Role of the United Nations in the Middle East: Revised Policy’ Asian Survey 
(Vol. 31, No. 3, March 1991, pp. 255-269)
105 ibid.
106 ‘Keeping Peace in Cambodia’ World Journal (25 April 1992, p. 10)
107 This was a very slow change, not necessarily directly linked to economic considerations but to the strategic 
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Vietnam in December 1992, signing four agreements guaranteeing foreign investment in each other’s countries and 
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foreign policy objectives of securing maximum political influence and military strength 
arose in part from a sense of vulnerability, rooted in painful memories of successive 
invasions by foreign powers. These experiences were reinforced by regional wars 
following the establishment of the People’s Republic—the Korean War, the Vietnam 
War, and the border clashes with India and the Soviet Union.109 Convinced that World 
War III was inevitable, Mao, Lin Biao and other radical CCP leaders firmly believed 
that China must prepare for ‘an early and total war.’110 They also sought to develop 
political and military power in order to further China’s leadership of world revolution 
and its support of other countries’ revolutionary causes.111 In addition, when master­
minding domestic political campaigns, Mao constantly stressed the importance of 
continuous revolution and class struggle. When applying these principles to foreign 
policy, political rhetoric and national security issues had to be considered.112
These beliefs were first overshadowed and later discarded in the Deng era. The new 
leadership realised that China was not only far behind the developed countries, such as 
the United States and Japan, but also behind its smaller neighbours.113 Even Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, Chinese territories ruled by capitalist governments, were far more 
prosperous than the socialist Mainland. In order to revitalise China, Deng decided in 
1979 that the ‘foremost national priority should be China’s economic interests’.114 For 
the first time in China’s modem history, economic modernisation became the primary
109 ibid.
110 Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong yu heluxiaofu (Mao Zedong and Khrushhchev) (Jilin: Changchun renmin chubanshe, 
1989, pp. 58-61)
1,1 ibid
112 ibid
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114 Yan Xuetong, ‘Deng Xiaoping de guojia liyiguan' (Deng Xiaoping’s View About National Interests) Xiandai 
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goal for national development under Deng’s reform auspices.
These changes from ‘politics in command’ to economic supremacy were reflected in 
Chinese foreign policy behaviour. Beijing’s modernisation drive had two chief 
components— reform and openness— both of which focused on economic development 
rather than on political campaigning.115 Furthermore, China decided to enlarge the range 
of foreign policy issues to include not only political-strategic elements, but also 
economic and cultural aspects.116 As confirmed by then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen in December 1994, economic development was a major goal of Chinese foreign 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s.117
China’s ‘economics first’ policy permeated the formerly unlikely areas such as highly 
protected military technology. Economic priority took an extreme turn when it came to
no
arms sales, driven by Deng’s reform imperative. China became one of the largest 
arms suppliers in the world in the 1980s and early 1990s.119 While principally motivated 
by long-term political and strategic calculations, Beijing’s military leaders also
I 2q
welcomed arms sales as a means of financing the army’s modernisation.
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From Rigidity to Flexibility
At the peak of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, the political and ideological rigidity 
of the leadership left little room for China to conduct its foreign policy within the basic 
diplomatic norms of courtesy, equality and respect.121 Mao’s continuous revolution 
theory encouraged harsh political persecution of its own citizens122 and the adoption of 
an unyielding posture towards the outside world.123 One of the most revealing examples 
was China’s recall of all but one of its ambassadors in 1967,124 effectively shutting 
down its already narrow diplomatic channels with the outside world. This, however, 
should be looked at with a specific reference to the hight of the Cultural Revolution, and 
not a general behavour pattern.
China paid a heavy price for this rigid and isolationist foreign policy. Economically, it 
lagged far behind most other countries. Strategically, it had a real sense of being 
‘encircled’ by the two superpowers and hostile neighbours. “ Although in the 1970s 
Mao made efforts to break the isolation by seeking rapprochement with the United 
States, Japan and most of the Western powers, his revolutionary rhetoric and dogmatic 
principles remained fundamentally unchanged—this was evidenced by Beijing’s actions
121 Lowell Dittmer, China 's Continuous Revolutions (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1978, pp. 163-173)
122 People were jailed for the ‘crime’ of listening to foreign radio broadcasts such as ‘Voice of America’ or ‘Radio 
M oscow’.
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which China was at odds were Indonesia, Burma, North Korea, Britain (over Hong Kong), Japan, Thailand and India. 
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following the catastrophic Tangshan earthquake in 1976.
It took a change in the top CCP leadership to transform rigidity in Chinese foreign 
policy to a more flexible posture. Under Deng, Beijing adopted more reform-oriented 
and practical economic policies, both internally and externally. China dramatically 
changed its attitudes towards such previously labelled ‘capitalist practices’ as joint 
ventures, foreign investment and foreign loans. Throughout China, governments at the 
central, provincial and district levels worked hard to attract investment from abroad. 
This became one of the main avenues for obtaining foreign capital and updated 
technology, and for gaining access to international markets.
The fruitful economic reform outcomes provided Beijing with sufficient legitimacy to 
justify the exercise of greater flexibility in its ‘independent foreign policy’, which 
started in 1982. This policy was aimed, on one hand, at maintaining a friendly 
relationship with the Untied States, and, on the other hand, at improving its ties with the 
Soviet Union.1"8 In practice, however, China moved closer to the West, which was
126 Tangshan, a large coal manufacturing city in northern China, was struck by an earthquake that killed at least 
250,000 people (by official account). Many governments, organisations, and individuals from throughout the world 
offered their help. The Beijing government, however, refused all such offers, believing that if they were accepted, 
China’s principle of ‘self-reliance’ would be violated. In addition, the Gang of Four was still in power, and one of 
their most infamous slogans was ‘we would rather have socialist grass (to eat) than capitalist grain’. How, then, could 
a socialist country accept support from capitalist nations? It would be wrong, however, to assume that foreign policy 
was totally dominated by such rigidity all the time over all the events during the Mao era; occasionally, Chinese 
foreign policy appeared pragmatic. But the paradox was that even on these pragmatic occasions, the Chinese leaders 
had to pay lip-service to dogmatic considerations. See Lowell Dittmer, China ’s Continuous Revolution (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978, pp. 33-65). One typical example was Mao Zedong’s decision to invite Henry 
Kissinger, US President Richard Nixon’s national security adviser, to visit Beijing in October 1971. This decision 
was obviously based on the realistic and geopolitical considerations of world politics rather than Mao’s traditional 
ideology. But after Kissinger and his aides arrived in Beijing, they were shocked by the big eye-catching posters at 
the airport and the small pamphlets at their hotel rooms, all carrying such slogans as ‘Down with the US imperialists 
and their running dogs’. Mao, himself, had to explain these away to his American guests as fang kongpao (meaning 
issuing empty statements for propaganda purposes), a way to stick to China’s projected revolutionary image in the 
world. See Li Gong, Kuayue honggou: 1969-1979 zhongmei guanxi deyanbian (Across the Wide Gap: the Evolution 
of Sino-US Relations, 1969-1979) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1992, pp. 144-146).
127 Nicholas Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994, pp. 
63-64)
128 Sheng Lijun, ‘China’s ‘Independent Foreign Policy” Pacific Focus (Vol. ix, No. 1, Spring 1994. pp. 5-45)
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better able to meet the demands of China’s modernisation drive than the Soviet Union, 
or today’s Russia. In fact, the whole Chinese foreign policy in the reform era could be 
described as a ‘tilted independent policy’—tilting toward the United Sates, Japan and 
Western Europe in the 1980s and to Russia, Japan and Southeast Asian countries in the 
1990s—as far as economic benefit was concerned.130 Clearly, this constituted a reversal 
of Mao’s policy in the 1950s of leaning toward the Soviet Union. And it was a profound 
shift from the 1960s and early 1970s’ policy of fighting against the two ‘hegemonic 
powers’—the Soviet Union and the United States.131
No better examples demonstrated the depth of change in China’s foreign policy than 
those of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, South Africa and South Korea. For 
many years, China had refused to establish any official contact with these countries. 
This position reflected Beijing’s deeply committed moral righteousness, its support for 
the Arab states, its disapproval of South Africa’s apartheid system and the Chinese 
government’s appreciation of the ‘blood-linked’ comradeship with North Korea. 
Diplomatic recognition of Israel and South Africa highlighted a turning point in the
129 ibid.
130 ibid.
131 ibid.
132 Beginning in the 1980s, China, while retaining its pro-Arab stance, first created unofficial ties with Israel by 
establishing academic exchanges in Tel Aviv and Beijing, and then moved to full diplomatic relations in 1991. This 
flexibility paid off for Beijing. There was some form of increasing military cooperation between the two countries. 
The Chinese military, for example, was able to acquire some advanced technology, such as that for air-refuelling, 
from Israel to upgrade its equipment. See Nayan Chanda, ‘Fear of the Dragon’ Far Eastern Economic Review (13 
April 1995, p. 25). More importantly, Tel Aviv chose to be closer to Beijing in the PRC-Taiwan rivalry. In the spring 
of 1995, for example, unlike neighbouring Jordan and the Gulf monarchies, Israel flatly refused to accept an 
‘unofficial’ visit by Taiwan’s president Lee Teng-hui. See Yarosiav Thofimov, ‘Jilt and Tilt: Israel Stops Wooing 
Taiwan and Turns to China’ Far Eastern Economic Review (25 May 1995, p. 29)
133 A similar, although more gradual development has taken place between China and South Africa. In 1990, the two 
countries set up unofficial offices in one another’s capitals—the ‘Centre for Chinese Studies’ in Beijing and ‘Centre 
for South African Studies’ in Pretoria. See ‘New Development between China and South Africa’ Beijing Review (19- 
25 September 1991, p. 3). Most staff members in these two ‘cultural centres’ are diplomats. Since then, a few high- 
level visits have been made between the two countries. In October 1991, for example, South African Foreign Minister 
R. W. Botha paid a clandestine visit to Beijing to discuss bilateral relations. See ‘China Card’ Far Eastern Economic 
Review (31 October 1991, p. 9). This diplomatic manoeuvre confirmed that the Chinese leadership was much less 
concerned about ideological differences now than ever since 1949. The election of Nelson Mandela in April 1994 as 
the first black South African President ended the notorious apartheid system in South Africa, which also cleared the 
way for China to further develop the bilateral relation. In early 1997 South Africa decided to terminate its diplomatic
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PRC’s rigid foreign policy approach as it moved to a more accommodating and 
amicable posture.
However, among these diplomatic breakthroughs, it was the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations with South Korea that tested Beijing’s pragmatism and the extent of 
flexibility. The theme of modernisation in China played a pivotal role in Beijing’s shift 
in policy toward the Korean Peninsula, and it was a very complex and difficult issue for 
the Chinese leadership because of China’s long involvement with North Korea’s party 
and state building since the Korean War.134
In 1950, China, inspired by a perceived threat of invasion by the Western imperialists,
entered the Korean War and provided substantial military support to the North Koreans
in their war with the South. Strategic and political calculations dominated China’s
Korea policy in this period, because Beijing was extreme sensitive to its border’s
1security and its implications for China’s survival and development.
With the changing international and domestic environments in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Beijing substantially adjusted its Korea policy. Despite its openly stated alignment with 
Pyongyang, China had (since the complete withdrawal of its military forces from the 
North in 1958) ceased to support a North Korean military attack on the South. In the
relations with Taiwan and to assume formal ties with China in 1998 indicated that the bilateral relations entered into a 
new stage.
134 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, ‘Looking Across the Yalu; Chinese Assessments of North Korea’ Asian 
Survey (Vol. 35, No 6, June 1995, pp. 528-545)
135 Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilisation, and Sino-American Conflict, 
1947-1958 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996, Introduction, Chpt. 1)
136 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: the Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994, Chpt. 2). There were sporadic quarrels between Beijing and Pyongyang in the past; 
the nadir occurred in 1969, the peak of China’s chaotic cultural Revolution, when Chinese and North Korean forces 
clashed along their border. See Nayan Chanda, ‘Lesser Evil’ Far Eastern Economic Review (21 December 1995, pp. 
17-18). Despite the increasing difficulties, the PRC nevertheless managed to maintain a warm and workable
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reform era, Beijing consistently expressed interest in avoiding another major military 
conflict in the region, and had a genuine interest in the creation and maintenance of a 
peaceful and stable situation on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing hailed the first high- 
level talks that took place in September 1990 between the North Korean Prime Minister 
Yon Hyoung Muk and the South Korean Premier Kang Yong Hun as “a good beginning 
that will help alleviate tensions and promote the process of Korean 
reunification.” Beijing also encouraged both Pyongyang and Seoul to create a nuclear- 
free Korean Peninsula, a move that would be in line with China’s national interests.
However, it was not at all easy for Beijing to finally decide to establish formal relations 
with Seoul. As Wu Weiqun observed, Beijing’s need for North Korean support for the 
Chinese communist regime after the Tiananmen Incident became a potential obstacle to 
establishing relations with South Korea.140 Beijing and Pyongyang were both isolated at 
that time from the other remaining socialist countries and from the international 
community at large. They relied very much on each other for moral support.141 
Furthermore, mutual moral supports in the long revolutionary past between the two
relationship with North Korea. High-level bilateral visits took place virtually every year. Political developments in 
China and Eastern Europe since the late 1980s brought Beijing and Pyongyang closer together. Kim II Sung was one 
of the few world leaders who openly supported Deng Xiaoping’s military suppression of student demonstrations in 
Tiananmen Square 1989. According to Nayan Chanda, from the 1969s to the mid-1980s, Pyongyang was able to play 
the ‘Beijing card’ against the ‘Moscow card’, effectively preventing China from moving closer to Seoul. As the 
international situation changed, especially after the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries established 
diplomatic relations with South Korean, the PRC gained more freedom and confidence in expanding its relations with 
Sough Korea. In fact, in the post-Cold War era, beginning with the late 1980s, Beijing had strong incentives to 
develop relations with Seoul, because a closer relationship might increase China’s leverage in dealing with the 
Korean problem and with East Asia as a whole. As one US official in Washington suggested, “having good relations 
with both (Koreas) puts China in the best possible situation” in world politics as well as regional affairs. See Nayan 
Chanda, ‘Chinese Welcome North Korea’s Kim, But Relations are Subtly Changing’ The Asian Wall Street Journal 
Weekly (21 October 1991, p. 24, p. 26)
137 James Cotton, Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: from Roh Tae-Woo to Kim Young-Sam (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1995, pp. 87-123)
138 ‘Korea’s First High-Level Talks’ Beijing Review (24-30 September 1990, p. 15)
139 Xu Baokang, ‘A Good Foundation for Solving the Nuclear Problem in the Korean Peninsula’ Renmin ribao 2 
December 1991, p. 6
140 Wu Weiqun, Conflicts o f Divided Nations: the Cases o f China and Korea (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995, pp. 
21-22)
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countries had been translated into personal relations at the top leadership level, which 
made it even harder to break away.142
On the other hand, China had long since shifted its domestic priorities from political 
campaigning to addressing economic reality in a pragmatic manner. The need for 
economic development was Beijing’s primary incentive for normalising relations with 
South Korea.143 China’s modernisation programs could not be realised without 
extensive external support and exchanges from industrialised countries that were able to 
provide advanced technology, capital, markets and managerial skills. As a newly 
industrialised country and a close neighbour, South Korea was in a very good position 
to provide China with valuable experience and lessons in economic development 
strategy, especially in ‘export-led’ industrialisation.144 Also, strategically, the addition 
of supplies from Korea would help to reduce China’s dependence on imports from 
Japan and the West.145
Several events that took place in 1990 paved the way for Beijing’s final decision.146 In a 
leading Beijing Review article, South Korea was described as having shed off ‘the cloak 
of the Cold War’, which was, in the eyes of the Chinese government, indicative of
142 The Chinese attachment to North Korea throughout the 1980s was underpinned by personal ties and sympathies. 
Leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen and Bo Yibo, who 
held leading positions during the 1950s, 1980s and 1990s, were personally involved to varying degrees in the Korean 
War. Their contemporaries in North Korea, headed by Kim II Sung, also retained power. This decades-long 
friendship was sustained and enhanced through frequent, mutual public or private visits. It was much more difficult 
for the Beijing leadership at that time to break or downplay its ties with North Korea than it was for Gorbachev, who 
shared with Kim II Sung neither age nor personal ties. See Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: the Making 
of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 177-252)
143 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, ‘Looking Across the Yalu; Chinese Assessments of North Korea’ Asian 
Survey (Vol. 35, No 6, June 1995, pp. 528-545)
144 ibid.
145 ibid.
146 These events included the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Russia; three meetings 
between the prime ministers of North and South Koreas; and the decision by China and South Korea to set up non­
governmental trade offices in each other’s capitals. These developments were seen as part of the ‘realignment of 
relations among Asian nations.’
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changes in South Korea towards being more friendly and cooperative. 147
China’s achievement of successful relations with the two Koreas tested the scope of the 
transformation of Beijing’s foreign policy. Any change of such magnitude required 
considerable political flexibility and a need to balance various demands from the both 
sides by careful diplomatic skills.
From the above analysis, it becomes clear that in a departure from previous practice 
under Mao, Beijing substantially reformed its work priorities and effected a transition 
from an isolated society to a more open country with remarkable achievements. In the 
political area, China shifted from world revolution to world peace, an essential 
prerequisite for creating an international environment conducive to China’s 
modernisation program. In the strategic area, China discarded its self-imposed isolation 
to become an active player in world affairs. On the economic development front, China 
abandoned the ‘politics in command’ in favour of reform measures designed to 
stimulate economic growth. Finally, on the diplomatic front, China showed more 
flexibility in order to optimise the positive international factors to best serve its national 
interests.
‘One Country, Two Systems’ and Its Policy Source
The previous two sections of this chapter compared and contrasted Chinese foreign 
policy under Mao with the transformations which took place in Deng’s reform era by
147 Hu Xueze and Ging Jinhu, ‘World Situation Unstable Despite Detente’ Beijing Review (14-20 January 1991, pp. 
27-28)
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examining Mao’s pragmatic foreign policy and the changing priorities under Deng. The 
paradigmatic shift and pragmatic changes in the reform decades reached its climax 
when China announced the ‘one country, two systems’ policy, undoubtedly one of the 
most significant Chinese foreign policy initiatives in the 1980s.
This section dissects the policy source of ‘one country, two systems’ from three 
perspectives: theoretical challenges, past practice and policy motivation. The purpose of 
exploring this subject in this order is not to study the formulation of ‘one country, two 
systems’ policy in detail, which is a task beyond this chapter. Rather, it is an attempt to 
examine some key policy sources which had to be taken into account in the process of 
formulating this policy. This example highlights the dynamic nature of Chinese foreign 
policy motivation.
The fundamental shift in Chinese foreign policy from the Mao era to the age of Deng 
could be seen to be encapsulated in China’s ‘one country, two systems’ policy. The 
origin of this policy could be sourced in China’s evolving response to Taiwan’s 
reunification. The liberation of Taiwan by military force was a major objective of 
Chinese foreign policy during the Mao era. The mainland’s slogan ‘Liberate Taiwan’ 
was paralleled by the Taiwanese slogan ‘Recover the Mainland’. In the late 1970s, 
Beijing made a significant change in its Taiwan policy by promoting ‘peaceful 
unification’.149
Mao proclaimed that, as a continuation of the civil war between the CCP and the KMT,
148 Lang Kao, ‘A New Relationship Across the Taiwan Strait’ Issues and Studies (Vol. 27, No. 4, April 1991, pp. 62-
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the regime in Taiwan must be overthrown and Taiwan must be integrated into the PRC 
as a province governed by socialist principles.1' 0 During the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing 
was prepared to use military force to take over Taiwan, and sporadic military clashes 
occurred.151 Given the prevailing atmosphere at that time—class struggle internally and 
world revolution externally—little room existed for Beijing and Taipei to reach a 
compromise on the Taiwan issue. When economic modernisation took priority, 
Beijing abandoned its generally hostile, uncompromising position in international 
affairs, and substantially modified its stance towards Taiwan, too.153
Before the term ‘one country, two systems’ was formally adopted by the Chinese 
government in solving the Hong Kong issue, the core of the idea had already become 
evident in the changed policy towards Taiwan after 197 8.154 However, the official 
announcement was made by the NPC Standing Committee in September 1981, which 
for the first time stated that after reunification, Taiwan would be permitted to enjoy a 
high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and have the right to retain 
its armed forces.155 Although the term ‘one country, two systems’ was not explicitly 
used, the idea was already clear.
150 Wu Hsin-hsing, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994, Chpt. 1)
151 Lee Lai To, The Reunification o f China: PRC-Taiwan Relations in Flux (New York: Praeger, 1991, pp. 21-30)
152 ibid. Hostility between the two sides was expressed in a propaganda war, in which each side offered huge cash 
incentives to lure defectors from the opposite side.
153 ibid.
154 In November 1978, in an interview with the Washington Post correspondent, Deng said that after a peaceful 
reunification of the country, Taiwan might still retain its capitalist economic and existing social system. See ‘Deng on 
Maintaining Hong Kong Policy’ Documents on ‘One Country, Two Systems’, ed. by Taiwan Affairs Office of Shanxi 
Province, 1988; See also, Beijing Review (No. 1,4-10 January 1988, p. 17). In the meeting with the governor of Hong 
Kong in March 1979, Deng again stated that: “We have always taken the special status of Taiwan into account. The 
social system there need not change and people’s living standards need not be affected and as a local government, it 
may have extensive autonomy and armed forces for its own defence.” ibid. p. 13
155 ‘Chairman Ye Jianying’s Elaboration on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful 
Reunification’ Beijing Review (No. 40, 5 October 1981, p. 10)
Chapter Seven 239
The concept of ‘one country, two systems’ was formally articulated by the Chinese 
government during the Sino-British negotiations on the future of Hong Kong. From the 
Chinese leadership’s perspective, under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework, the 
mainland would continue its socialist system while Hong Kong would maintain its 
capitalist system within a unified China. 156 This concept was also seen by Deng to have 
history-making significance—setting a good example for peaceful settlement of issues 
left over by history. 157 Deng emphasised that ‘one country, two systems’ was a new 
concept for the world, and a new way to solve conflicts, such as those between North 
and South Korea, or between East and West Germany. 158
Theoretical and Ideological Challenges
The basic concept of ‘one country, two systems’ recognised the reality of Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan, and sought to continue the socio-economic systems there for a 
considerable period after formal reunification. 1
During the negotiations between China and Britain on the future of Hong Kong, the 
concept was further developed. 160 Beijing claimed that it was in accordance with this 
concept of ‘one country, two systems’ that China reached agreement with Britain on the 
Hong Kong issue. A Beijing Review editorial stated:
The formula of ‘one country, two systems’, which forms the basis of the Hong 
Kong accord, is not someone’s whim. It is solidly grounded on a theoretical
156 Wang Enbao, Hong Kong, 1997— the Politics of Transition (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995, Chpt. 2)
157 ibid.
158 ‘Deng Xiaoping Talks to Hong Kong’ Documents on ‘One Country, Two Systems ’ ed. by Taiwan Affairs Office of 
Shanxi Province, 1988, p. 21
159 “ One Country, Two Systems’ Bom of Reality’ Beijing Review (Vol. 28, No. 5, 4 February 1985, p. 15)
160 ibid.
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understanding of the extended duration of the socialist transition period. When 
this is appreciated, lingering doubts about the durability of the present 
arrangements will disappear.161
In the framework of ‘one country, two systems’, the relations between the mainland, 
where a socialist system would presumably continue, and Hong Kong, where a capitalist 
system would remain, were central. The policy could be seen as an outcome of Beijing’s 
pragmatic tendency in decisionmaking, but it was not without challenge.
The first challenge was constitutional—the problem of how to interpret China’s national
constitution in conjunction with Hong Kong’s local capitalist law. It seemed
inconceivable that under the Chinese socialist constitution, which stressed the ‘four
1
cardinal principles’, there could be room for the existence of a capitalist system.
This difficulty seemed to be solved by Article 31 of the Chinese constitution, which 
gave the NPC the right to set up special administrative regions in which different socio­
economic systems could be adopted.163 Under the Sino-British agreement, the NPC 
enacted and promulgated the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (HKSAR) in accordance with the constitution of the PRC, stipulating that “after 
the establishment of the HKSAR, the socialist system and socialist policies shall not be 
practised in Hong Kong and that Hong Kong’s previous capitalist system and life-style 
shall remain unchanged for 50 years.”164
161 ‘The Hong Kong Solution’ Beijing Review (No. 41,8 October 1984, p. 4)
162 Kevin Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo: The Historical Roots o f China's Hong Kong Policy (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990, pp. 63-71)
163 ibid.
164 See A Draft Agreement Between the Government o f the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government o f the People 's Republic o f China on the Future o f Hong Kong, 26 September 1984
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Thus, from a constitutional point of view, with this special article in China’s national 
constitution and the international agreement between China and Britain, HKSAR’s 
capitalist status had a legitimate basis and legal protection.
The second challenge was ideological. The CCP maintained that the ‘four cardinal 
principles’ constituted the fundamental prerequisite for achieving China’s 
modernisation in a socialist manner. The CCP had often claimed to perceive the danger 
of ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ in any challenge to the four principles. 165 The CCP 
leadership insisted that socialism was the historically correct choice of the Chinese 
people and that it was socialism that had saved and helped China to remain strong 
politically and militarily. Socialism was the cornerstone that enabled the country to 
stand independently in the world. 166 It argued that if China gave up socialism, then the 
foreign capitalist economies would “occupy China’s markets and destroy China’s 
national economy”, and politically, China would “fall under their control and lose its 
independence in foreign affairs.” 167
Chinese scholars managed to find some theoretical justifications for ‘one country, two 
systems’. They argued that although there was no such notion as ‘one country, two 
systems’ in classical Marxist works, the concept was actually not in contradiction with 
the principles of Marxism, since the core of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought was to 
‘seek truth from the facts’. The concept of ‘one country, two systems’ was the result of 
combining the basic principles of Marxism with the changed situation in order to solve a
165 William McGum ed. Basic Law, Basic Questions (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Company, 1988, pp. 72-75)
166 ibid.
167 ‘Official Stresses the Four Principles’ Beijing Review (No. 3, 19 January 1987, p. 4)
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new problem.168
The third and the biggest challenge was the uncertainty and debate over the applicability 
of such a policy in Hong Kong. Since it was a policy without precedent, there was no 
easy answer to the challenge. However, a brief examination of the past practice of two 
systems in Chinese society may give a clue to the answer of this challenge.
Past Practice o f Two Systems in China
In international relations, China often selectively applied some Western concepts to 
defend its foreign policies. For example, China found the concept of sovereignty very 
practical in justifying its behaviour. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked the 
system transition from a unipolar/papal hierarchical conception of medieval society to a 
new multipolar horizontal conception of world order based on the coexistence and 
coordination of sovereign states.169 Westphalia, therefore, stood for the traditional 
approach to regulating a highly decentralised world of sovereign states. Countnes 
with different social systems were said to manage to coexist peacefully for longer 
periods, because they acknowledged the principles of sovereignty and non-interference 
in each other’s internal affairs.171 As a consequence of the definition and practice of the 
state itself, it became questionable later on as to whether the government in question, 
within a single jurisdiction where the central authority commanded absolute power to
168 Lu Deshan, ‘Lun 'yiguo liangzhi” (On ‘One Country, Two Systems’) Shehui kexie (Journal o f Social Science) 
(Jinlin: Jilin University, March 1986, pp. 132-145)
169 Samuel Kim, China In and Out o f the Changing World Order (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1991, p. 12)
170 ibid.
171 Richard Falk, ‘The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order’ Richard Falk 
and Cyrus Black eds. The Future o f the International Legal Order, Vol. 1 Trends and Patterns (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 42-48)
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conduct its internal affairs and no external country with the right to intervene, could
• • .  . 1 *7 7
maintain two distinct social systems.
China under Mao always insisted that the principle of peaceful coexistence was 
applicable only to international relations, and that it was not suitable for regulating
1 *77
relations in a country’s domestic politics. It also held that so long as “the state 
remains a state, it must bear a class character” and “there must exist class struggle”.174 
Therefore, it could be understood that within the Chinese state, there could only be one 
political authority, namely that of the CCP’s, which was constantly fighting with other 
political forces for maintaining such authority over the whole society.
With the changes in China’s domestic politics in the 1980s and 1990s, the principle of 
peaceful coexistence acquired a new dimension. Deng Xiaoping found this principle 
particularly useful not only for handling state relations, but also for dealing with internal 
affairs. Deng pointed out that peaceful coexistence between two different systems 
within China could have certain advantages.176 When the principle was applied 
internally, it could help settle disputes by peaceful means on the bases of respecting 
reality and history with neither side seeking to undermine the other, but rather trying to 
complement each other. This could result in mutual cooperation and mutual 
understanding. He also argued that the major part of the system within the framework 
of ‘one country, two systems’ should be socialist in nature and the central government
172 ibid.
173Samuel Kim, China In and Out o f the Changing World Order (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1991, p. 55-63)
174 ‘A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement’, the CCP’s letter to the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 14 June 1963, CCP’s Correspondence with the Communist Party o f the 
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177 Deng Xiaoping, ‘Talks on the Delegation of Hong Kong Prominent Business People’, on 22 June 1984, On ‘One 
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should represent national sovereignty. Within such a framework, the special 
administrative regions should only have autonomous rights as granted by the National 
People’s Congress.178
Some Chinese scholars argued that two different systems had in the past existed both in 
China and in other countries. According to their view, the cases in question included the 
duality of slavery and feudalism in the Liao Dynasty of 926-1125 A. D. in China; a 
system of slavery and feudalism in Japan from the 7th century to the 9th century; and 
the coexistence of a slavery in the South and a capitalist system in the North in the 
United States in the period of 1789-1865.179
Other Chinese scholars disagreed. They said that in order to make a meaningful 
comparison, there must be distinguishable differences between the two systems, and 
that they must represent two totally different and opposing socio-economie systems, 
such as capitalism and socialism.180 In the cases mentioned above, there was no 
fundamental difference between the co-existing systems because they were all 
exploitative in nature, and therefore, they could not be viewed as ‘one country, two 
systems’.181 According to this argument, the two systems must be opposing ones, and 
must have their respective administrative regions and conduct themselves 
independently.182
According to this understanding, it seemed that in East Asia there was only one case
178 ibid.
179 Li Jiachun and Yao Yiping, ‘On ‘One Country, Two Systems”  Journal o f Taiwan Studies (No. 1, 1986, pp. 51- 
55)
180 Lu Deshan, lCong xianfaxue lun yiguo liangzhi' (On 'One Country, Two Systems' from the Constitutional 
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1which met the criteria of ‘one country, two systems’—namely the case of Tibet. This 
case was, in fact, cited by some Hong Kong scholars as an example which challenged 
the feasibility of the concept of ‘one country, two systems’ in Hong Kong. In some of 
the papers written by mainland scholars, Tibet was also mentioned in the context of
1 84 .speculating on the feasibility of the policy in Hong Kong.
On another occasions, though, senior Chinese officials dismissed the case of Tibet as 
being of little relevance to Hong Kong, saying that, for example, “the Tibetan example 
is cited repeatedly by some scholars, but that is a complete distortion because there was 
an open rebellion there that was supported by foreign powers.” 185
Arguments by both mainland scholars and Chinese official statements contained 
considerable ambiguity, however. The case of Tibet was frequently mentioned by those 
who were doubtful about the applicability of the concept, suggesting that what 
happened in Tibet would inevitably be repeated in Hong Kong. To clarify the picture, it 
is therefore worth briefly looking at points of commonality and difference with the 
cases of Tibet and Hong Kong.
In constitutional theory, Tibet had a completely different system from the rest of China
182 ibid.
183 Wang Enbao, Hong Kong, 1997—the Politics o f Transition (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 94-97)
184 For instance, an article on this subject, published in the Journal for Taiwan Studies, stated: “After the 
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Then, the central government, in coordination with local patriotic leaders, and strongly urged by Tibetan people, 
gradually carried out democratic reforms and abolished the brutal slavery system. ‘The Relationship between Tibet 
and Central Government’ Journal for Taiwan Studies (No. 58, 1989, pp. 139-142)
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January 1984, p. 12
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before 19 5 9.186 There was also an agreement between the central government and the
i on
local Tibetan government to maintain the status quo in Tibet. For about eight years 
after this agreement, Tibet enjoyed considerable autonomous rights, which allowed the
1 oo
Tibetan government to conduct local affairs based on established practice. The 
Chinese central government had promised not to change the existing socio-economic 
and political system, nor to introduce reforms in Tibet. However, in practice, 
autonomy in Tibet was more restricted than had been promised on paper, though Tibet 
had far more autonomy than other autonomous regions, such as Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia. Even so, the Tibetan local government did not have the right to conduct 
external relations, and there was no separate customs border.190 Theoretically, local 
officials including the Dalai Lama, had to ask permission from the central government 
to visit foreign countries. The Tibetan government was under the close supervision of 
the military administrative committee, too. For the Chinese government, the stationing 
of the PLA in Tibet was important, since the army could carry out defence activities, 
and at the same time could watch over Tibetan activities and act as a deterrent force.191
Some scholars believed that the Chinese government was cautious in its policy 
implementation in Tibet. For example, Grunfeld wrote:
Most of the effect of the Chinese rule was informal and indirect, and much of it 
concerned only the fringe areas of Tibetan life without penetrating the inner 
recesses of the community’s traditions.... Although many of the more barbaric 
and objectionable aspects of Tibetan customary law and justice were 
discouraged and in practice abandoned, the main body of communist China’s
186 George Ginsburg and Michael Mathos, ‘Communist China’s Impact on Tibet: The First Decade (II)’ Far East 
Survey (New York, Vol. 29, No. 8, 1960, p. 123)
187 ibid.
188 ibid. pp. 126-131
189 ibid.
]90ibid.
191 Adalbert T. Grunfeld, The Making o f Modern Tibet (London: Zed Books Ltd. 1987, pp. 87-119)
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192statutory law was never enforced in Tibet.
Others had different views and examined the Chinese government’s important steps 
towards change, which included the setting up of the ‘Preparatory Committee for the 
Autonomous Region of Tibet’ in April 1956. Although the committee had the Dalai 
Lama as chairman and the Panchen Lama as vice-chairman, with fifty-one members 
(five of them were officials sent by Beijing), it functioned only on matters that the 
Beijing authorities had already decided, leaving the committee with no real power or 
autonomy. The establishment of the committee was seen as an important step towards
1 Q T
changing the constitutional structure of Tibet.
In respect of day-to-day work, the Chinese leaders seemed under pressure to offer 
practical and immediate relief to the masses in order to obtain their allegiance. The 
Chinese leaders acknowledged that anything less than that level could create alienation 
and resentment among the Tibetan people.194 On the other hand, there existed powerful 
local forces in Tibet which actively sought independence and resisted the Han presence 
in the region.195 A confrontation and final showdown was inevitable. The coexistence of 
the two systems ended in 1959 after an unsuccessful revolt led by the Dalai Lama.196
A combination of factors contributed to Beijing’s failure to maintain its original plans 
for Tibet—these included a “misunderstanding of the nature of Tibetan society, a lack 
of consistency in Beijing’s political line, persistent Chinese chauvinism and an inability
192 ibid. p. 119
193 See Tibet and the People's Republic o f China, A Report to the International Commission o f Jurists, by its Legal 
Committee on Tibet, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 1960
194 Adalbert. T. Grunfeld, The Making o f Modern Tibet (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1987, p. 124)
195 ibid
196 j
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59 1 97to respond adequately to growing resentment on the part of the Tibetan populace.”
In comparison with the situation of Hong Kong, Tibet’s position was much more 
vulnerable. Firstly, the agreement between the central government and the local Tibetan 
government was not an international agreement, and therefore the central government 
was not bound by international law of any kind. There was, moreover, no third party in
198a position to influence CCP’s policy.
Secondly, the Tibetans lacked bargaining power and were almost at the mercy of the 
central government. 199 There was no clear guarantee from the central authorities as to 
the duration of the promised Tibetan status quo. In retrospect, to maintain the status quo 
in Tibet at that time seemed to be an expedient, tactical policy rather than a fundamental 
state policy.200 Although the Chinese leaders were committed to leaving the status quo 
in the short term, they believed that the Tibetan system had to be changed when the 
conditions were ripe.201
Thirdly, strong ideological and cultural tensions existed between the two sides. 
According to official propaganda, the social system of Tibet was “a reactionary, dark, 
cruel and savagely feudal serf system”, and only the introduction of democratic reforms
would “liberate the Tibetan people, develop the economy and culture of Tibet and
202provide the groundwork for building a prosperous, happy and socialist Tibet.”
197 ibid. p. 126
198 Wang Enbao, Hong Kong, 1997— the Politics o f Transition (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 94-97)
199 See Tibet and the People ’s Republic o f China, A Report to the International Commission o f Jurists, by its Legal 
Committee on Tibet, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 1960
200 ibid.
201 ibid.
202 ‘Resolution of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet’, Beijing: New China News 
Agency, 20 July 1959
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Above all, the independent tendency among Tibetans and the Chinese government’s 
determination not to let go led to the final fracture. Tibet was important to China, 
politically, strategically and culturally. In addition, China was deeply concerned about a 
possible ‘chain reaction’ following Tibetan independence, since China’s other minority 
regions, such as Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, could follow Tibet in demanding 
independence.204 Official Chinese historiography regarded Tibet as a classic example of 
separatism being encouraged and assisted by foreign imperialists, and as an area that all 
Chinese leaders were determined to see remaining with China. Thus, while the 
Chinese government was flexible towards the apparently intolerable socio-economic 
conditions in Tibet, it became quite ruthless towards any Tibetan move for 
independence, since this directly related to the highly sensitive matter of sovereignty. In 
this sense, in spite of the great differences, the case of Tibet still contained some 
valuable relevance for Hong Kong.
Policy Motivation
The previous two sections discussed the theoretical challenges and practical parallel of 
‘one country, two systems’ in mainland China. What, then, was Beijing’s main policy 
motivation as it sought Hong Kong’s reunification within this formula?
To put it in perspective, ‘one country, two systems’ policy as a solution to the Hong 
Kong problem was developed in parallel with one of China’s most important foreign
203
204
205
Adalbert T. Grunfeld, The Making o f Modern Tibet (London: Zed Books Ltd. 1987, pp. 135-147)
Wang Enbao, Hong Kong, 1997— the Politics o f Transition (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 94-97) 
ibid.
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policy decisions in the Deng era—its abandonment of the anti-hegemonic united front 
foreign policy in favour of the ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ (IFP) in 19 82.206 The 
essential purpose of IFP was not concern about immediate national security nor the 
reunification of Hong Kong and Taiwan at all costs.207 Rather it was an attempt to 
comprehensively enhance China’s economic strength through modernisation, which in 
Deng’s view was itself the best way to ensure national security and China’s 
reunification.
According to Deng, a deciding factor and the core of the ‘one country, two systems’ 
theory was the superiority of the mainland’s socialist system and on-going 
modernisation drive. The mainland’s socialism would be politically dominant in the 
anticipated unified China and the pledge to maintain capitalism in Hong Kong and 
Macao for fifty years was based on the assumption that within that period the mainland 
economy would catch up with those regions.209 Wang Enbao observed that a major 
characteristic underlying Deng’s ideas about ‘one country, two systems’ was his 
confidence in what James Rosenau described as a ‘linkage’ theory:210 a linkage of 
China’s domestic politics with international issues; a linkage of China’s modernisation 
with the Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwanese economies; a linkage of the PRC’s 
socialism with the capitalism of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan; and a linkage of Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan in the framework of China’s reunification. For Deng, 
mainland China’s ambitious modernisation program and its socialist system were the
206 Samuel Kim, ‘New Direction and Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the World: 
New Direction and Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 3-6)
207 ibid.
208 Deng listed reunification as one of the three tasks for China in the 1980s together with modernisation and 
opposing hegemony, however he immediately pointed out that the fundamental way to achieve this reunification lay 
in modernisation. See Deng Xiaoping, ‘Muqian de xingshi he renwu ’ (The Present Situation and the Task), Selected 
Works o f Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982 (Beijing: People’s Press, 1983, p. 204)
209 “ One Country, Two Systems’ Born of Reality’ Beijing Review (Vol. 28, No. 5, 4 February 1985, pp. 15-16)
210 James Rosenau ed. Linkage Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1969)
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211core of the ‘one country, two systems’ structure, without which it would not exist. 
The success of capitalism in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan would serve the
mainland’s modernisation purposes, and the success of modernisation would guarantee
2 12those regions’ sustainable prosperity.
Deng’s strong confidence in the dialectic relations between his political assessment of 
Hong Kong’ future and the realisation of modernisation in the mainland was clearly 
shown in the priority he assigned to the two: despite its rising importance and urgency, 
the Hong Kong issue never superseded China’s ultimate goal of four modernisations in 
the Deng era.213 This meant that the Hong Kong issue was handled within the 
framework of advancing China’s modernisation program. This also meant that the 
policy motivation for China’s recovery of Hong Kong in 1997 and the terms and 
manner with which the takeover was accomplished were closely tied to Deng’s vision of 
a stronger China.214
Viewed from this perspective, Beijing’s ‘one country, two systems’ proposal was the 
best policy choice for China in the circumstances, allowing it to achieve its twin goals 
of national modernisation and resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong. In order to 
maintain and maximise Hong Kong’s functions as a global financial centre, regional 
headquarters for manufacturing firms, regional center for other services such as 
accounting and taxation, a trade window, a technology purchase window and
211 Wang Enbao, Hong Kong, 1997—the Politics o f Transition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1995, p. 50)
212 ibid.
213 ibid.
214 Samuel Kim, ‘New Direction and Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Policy’ Samuel Kim ed. China and the World: 
New Direction and Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 3-6)
215 William Overholt, The Rise o f China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc. 1993, pp. 178-193)
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international financial capital for China,216 China conceded that Hong Kong had to have 
different rules from those of the rest of China. Only if Hong Kong’s economic 
powerhouse status were maintained could China use it to fully benefit its four 
modernisations program.217
The above discussion indicated that the principle of sovereignty notwithstanding, 
economic motivation also prevailed in Deng’s Hong Kong agenda in the early 1980s, 
which, in the final analysis, was seen as offering the best guarantee for sustaining 
national sovereignty, unity and security.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the transformation of Chinese foreign policy motivation in both 
the Mao and Deng eras, demonstrating its dynamic nature. Mao’s China adopted a 
selective policy towards international law as far as state succession and the law of 
treaties were concerned. The Chinese government regarded itself as the successor to 
past Chinese dynasties and even the KMT government on some questions, but not on 
others. In the handling of specific cases, the Chinese government tended to fight for a 
formal right first, then applied flexibility in its subsequent actions. The degree of 
flexibility given depended on the judgement of the leadership on the relative importance 
of the issue in question. It was these self-interest, strategic considerations and 
perception of the existing international situation that determined whether to recognise or
216 ibid. p. 200
217 ibid.
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abrogate pre-existing treaties.
The two cases discussed in this chapter suggested that Beijing’s practical approach 
towards so-called unequal treaties was prudent. Although the Chinese government 
always insisted that it was not bound by these unequal treaties, it nonetheless never 
directly challenged their validity before negotiated settlements were reached. There 
were conscious attempts to maintain at least a semblance of consistency on these issues 
and to follow general international practice. The CCP’s tolerance of the continued 
Soviet presence in northern China until 1955 was largely an outcome of strategic 
considerations stemming from the Korean War rather than from a lack of political will 
on the part of the leadership; while the recognition of Outer Mongolia as an independent 
sovereign state involved accepting an historic reality under Soviet pressure. In both 
cases, despite the core values of sovereignty and territorial integrity, it was the 
perception of national interests at that specific time that determined China’s attitude and 
policy towards these cases.
Changing priorities in the reform era injected new dynamism into China’s foreign 
policy motivation. Beijing overcame a range of difficult issues of ‘principle’ to adopt a 
more flexible and pragmatic foreign policy. Evidently, the shift in the top leadership’s 
position, from a single-minded political-strategic concern to a more encompassing 
approach to national interests, was accompanied by fundamental changes in both the 
domestic and international settings. These changes, together with the normalisation of 
relations with the United States in 1979 and the restoration of party relations with the 
USSR in 1989, enabled the Chinese government to gain greater economic, strategic and 
political leverage in global affairs, and to play a more important role in reshaping the
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new world order. This policy pragmatism continued in the early 1990s and resulted in 
the establishment of previously unthinkable diplomatic relations with Israel, South 
Africa and South Korea. Beijing was quite successful in exploring this bonus in foreign 
relations to serve its changing priorities, and eventually turned them into valuable assets 
in China’s modernisation drive.
International cooperation, in turn, influenced Beijing’s interpretation of the outside 
world. Beijing, under the leadership of Deng, no longer viewed the international system 
as invariably hostile in the 1980s. This gave Beijing new confidence in dealing with the 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao issues and, as a result, its attitude towards solving these 
issues became much more conciliatory, with the Maoist slogan of ‘Liberate Taiwan’ 
surrendering to Deng’s ‘peaceful unification’ and ‘one country, two systems’.
Despite theoretical dilemmas and practical challenges, the policy of ‘one country, two 
systems’ proved to be the best possible policy decision in achieving China’s twin goals 
of economic development and recovery of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain. It 
took a fundamental change in foreign policy thinking on the part of the top Chinese 
leadership to accept such a departure from previous orthodoxy. The political 
implications of this in future China’s foreign policy would no doubt be profound.
This was not to suggest that Beijing had no other concerns in its foreign policy 
motivation except the single-minded pursuit of sovereignty and economic development. 
National security and political strategic calculations were regarded as closely connected 
to the successful Hong Kong policy, too. Ideological argument also still exerted 
influence—depending on the political need envisaged by the CCP leaders. It was the
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dialectic relations among these and other factors that formed the dynamic changes of 
Chinese foreign policy motivation.
PART III
BEIJING’S FIFTH COLUMN POLICY IN 
HONG KONG TRANSITION PERIOD
- A TEST CASE
This Part is a case study which provides fresh empirical evidence by documenting the 
CCP’s fifth column operation in Hong Kong during the transitional period. It looks to 
test the hypothesis that transformation of Chinese foreign policy behaviours could be 
pragmatic and cosmetic, while very similar manifestations of perception, personality 
and structural/situational elements as those that had existed in Mao’s foreign policy 
remained the key motivational drives of Chinese foreign policy under Deng.
Chapter Eight records the CCP’s fifth column operation in Hong Kong from 1983-1997. 
Chapter Nine examines the political raison d ’etre of this policy and its relationship with 
Chinese foreign policy motivation more broadly. Part III has revealed the lingering 
revolutionary determination of the Party leaders to preserve the grip of power in Hong 
Kong in their seemingly single-minded pursuance of modernisation at the national level.
The findings of the case study have tested positively the hypothesis set out in the earlier 
Parts. Part III has also advanced the previous theoretical exploration, empirical analysis 
and desirability debate of Chinese foreign policy motivation study to a new level of 
understanding.
Chapter Eight
The Operation of Beijing’s Fifth Column
During the transitional period from 1983 to 1997, Beijing quietly undertook a covert 
immigration scheme—the fifth column policy by definition of this thesis—to send tens 
of thousands of its cadres to Hong Kong. This special human transborder movement to 
Hong Kong was first conceived and set in motion in early 1983 while the Chinese and 
British governments were negotiating the terms of reversion of Hong Kong to China. 
More than 83,000 mainland officials entered Hong Kong under such a scheme, many 
with changed names and false identities, as part of a secret operation mounted by the 
Chinese government to install a political force extraordinaire in Hong Kong. The 
contrivance of this scheme was in fact simple: these fifth columnists were given the 
appearance of being ordinary immigrants for family reunion, but in reality they were 
sent with the Chinese government’s official blessing to carry out the CCP’s mission 
while not legitimately qualifying for the entry status they claimed.
The main argument sustaining this chapter is that during the transitional period from 
1983 to 1997, Beijing made strenuous efforts to successfully expand its existing party 
establishment and united front network, which had mainly targeted big business and 
professional elites, into grassroots businesses and community groups in Hong Kong 
through a fifth column policy. This policy was initiated as a political insurance device 
by some dubious minds within the CCP leadership. It was intended to complement the 
official CCP’s representation and was designed as a safety mechanism in case the more 
generic political structure outlined in the two basic documents did not work out.
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This chapter records the operational side of the fifth column in Hong Kong and leaves 
the analysis of the motivation of such a policy to Chapter Nine. As an important 
background and to put the fifth column operation in perspective, the CCP’s official 
presence in the territory is first investigated. The first part of this chapter reviews how 
the CCP organisationally consolidated and reinforced its official structure in Hong 
Kong during the transitional period from 1983 to 1997. The three layers of the CCP’s 
official presence in Hong Kong were buttressed up by a fourth and the most weighty 
form of presence—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Hong Kong Garrison on 1 July 
1997. By analysing the restriction and limits imposed on the CCP’s official operations 
in Hong Kong, the first half of this chapter discusses why, to the Beijing leadership, the 
institutional arrangements for the Chinese government’s representation in Hong Kong 
were inadequate to serve Beijing’s needs in the transitional period and beyond.
The second half of this chapter gives evidence that discloses how the CCP covertly 
deployed a large number of fifth columnists in Hong Kong. It documents fifth column 
activities in the transitional period by examining the issues relating to the policy 
initiative, recruitment procedure, missions and loyalty control. The operation details 
recorded in this chapter strongly suggest that Beijing was indeed pursuing a fully- 
fledged fifth column policy in Hong Kong, although the expectations for and practical 
value of such a policy fluctuated in accordance with the dynamics of political transition.
By contrasting the CCP’s overt and covert techniques, official and underground 
operations in Hong Kong, this chapter prepares a new empirical ground for the 
theoretical examination in Chapter Nine. By linking these two forms of the CCP’s 
presence in Hong Kong, it becomes possible for this chapter to offer, in the conclusion,
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a complete picture of Beijing’s political status at every stage of Hong Kong’s transition, 
and outline the CCP’s strategic thinking to improve its standing in the future. However, 
this picture is by no means simple and clear-cut, instead, it is complex, and in places 
contradictory. For one thing, although the fifth column policy was itself consistent, its 
operational contents, such as the recruitment process, were widely abused, and loyalty 
controls were only fitfully administered by relevant authorities. The problematic 
operation of fifth column policy gave rise to doubts about the wisdom of continuing the 
fifth column policy in Hong Kong.
The Fifth Column—A Definition
Although the term ‘fifth column’ was probably coined during the Spanish Civil War by 
the Nationalist general Emilio de Mola,1 the fifth column strategy, as an old art of war 
and politics, could be dated at least to 500 BC in the writing of Thucydides’ History of 
the Peloponnesian War. In this book, Thucydides commented on the conflicts between 
oligarchic and democratic factions in the various Greek cities as the main triggers to 
invite in the Peloponnesians or the Athenians respectively. The conflicts and wars 
provided ample opportunities for secret and treasonable activities in that either side of 
the conflict could get military aid from outside in order to consolidate its own power 
and destroy the opponents. Loyalty to the state provided little protection for lives and 
property. Party and faction loyalty, Thucydides believed, became stronger even than
1 Generally, people who are engaged in treacherous and subversive activities against their own country for a hostile 
foreign power are called fifth columnists. The term of fifth column arose during the Spanish Civil War, when the 
Spanish nationalist general, Emilio de Molo (1887-1937), was asked at a press conference which of four army 
columns he expected to capture Madrid. He answered ‘the fifth column’, meaning organised sympathisers within the 
opposition camp would rise from within in a concerted effort to topple the enemy. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of 
Political Thought (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1982, p. 172)
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blood.2 3
The survival of the fifth column strategy in the twentieth century suggested its enduring 
value in being able to accomplish what other open and more conventional means 
sometimes failed to achieve. By common definition, foreign agents, domestic traitors 
and enemy dupes formed the backbone of a fifth column. The main tasks of a fifth 
column would include espionage, sabotage and subversion in order to leave their host 
countries demoralised, divided and militarily unprepared for war. The fifth column 
strategy became a favourite technique not only for Franco’s Spanish Nationalists but 
also for other governments.4 In this century, many countries were believed to have 
employed the fifth column strategy one way or another in both wartime and peace 
periods, but the term was most strongly associated in the existing literature with 
Germany in the first half of this century.5 Hitler’s attacks on continental Europe and 
beyond, especially his blitzkrieg victories in the spring of 1940, seemed explicable to 
many military commentators as the success of Trojan Horse treachery or fifth column 
strategy. Historian Louis De Jong pointed out that fear of Nazi espionage, sabotage, and 
subversion was an international phenomenon that gripped nations in Europe, North 
America, and South America, and that the “fifth column certainly did exist.”6 In 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, for example, the Nazis had relied on ethnic
2 Thucydides, History o f the Peloponnesian War E.F. Poppo and l.M. Stahl eds. (New York: Garland, 1987, Vol. 3, 
82.1 and 82.6)
3 Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 21-56)
4 ibid. The circumstances for deploying fifth columns differed from case to case. The rationale for a fifth column in 
the fifth century BC as mentioned above would be significantly different from that in the first half of this century in 
Europe. The actual tasks set for the fifth columns also varied from country to country, but they share a common 
motivation: to weaken from within. See Luis Losada, The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War (Netherlands: 
Lugduni Batavorum E. J. Brill, 1972, pp. 108-121)
5 Louis De Jong, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, 
pp. 99-112)
6 ibid.
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Germans to help conquer these countries.
De Jong further observed that the functions of the fifth column could be divided into 
peacetime and wartime activities. In peacetime chief functions consisted of creating 
propaganda, supplying detailed information on commercial, industrial and political 
activities and national morale, maintaining surveillance of important citizens of the 
‘host land’, and above all, preparation for an emergency. In conducting all these tasks, 
the fifth column could manipulate all the social, political and idealistic ambitions and 
aspirations of various groups of people of the ‘host land’ to lull that land into a false 
sense of security so as to undermine its defence preparations and sow political, class and 
racial dissension.7 8
Other scholars tended to agree. Francis MacDonnell believed that in peacetime, the 
deployment of fifth column by a government was closely related to its fear and sense of 
insecurity. In this sense, many governments would be inclined to resort to fifth column 
strategies in one way or another at times of crisis. It was widely alleged that Italy, 
Japan, the Soviet Union and US were seeking to undermine their adversaries from 
within by employing a fifth column, which in turn brought about the ‘red scare’, ‘yellow 
scare’ and Axis scare in the twentieth century.
The Chinese government was a skilful fifth column operator in its domestic politics. For 
example, in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, the CCP was actively engaged in the
7 ibid. pp. iv-vi
8 Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 3-6)
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policy of ‘divide and rule’, or ‘blend sand with soil’,9 by strategically dispatching its 
hundreds and thousands of Han cadres to penetrate the local borders and to control local 
governments and population. The successful application and positive results of this 
policy in China’s remote frontiers enhanced the value of this strategy in the minds of the 
Chinese policy makers. As China and Britain entered into negotiations over the future of 
Hong Kong in early 1982, to resort to the traditional fifth column tactics quickly 
became an attractive option for some of the Chinese top leaders, notwithstanding the 
CCP’s general good-will and sincere intention to allow the Hong Kong people to govern 
Hong Kong.10
Beijing’s political efforts to penetrate Hong Kong’s social fabric predated the 
establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 and was all-encompassing. However, 
the fifth column in this study refers specifically to a group of selected CCP cadres who 
were quietly sent to Hong Kong during the transitional period. The purpose of this 
exercise was to position a force of the CCP’s trusted personnel in the territory. These 
people went to great trouble to hide their real identities with changed names, false birth 
certificates and fabricated personal background information. The vehicle for this 
operation was to hijack an existing immigration program for one-way exit permit 
holders—an annual quota agreed to allow migrants from the mainland to reunite with
9 The Chinese idiomatic expression ‘blend sand with soil’ has the same connotation as fifth column. It literally means 
that if soil becomes too tightly sticking together, it is necessary to put some sand in and blend them, so that the soil 
will loosen up for better use.
10 The good-will was expressed most clearly in the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed in December 1984. For 
example, it reads: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and 
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will 
remain basically unchanged.” “The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and 
so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of 
association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and 
of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, 
ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.” See Joint
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their families in Hong Kong. The obvious convenience of using this channel was that 
China could deceive Hong Kong authorities to accept these people, who would 
otherwise not be able to obtain their lawful resident status upon arrival, and would not 
be granted permanent residential rights until after they had live in Hong Kong for seven 
years.* 11
Taking this into consideration, China’s fifth column in Hong Kong was different in 
many respects from the traditional definitions. These immigrants were not undercover 
agents whose tasks might include collecting intelligence—political/economic/military 
information with national importance on security, defence, trade and technology. Nor 
were they trained to undertake radical actions or to stage uprisings in Hong Kong after 
July 1997. Nor were they simply transborder immigrants whose identities would be 
acknowledged by and registered with the local authorities. The missions of the fifth 
columnists in this study seemed to have been premised on more realistic yet more 
ambitious aspirations, reflecting several levels of concerns and needs of the CCP 
leadership. Firstly, in the minds of the policy makers in Beijing, the existence of a fifth 
column was a psychological assurance—at the very least, it could boost the CCP’s 
presence in Hong Kong by having the ‘numbers’. Secondly, a fifth column could serve 
as an integral part of China’s Hong Kong policy. As an auxiliary force to the Chinese 
government institutions in Hong Kong, it could accomplish what the official 
representation might have difficulty in achieving. This would include to infiltrate local 
communities and grassroots organisations. Thirdly, the fifth column was expected to
Declaration o f the Government o f the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government o f 
the People 's Republic o f China on the Question o f Hong Kong, December 1984, Article 3
11 Philip Webster, ‘Hong Kong Told of Citizenship by Points’ The Times 5 April 1990, p. 2
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gradually influence Hong Kong’s political configuration and general social disposition 
through aggressive business integration at the broader community levels, to manipulate 
the popular mood, and to mobilise support from within Hong Kong’s body politics. 
Fourthly, and most importantly, as a political insurance device, it was designed as ‘wild 
cards’, ready and able to play significant roles in accommodating Beijing’s future 
interests if all other institution-based political mechanisms failed.
Nominally, these fifth columnists were not attached to Chinese official establishments 
in Hong Kong. This gave them substantial freedom to exercise political and economic 
autonomy, and this fundamentally differentiated them from those employees with 
official status working for the Chinese government organisations and businesses, who 
were subject to strict regulation and discipline. However, political allegiance, a patron- 
client relationship with the party and business self-interest of the fifth columnists were 
projected by the CCP’s leadership to be strong enough to bind them together to the 
party’s ownership in times of need. The fifth column policy was aimed at achieving 
long-term benefits—to spread China’s influence widely and deep-down in the 
grassroots of Hong Kong society, and to cover as much ground as possible to generate 
local support for the CCP.
Although these people originated from a diverse background in terms of age, education, 
profession, origin of work locations and sponsoring organisations, they usually had one 
important thing in common: they were well-connected within the Chinese party-state 
system and often enjoyed prominent patronage within the party. Most of them had 
access to intimate and complex relations with various levels of party bosses, 
government bureaucrats and major corporation executives. Ultimately they were the
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winners in mainland domestic politics and economic reform.
Once in Hong Kong, these fifth columnists dispersed in a wide range of professions, 
such as lawyers, academics, executives of multinational trading companies, publishers, 
contractors, private dealers, property developers, hotel owners and tourist operators. 
Some of them had received a certain amount of financial assistance from the sponsoring 
bodies to kick-start their new life in Hong Kong. When the businesses were rolling, they 
usually tried to pay the ‘loans’ off quickly so that they could be ‘debt-free’ and have 
more autonomy in their business decisions. Others were just given the opportunity to 
‘swim’ by themselves. Most of these people were doing well because of their close 
connections with the mainland and their sound knowledge of business norms in Hong 
Kong. These people usually were in their 30s or 40s, with good education, training and 
skills. Despite their relatively late entry into the game, generally they were good 
survivors and faring well.
CCP’s Official Presence
The Chinese government had had no legal representative office in Hong Kong prior to 
1984 when the New China News Agency’s Hong Kong Office (the Xinhua Office) was 
publicly confirmed in the Joint Declaration to be China’s official representative. 
However, Chinese communist activities in Hong Kong could date back at least from 
1921, and its existence was an open secret and tolerated by the Hong Kong
12 For a comprehensive study on the topic, see John P. Bums article, ‘The Structure of Communist Party Control in 
Hong Kong’ Asian Survey (Vol. XXX. No. 8, August 1990), and the book A History of Chinese Revolution by The 
Chinese Communist Party History Research Group (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe Vol. II, 1985, pp. 23-61). Hong
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government. There were roughly three periods into which the CCP’s 1949-1997 history 
in Hong Kong fell: 1949-67, 1968-81, 1982-1997,13 and throughout all three periods, 
the CCP operated as an underground political force in Hong Kong.14
Under British rule, the CCP steadily expanded its organisational structure. At first, there 
was the CCP’s Hong Kong-Macao Work Committee (Work Committee), chaired by the 
director of the Xinhua Office, with other major stakeholders appointing their senior 
officials as committee members.15 Strictly speaking, the Work Committee was 
structurally at its highest level representing the CCP, and the Xinhua Office was de
Kong people were among the first targets for recruitment when the CCP was formed in 1921. After its second 
congress in the following year, the CCP concentrated on the need to provide leadership to the workers’ movement in 
Hong Kong through the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat. In 1922 and 1923 more than 180 strikes were called by 
workers throughout the mainland with 300,000 people taking part, including a general strike by 100,000 seamen in 
Hong Kong against the British. The organisers of the general strike in Hong Kong were mostly Guangdong natives. 
Among them were So Zhaojin, Zeng Sheng and Chen Yu, who would later become prominent members of the 
Communist Party. But the party activities in Hong Kong soon came to an abrupt halt in 1927 following a purge of the 
CCP by the nationalist KMT on the mainland after the failure of the first CCP and KMT cooperation (the first United 
Front). Communist activities in the British colony dwindled significantly in the 1930s when the CCP became engaged 
in a battle for survival with the KMT on the mainland. A change occurred in 1937 when the CCP and the KMT 
cooperated for the second time (the second United Front) in the war against Japanese aggression. In 1938 Liao 
Chengzhi, who would later become director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, set up an army liaison 
office in Hong Kong to collect funds for the communist-led Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army. During the 
eight years of war against the Japanese, guerrilla fighters led by communists fought in Hong Kong, Kowloon and the 
New Territories. They were known as the East River Guerrilla Column. Some of these fighters remained in Hong 
Kong after the British regained Hong Kong at the end of World War II in 1945. Others became senior officials of the 
Work Committee which later assumed the title of the Xinhua Office Hong Kong Branch in 1948. Historically, the 
Xinhua Office provided leadership to the major riots, strikes, union movements and left-wing propaganda campaigns 
in the territory.
13 Ian Kelley, Hong Kong: A Political-Geographic Analysis (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986, pp. 82-87). 
The first period ended with the violent riots sparked by the Cultural Revolution, when Hong Kong security forces 
suppressed many local trade unions and leftist groups. The middle period was one of quiet rebuilding. The latter 
began with the announcement that a new unit would be set up by the Chinese government to handle reunification 
matters, the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office. Its first director was Liao Chengzhi, a specialist 
on reunification issues. The office was senior to the Xinhua Office in the Chinese government hierarchy.
14 The communist activities were strictly illegal under British rule. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘Beijing’s Post 1997 
Strategies and Its Cadre Establishment in HKSAR of Hong Kong’ working paper on the conference ‘Futures: The 
Political Transition in Hong Kong’, Perth, Australia, 2 May 1996. It had long been Beijing’s intention that the party 
organisation should remain underground even after the transfer of sovereignty. If it came out to declare its power, it 
would inevitably be seen as the true locus of Beijing’s authority to interfere with HKSAR government’s autonomy, 
which would cause local anxiety and might send an unwanted signal to Hong Kong people. Furthermore, Beijing 
would not wish to be placed itself in a position where it might be subject to the uncertainties of elections contested by 
secret ballot.
15 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 67-68). Xu revealed that other 
Work Committee members included chief executives of Bank of China, China Resources and China’s Tourist 
Bureau, trade union leaders and other groups.
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facto representative of the Chinese government. But in practice, the functions of these 
two units were fused with the party secretary of the Work Committee publicly holding 
the director position of the Xinhua Office. These key players formed a standing 
committee which had a mandate from the CCP headquarters in Beijing to implement the 
CCP directives, to maintain party discipline and party organisation, and to coordinate 
united front activities.16 Another important function of the Work Committee was its role 
in reporting and advising Beijing on Hong Kong related issues.
Later, under the leadership of the Work Committee, there were China’s wide-spread
business entities, security/intelligence establishments, which sprang up like mushrooms
18during the transitional period, to complete the CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong. 
The PLA Garrison would be officially added to this organisational chart in July 1997. 
The structural and functional divisions among these players was not well differentiated, 
for in reality their responsibilities often intertwined and overlapped.19
Work Committee and Xinhua Office
The Work Committee and the Xinhua Office had notionally separate but overlapping 
responsibilities and there was a degree of rivalry between them as a result. The Work 
Committee, appointed by the party’s Central Committee, was headed by a secretary,21
16 John P. Bums, ‘The Role of the New China News Agency’ John P. Bums ed. Hong Kong and China in Transition 
(Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994, pp. 29-21)
17 ibid.
18 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 72-78)
19 ibid.
20 Robert Cottrel, The End of Hong Kong (London: John Murray, 1993, pp. 97-133)
21 The power and status of a Work Committee secretary differed according to his personal power base, linkage within 
the CCP network and relationship with top leaders. Zhou Nan, who held the position from 1990-1997, used to be a 
vice minister for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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several deputy secretaries, and a secretary general. It also comprised a number of 
ordinary members. The deputy secretaries of the Work Committee were drawn from 
among some of the deputy or assistant directors of the Xinhua Office. In the 1980s and 
1990s, other members of the Work Committee were mainly from among the leaderships 
of state-run companies based in Hong Kong, such as China Resources, China 
Merchants, Bank of China and China Travel Service.24 In the words of a senior Chinese 
official in the Xinhua Office, the relationship between the Work Committee and the 
Xinhua Office was ‘one body with two faces’, with the Xinhua Office serving as a 
‘public face’ or ‘window’.25
The CCP’s strength in numerical terms and the position of various CCP elements in 
Hong Kong, including the Work Committee and the Xinhua Office, have never been 
disclosed by the Chinese side. Due to the secrecy of the CCP’s personnel arrangements 
and staff management in Hong Kong, and also due to the consistent denial of the 
existence of such an undeclared party contingent by the British colonial authority, the 
exact numbers of cadres working in Hong Kong was very difficult to confirm.26 
According to Xu Jiatun, in 1983 there were only about 6,000-7,000 CCP members in 
Hong Kong and Macao, among whom those of mainland origin numbered about 3,000,
22 Deng Feng, ‘ Xianggang xinhuashe-gongwei caigande waiyi’ Dangdai (Contemporary), (No. 4, 16 December 1989, 
p p .17-21) 
ibid
24 ibid
25 Interviews with senior officials of the Xinhua Office in Hong Kong, December 1996
26 Jonathan Mirsky, East Asia editor of The Times (London) said that the information ‘leaked’ from the Special 
Branch indicated that around 23,000 to 28,000 Communist members were active in Hong Kong by the end of 1995. 
Interview with Jonathan Mirsky, Hong Kong, December 1996. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Associate Editor & China Editor 
of South China Morning Post gave a more conservative figure about 15,000. For a further discussion of the size and 
operations of the underground party cell, see ‘Communists Mark Time Under Wraps’ Guardian (London), 2 
September 1995; ‘China’s Magic Tool for Hong Kong’ The Economist 18 March 1995
Chapter Eight 269
while more than half were local CCP members. Although China would be the 
legitimate sovereign of Hong Kong from 1 July 1997, the party system still could not 
operate as it did in mainland China due to Beijing’s international commitment to the 
Hong Kong people. These considerations and restrictions were the constant source of 
concern to the Beijing leadership, and reinforced the CCP’s determination to adopt a 
long-term strategy to compensate for this deficiency.
As mentioned earlier, the CCP’s interest in penetrating Hong Kong’s political life 
predated 1982, when the Chinese and British governments finally sat down to talk in 
detailed terms about the future of this tiny colony.28 Since the Xinhua Office became the 
Chinese government’s official representative in Hong Kong in 1948, it not only was the
29locus for the mainland CCP members working in Hong Kong under the British rule, 
but also provided separate leadership to local underground Hong Kong communists by 
appointing designated individuals directly from the Beijing-based CCP Central 
Overseas Chinese Committee.30 This situation ended in 1983 when Xu Jiatun, former 
director of the Xinhua Office, consolidated his power by merging the two party systems 
under the sole responsibility of the Work Committee, expanding the Xinhua Office’s 
power to include providing guidance and supervision of indigenous Hong Kong CCP 
members.
97
27 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, p. 69)
28 Kevin Rafferty, City on the Rocks: Hong Kong’s Uncertain Future (New York: Viking Publishings, 1990, pp. 53- 
62). Robert Cottrel, The End of Hong Kong (London: John Murray, 1993, Chpts. 1 and 2)
29 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, Chpt. 1). Xu described the Xinhua 
Office as the engine house for the management of mainland-sent CCP members who work for the Xinhua Office, 
other Chinese establishments or their own businesses (fifth columnists), p. 26
30 ibid. p. 69. Before 1983, Li Qixin, Deputy Director of the Xinhua Office and appointed by the Overseas Chinese 
Committee of the Party Central Committee, had been in charge of this task.
31 ibid. p. 27
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The evolution of the Xinhua Office before 1982 revealed the increasing importance the 
CCP attached to Hong Kong. From 1949 to the late 1970s, the role of the CCP in Hong 
Kong developed organisationally to accommodate its position as a party out of power
32operating in what it perceived to be a largely hostile capitalist environment. 
Consequently, its power in Hong Kong was largely exercised in the market 
place—during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the CCP exercised its control largely at 
nominally economic levels.
The process of Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty from 1982 to 1997 
created an urgent need for the Xinhua Office to expand its working agenda to include 
achieving its direct political participation and expanding its influence in the transitional 
period. The Chinese government gave the Xinhua Office a renewed mandate to elevate 
its economic and political control to a new administrative level.34
Indeed, during the transitional period, the Xinhua Office greatly raised its public profile 
and status by strong performance in committing itself to the critical foundation-laying 
work for the return of Hong Kong to China. It played an irreplaceable role in lobbying, 
consulting and convincing Hong Kong business leaders in the lead up to the drafting of 
both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law in the 1980s. It supplied personnel for 
China’s negotiating teams in the Joint Liaison Group and elsewhere. Its officials often 
spoke on behalf of the Chinese government on important policy initiatives and
32 John P. Bums, T he Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong’ Asian Survey (Vol. XXX. No. 8, August 
1990 p. 748)
33 ibid. p. 763
34 ibid.
35 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 69-75)
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responses, including matters of a technical kind involving major infrastructure projects 
such as the new airport. In addition, the Xinhua Office was also charged with the tasks 
of winning over the support of many social groups and isolating those identified as
36enemies.
In many respects, the Xinhua Office was given the role of ‘shadow government’ during 
the transitional period, waiting in the wings for the handover in 1997. It not only 
exerted influence within Hong Kong territory, but also assisted in the conduct of 
China’s relations with other Chinese communities in the region, particularly with 
Taiwan.38 At the end of 1996, it was entrusted with the sole responsibility for the 
selection of Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive, Tung Chee-Hwa.
During his term as the director of the Xinhua Office from 1990 to 1997, Zhou Nan 
adopted a series of hard measures to organisationally and structurally strengthen the 
Xinhua Office in response to increasing tension between the Chinese and British 
governments. At the end of 1996, it employed around 500 staff, more than double its 
pre-1982 level.40 In the early 1990s, the Xinhua Office was organised into ten
36 ibid.
37 John Bums, ‘The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong’ Asian Survey (Vol. XXX. No. 8, August 
1990 p .748)
38 ibid.
39 The Joint Declaration stipulates that Chief Executive of HKSAR would replace the governor as head of the 
government. It reads: “The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People’s Government on the basis of the 
results of elections or consultations to be held locally.” See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People 's Republic of China on the 
Question of Hong Kong, December 1984, Article 3
40 Interviews with senior Xinhua Office official in Hong Kong, December 1996. The pre-1982 figure was around 200.
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departments,41 a research office and a general office. The Coordination Department was 
primarily responsible for united front work,42 the most important work of the Xinhua 
Office. It was expected to identify not only the rich and powerful among Hong Kong 
political and business circles, but also those people with great potential to become 
powerful. Its work emphasis was to continuously groom and cultivate a close 
relationship with them in order to win and maintain their support in implementing 
China’s policies in Hong Kong.43
This same period also saw the emergence of the model of future party extension into 
Hong Kong in the form of dangzu (party cores), which were sprouting at a brisk rate in 
the mainland corporations in Hong Kong as well as in unexpected places such as the 
universities and other academic institutes.44 As more Chinese professionals who were 
the CCP members found employment in large establishments such as banks, trading 
houses, multinational corporations and media units, dangzu were expected to increase in 
number to accommodate the party constitutional request on the structure.45
The signing of the Joint Declaration ushered in a new dimension of political sensitivity 
and challenge to the work of the Xinhua Office. During the transitional period, the 
Xinhua Office had to reorient its work focus and diversify its functions to meet new 
challenges. These included propagating the CCP’s policy position in the territory,
41 They were coordination, propaganda, foreign affairs, personnel, social work, economics, education-science- 
technology, arts-sports, Taiwan affairs and security. Also attached to the Xinhua Office was the local branch of the 
Xinhua News Agency and its district offices located in Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories. Willy Wo- 
Lap Lam, ‘Beijing’s Post 1997 Strategies and Its Cadre Establishment in SAR of Hong Kong’ working paper on the 
conference ‘Futures: The Political Transition in Hong Kong’, Perth, Australia, 2 May 1996
42 ibid.
43 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 69-75)
44 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ‘Beijing’s Post 1997 Strategies and Its Cadre Establishment in SAR of Hong Kong’ working 
paper on the conference Futures: The Political Transition in Hong Kong, Perth, 2 May 1996
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supervising and reporting on China’s key organisations, coordinating China’s business 
activities in Hong Kong and “building a coalition to support party policies through 
aggressive united front work”, including “recruiting candidates for leadership in the 
post-1997 Hong Kong government.”46 Among these functions, united front work 
continued to be the “most important.”47 This involved identifying credible locals to 
speak out on China’s behalf on critical issues.48 Well before 1949, the CCP had 
appointed Hong Kong residents to various consultative bodies in Beijing and 
Guangdong province.49 With the imminent transition of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, 
appointments of this kind were expanded to facilitate the increasing need to achieve 
concrete results on various fronts. Or as John Bums vividly described it—the “net has 
been cast a little wider.”50 The Xinhua Office, as the CCP’s mouthpiece, administrator 
and the highest official representative in Hong Kong, could be said to have done all it 
could to advance Beijing’s interests in the territory during this crucial period. However, 
it was exactly because of this high official status that the Xinhua Office was cautious 
not to be seen as directly engaging in community and grassroots-based activities, lest it 
be criticised as being instigating. Of course, resource constraints also added to this 
restriction.
The operation of the fifth column in Hong Kong inevitably added a new responsibility
45 ibid.
46 John P. Bums, ‘The Role o f the New China News Agency’ John Bums ed. Hong Kong and China in Transition 
(Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994, p. 18)
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
49 Such as the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and their 
provincial affiliates.
50 John P. Bums, ‘The Role of the New China News Agency’ John P. Bums ed. Hong Kong and China in Transition 
(Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994, p. 42)
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to the Xinhua Office, which found itself under great pressures to deal with increasing 
workloads. This situation to some extent exacerbated some contending internal issues, 
such as staff shortage and job division among 10 Departments,51 and was regarded by 
some officials as an unwanted burden. However, this new obligation in turn empowered 
the Xinhua Office to oversee the political well-being of the fifth columnists and to 
monitor the policy development and implementation in general. This duty continued at 
least until the new office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) assumed its function 
in mid 1997.
Business Establishments
As mentioned earlier, China-owned business operating in Hong Kong was part of 
China’s official, or ‘overt’, presence. The imminent change of sovereignty gave the 
mainland business establishments a greater leadership role in Hong Kong’s economy, 
and there was evidence that Beijing would not fulfil this role without a political 
sting—there wasn’t a clear line separating government and business work.
Most large mainland enterprises in Hong Kong were headed by China’s senior
. . . obureaucrats or communist capitalists. For example, Gu Yongjiang, chairman of China
51 Interviews with officials from the Xinhua Office, Hong Kong, December 1996 and December 1997
52 For example, in 1996, the new chairman of the Hong Kong Association of Banks was Yang Zilin, chief executive 
of the Bank of China’s Hong Kong and Macao Regional Office. Yang came to Hong Kong in 1994 from the bank’s 
head office in Beijing. Later that same year, Yuan Wu, a senior vice president of China Merchants, the shipping and 
property conglomerate controlled by the Ministry of Communications, was selected to join the 60-person Provisional 
Legislature, the interim body appointed by Beijing to take over from the 1995 Legislative Council on 1 July 1997. 
The directors of the board of Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises Association, a body like the local chambers of 
commerce, highlighted the relationship between the mainland Chinese firms and the Chinese state. At the end of 
1997, its chairman, Gu Yongjiang, was also the chairman of China Resources and formerly a vice minister in 
MOFTEC. Among the vice chairmen, there was Yang Zilin of the Bank of China; Li Yinfei, president of China 
Merchants Holdings (whose chairman, Huang Zhendong, was the Minister of Communication in Beijing); and Zhu
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Resources, arrived in Hong Kong from the central government bureaucracy only in 
1996. There was an obvious link between the mainland enterprises in Hong Kong and 
functional ministries in Beijing or at the provincial level. Despite efforts within China to 
minimise the direct control of enterprises by governmental organs, and despite some of 
the larger and more successful enterprises having a fairly high degree of management 
autonomy, most were far from being autonomous commercial entities. For example, 
China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), despite looking more 
like a private company than any other Chinese business in Hong Kong, clearly had to 
take orders from Beijing during the 1995-96 disputes over Dragonair.
A wide discrepancy existed between official Chinese statistics and popular beliefs about 
the actual number of the mainland-origin companies operating in Hong Kong. The 
upbeat of these companies undoubtedly was an effective image boost for China, and the
Yuening, chairman and general manager of China Travel Service and the former vice mayor of Shenzhen. Two other 
vice chairmen with links to southern China were He Keqin, chairman of Guangdong Enterprises, the commercial arm 
of the Guangdong provincial government; and Wang Chengming, chairman and general manger of Fujian 
Enterprises, the same for that province. Another example could be founded by looking at the ascendancy of Huang 
Diyan who held the special post of honorary president of the association. Huang came to Hong Kong from Beijing in 
1983 and rose to chief executive of the Bank of China’s Hong Kong and Macao Regional Office. He retired from this 
post in 1994, but stayed on at the bank as managing director and adviser to the regional office. He also sat on the 
bank’s board of directors in Beijing; and back in Hong Kong he was a member of China’s Preparatory Committee 
overseeing the formation of the first HKSAR. Interviews with officials from China Resources, Bank of China, China 
Merchants, China Travel Service, and staff from Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises Association, December 1996 and 
December 1997.
53 The Xinhua Office held that there were less than 1,800 such companies, while many others put this figure to more 
than 3,200. Interviews with senior official of the Xinhua Office, and with Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Associate Editor & 
China Editor, South China Morning Post, December 1996. This discrepancy might be the result of the confusion over 
counting on the Chinese side. For example, although authorities had only approved 300 mainland-based organisations 
to set up operations in Hong Kong by 1987, by then more than 1,000 had opened for business without appropriate 
approval. Adding to this confusion, the mainland China’s financial institutions, large trading corporations and other 
companies in Hong Kong could be further divided into five categories: (i) wholly owned subsidiaries of State Council 
units such as MOFTEC and the Finance Ministry; (ii) representative companies of provinces and cities; (iii) Hong 
Kong companies that were wholly owned by China’s units of the first two categories, controlled by them, or in 
partnership with them; (iv) ‘grey-area companies’ such as those owned by the PLA or private entrepreneurs, which 
the Xinhua Office was aware of, but did not acknowledge; and (v) underground companies not registered with the 
HKMAO or the Xinhua Office. The former three had, by request of the Party Constitution, set up either party 
committees or branches to supervise work, and were obliged to consult with the Xinhua Office over organisational 
and administrative issues. No wonder the HKMAO complained, “we have lost control, and this is a problem of the 
system” of managing Hong Kong. See John P. Bums’ paper ‘The Role of the New China News Agency’ John P. 
Bums ed. Hong Kong and China in Transition (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994, p. 33)
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successful operation of these business establishments, particularly those of leading 
state-owned corporations, generated much needed capital and market share for the CCP 
to plant its feet firmly in the territory. Their rapid business and financial influence in 
Hong Kong helped China to more confidently claim its sovereign legitimacy over the 
territory.54
At the administrative level, the fact that all these mainland companies were under dual 
leadership and supervision of both mainland authorities and the Xinhua Office created 
some complicated management problems. In principle, the Xinhua Office had the 
supervisory power over all China’s business and trading outlets in Hong Kong. But in 
reality, it had no absolute control over them55 due to its inability to solve many of their 
practical problems. The authority of the Xinhua Office was further weakened when it 
came to be widely regarded by the mainland companies as a policing body functioning 
as a regulatory unit, which delivered no real economic benefit, nor advanced their 
business interests.56 Handicapped by resource constraints, the Xinhua Office’s power 
extended little beyond relaying the CCP’s directives, organising political studies, 
discipline inspection and absorbing new party members.57 In business and personnel 
management matters, the corresponding sponsoring mainland ministries enjoyed 
indisputable authority. In many ways the companies were more willing to report directly 
to, and seek assistance from, the mainland authorities, which were often regarded as the 
real sources of power—capable of providing funding and staff, generating business 
opportunities and, in many cases, standing up for the rights and even the very existence
54 Ken Davies, Hong Kong to 1997: A Question o f Confidence (London: The Economic Intelligence Unit Limited, 
1990, pp. 152-168)
55 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, p. 69)
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of these companies in Hong Kong.58 For example, China Resources—Beijing’s main 
trading arm in Hong Kong—often bypassed the Xinhua Office to report directly to the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), while the China 
Merchants Steam Navigation Company did the same thing by answering mainly to the 
Ministry of Communications.59 Lacking genuine economic leverage, the Xinhua Office 
was gradually sidelined in day-to-day running of these companies.60
Because of their mainland connections to the party, the State Council, provincial 
governments and other channels of authority, this group of Hong Kong-based red 
capitalist enterprises quickly ascended to prominence and played an increasingly 
important role in Hong Kong’s business and financial institutions. By the mid 1990s, 
some of the bosses of these companies had been listed among the top 100 most 
powerful and wealthy businessmen in Hong Kong social and business circles, including 
chambers of commerce, the Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club and other charity and 
sporting outfits.61 The political significance of these ‘new rich’ was tipped to grow, 
especially if taking into account their intimate association with the Chinese authorities, 
and their close relationship with local Hong Kong business tycoons, whose commercial 
interests were guaranteed to be well looked after.
56 ibid. pp. 78-82
57 ibid. p. 69
58 Interview with senior officials from China Resources, Hong Kong, December 1996, December 1997
59 ibid
60 Conflicts between the self-interested mainland companies and the Xinhua Office over the control of the business 
establishments could be further evidenced by drawing from the experience of Xu Jiatun when he was the director of 
the Xinhua Office. According to Xu, he investigated the mismanagement of Everbright Company for the alleged 
purge of subordinates by its director Wang Guangying. When Xu presented his findings to Zhao Ziyang, then the 
Chinese Premier, Zhao asked Xu to quietly drop the matter. Xu later found out that Wang gave financial support to 
one of Zhao’s relatives, Zhang Shaohuang, who opened a company with only two Hong Kong dollars as its real 
capital, but since had been doing well under the patronage of Wang. See Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: 
The United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 260-261)
61 Mark Roberti, The Fall o f Hong Kong (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994, pp. 305-322)
62 For a discussion of the ‘red aristocracy’ in Hong Kong, see ibid.
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These mainland business establishments not only incarnated one pivotal level of the 
CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong, but also greatly enhanced the image of the CCP. 
In addition to the immediate and direct commercial benefit to the Chinese government, 
a strong contingent of mainland business firms in Hong Kong served at least one other 
objective—by permitting selected bureaucrats or party officials to manage these 
enterprises in Hong Kong, the CCP relied on them, in their capacity as caretakers and
63‘insiders’, to ensure the smooth implementation of Beijing’s policy.
Intelligence and Security Establishments
Another form of the CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong was its intelligence and 
security establishments. Hong Kong’s geographical proximity to mainland China and its 
social and economic system held a natural attraction for international intelligence—it 
was known as Asia’s ‘den of spies’.64 It was reported in April 1997 that China had 
allotted $HK1.2 billion during the transitional period to enable more than 900 special 
agents from military and state security organs to set up companies and other business 
outlets in Hong Kong.65 It was also estimated that there were about 5,000 foreign spies, 
other than mainland agents, in Hong Kong at the beginning of 1997.66
Given Hong Kong’s colonial history and its would-be Special Administrative Region 
status in the Chinese system, China itself was probably the most interested party to plant
63 ibid.
64 Bruce Gilley, ‘Ferment in Asia’s Den of Spies’ The Canberra Times 27 October 1997
65 ibid.
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new listening posts in Hong Kong and to upgrade the sophistication of its intelligence 
facilities during the transitional period.67 China’s inability to tap into the substantial 
flow of useful commercial, political and military information across airwaves and 
telecommunication lines in the territory had long left it frustrated. China used to rely 
on a station in Hainan province to monitor signal traffic. The facility was poorly 
equipped and the information was patchy because of the distance and because the 
station spent most of its resources tuning into activities in the South China Sea.69 The 
new office of the MFA, headed by China’s former Ambassador to Britain, Ma Yuzhen, 
was expected to become China’s new intelligence centre in the region, with better
70equipped staff and facilities.
During the transitional period, Beijing showed even greater sensitivity to the possibility 
that Hong Kong might be turned into a ‘base of subversion’.71 The CCP adopted two 
concrete measures to prevent this scenario from being realised. Firstly, a clause banning 
subversive activities was added to the Basic Law in 1990 after the 1989 Tiananmen 
Incident. Secondly, Beijing accelerated stationing a large corps of counter-intelligence
72and security personnel in Hong Kong to guarantee the effectiveness of the clause.
«
Coincidentally, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) was created in 1983 to take 
over the counter-espionage and political police functions of the Ministry of Public
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
ibid.
Interviews with senior Chinese security officials, December 1996
ibid.
ibid.
Interviews with senior Xinhua Office officials in Hong Kong, December 1996 
William Overholt, The Rise o f China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993, Chpt. 5) 
ibid.
Chapter Eight 280
Security (MPS).73 The main purpose in establishing the MSS was to “counter 
espionage, counter subversion and counter forces destructive to the Chinese people at 
home and abroad”,74 which had become an agonising problem for China as it proceeded 
with its ‘open and reform’ commitment. The MSS, with due responsibilities of 
countering international espionage and thwarting ‘subversive’ and ‘counter­
revolutionary’ activities, controlled most of the Chinese intelligence establishments in 
Hong Kong. From early 1990 to 1997, it ran numerous companies in Hong Kong as 
fronts for its agents. At the same time, it also used the services of various academic and 
international-exchange institutes in North America, Europe and Southeast Asian 
countries as staging grounds for Hong Kong. Such ‘transit points’ or springboard set­
ups were commonly used by the MSS to smooth the entry of its agents to non-Chinese 
businesses and to non-leftist circles in Hong Kong.76
Given the vital importance of Hong Kong to China’s modernisation program, to 
maintain the CCP’s official presence by ensconcing a great number of intelligence and 
security specialists was perhaps not only in Beijing’s best interests, but also absolutely 
necessary. Usually, there were two ways to deploy China’s intelligence personnel. 
One was, as mentioned above, to set up companies or business outlets as their covers 
and points of contact; and the other was to disperse them among other mainland 
establishments. These somewhat shadowy intelligence figures usually wore the hats of 
the Xinhua Office officials, or were said to be affiliates of other mainland departments
73 ‘Ministry of State Security Set up on Mainland China’ Issues and Studies (July 1983, pp. 5-8)
74 ibid.
75 Interviews with officials of Hong Kong Government, senior Xinhua Office officials and fifth columnists, Hong 
Kong, December 1996 and December 1997
76 ibid.
77 William Overholt, The Rise o f China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993, Chpt. 5)
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or, most commonly, were employees of other PRC business corporations. For these 
‘under cover’ agents working in the PRC companies, their real identities were not 
known to most of their colleagues.80 A large proportion of the security and intelligence 
officers in Hong Kong worked under the co-ordination of the Security Department of 
the Xinhua Office.81 Officials from the MPS were charged with the internal security 
work of the Xinhua Office and other mainland large corporations, while those from the
MSS were responsible for information gathering and counter-espionage activities
82commonly assigned to all other intelligence workers.
Although the Xinhua Office in principle managed the overall intelligence work in the 
territory, the intelligence and security officers often bypassed it to communicate directly 
with one of the following central government level departments: the MSS; the MPS; the 
intelligence wings of the various PL A units; the intelligence outfits of such CCP’s 
Central Committee units as the General Office, the United Front Department and the 
International Liaison Department.83 According to Xu Jiatun, the provincial department 
of the State Security as well as the PLA’s regional commands also posted their 
intelligence experts in Hong Kong.84
To complicate the matter even further, there was a small group of agents working
79
78 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoir (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 221-225)
79 ibid.
80 For more detail about the activities of mainland agents in Hong Kong, see ‘Mainland Security in Hong Kong’ Next, 
27 January 1995
81 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoirs (Hong Kong: United Publishing Press, 1993, p. 76)
82 ibid. p. 53. This coincided partially with a statement by Wang Dong, Director of the Xinhua Office Security 
Department. He was reported as saying that his unit was mainly responsible for the security matters of the Xinhua 
Office as well as the mainland Chinese companies. Naturally, he did not mention the role of State Security’s 
intelligence and counter-intelligence work. See ‘Security Responsibility of Xinhua Office’ Sing Tao Daily News 12 
April 1996
83 Xu Jiatun, Hong Kong Memoirs (Hong Kong: Untied Publishing Press, 1993, pp. 53-55)
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directly as ‘private liaison officers’ for some senior CCP leaders. As in similar 
operations in most countries, intelligence officers based in Hong Kong were expected to 
report only to the units that directly supervised them. As a consequence, duplication of 
information gathering efforts, turf battles and ‘cross fires’ happened from time to time.86
PLA ’s Hong Kong Garrison
The Basic Law, which was promulgated in 1991, confirmed that a PLA garrison would 
be stationed in Hong Kong from 1 July 1997. In late December 1996, the ‘Garrison 
Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC’ was published by 
the policy-setting Central Military Commission (CMC) and was approved by the 
Standing Committee of the 23rd meeting of the eighth National People’s Congress 
(NPC), although the exact size and components of it was not disclosed then.
84 ibid.
85 ibid. Especially Yang Shangkun and Li Xiannian. Chpt. 1
86 ibid. Xu Jiatun tried to unify various intelligence operations in Hong Kong to avoid confusion and in-fighting. Turf 
battles among different branches of the intelligence and police apparatuses in the Shenzhen and Hainan SEZs were 
frequently reported in the Hong Kong and Taiwan press, too.
87 Jeffrey Parker, ‘Red First Regiment Ready for Hong Kong’ Reuters, Beijing, 28 January 1996
88 The CCP’s main newspaper Renmin ribao hailed the promulgation and implementation of the law as being of: 
“great significance to ensuring that the troops sent to Hong Kong by the central government to take charge of defence 
matters will fulfil their obligations in accordance with the law, safeguard state sovereignty, reunification and 
territorial integrity, and maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability...The Garrison Law has embodied the 
principle of state sovereignty in a clear-cut manner.” See ‘Garrison Law Enshrines State Sovereignty Principle’ 
Renmin ribao 31 December 1996, p. 1. The law stipulated in full detail the functions of the garrison and its terms of 
reference; the methods of troop administration; legal jurisdiction over the soldiers; and the garrison’s relationship 
with HKSAR authorities. The provision that the Hong Kong garrison troops be composed of three services 
demonstrated the determination of the CCP to resume the overall exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong in its land 
territory, territorial waters and air space. See James Pringle, ‘Elite Unit Selected for Colony by Peking’ The Times 29 
January 1997. With the special political missions of the garrison in mind, the CMC laid great emphasis on the loyalty 
and ideological purity of the garrison. According to the Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, General Tao 
Bojun, selection of garrison members was made under the direct supervision of the CMC. General Tao commented 
that the elite corps was made up of “the best, the most superior cadres and soldiers”, and “it will be a civilised, 
militarily distinguished garrison.” See ‘Hong Kong Garrison Law Is an Important Law’ Hsin Wan Pao 24 October 
1996. The political sensitivity also reflected in the CMC’s selection of the garrison. The bulk of the garrison was 
made up of troops from the illustrious Red One Brigade, which was formed in the 1927 Autumn Harvest Uprising by 
Chairman Mao. After the founding of the People’s Republic, the Red First Regiment took part in the Korean War 
(1950-1953) and other military operations and “built brilliant feats.” See ‘China’s Red First Regiment Ready for 
Hong Kong’ Beijing: Xinhua News Agency via Reuters, 28 January 1996. Former Red One Brigade alumnae 
included Generals Yang Dezhi and Su Yu. The naval and air force units of the garrison came from divisions that had
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Given that the CCP had always attached a special value, and accorded a unique status, 
to the PLA, this announcement was of particular significance under the circumstances. 
For the Chinese leadership, the garrison would be a powerful guarantor for the 
continuous existence and expansion of the three other forms of the CCP’s official 
presence in Hong Kong after the sovereignty of Hong Kong changed hands. In one of 
the CCP’s traditions, which was dramatised in Mao’s famous quotation: power came 
from the barrel of gun, the PLA’s Hong Kong Garrison would be seen by the Chinese 
leadership as a fourth and indispensable form of the CCP’s official presence after July 
1997.
To station the PLA’s Hong Kong Garrison would not only symbolise China’s full 
recovery of the territory, but also give teeth to China’s other institutional arrangements 
in Hong Kong. This military presence was essential for China in the sense that it would 
bridge the crucial gap of a meaningful sovereignty expressed in political, economic and 
military forms.
distinguished themselves in flashpoints including the Spratly Islands. They had also escorted top leaders on domestic 
trips. See James Pringle, ‘Elite Unit Selected for Colony by Peking’ The Times 29 January 1997. However, in order to 
reflect the ‘five lakes and four seas’ principle of the PLA personnel management, the members of the garrison were 
recruited from different military regions. Officers with the rank of platoon chief or above have college-level 
education. The recruits were trained in subjects including English, Cantonese, Hong Kong Laws and international 
affairs in Shenzhen from 1993. ibid. In terms of command and control, the relations with other CCP organisations in 
Hong Kong, the garrison commander, Maj-Gen. Liu Zhenwu, was reported to have indicated that the garrison would 
be administrated in a ‘closed-door’ or behind the barrack fashion, and funded directly by Beijing. See ‘Hong Kong 
Garrison Law Is an Important Law’ Hsin Wan Pao 24 October 1996. It would report directly to the CMC and take 
orders from the Central Government. However, in logistics support and other areas of administration, it would work 
closely with the Guangzhou Military Regiment. It was conceivable that should the troop strength in Hong Kong 
prove insufficient to handle contingencies, the HKSAR garrison could be quickly reinforced from the PLA units 
based in Shenzhen and Huizhou.
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CCP’s Invisible Presence—The Fifth Column
The above-discussed four official institutions constituted a major structural framework 
with which the CCP would exercise its power before and after 1997. In other words, 
these different levels of arrangements provided the CCP with legal cover-up to operate 
in Hong Kong. However, the examination in the previous section concerning the CCP’s 
official presence in Hong Kong brought to attention a fairly weak CCP’s powerbase in 
grassroots Hong Kong society. This serious inadequacy was detected by the Chinese 
leadership at the very beginning of the transitional period, and steps were taken to 
redress the issue. A detailed analysis of how and why the CCP felt strongly about this 
insufficiency and therefore a policy to fix it will be covered in depth in Chapter Nine.
The main task of this section is to document China’s invisible presence in Hong Kong 
during the transitional period—its fifth column. The record is based on the information 
obtained through interviews with some senior Chinese government officials, Hong 
Kong government officials and 28 fifth columnists, who possessed inside knowledge of 
the CCP’s Hong Kong policy and who were involved in various degrees with the fifth 
column policy development and implementation. It shows that the launching of a fifth 
column as an ultimate political insurance policy as well as a practical program to assist 
the CCP’s official representation in achieving China’s Hong Kong policy objectives 
added a poignant mass-oriented work dimension to the base of the CCP’s hierarchical 
pyramid structure in Hong Kong. It was also the final touch that completed the CCP’s
Hong Kong organisational mapping.
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The Chinese government’s ability to exploit grey areas of the existing immigration 
agreement with Hong Kong authority to systematically, yet secretly, organise a human 
transborder movement of such a magnitude proved not only its committed political will, 
but also the lengths it was prepared to go to ensure the recovery of Hong Kong in an 
unmistakable manner. The camouflaged and invisible existence of the fifth columnists 
was due partly to the secretiveness of this scheme, and partly to the gradualness and 
long-term projection of its policy outcome in Hong Kong society, as compared with the 
influence of the CCP’s formal institutions. While CCP’s official presence attracted 
much public scrutiny, the fifth column activities went largely undetected—its elusive 
existence created obscurity to suppress public interest.
During the thirteen years of transitional period, the perceived values of the fifth column 
vacillated in corresponding to the drastic changes taking place in Hong Kong’s political 
battlefield. The full significance of the fifth column policy revealed itself gradually as 
Hong Kong’s political transition unfolded, which will be further examined in Chapter 
Nine.
Before going into the details of the operation, it is necessary to discuss first some 
background on the mainland immigration to Hong Kong, in particular, the principles 
and practice of immigration under the family reunion category.
History o f Mainland Immigration to Hong Kong
Hong Kong’s transformation from a tiny fishing village into a major international 
trading centre would have been impossible without the millions of people who came to
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Hong Kong over a period of more than a hundred years. They came from all over the 
world but predominantly from mainland China.90 Although from time to time 
immigrants were rejected because of concerns about the size of the population in the 
small territory, the exceptional turnover through emigration and immigration was 
accepted as one of the important elements contributing to Hong Kong’s success.91
Migrants from the mainland before the 1940s were pushed into Hong Kong by political 
and economic pressures—constant wars and a devastated economy—rather than pulled
Q1to it by the economic attractions. The first time mainland Chinese immigrants became 
explicitly subject to immigration control was in 1940 when a universal requirement to 
carry travel documents was introduced in Hong Kong by the Immigration Control 
Ordinance.94 This measure was apparently intended to cope with the large influx of 
refugees from mainland China as a consequence of the war between China and Japan 
which intensified sharply in 1937, and resulted in the fall of Guangdong to Japanese
89 When the British first took Hong Kong island, its population was rather small. In June 1845, a figure of 23,817 was 
given, while the entire territory was home to about 100,000 people at that time. See David Podmore, ‘The Population 
of Hong Kong’ Keith Hopins ed. Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 
23-25)
90 Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, Report submitted to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 1955, pp. 12-13 (Hong Kong: Public Record Office). Subsequently, Hong Kong 
witnessed a considerable increase in its population through several waves of immigration from mainland 
China—only later did this come to be seen as a problem. See David Podmore, ‘The Population of Hong Kong’ Keith 
Hopins ed. Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 23-25). At first the 
resident population remained very small, overall growth rate was quite limited and more people were needed. The 
establishment of the colony did not, in itself, restrict freedom of movement in both directions across the border. See 
Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, Report submitted to the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees, 1955, pp. 12-13 (Hong Kong: Public Record Office)
91 Elizabeth Cheng and Stacy Mosher, ‘Free for All: Economic Strategy Inspired by Hong Kong’ Far Eastern 
Economic Review (14 May 1992, p. 29)
92 Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, Report submitted to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 1955, pp. 21-33 (Hong Kong: Public Record Office). For example, The Taiping 
Rebellion (1839-64) produced a large group of refugees from various parts of Southern China, which increased the 
population of Hong Kong to about 165,000 by 1861. Following the 1911 Revolution, which brought down the last 
Imperial dynasty of China, the Qing Dynasty, the population of Hong Kong increased from about 300,000 in 1901 to 
625,000 in 1921. See Jean-Francois Destexhe, ‘Hong Kong and 1997: The Facts’ Werner Menski ed. Coping with 
1997 (England: Trentham Book Ltd. 1995, p. 23)
93 Edward Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong, Report submitted to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 1955, p. 16 (Hong Kong: Public Record Office)
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rule in 1938. The new controls, however, were ineffective and did not stop immigration 
from mainland China.95 Due to the continuous pouring in of refugees, the population 
grew rapidly during this period.96 After 1945 came the largest influx of immigrants in 
Hong Kong’s history, due to China’s civil wars and the uncertainty posed by the 
change-over to communist rule on the mainland.97
Hong Kong’s first census was taken in 1961. The figure indicated that between 1950 
and 1960, immigration from mainland China fell substantially as political stability in 
mainland China increased and border control was enforced by the Hong Kong 
government. Podmore argued that Hong Kong’s population increase between 1950 and 
1970 was mainly due to natural increase rather than to immigration. Also tight policing 
of the border with China contributed greatly to the reduction of the immigration level, at
Q O
least for a time being.
In the 1960s and the 1970s, many Chinese continued to come and settled down in Hong 
Kong, and Chinese authorities actually appeared to encourage this trend.99 This fast­
growing population soon strained Hong Kong’s infrastructure and intensified some
94 Jean-Francois Destexhe, ‘Hong Kong and 1997: The Facts’ Werner Menski ed. Coping with 1997 (England: 
Trentham Book Ltd. 1995, p. 25)
95 David Podmore, ‘The Population of Hong Kong’ Keith Hopins ed. Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 24)
96 ibid. Podmore emphasised that there were no accurate data available for this period. But official estimates spoke of 
275,000 refugees by the end of 1937, 450,000 a year later, and 700,000 at the end o f 1939. By 1941, Hong Kong’s 
population had risen to 1,639,999. Podmore indicated that the true figure might well have been much higher.
97 By the late 1940s, the population had increased to 2,360,000. After the PRC was established in 1949, a stricter 
immigration policy for Hong Kong was put into place by the British government. See George Endacott, A History of 
Hong Kong, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 197)
98 David Podmore, ‘The Population of Hong Kong’ Keith Hopins ed. Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 25)
99 Albert Chen, ‘The Development o f Immigration Law and Policy: The Hong Kong Experience’ McGill Law Journal 
(Vol. 33, No. 4, 1988, pp. 649-651)
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social problems, which turned local opinion against further immigration.100 So the 
burden of ensuring at least a semblance of border control fell on the Hong Kong 
authorities.101 These controls were not very effective, nor were they probably meant to 
be: Hong Kong’s industrialisation constantly needed more people to sustain its labour 
supply. The situation, in fact, bore a striking resemblance to today’s porous 
Mexican/US border.102
In 1971, for the first time the immigration law of Hong Kong fell into step with the 
legal traditions and practice of law in Britain.103 The global decolonisation process, 
particularly in Africa during the 1960s, had already affected the legal rights of people in 
the former colonies. The exclusionary ground rules of British immigration policies to 
keep out of Britain the non-Caucasian residents of former colonies became consolidated 
in the Immigration Act, 1971.104 In Hong Kong, the Immigration Ordinance, 1971 
superseded the Deportation of Aliens Ordinance of 1935, the Deportation (British 
Subjects) Ordinance of 1936 and the Immigration (Control and Offences) Ordinance, 
195 8.105 Thus, in 1971 all immigration-related laws plus those on deportation were put 
together in a single statute, indicating a more coherent policy on immigration.106
The 1971 Ordinance introduced three categories of Hong Kong residents: Hong Kong
100 In the early 1960s, for instance, provision of fresh drinking water became a severe problem at certain times of the 
year, leading to rationing and calls for stricter controls on what was seen as illegal immigration. However, the 
Chinese authorities did little to stop its citizens from migrating to Hong Kong. See David Podmore, ‘The Population 
of Hong Kong’ Keith Hopins ed. Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 
31)
101 ibid.
102 Clark Reynold and Robert McCleery, ‘The Political Economy o f Immigration Law: Impact o f Simpson-Rodino on 
the United States and Mexico’ Journal of Economic Perspectives (Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 117-131)
103 Albert Chen, ‘The Development of Immigration Law and Policy: The Hong Kong Experience’ McGill Law 
Journal (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1988, pp. 627-629)
104 ibid.
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Belongers, Chinese Residents and Resident United Kingdom Belongers.107 The term 
‘citizen’ was carefully avoided in this nomenclature. These three categories differed
particularly in terms of rights to hold immovable property and with regard to
1 08deportation rules applicable to them.
Officially, the Hong Kong government continued to negotiate with Chinese authorities 
on an annual basis the terms and quotas of immigrants from the mainland—over 90% of 
them were supposed to come to Hong Kong for family reunion. The number of such 
immigrants was substantial. Albert Chen estimated that there were over 97,000 for the 
period of 1974-1977 alone.109 A new policy, introduced on 30 November 1974, became 
known as the ‘reach-base’ or ‘touch-base’ policy. It meant that illegal immigrants who 
had clandestinely reached the territory of Hong Kong and had found proper 
accommodation with relatives or friends, could have their stay regularised through 
simple procedures. However, immigrants who were caught in the border area or in the 
territorial waters of Hong Kong would be subject to repatriation.110 The practical 
application of Hong Kong’s immigration laws was to a large extent based on discretion. 
This had, first of all, the effect of encouraging irregular immigration from mainland 
China to continue.111 This basic policy approach could not be more different from what 
the authorities in Britain aimed for, namely to use strict entry controls as a central 
element of immigration policy.112
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A mixed policy of this kind, familiar in several European countries, but not in Britain 
itself, seemed to have two distinct advantages to those in charge of Hong Kong affairs. 
Firstly, its discretionary basis allowed the authorities to exercise flexible immigration 
control, in terms of both numbers and quality of new entrants. As long as new 
immigrants were needed, less forceful implementation would allow more candidates to 
regularise their stay in Hong Kong. Should the immigration pressure get out of control, 
the application of stricter border controls would enable the authorities to put a firmer 
check on illegal border crossings and increase the number of persons subject to 
repatriation.113
However, with its booming economy and virtually full employment, particularly in the 
1970s and 1980s, Hong Kong’s manufacturing and sendee trades relied on a constant 
stream of new immigrants to sustain its economic growth.114 On the other side, there 
was little doubt that one of the obvious motives for China to adopt relaxed attitude 
towards its citizens emigrating to Hong Kong in the 1970s was because “a kind of 
peaceful take-over has been achieved in this way.”115 From the early 1980s, a large 
exodus of Hong Kong residents to elsewhere in the world led to further significant 
manpower shortages in some sectors in Hong Kong, which were quickly filled by 
skilled and talented immigrants, mainly from mainland China.116 If the British 
government had its own immigration agenda regarding Hong Kong residents’ right of
113 Prakash Shah, ‘British Nationality and Immigration Laws and Their Effect on Hong Kong’ Werner Menski ed. 
Coping with 1997 (England: Trentham Books Lit. 1995, p. 92)
114 Jean-Francois Destexhe, ‘Hong Kong and 1997: The Facts’ Werner Menski ed. Coping with 1997 (England: 
Trentham Book Ltd. 1995, pp. 21-27)
115 ibid.
116 ibid.
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abode, so, too, had China. But the underlying motives of the two could not be more 
different.
During the transitional period from 1984 to 1997, immigration to Hong Kong from the 
mainland continued to be, first of all, an economic necessity for the territory, but it also 
became a political device for the Chinese government. In the 1980s, the relevant laws in 
Hong Kong underwent significant modification. The British Nationality Act, 1981 
distanced the people of Hong Kong still further from London. Following the Sino- 
British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong in December 1984, as the 
British realised the inevitability of Hong Kong’s transfer to China in the mid 1997, 
several important steps were taken by the British authorities to reclassify the people of 
Hong Kong and keep their immigration status vis-ä-vis Britain under control, as much 
as possible. This was done in line with the Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order of 
1986.117
The ‘Resident United Kingdom Belongers’ category was retained under the reforms of 
immigration laws in the 1980s, although precise definition of who belonged to this 
category was tightened up. The former category of ‘Citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies’ under the British Nationality Act, 1948 was broken down by the British 
Nationality Act, 1981 into several distinct groups of British citizens with dramatically
117 Prakash Shah, ‘British Nationality and Immigration Laws and Their Effect on Hong Kong’ Werner Menski ed. 
Coping with 1997 (England: Trentham Books Lit. 1995, pp. 95-96). In essence, the earlier category of ‘Hong Kong 
Belongers’ was replaced by ‘Hong Kong Permanent Resident’, which, under a revised section o f the 1971 Ordinance, 
also included the former category of ‘Chinese Residents’. This, on the one hand, claimed the former immigrants from 
mainland China as people belonging to Hong Kong and gave them the right o f abode in the territory and exempted 
them from restrictions on their stay and certain deportation powers o f the authorities. On the other hand, most of the 
people in this category lacked the right of abode in the UK, and the right of immigration to Britain was certainly not 
extended to them.
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different rights.118 
Immigration for Family Reunion
The motives for the immigrants from the mainland to Hong Kong in the last few 
decades of colonial rule were quite different—Hong Kong was seen as ranging from a 
political refuge or sanctuary to an economic shelter or haven. As those earlier 
immigrants settled down and their businesses flourished, they began to bring out their 
family members and relatives to join them. As more and more people applied for this 
reason, the family reunion program became the dominant category of Hong Kong’s 
immigration scheme.
One deciding factor that gave Hong Kong’s immigration this distinctive characteristic 
was the fact that at any one given time since the beginning of this century more than 
90% of Hong Kong residents claimed to have immediate or extended family members 
living in mainland China.119 Immigration from China, under the family reunion 
program, was a constant source of cheap labour that Hong Kong economic development 
was craving for. In fact, both Chinese and Hong Kong immigration authorities agreed 
that over 90% of emigrants from China each year were accepted nominally for the 
purpose of family reunion, and only less than 10% of entry was under the ‘special
118 ibid. pp. 84-86
119 Albert Chen, ‘The Development of Immigration Law and Policy: The Hong Kong Experience’ McGill Law 
Journal (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1988, pp. 627-629). Also see Siu Yat-ming, ‘Population and Immigration: With a Special 
Account on Chinese Immigrants’ Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming eds. The Other Hong Kong Report— 1996 (Hong 
Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, pp. 327-347)
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needs’ category. 120
The second characteristic of Hong Kong immigration from the mainland was that 
immigration applications were almost all unilaterally handled by the source country 
rather than by the receiving end. In world immigration practice, the opposite is more 
common—the host countries control not only the total number but also screen 
individual applicants on the basis of agreed merits.
The procedures regarding applications for emigration to Hong Kong stated that they 
must be initiated by sponsoring Hong Kong residents to Chinese authorities, and the 
Chinese side retained the privilege to check and prove or reject the applications. 
Historically, many Hong Kong residents were once refugees from the mainland. When 
they fled, they usually took no documents that would furnish evidence of the claimed 
relationship between the applicants and the sponsors. This technical difficulty 
effectively ruled out the Hong Kong authority’s role in verifying the cases and allowed 
it to concern itself only with daily quota and border checking. In practice, Chinese 
authorities were virtually given a free hand to play the game. This also meant that 
Beijing had the convenience to shuffle the cards and blend its own cadres into the 
emigration flow with little likelihood of being challenged by the Hong Kong authorities. 
This was exactly what Beijing did.
There was little doubt that the Chinese government had been sending its own cadres to
120 Interviews with the officials from the Xinhua Office and Hong Kong Immigration Authority, December 1996. 
This 10% referred to heirs, people with special skills, and the professions Hong Kong had a great demand for.
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Hong Kong through this way, but it was the signing of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration in 1984 that significantly highlighted the viability of this practice in serving 
the CCP’s more urgent needs, and accelerated the scale of the operation. Chinese 
authorities seized this opportunity and maximised its potential to systematically channel 
the fifth columnists into Hong Kong. With fabricated documents and false identities, 
these fifth columnists replaced the deceased, the unknown or the non-existent under the 
name of ‘family reunion’, who did not exist in the first place. These fifth columnists 
were merged with those genuine ‘one-way exit permit’ holders to enter into Hong Kong 
undetected.
There was some evidence of negotiations between the Chinese government and the 
Hong Kong immigration authorities, which were seeking to pressure China to tighten its 
verification procedures.121 This implied that the Hong Kong side was aware and 
concerned that permits were being issued to inauthentic immigrants. Beijing denied 
that there was any wrong-doing. However, in order to ease the tension, the Chinese 
government, as a gesture, maintained, and later reduced to, a smaller annual quotas of 
emigrants for family reunion in the 1980s.123 But, as will be discussed in detail later in
121 Interviews with Hong Kong Immigration Authority, December 1996. Interviews with former senior policy adviser 
of Hong Kong Immigration Department, London, December 1997
122 ibid.
123 According to figures discussed by Albert Chen, the Chinese government gradually reduced the number of exit 
permits from a peak of 310 per day in December 1978 to about 150 per day in 1980. This meant about 55,000 new 
immigrants to Hong Kong each year, which was seen as too high. See Albert Chen, ‘The Development of 
Immigration Law and Policy: The Hong Kong Experience’ McGill Law Journal (Vol. 33, No. 4, 1988, p. 639). Yun- 
Wing Sung reported that China exercised ‘voluntary export constraint’ during the Sino-British negotiations in the 
early 1980s by unilaterally halving the quota of emigrants from 150 to an average of 75 persons per day, which 
totalled annual 27,000 or so mainland immigrants. See Yun-Wing Sung, ‘The Hong Kong Economy: To and Beyond 
the 1997 Barrier’ paper for the Conference on the Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong, 
Washington D.C. January 1991. However, from November 1993, this number increased to 105 per day, and from July 
1995 to handover, it was further increased to 150 per day—the same level as in late 1970s—at the request of the 
Chinese side. Interview with senior Hong Kong immigration officials, December 1996. Also see Siu Yat-ming, 
‘Population and Immigration: With a Special Account on Chinese Immigrants’ Nyaw Mee-kau and Li Si-ming eds. 
The Other Hong Kong Report—1996 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996, pp. 327-347)
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this chapter, the actual number of fifth columnists was not affected by this adjustment.
According to the Hong Kong authority’s official statistics, the Chinese government 
approved more than 465,987 immigrants from the mainland to Hong Kong for ‘family 
reunion’ from 1983 to June 1997. If it is estimated at a conservative figure of 18 
percent124 of total mainland emigrants to Hong Kong being the fifth columnists, the 
number reached more than 83,000—representing more than 1.4 percent of total Hong 
Kong population of 6 million. In simplified terms, if taking the 35 percent of Hong 
Kong’s 2.6 million registered voters who cast their ballots in 1995 Legislature Council 
election—the highest turnout ever in Hong Kong election history—as the parameter, 
then in real terms these 83,000 could have accounted for more than 9.12 percent of 
Hong Kong’s actual electoral votes. If Hong Kong was going to operate with a high 
degree of autonomy and gradually evolve into a more democratic society as China 
promised in the two basic documents, then this voting bloc would be very significant, 
and the fifth column should be seen as being well positioned to play a critical role in the 
democratic processes ahead.
124 Interviews with senior Chinese officials. This percentage was said to be conservative and in the sense of ‘at least’, 
because sometimes (eg. 1985-87 and 1990-92) the percentage was much higher.
125 The Pro-China camp and fifth columnists did not do well in 1995 Legislative Council election. According to some 
Xinhua Office officials, one of the reasons was that anyone needed to satisfy living in Hong Kong for 7 years before 
becoming eligible voter. Therefore only those arriving in Hong Kong before 1988 were eligible for the 1995 election. 
The Chinese officials complained that they did not ‘have the number’ and saw it to be one more reasons to continue 
the fifth column policy, which they hoped would pay off in the future elections. Interviews with Chinese senior 
officials and officials from the Xinhua Office, Hong Kong, December 1996, December 1997
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A Hijacked Agenda126
Family reunion, with its humanitarian connotations, tends to arouse sympathy. 
Therefore it could be easily exploited to benefit a hidden agenda. The historical bond 
between the mainland and Hong Kong made ‘family reunion’ a convenience for China 
and a ‘natural’ event for many Hong Kong people. This situation provided perfect cover 
for the CCP to hijack this traditional immigration program. By so doing, China was able 
to piggyback its own political agenda on a basically social policy to serve its long-term 
aspiration.
Beijing always consciously sought to improve its comparative strength and to 
emphasise its absolute power in Hong Kong, which has been examined in the previous 
section on the CCP’s official presence in Hong Kong. Immigration to Hong Kong long 
represented an additional and legal option for Beijing to further consolidate its political 
agenda. The initiation of the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong and the final 
agreement by the Chinese and British governments on the issue greatly enhanced the 
political sensitivity and urgency of immigration to Hong Kong. From then on, for 
Beijing, questions of who were going to stay in Hong Kong, what they would be doing 
before and after 1997, and how to rally support from all levels of Hong Kong society 
around its official powerbase became matters of considerable interest. There was little 
doubt that left to its own devices, Beijing would almost certainly have flooded Hong
126 This section is based on interviews conducted with Chinese officials, Hong Kong government officials and 28 
participants in China’s covert migration program at the end of 1996 in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taipei. 
Additional interviews were undertaken in Hong Kong and London at the end of 1997. The names of the interviewees 
were suppressed to protect their identities.
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Kong with many more mainland cadres. However, because of its international 
obligations and promises, because its own vital political and economic interests were at 
stake, and also because the watchful eyes of countries around the world were on Hong 
Kong, Beijing’s choices were circumscribed. With all these restrictions, to further 
exploit the existing immigration program, which, as discussed previously, left some 
grey areas and weak links, became an even more attractive option to the CCP.
i) Initiative
It was an open secret that the Chinese government had used the immigration program to 
channel some of its agents into Hong Kong well before 1983. But the number of people 
previously involved was not at all comparable to the fifth column policy which Beijing 
initiated in 1983, soon after the Chinese and British governments started to negotiate on 
the terms for Hong Kong to return to China.
In late 1982, two highly confidential documents from the CCP Central Committee were 
circulated among leading party officials at ministerial and provincial party committee 
levels. These documents, later referred to as ‘Hong Kong issue guiding documents’ in 
many subsequent party circulars, set the scene for the party to launch a fifth column 
program. In essence, these documents highlighted the nature of the CCP’s work in Hong 
Kong—complex and delicate, and the CCP’s ultimate goal in Hong Kong—to recover 
both nominal and actual sovereignty. The documents relayed Deng Xiaoping’s
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directives on ‘participation’ in Hong Kong affairs, 127 which fully demonstrated China’s 
rock-solid determination that it should not only recover sovereignty but also the 
administration of Hong Kong. 128
These documents read that considering Hong Kong’s domestic and international 
importance to China and its British colonial history, the party Central Committee 
decided that it was absolutely necessary to strengthen the party’s work in Hong Kong. 
They stressed that the purpose of Comrade Deng’s ‘participation’ comments was aiming 
to expand China’s influence in the territory, to win support from the Hong Kong people, 
and to prepare for the final resumption of sovereignty. The documents revealed that the 
CCP’s Central Committee had assigned the central Organisation Department to consider 
a comprehensive practical proposal.
In retrospect, many, who sighted the documents at that time, said that they did not sense 
anything unusual in these documents. Their experience with the CCP had prepared them 
for such political crusade over events as important as Hong Kong’s reunification. In line 
with the CCP’s tradition, they could well expect that China would undertake actions to 
upgrade its institutional arrangements and reinforce the presence of its personnel in
137 In the early 1983, Deng was quoted saying that: What would be our work focus in the remaining years up to 1997? 
Participation....Since the sovereignty issue had been settled, if we did not settle the concrete issues, there would just 
be a hollow shell. It was certain that a heavy burden would be left to Hong Kong people and to the Chinese Hong 
Kong government in the future. So the key lay in participation. Interview with Chinese official, December 1996. 
Similar text was reported by He Po-shih later in 1991. See He Po-shih, ‘Five Major Tasks Are Aimed at Control’ 
Dangdai (Contemporary), (No. 7, 15 October 1991, pp. 14-15)
128 The documents interpreted Deng’s directives on four levels: First, participation on the diplomatic level. Second, 
participation at the local government level. Third, participation in various consultative organisations. Fourth, 
participation in mass organisations. It stressed that it was necessary to rely on the broad patriotic masses and guide 
them to act in keeping with the arrangements of the central leadership. It was necessary to build up extensive social 
connections and establish a good and popular image among the masses, thus enabling the local masses to understand 
and accept what we were doing.
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Hong Kong. Few would have, however, guessed the means by which the ‘participation’ 
was to be accomplished would be what it turned out to be.
Months later, the central Organisation Department of the CCP circulated its own 
documents to follow up the previous two CCP’s ‘guiding’ documents. One of them was 
entitled ‘Regulations on the Selection of Cadres to Work in Hong Kong’. This was a 
concrete, detailed plan for intensifying and widening the party’s participation in all 
levels of Hong Kong society in the years to come. But central to this document was its 
announcement that in close consultation with other central government agencies, in 
particular Hong Kong & Macao Office under the State Council (HKMAO), the CCP 
central Organisation Department had completed a proposal to send the ‘best and 
brightest’ cadres to reinforce the party’s work in Hong Kong. It laid down some broad 
principles for organising the program: at the central government level, five major 
sponsoring bodies—HKMAO, MSS, the CCP’s United Front Department, the Overseas 
Chinese Office under the State Council and the Taiwan Affairs Office under the State 
Council—were nominated to be the main caretakers for coordinating the recruitment 
and management of the ‘outpost’ cadres. HKMAO, however, was the most important 
one among the five equals—its close links with the CCP and the State Council leaders 
gave it authority, and its long involvement in Hong Kong affairs gave it a prestigious 
status—it would not only keep track of the movement of the fifth columnists, but also 
would be the arbitrator if disputes arose.
All these five bodies, except HKMAO, had affiliations at most of the province (or 
autonomous municipality) levels. In practice, this meant that these ‘big five’ not only
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horizontally managed other functional ministries and agencies such as MOFTEC and 
the Ministry of Finance, as far as the fifth column program was concerned, but also 
vertically controlled their direct subordinate bodies at provincial and municipal levels. 
At the provincial level some governments of the south-east coastal provinces and 
autonomous municipalities were also given the privilege of inclusion in the program.
All the party committees at ministerial and provincial levels were encouraged to assist 
in the implementation of this program. These documents urged all those in leading 
positions to support this initiative by becoming actively involved in recommending and 
selecting those ‘politically reliable, professionally excellent’ party cadres to work in 
Hong Kong. These documents themselves, however, did not spell out administrative 
details of the program, for example, how and by what vehicle the designated fifth 
columnists could be sent to Hong Kong, and what resident status they would assume. 
The documents did specify, however, that the Entry/Exit Management Departments of 
the MSS and its provincial subsidiaries would be the sole agents to process all the 
technical details.
ii) Recruitment
The recruitment of the fifth columnists started as early as 1983 and the numbers 
fluctuated in the following years. During 1983-1997, it peaked twice: once in 1985- 
1987 and once in 1990-1992.
129 It meant travel/identity documents.
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Each year, the number of the recruits was decided through a yearly quota system, 
mainly on the advice of HKMAO. The number was generally set around 18-20% of that 
year’s immigration quotas for family reunion to Hong Kong. During those two peak 
periods, the ratio could soar as high as 30% or over. The yearly quota then was 
distributed among those five sponsoring bodies at the central government level and 
some key provincial governments under the supervision of the CCP’s central 
Organisation Department and HKMAO. The division, however, was by no means meant 
to be equal and ‘fair’, with a working principle of ‘each according to its needs’.
In the first few years, the lion’s share of the quotas was consumed by the five bodies at 
the central government level, leaving their provincial affiliates and those provincial 
governments badly trailing behind. The disquiet and resentment of disgruntled 
provincial leaders, especially those in Guangdong and Fujian, resulted in a compromise: 
a quota plus an ‘actual need’ with considerable flexibility was to be practised at 
provincial government level from 1985.
This meant that although the local governments might not receive the same quotas as 
some central government bodies, or different local governments might find unequal 
quotas among themselves, the individual local authority could partly compensate for the 
deficiency by syphoning off additional numbers from the locally controlled yearly 
quotas of normal emigrants to Hong Kong. The central government gave tacit consent to 
this adjustment as a way to balance central-regional interests. This explained the first 
peak in number of fifth columnists from 1985 to 1987. This irregularity in practice also 
made a headcount of the actual number of fifth columnists very difficult for the
HKMAO.
Chapter Eight 302
When the five government sponsoring bodies obtained their quota, they were obliged to 
disperse them horizontally among other ministries, departments and agencies at the 
central level, as well as to trickle some down vertically to its affiliates at the local 
government level—all of the five sponsoring bodies except the HKMAO had their 
affiliates at the provincial level. The fact that these affiliates were under double 
leadership from Beijing and local governments turned out to be a blessing for them: as 
far as this program was concerned, they were in a position of being able to source from 
both of them. This practice, in the succeeding 15 years, gave them strong, accumulated 
bargaining positions that extended to other domains of the system as well because of 
China’s internal power structure and interrelations. As will be seen later in this section, 
widespread corruption and abuse of this very privilege were common among the local 
party officials in the recruitment process. This significantly weakened the projected 
upshot of Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong.
Under the principle of ‘politically reliable and professionally excellent’, the central 
Organisation Department and HKMAO set out the following recruitment procedures: 1) 
interest expressed by candidates; 2) written recommendation by party committees of the 
relevant work units; 3) cleared with ministerial or provincial party organisation 
departments; 4) approved by sponsoring bodies; and 5) registered with HKMAO. 
However, in practice all these were observed ‘with discounts’—meaning that there were 
various degrees of distortion or violation of these guidelines.
This study found that there was no uniform, consistent approach to recruit fifth
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columnists. Contrary to the general trend of institutionalisation of the government 
division of labour in China during the reform era, the recruitment of fifth columnists 
virtually still stuck to the CCP’s old revolutionary methods from the 1920s and 30s for 
recruiting its party members. This practice gave those individuals in charge the right to 
recommend, assess, appoint, approve and control candidates. Of course, the candidates’ 
work units were required to give clearance to the candidates, but they were often not 
consulted beforehand and left with little choice but to accept the fait accompli.
To emigrate to Hong Kong with legal status and enormous economic potential 
represented a golden dream for many Chinese. Therefore, to be able to board the fifth 
column ship to Hong Kong was regarded as a tremendous opportunity and reward. Not 
surprisingly, there was a lot of competition among the prospective candidates. It was 
reported that two most effective currencies to secure a fifth column candidature were 
personal network and bribery. Good networking to find a powerful patron was pivotal in 
the whole recruitment process. Securing patronage often, however, came with a price.
There were two parallel ways for interested persons to seek their patrons—to use their 
connections abroad or within the party. Patronage abroad required the prospective 
candidates to identify their overseas connections by demonstrating that they had good 
contacts with important people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Southeast Asian countries, 
or in other parts of the world. The identified overseas patrons should have the potential 
to realise some business, or possibly political, benefits for China, and they should 
usually command prominent positions in the local business circles and have high 
standing in their communities. If they had all these attributes, they were almost certain 
to be added to the CCP’s united front work list, if not already on it.
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There was a great diversity and complexity regarding the details of application through 
this channel. Some of the candidates were able to secure this kind of patron because 
they had previously worked in Hong Kong or other countries for those Chinese official 
institutions. During their stay, they had built up good personal and business relations 
with these people in Hong Kong or elsewhere. When they tried to come to or to 
continue to live in Hong Kong by changing their status from Chinese government 
officials to Hong Kong residents, they turned to these patrons for help. At the same 
time, good personal relationship and business self-interests could often motivate these 
patrons to commit themselves to be sponsors. The fifth columnists by this patronage, 
either voluntarily or urged by the sponsoring bodies, were encouraged and usually 
approved quickly (the so-called ‘express lane’). Although the actual number of fifth 
columnists with such patronage accounted for only a small proportion of the total, the 
fact that Beijing was keen on tapping this potential revealed the CCP’s determination to 
leave no stone unturned when it came to the issue of Hong Kong reunification.
The majority of the fifth columnists were recruited through patronage within the party. 
Generally, as a first step, interested individuals needed to find powerful patrons within 
the system. Such patrons did not necessarily hold high office, but had to possess 
‘practical’ power and skills to navigate and bargain within the system. As China’s 
political culture encouraged personal clout and patronising rather than institutional 
transparency and accountability, an individual’s career development and promotion 
depended heavily on the good will of people higher up on the party or bureaucratic 
ladder. Because the whole fifth column recruitment process was supposed to be 
completed in a secret and sealed-off ‘internal’ party circle, it was effectively protected
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and shielded from any outside scrutiny. Under such circumstances, reliance on good 
networking and patronage were even more important than it would normally be.
It was observed that in the early years of the implementation of the policy, the rules and 
regulations were more strictly adhered to than in the later years (the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s). With the CCP’s official representation quickly expanding and 
consolidating its influence during the transitional period, the original fears and 
uncertainty that underlined the motivation for the fifth column policy in Hong Kong 
were gradually replaced by confidence and a general optimism that Hong Kong would 
work with the terms set out in the Joint Declaration and, later, in the Basic Law. This 
changed situation in the mid and late 1980s led to an apparent laxity in the fifth 
columnist recruitment procedure. Although the quantity of outpost fifth columnists in 
these years peaked or remained steady, the decline in political quality of the recruits 
substantially compromised the standards and undermined the effectiveness of the 
policy. Widespread and entrenched corruption, furthermore, allowed some organisations 
and individuals with power to reduce the recruitment process into a lucrative business to 
be operated with market exchange principles for their own benefit.
It was reported that the level of corruption worsened in those traditionally more 
‘sanctuary’ institutions which had strong links with both central and local governments. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, for example, some coastal provincial Departments 
of State Security, were under the dual leadership of both the MSS and the local 
provincial governments. In the case of fifth columnist recruitment, every year the 
provincial Departments of State Security were allocated a quota directly from the MSS 
in Beijing. At the same time, they were also always successful in demanding an
Chapter Eight 306
additional quota from local governments. Although the MSS was only established in 
1983, it enjoyed special status and treatment both at the central and local government 
levels because of its claimed importance in safeguarding the nation’s security. As a 
consequence of this doubling up, after years of positioning its own members in Hong 
Kong, these provincial Departments of State Security later often had ‘extra’ quota at 
their disposal. As migration to Hong Kong remained the dream shared by many in the 
mainland, the ‘extra’ quota gave these Departments a relentless power to pursue their 
own objectives. This strong bargaining position gave the provincial Departments of 
State Security a compelling leverage over other organisations and individuals who were 
also eagerly trying to expand their sectoral power bases or personal interests in Hong 
Kong—they could always strike handsome deals with other departments and interested 
parties to trade-off part of their quota. The currency in this exchange could be money, 
favour, promotion, housing, job or other privileges. This practice was reported to be a 
great source of corruption, and caused considerable resentment among other ministries, 
departments and individuals.
There was a general understanding between the sponsoring bodies and the fifth 
columnists that in guaranteeing them one-way exit permits, the government did not 
accept responsibility for giving their spouses and children the same treatment. In theory, 
this meant that their family members would need to join the long waiting queue for the 
‘family reunion’. In reality, however, most of them brought their family members across 
the border in a relatively short span of time. This was again the pay-off of good 
connections plus good money. For some mainland border officials, this created yet 
another opportunity to squeeze profits from the fifth columnists to fill their own 
pockets—a ‘shared prosperity’, so to speak.
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iii) Mission
Over the period of 15 years, the original mission of the operation underwent a series of 
transformation, transpiration and redefinition in response to the fluid political 
developments in Hong Kong—from the originally instinctive and crude reaction in the 
early 1980s to the more sophisticated and targeted manipulation in the mid 1990s. The 
former was strongly influenced by a cold war rigidity and simplicity in Chinese foreign 
policy thinking, while the latter responded to the changing policy setting and work 
priorities in Hong Kong.
While the CCP was strongly committed to a fifth column policy in Hong Kong from the 
outset, the policy objectives were adjusted many times throughout the transitional years, 
intentionally or otherwise, to serve the perceived changing political needs. The irony 
was that, contrary to the official mission statement to strengthen the party’s work in 
Hong Kong, many individuals/groups involved in the process took a free ride at the 
expense of the party’s principles and reputation. Paradoxically, while the policy was 
meant to be the party’s collective effort based on long-term political considerations, 
many individuals mainly sought to reap immediate and quick personal gains.
There was approximately a three-staged transformation of the fifth column missions in 
Hong Kong. In the first stage (1983-1984), as mentioned above, the mission was 
initiated as a political insurance policy—by having numbers there in case things went 
wrong. It was a time when the cold war mentality still prevailed in China’s foreign
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policy thinking, and there was a strong distrust of the British intentions regarding the 
future of Hong Kong. The mission reflected uncertainty and concerns of the CCP’s 
leadership. The second stage (1985-1989) witnessed increasing cooperation between the 
Chinese and British governments in resolving a series of transitional issues. It was 
during this period of time that the Chinese official establishments expanded rapidly and 
functioned well. This was also a period of rising confidence and good-will on the part of 
the Chinese government, notwithstanding conflicts with the British government from 
time to time. It was against this backdrop that the original mission of the fifth column 
seemed out of context and became less relevant.
However, it was also during this period that the previously subdued practice of 
corruption (seeking personal gains through power and connections in the fifth column 
recruitment process) surfaced and spread widely across the relevant party organisations 
and government bureaucracy. In fact, the lucrative business generated from corrupt 
practices gathered such momentum of its own that it seemed to be operating 
independently, having little in common with the designed mission of the policy.
The redefining of the fifth column’s mission at the third stage (1989-1997) came after 
1989 when the British government joined the Western countries in sanctions against 
China and Chris Patten assumed a tough stand on political reform in Hong Kong in 
1992. Patten’s reform agenda not only greatly irritated Beijing, but also alerted it to 
review the fifth column policy, to reassess its value and to redefine its mission. In this 
stage, the bitter arguments and final breakdown of the Sino-British consensus on the 
scale and speed of political reform in Hong Kong to a large extent revived the logic of 
the fifth column policy as stated in the first stage. Patten’s 1992 political reform
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proposals and two (1991 and 1995) Legislative Council election results clearly showed 
that, in the eyes of Beijing leadership, a future task lay in wooing votes and winning the 
‘numbers’ through universal suffrage in Hong Kong. It was the combination of the 
inevitable democratisation and electoral imperatives that, for the first time in the 
operation of the fifth column in Hong Kong, gave the fifth column a clear and concrete 
mission by adding a new dimension—to form a voting bloc in the post 1997 period, and 
to mobilise popular support around it.
iv) Loyalty Control
The official selection process of fifth columnists stressed the primacy of political 
awareness and reliability as criteria for screening candidates. Evidently, the sponsoring 
bodies in the mainland were requested to do everything right to ensure the political 
loyalty of their outpost cadres.
In addition to the formal selection procedures, the organisation departments at various 
levels would arrange ‘informal’ one-to-one talks with the candidates before they 
departed for Hong Kong. The talks usually had two major themes. Firstly, the 
candidates were urged to report to the Department of Coordination of the Xinhua Office 
and to keep each other informed. They were encouraged to turn to the Xinhua Office for 
assistance if they encountered ‘difficulties’. Secondly, they were requested to keep in 
close touch with the sponsoring bodies back in the mainland by submitting written work 
reports at regular intervals of 6 to 12 months. Other forms of contact included oral 
reports, facilitating the visits by the officials from the sponsoring bodies, and calling in 
when they returned to the mainland for business or family visits. These talks, in fact,
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were referring to a reporting system and instating a surveillance mechanism.
Some fifth columnists who were among the first to arrive in Hong Kong in 1983 and 
1984 recalled that, at that time, the staff from the Xinhua Office’s Department of 
Coordination would every now and then invite a group of them to attend informal 
gatherings, such as ‘yuong cha to ‘chat’ with them as a way of keeping in touch. Most 
later arrivals also reported having some irregular contacts with the Xinhua Office when 
they were new to Hong Kong. However, this kind of contact quickly faded away for two 
reasons. Firstly, the understaffed Xinhua Office found itself struggling to cope with the 
number of fifth columnists pouring in. Secondly, ‘other work’ of economic importance 
took priority on the part of the fifth columnists. As a result, even this semblance of 
control ceased to exist. This showed that the CCP had little idea, or experience, of how 
Hong Kong society worked—and therefore how the fifth columnists should be managed 
in the early 1980s.
It was reported that majority of the fifth columnists felt more comfortable, and 
considered it more useful, to keep in regular contact with their mainland sponsoring 
bodies. They did so in many ways, by establishing extended commercial networks or 
through business transactions. Informal oral reports were common when opportunities 
arose.
This meant that the fifth columnists’ activities were largely outside the direct scrutiny of 
the party network in Hong Kong, which was totally contrary to what had been stated in 
the two guiding documents of 1982. Indeed, compared with those working within the 
mainland official establishments and to the publicly identified CCP cadres, the fifth
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columnists enjoyed enormous political freedom and economic autonomy. The presence 
of a large fifth column in Hong Kong with a loose loyalty control mechanism was 
suggestive of the CCP’s poor management of, or inability to handle, the policy 
effectively under challenging circumstances. It would be hard to imagine that those fifth 
columnists, who were used to party discipline and authoritarian supervision in the 
mainland, would not have a sense of release and might behave differently when a 
conflict of interests arose.
This lack of coordinated supervision was also caused by the CCP’s inadequate 
command of resources in Hong Kong to put in place a more efficient control regime. 
Some traditional practices such as political coercion and punishment common in the 
mainland would be hard to reinstate in Hong Kong. Despite China’s awareness of the 
potential danger of lapses of loyalty, little was done to curb the trend and the apparent 
drift-away of loyalty remained a sticking point for the more effective operation of the 
program. In 1990, Xu Jiatun’s ‘unauthorised trip’ to the US highlighted the serious 
inadequacies in commanding the loyalty of Chinese officials and fifth columnists in 
Hong Kong.
Loyalty control, however, took a different form by the CCP to link it with commercial 
interests and opportunities. Maintaining loyalty to the sponsoring bodies in the 
mainland was often rewarded handsomely with favourable trading conditions and 
business opportunities, which enabled the fifth columnists to succeed and prosper in the 
fierce competition in Hong Kong society. This mutually beneficial arrangement was 
very important in the Chinese economic system, which was often marred by personal 
favour, non-transparency and irregularity of the policy regime. As with many other
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aspects of the Chinese politics, doing business with the mainland depended to a large 
extent on the goodwill of party leaders and government agencies.
However, despite all the unsatisfactory aspects, the fifth column policy was able to 
continue and developed steadily. In fact the CCP was prepared to pay the cost. In the 
words of some senior Chinese officials, the party believed that most of the fifth 
columnists would act on their conscience and demonstrate their ultimate loyalty to the 
CCP when needs arose. In the worst scenario, if only 50% of the fifth columnists 
maintained their political allegiance and party affiliation to the CCP, then the fifth 
column policy should be seen as a success and all the efforts would be paid off.130 This 
was a quite revealing statement, although the base for such confidence might be 
doubtful for many.
Conclusion
This chapter showed that the CCP was enthusiastically engaged in a traditional two- 
handed approach in setting its Hong Kong policy. On the one hand, China aggressively 
pursued institutionalisation to consolidate its official presence and expand its influence 
in Hong Kong society. On the other hand, China secretly moved tens of thousands of its 
cadres across the border to penetrate Hong Kong’s grassroots communities. It was 
ironic that this persistent infiltration effort by the CCP with its party members (the fifth 
columnists) was little known by the public in Hong Kong, and therefore no public 
outcry was raised; on the other hand, the presence of the PLA Garrison, which was one
130 Interviews with senior Chinese officials, December 1996
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of the most institutionalised and disciplined aspects of China’s projected official 
presence, encountered fierce and vocal opposition from quite a number of Hong Kong 
political groups.
The CCP’s central Organisation Department was the policy powerhouse of the fifth 
column scheme, but, like other politics in China, the real authority for operating this 
program resided in the HKMAO of the State Council. The administrative responsibility 
for recruitment and approval rested with each ministry, department, agency or 
provincial government. Needless to say that there was much in-fighting, complaints and 
jealousy over the ‘unequal distribution’ or ‘unfair treatment’ among the organisations 
and individual candidates.
The predominance of political reliability as the primary qualification for the fifth 
columnists was, to a large extent, watered down as the policy progressed, and the 
standard of selecting ‘the best and brightest’ was compromised by a widespread practice 
of corruption by party officials. The whole selection process was in the end manipulated 
by a few to gratify their own sectoral and personal interests, and to extend or cement 
patron-client relationships within the party.
The central Organisation Department was aware of the erosion of these policy 
guidelines in implementation of the fifth column policy, but could do little to alter the 
trend. Deng’s reform in China brought a new contingent of political elite into the 
existing bureaucratic structures. These people possessed the best qualifications in terms 
of education, expertise and skills, and some had considerable political connections and 
influence. Since they constituted the backbone of the party and state apparatus at both
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central and provincial levels, the government relied heavily on them for policy advice 
and formulation. However, in the case of Hong Kong, the dilemma was that the party 
also had to rely on these people to implement its Hong Kong policy, since they 
represented ‘the best and brightest’. Many of the fifth columnists were from, or had 
close ties with, this elite group. Therefore this policy elite often had a stake in both 
sides, and to keep the fifth column policy going was in their own interests.
This chapter discovered that in practice, the party’s long-term objectives in Hong Kong 
often succumbed to the immediate self-interest of those policy practitioners. In 
particular, it proved that the absence of a regulatory framework and a transparent system 
in the recruitment process of the fifth columnists permitted patronage, favouritism, 
abuse of power and other forms of corruption to gain ground. It needed more than 
political will, perhaps an overhaul of the system, to fix the widespread corruption.
In the early stage of the fifth column policy implementation, the discrepancy between 
the CCP’s political expectation of its fifth columnists and their quick transformation 
into profit-driven ‘capitalists’ in Hong Kong’s market economy were highly suggestive 
that the CCP had little knowledge of how Hong Kong’s political and capitalist systems 
functioned, and hence how it should be governed. Loyalty control became increasingly 
ineffective and problematic. While the CCP might envisage to cultivate a whole new 
generation of ‘red capitalists’ in Hong Kong through a fifth column policy, most fifth 
columnists seemed to have pragmatically curtailed their roles into profit-hunting, and 
have invested their energies elsewhere.
These findings pose an interesting question: if the fifth column policy was so ineffective
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and problematic, why, then, was Beijing continuing with it throughout the whole 
transitional period? It seems dysfunctional that Beijing should devote so much effort to 
groom a large fifth column in Hong Kong which would turn out to be of little use. But 
the reality that the CCP always operated outside the laws of Hong Kong, and would 
continue to do so, and that its jurisdiction after 1997 would be subject to close 
international scrutiny helped to make sense of such an arrangement. A strong contingent 
of fifth columnists in Hong Kong was not an indication of CCP’s optimism and 
confidence in its position in the future PIKSAR. Rather it was a political insurance 
policy, which was reflective of Beijing’s insecurity, uncertainty and an embedded 
distrust of the colonial government and its proxies in Hong Kong.
These findings raise fundamental theoretical issues that coincide with the study of 
Chinese foreign policy motivation in general. Questions of considerable relevance to 
this chapter are: what was the fifth column policy motivation? What were the factors 
that determined the fifth column policy motivation? What was the dialectic process 
behind such motivation during the transitional period? What was its connection with 
broader Chinese foreign policy motivation? These questions are to be addressed in the 
following chapter.
Chapter Nine
The Motivation of Beijing’s Fifth Column Policy
Chapter Eight documented China’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong from 1983 to 
1997. Evidence showed that although the policy was consistent, the perceived value and 
real content of the policy changed over time. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 
Eight, the need for a fifth column policy in 1983 stemmed from the fear that to fully rely 
on an institutionalised process might not serve China’s best interests in Hong Kong. In 
the early 1980s, China was in the initial stage of domestic reform after decades of 
political turmoil and economic stagnation; and internationally, it was still locked in the 
battles with two superpowers as the Cold War continued, despite the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the US in 1979. By 1982, Deng had been in power for only 
four years and his authority was far from being absolute when China was suddenly 
forced to face one of the most critical foreign policy issues—the recovery of Hong 
Kong. It would not be hard to imagine that the CCP’s leadership consensus would 
instinctively favour a fifth column policy to be put into place as a political insurance. 
Even Deng himself might have genuinely espoused and endorsed such an idea. By the 
end of 1980s, the generally smooth development of institutionalisation in the 
transitional period made the logic of fifth column policy less relevant.
However, the British government’s sanctions against China after 1989 and its push for 
rapid democratisation in Hong Kong in 1992 struck the most sensitive point of the 
CCP’s apprehension over Hong Kong, and quickly revived and reinforced the original 
motives of the fifth column policy. Evidence in Chapter Eight showed that as a 
counterbalance, the fifth column not only received a boost in numbers in the early
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1990s, but was also given a more clearly defined role to play—the originally perceived 
value of the policy was overlain with a new dimension to shore up the pro-Beijing 
voting bloc in future HKSAR elections. However, what was more significant was that 
China was able to continue to consolidate institution-based approaches from 1992 to 
July 1997 despite bitter disputes with Governor Patten, while at the same time 
intensifying its fifth column operation in the territory. On 1 July 1997, the glorious and 
momentous handover ceremony climaxed a highly successful undertaking which was 
mainly based on negotiated institutional process and procedures. It could be argued, in 
this event, that institutionalisation was recognised to be the primary vehicle for China’s 
Hong Kong policy. In contrast, the fifth column policy seemed to have waned into 
insignificance.
The seemingly contradictory efforts by Beijing to strengthen institutional power on the 
one hand and to deploy a fifth column force to undermine the very authority of this 
power on the other could be accounted for through analysis of the intimate and mutually 
complementary relationship of the two policies. These two parallel, yet competing, 
developments suggested that far from being simple and static, Beijing’s fifth column 
policy motivation responded to the more profound changes in China’s foreign policy in 
general. On the one hand, the fifth column policy in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1997 was 
sustained by two intellectual pillars: the continuation of a siege mentality of wall­
building in Chinese foreign policy thinking—trying to erect human barriers to keep in 
as well as to keep out; and a political self-sufficient and self-reliant philosophy to build 
up a contingent of supporters for emergency. On the other hand, this policy justification 
fluctuated considerably during the course of its implementation. The increasing success 
of the institution-based approach not only gave the Chinese policy makers more
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confidence and predictability to exercise decision autonomy, but also at times led to the 
downgrading of the fifth column tactics to secondary consideration in practice. This 
situation accounted for the apparent laxity in loyalty control of the fifth column 
operation, which was responsible for the compromised standards and ineffectiveness in 
management. As a result, the importance of using a covert approach to achieve China’s 
overall Hong Kong objectives was reduced during the transitional period.
Between 1985 and 1989 the weakening of the fifth column policy from its original 
objectives gave its recruits freedom to engage almost solely in business activities with 
little political pertinence to their official missions. This serious policy erosion did not 
lead Beijing to scrap the program altogether. Instead, Beijing allocated considerable 
resources for its continuing operation. This paradox revealed that there must be some 
deeper concerns in the minds of Beijing’s leadership that could not be easily removed. 
The persistence of the fifth column policy without a clear goal during this period 
coincided with two major hiccups in China’s domestic political and economic reform 
process—the loss of the party secretaryship by Hu Yaobang in 1987 and by Zhao 
Ziyang in 1989. In these two incidents the conservative forces in the party were able to 
temporarily restore more traditional ways of conducting domestic and international 
affairs. It is possible that either Beijing was not fully informed of the problems of the 
fifth column operation, or advice on the policy review was rejected by the leadership. 
Either way, the continued operation of the fifth column program must have had support 
from the top leadership.
The findings in Chapter Eight give rise to questions of great importance for this thesis: 
where did the fifth column which the CCP so painstakingly installed in Hong Kong fit
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in the overall picture of China’s Hong Kong policy and China’s foreign policy in 
general? Why did China pursue such a policy in the first place given that its sovereign 
rights in Hong Kong were already recognised and guaranteed by the Joint Declaration 
and, later, by the Basic Law? Did the final event of Hong Kong’s historic handover 
represent the failure of Beijing’s fifth column policy? What were the major 
considerations underlining Beijing’s motivation? What was the motivation of this policy 
after all?
The evidence of Beijing’s fifth column operations in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1997 
gave no simple answer to these questions, nor could it clarify the motivation behind 
such a policy in a nutshell. This chapter considers these questions by analysing the 
historical, political, structural and situational sources underpinning the CCP’s decision 
to embark on the fifth column policy, and the changes that occurred from 1983 to 1997 
which impacted on the continuation of the operation. This chapter argues that despite 
the ostensible non-performance of the policy and a simultaneous expansion of 
institutional mechanisms for China’s rule in Hong Kong, the ever increasing numbers of 
fifth columnists fulfilled the original and core objective of the fifth column policy— 
political insurance. The CCP was prepared to bear potential political cost in exchange 
for peace of mind. For one thing, it was with the psychological support of the fifth 
column’s invisible presence that the CCP was able to embrace institutional 
approaches—knowing that it had something to fall back on if other means did not work 
out.
This chapter is structured to analyse Beijing’s motivation of the fifth column policy on 
the basis of evidence presented in Chapter Eight. It returns to the theoretical framework
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identified in Part I of this thesis to elucidate the roles and the interplay of perception, 
personality and structural/situational factors in analysing the motivation of such a 
policy. There are three sections in this chapter. Firstly, the CCP’s perception of 
sovereignty and the issue of Hong Kong are discussed in the context of Chinese 
revolutionary historiography. Sovereignty was a very sensitive issue for the CCP, not 
only because it was an important principle of Chinese foreign policy, but also because 
of China’s bitter experience of abuse of its sovereignty by the international powers and 
institutions in modem history. Because the loss of Hong Kong in many ways 
symbolised the beginning of so-called ‘centuries of humiliation’ to the Chinese nation, 
resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong would signify the end of this national 
shame. China’s obsession with sovereignty was one of the official justifications for 
launching and sustaining a fifth column policy in Hong Kong.
Secondly, the role of the Chinese leadership and the influence of ‘rule by man’ as an 
entrenched political culture are examined. Two of Deng Xiaoping’s quotations revealed 
the fundamental considerations for the CCP to adopt ‘rule by man’ in Hong Kong’s 
transitional period and beyond. Following this lead, this section also assesses Hong 
Kong as a Chinese society to conclude Beijing’s judgement of the political feasibility 
for applying ‘rule by man’ as an appropriate methods of government in Hong Kong.
Thirdly, the volatile political developments in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1997 are 
reviewed to demonstrate how structural/situational components affected the fifth 
column policy motivation. The disintegration and realignment of Hong Kong’s political 
forces during the transitional period constantly shifted the delicate balances among all 
political forces, and Beijing’s assessment and reassessment of its own comparative
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strength at all levels of Hong Kong society provided performance feedback for it to 
adjust the fifth column operation.
Perception—Issue of Sovereignty
In Chapter Two, perception was identified as one of the principal elements in a foreign 
policy motivation. The investigation of Chinese foreign policy in Chapter Four 
confirmed this theory and empirically demonstrated how the Chinese leadership’s 
perception of the world was held hostage by its own past, and how ideologies helped to 
shape and reinforce this perceptual foundation. What, then, were the makings of the 
CCP’s perception which motivated its fifth column policy in Hong Kong?
There are two aspects to this question. First, China had a particularly hostile view of 
Britain. The CCP in the 1950s regarded London as a power belonging to the reactionary 
camp headed by the United States.1 In a foreign policy comment in 1949, Mao asserted:
The US and British governments belong to the type in which the bourgeoisie, 
and this class alone, exercises dictatorship over the people. Contrary in all 
respects to the people’s government, this type of government practises so-called 
democracy for the bourgeoisie but is dictatorial toward the people.2
On another occasion, Mao dismissed the idea of seeking help from the British and 
American governments as “naive”. “Would the present rulers of Britain and the United 
States, who are imperialists, help a people’s state?” Mao asked. If they wanted to do 
business, Mao reasoned, it was not because they wanted to help the Chinese people but
1 James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, pp. 101-103)
2 Mao Zedong, ‘Why It Is Necessary to Discuss the White Paper’ Selected Works o f Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign 
Language Press, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 445)
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because “their capitalists want to make money and their bankers want to earn interest to
3extricate themselves from their own crises.”
The CCP’s perception of Britain also, naturally, was influenced by its reading of 
history. To the Communists, Britain was an old imperialist power that had taken the 
lead in encroaching upon China. Since the Opium War of 1839-1842, the United 
Kingdom had involved itself in a series of aggressive actions: the Anglo-French 
intervention in 1856, the suppression of the Boxers, and hostility toward the Chinese 
Nationalist Revolution in the 1920s.3 4 These stereotyped descriptions formed the popular 
image of Britain in the minds of the ordinary Chinese people.
Second, two closely linked and emotional issues in the minds of the CCP leadership— 
that of sovereignty, and that of Hong Kong as a symbol of national humiliation as well 
as an inspiration for generations of Chinese revolutionaries struggling for its 
restoration—should be analysed to adequately address the question. Both the concept 
and practice of sovereignty were important because they not only informed the Chinese 
leadership of China’s international rights, but also empowered it to take actions to 
perpetuate such rights for enhancing its domestic legitimacy.
Theories and Practice o f Sovereignty over Hong Kong
The concept of sovereignty was central to the CCP’s leadership in that it not only 
sensitively linked China’s internal politics in its peripheral areas such as Tibet, Xinjiang
3 Mao Zedong, ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’ Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign 
Language Press, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 417)
4 William Tung, China and the Foreign Powers: The Impact o f and Reaction to Unequal Treaties (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1970, pp. 135-142)
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and Inner Mogolia, but also impacted on international issues such as Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan, all of which involved reunification with regions in which different 
political systems had evolved.
For Communist China, which rejected much of international law as ‘bourgeois’ or 
‘liberal’ in origin, the concept of sovereignty, which had been the essence of the 
Western notion of nation-state international law for about four centuries, became a 
unifying political force for China and a stick with which it attacked the bourgeois states.
There are many definitions on the concept of sovereignty. But basically, it is a theory of 
politics which claims that:
in every system of government there must be some absolute power of final 
decision exercised by some person or body recognised both as competent to 
decide and as able to enforce the decision. This person or body is called the 
sovereign.5
5 D. L. Sills, International Encyclopaedia o f the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968, p. 
231). Theories of sovereignty could be traced to Aristotle’s Politics and in the classical works of Roman law. 
However it was the modem French thinker Jean Bodin who first systematically discussed the theory of sovereignty. 
Bodin asserted that the sovereign had “the power to make law binding on all his subjects in general”, and that other 
rights of sovereignty included making peace and war, hearing appeals from the sentences of all courts, appointing and 
dismissing state officials, taxing, granting privileges of exemption to all subjects, determining coinage, and receiving 
oaths of fidelity from subjects. See Jean Bodin, Six Books o f the Commonwealth, published in 1576, M. J. Tooley, 
translated and ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962, pp. 43-45). After Bodin, Hobbes was the first thinker to make a 
great contribution in the development of the theory of sovereignty. In his The Leviathan, published in 1651, Hobbes 
argued that sovereign power was necessary for men to “defend them from invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of 
one another.” See Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan Michael Oakeshott ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960, pp. 107- 
120). These theories were challenged by Locke and Rousseau. Locke did not directly reject Hobbes, but reinterpreted 
natural law as encompassing innate and inalienable rights inherent in each individual. Locke moderated Hobbes’ 
view that state sovereignty was coercive and supreme, and he argued that the government should rule with the 
consent of the governed. See John Locke, The Second Treatise o f Government J. W. Gough, ed. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1976, pp. 81-93). In his The Social Contract, published in 1756, Rousseau agreed with Hobbes that state 
sovereignty was absolute, indivisible, inalienable and infallible; it was the result of a contract in which individuals 
surrendered their will. See Kenneth Thompson, Fathers o f International Thought: The Legacy o f Political Theory 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994, pp. 22-56). Marx argued that these approaches to the theory of 
state sovereignty were actually philosophical formulations rather than political reality. The state only represented the 
interests and will of the ruling class, not the general interests of society. See Kenneth Thompson, Fathers o f 
International Thought: The Legacy o f Political Theory (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994, pp. 22- 
56).
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According to this definition, the concept of sovereignty has two implications. Firstly, 
sovereignty is a power of highest authority and that power is supreme, absolute and 
independent. Secondly, sovereignty is a special attribute of the independent state.
Though modem thinkers differed about who was sovereign and how sovereignty 
functioned within a state, they did not deny sovereignty—a supreme and absolute 
power—itself. Under this concept of sovereignty, unchallenged authorities were created 
to settle legal disputes and to maintain social order within the nation-state. In addition, 
sovereignty became a fundamental concept in conducting international relations.6
However, there was an essential difference between the practice of sovereignty in 
domestic politics and in international politics.7 8 Jean Hampton argued that in domestic 
politics, sovereignty was generally a source of order. National authorities in such forms 
as governmental, legal and judicial agencies, military forces, and the police maintained 
the normal operation of national affairs. In most cases, these authorities had the ability
o
to enforce the law, settle conflicts or disputes, and maintain social order.
In international politics, the exercise of sovereign rights had quite opposite 
consequences to those which applied to domestic affairs.9 Because each state was 
sovereign, there was no authority that was superior to any one state. Therefore, each 
state had the authority to interpret international laws and defend its own interests. If one 
state claimed a piece of territory over which another exercised sovereignty, there was no 
authority above the two states, such as a world government, to settle that dispute.
6 Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 112-122)
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
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Because the possession of territory was essential to the existence of a nation-state, no 
state was willing to share sovereignty over its own territory with another state if the 
former was powerful enough to resist occupation and defend itself. States were less 
likely to agree to compromise over territorial disputes than over other matters.10 In most 
cases in a dispute over territorial matters the stronger power or powers (military, 
economic, political, or technological) were likely to win no matter how the two parties 
interpreted international law or defended their positions theoretically.11 This situation 
accounted for most changes on the political map of the world in the centuries after a 
modem state system was established under the concept of sovereignty.12
These ‘bourgeois’ or ‘liberal’ theories became central to China’s foreign policy and 
helped to explain the changes of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1842 as well as in 
1997. Despite the twists and turns in Chinese foreign policy over the years, the concept 
of sovereignty remained dominant in the Chinese image of world order. In Beijing’s 
view, sovereignty meant that a state had “the power, in accordance with its own will, to 
decide its own form of state, political system, and socio-economic system, and 
intervention by other states in these matters is absolutely not permissible.” China also 
considered the principle of sovereignty to be one of the most important principles of 
international law and had always been extremely sensitive to questions of sovereignty.14 
In the case of Hong Kong, before the Sino-British negotiations began, Beijing had
9 L. L. Black, Sovereignty: Power beyond Politics (London: Shepheard-walwyn, 1988, pp. 55-61)
10 Donald Snow, National Security: Enduring Problems o f US Defence Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987,
12 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, 
pp. 101-147)
13 Yu Fan, ‘Speaking about the Relationship between China and the Tibetan Region from View Point of Sovereignty 
and Security’ People 's Daily 5 June 1959
14 Kevin Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo: The Historical Roots o f China's Hong Kong Policy (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990, pp. 52-61)
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already consistently stated that Hong Kong was part of China’s territory and that the 
settlement of the question of Hong Kong was entirely within China’s sovereign rights. 
However, despite its non-recognition of the three unequal treaties of the 19th century, 
China was tolerant of the existence of Hong Kong as a British colony and had never 
challenged Britain’s administration.15 Beijing held that no action would be taken until 
conditions were ripe.16
The fundamental change in China’s domestic politics under Deng and the shift in the 
CCP’s focus from class struggle to economic development led to the emergence of a 
new pragmatism,17 which has been discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. With the 
development of China’s reforms and its open-door policies after 1978, the Chinese 
leadership noticeably adopted a more flexible attitude towards the issue of 
sovereignty.18 This, in turn, enabled the Chinese decision makers to be more flexible in 
dealing with sensitive issues such as economic relations and foreign investment.19 The 
creation of special economic zones and the introduction of a range of more flexible
policies to some 14 coastal cities in the early 1980s created a completely new situation,
20which needed not only a legal codification, but also a theoretical justification.
Beijing recognised to a considerable degree the theory of interdependence and 
international markets which, in previous years, had been regarded as a form of 
imperialist encroachment upon the sovereignty of other states. However, the change
15 Hungdah Chiu, Y. C. Jao and Yuanli Wu eds. The Future o f Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond (New York: 
Quorum Books, 1986, pp. 152-153)
16 ibid
17 Kevin Rafferty, City on the Rocks: Hong Kong’s Uncertain Future (New York: Viking, 1990, pp. 105-109)
18 ibid.
19 ibid
20 ibid
21 Wang Gunwu and Wong Siu-lum eds. Hong Kong in the Asia-Pacific Region (Hong Kong: University of Hong 
Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 1997, PP. 4-5)
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was also accompanied by a growing nationalism in both China’s domestic politics and 
its foreign policy. Nationalism, often in the name of patriotism, appeared to bolster the 
legitimacy of the CCP whose ideology, as a result of the repudiation of the old doctrines 
of the past, became a less powerful source of enthusiasm and support in China’s 
domestic politics.22
During the reform era, it seemed that China was prepared to accept the constraints of 
increased commercial and military links with the outside world, while at the same time 
making efforts to preserve its sovereignty and autonomy.23 Beijing considered resolving 
the long outstanding issue of the reunification of the nation as one concrete step in 
achieving this goal.24 There were several reasons why the Chinese leadership wanted to 
be seen as firm on the question of sovereignty. Firstly, the top Chinese leaders were 
from the old revolutionary generation, who had long experience of fighting foreign 
powers and foreign influence. They had participated in establishing the People’s 
Republic. For them, the unification of the whole of China was particularly important 
and was a special task which they determined to complete.
Secondly, any concessions on sovereignty would bring great political damage to those 
who made them. Prior to the Sino-British negotiations, Deng Xiaoping was on the point
of consolidating his leading position in China. He had to balance different factions
26within the party, particularly the reformers and the more conservative leaders. Deng
22 ibid.
23 Anthony Dicks, ‘Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance? Some Legal Aspects o f the Status o f Hong Kong’ The China 
Quarterly (Vol. 95, September 1983, pp. 427-455)
24 ibid. In this context, Peng Zhen, then chairman of the National People’s Congress, reiterated in a report in 
November, 1981 that: “We stand firmly on the principle of defending sovereignty, national unification and territorial 
integrity.” See People ’s Daily 30 September 1981
25 David Shambaugh, Deng Xiaoping: Portrait o f a Chinese Statesman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 
p p .151-158)
^  ibid.
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himself had a reputation of being highly flexible, but he often seemed to exercise this 
flexibility within certain limits.27 Anything that went beyond these limits would become 
unacceptable to him. To remain firm in China’s position on recovering sovereignty 
would add to Deng’s national prestige and further consolidate his authority." Had he
29failed to stick to this policy, his position could have been challenged by others.
Thirdly, the issue of sovereignty was not only applicable to Hong Kong and Macao, but 
also had great relevance to the question of Taiwan and, potentially, the positions of 
Tibet and other national minority regions in the Chinese state.30 Beijing considered that 
any compromise on its position over sovereignty could have a domino effect. Any 
concession on principle over the Hong Kong issue could carry forward to later 
negotiations on Taiwan and weaken Beijing’s bargaining position.
China’s sensitivity on the sovereignty issue was further provoked by Britain’s initial 
hard line on the Hong Kong question. In her first visit to Beijing in September 1982, 
Mrs Thatcher, as the British Prime Minister, disagreed with China’s stand that the 
unequal treaties were illegal, and stated that all three 19th century treaties concerning 
Hong Kong were legal and valid under international law. Deng Xiaoping was reported 
as angrily telling the British Prime Minister that China would recover all territories of 
Hong Kong by 1997, peacefully or otherwise.33 As a result of Thatcher’s visit, neither 
China nor Great Britain was willing to make concessions on the sovereignty issue, 
although they did agree to negotiate on the disputed territory and to maintain stability
27 Enbao Wang, Hong Kong, 1997: the Politics o f Transition (Colo.: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, Chpts. 2 and 3)
28 ibid.
29 ibid.
30 Zhiling Lin and Thomas Robinson, The Chinese and Their Future: Beijing, Taipei, and Hong Kong (Washington 
D.C.: The AEI Press, 1994, pp. 3-23)
31 ibid.
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and prosperity in Hong Kong.34
When the Sino-British negotiations started, soon after Mrs Thatcher’s visit, the question 
of sovereignty was the most contentious issue. The British proposed that the settlement 
of Hong Kong should be based on the model of ‘divided sovereignty’—Chinese 
sovereignty and British administration.35 This meant that China would resume 
sovereignty over Hong Kong but the British would continue to administer the region. 
Britain’s motives for this model were revealed by Colin Moynihan, Secretary of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Conservative Party. He said that “the British 
role in Hong Kong is the key to its economic stability”, and that in order to “maintain 
Hong Kong’s stability, Britain cannot give up its right of administration over Hong 
Kong.”36 An article published in The Economist asserted that there were only two 
alternatives for the Chinese leaders: they could either resume sovereignty and suffer a 
depression in Hong Kong, or ask the British to stay in order to assure the prosperity of 
Hong Kong.37
Some scholars such as Robert Skidelski and Felix Patrikeeff, suggested in September 
1982 that Britain should take a tougher line on the Hong Kong issue. They argued that 
Hong Kong’s prosperity, which China wanted to assure, was dependent on an economic 
“spine” that consisted of 20,000 people who would withdraw their investments from the 
colony if the status quo were not maintained. They even suggested that “the objective of 
British diplomacy should be to secure a new lease of some 15 to 30 years for the
32 Gerald Segal, The Fate o f Hong Kong (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993, Part I)
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
35 Enbao Wang, Hong Kong, 1997: the Politics o f Transition (Colo.: Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, Chpts. 2 and 3)
36 Colin Moynihan’s interview with Hu Bao, 14 September 1983. See ‘Britain’s Argument is Untenable’ Beijing 
Review (Vol. 26, No. 41,10 October 1983)
Chapter Nine 330
territory after 1997.”38
Anthony Dicks, a British scholar and lawyer, defended Britain’s position from a legal 
perspective. He claimed that the concept of divided sovereignty was the latest 
development of international law in the West. Dicks explained:
Sovereignty is said to be divided where the sum total of powers accorded by 
international law to a fully sovereign state are exercised in respect of a territory 
by two or more states. The manner in which the powers are distributed varies. 
One state may exercise most or all of the plenary powers, and may be said to 
have ‘effective’ sovereignty, while the other may have merely ‘titular’ or 
‘residual’ sovereignty, as has been the case with most leased territories. Again, 
one state by reason of its small size or lack of defensive capacity may entrust its 
external relations and defence to a more powerful state, while retaining full 
control of its own internal affairs. Still more complex examples o f divided 
sovereignty are provided by the United Nations Trust Territories.
The essence of divided sovereignty was that sovereignty could be separated and shared 
between states. This was indeed a new concept for the interstate system, since the 
modem concept of sovereignty meant supreme and absolute power within a state. 
However, as Dicks suggested, a state that lacked the military capability to defend its 
sovereignty might accept the arrangement of divided sovereignty. But China in the early 
1980s had the military power to take over and to defend the territories, and was, 
therefore, not likely to accept any divided sovereignty arrangement proposed by Britain.
On the issue of sovereignty over Hong Kong, Beijing actually had few options it could 
toy with. The concepts of sovereignty, strong Chinese nationalism, Beijing’s traditional 
position on Hong Kong, the decolonisation of the British Empire, and China’s military
37 ‘Hong Kong’s Future: That Ring of Confidence is Fading’ The Economist (12 March 1983, pp. 52-54)
38 Robert Skisdelski and Felix Patrikeeff, ‘Trumping the China Cards’ The Times 21 September 1983, p. 12
39 Anthony Dicks, ‘Treaty, Grant, Usage of Suffrage? Some Legal Aspects of the Status o f Hong Kong’ The China 
Quarterly (Vol. 95, September 1983, p. 437)
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capability all played important roles in determining China’s tough stance over Hong 
Kong. It was unimaginable that Deng Xiaoping and other leaders would have renewed 
the lease of the New Territories or would have allowed the British to remain in Hong 
Kong island and Kowloon. As will be discussed later in this chapter, for over a hundred 
years the Chinese had insisted that the British presence in Hong Kong was illegal. If 
Deng had agreed to let the British to continue their rule in Hong Kong, his authority 
would have been greatly weakened to say the least, or at worst would have collapsed.
Not surprisingly, China categorically denounced the British proposal of ‘divided 
sovereignty’. Jin Fu, a prominent Chinese legal scholar, wrote:
Sovereignty as a legal concept is indivisible in itself. What is sovereignty? It is 
the inherent right of a state, which manifests itself internally as supreme 
authority, namely, the exclusive jurisdiction of a state over its territory and, 
externally, as the right of independence, namely, the complete independent 
exercise of right by a state in international relations free from any outside 
interference. What is administration? It means administrative power, the power 
of a state to rule in its territory. It is a concrete expression of sovereignty. The 
concept of sovereignty naturally embraces administration. Since the two are 
indivisible, there can be no question of exchanging one for the other.40
The New China News Agency (Xinhua) published a statement in support of this view. It 
stated that: “If administrative powers remain in the British hands, how can China be 
said to have recovered sovereignty? In what sovereign state in the world is 
administrative power in the hands of foreigners? ” 41 From this official statement, in 
conjunction with what Deng had said on this issue, it was crystal clear that China had 
little room for compromise and its leaders would not make any concessions on 
sovereignty. Under such circumstances, the only choice for China to achieve its goal of
40 Jin Fu, ‘China’s Recovery of Hong Kong Area Fully Accords with International Law’ Beijing Review (Vol. 26, No. 
39, 26 September 1983, p. 17)
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reunifying Hong Kong without military force was the manner in which sovereignty 
would be transferred. This was indeed the case as it later developed into ‘one country, 
two systems’ policy.
The proposal by the British government in the early 1980s for ‘divided sovereignty’ 
only served as a grim reminder to Beijing that the British government was trying hard to 
maintain and extend its colonial rule in Hong Kong. This conclusion fortified Beijing’s 
leadership on the perceived threat posed by the ulterior motives of the British 
imperialists on China’s sovereignty, and it impacted directly on the formation of the 
fifth column policy in Hong Kong.
To the Chinese leaders, sovereignty also included the right to exercise authority within 
its own jurisdiction, and they were thus extremely sensitive to the possibility that this 
power over Hong Kong could be reduced after 1997 42 Because of this, China rejected 
any arrangement that would make it possible for the British to retain undue influence in 
the territory.43 China also demonstrated repeatedly its intense fear that Hong Kong 
might become a base for subversion to the mainland.44 At the very least, in Beijing’s 
view, sovereignty included the right to eliminate any threats to the central government. 
Therefore, Beijing’s perception of sovereignty over Hong Kong implied taking control 
of its affairs.
41 Xinhua News Agency, 21 September 1983, in FBIS, 16 September 1983, El
42 Enbao Wang, Hong Kong, 1997: the Politics o f Transition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, Chpts. 2 and 3)
43 ibid.
44 ibid.
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Pride and Politics o f Sovereignty in Hong Kong
In the context of Hong Kong’s reunification with China, the significance of Hong Kong 
was most widely recognised for its important role in China’s reform and modernisation 
program. However, although economics was certainly crucial, so, too, were politics, 
culture and China’s relations with Taiwan and the global community.
From Beijing’s perspective, the undoubted economic significance of Hong Kong was 
matched by nationalist pride in finally re-establishing sovereignty over the first territory 
to have been lost to foreign imperialists in the century of shame and humiliation that 
began with the Opium Wars of 1839-1842. The intensity of Chinese nationalistic 
sentiment for regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong was so high at the beginning of the 
1980s that it shocked some senior British negotiators, who admitted later that they were 
surprised by the depth of the Chinese feelings on the matter.45 For the Chinese leaders, 
the recovery of Hong Kong’s sovereignty was not only part of the re-establishing 
process of a unified Chinese state, but also the beginning of a healing process to finally 
purge the humiliation. To recover Hong Kong was a critical issue in Chinese thinking, 
uniting the KMT and the CCP, but the politics of sovereignty had never been more 
intensified for China’s communist leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, as the appeal of 
communist ideology had eroded substantially and nationalism served as a convenient 
and legitimating substitute.
Modem Chinese history had two major themes: the foreign occupation of Chinese
45 Michael Yahuda’s interview with Sir Percy Cradock in June 1992. See Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China's 
Challenge (London and New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 22-23). Sir Percy Cradock remarked that “Deng Xiaoping 
was determined to take (Hong Kong) back into full Chinese sovereignty even if it meant taking it back as a barren 
rock.” Also see Percy Cradock, Experiences o f China (London: John Murray, 1994, pp. 180-190)
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territories through various treaties or by force, such as in the case of Hong Kong, and 
strong anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements. Even as early as the last years of 
the Qing Dynasty, Chinese intellectuals called on the Western powers to return Chinese 
territories.46
Although the KMT and the CCP had different ideologies, they shared an identical 
nationalist view over Hong Kong. Dr Sun Yat-sen, the first President of the Republic of 
China after the 1911 Revolution, condemned the agreements concluded by the Qing 
Dynasty and the Western powers as unequal treaties. Sun argued that the Western 
powers’ political and economic oppression made China a “hyper-colony.”47 Under the 
leadership of Dr Sun Yat-sen, the KMT declared its anti-imperialist foreign policy and 
the party’s position on the unequal treaties. Sun urged his followers that “the abolition 
of unequal treaties should be carried into effect with the least possible delay.”49
46 See Kevin Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 20-23). These intellectuals 
argued that the circumstances under which the treaties were conducted had changed. In the 1890s, Kang Youwei, a 
well-known leader of the 1898 Hundred Day Reform, criticised the imperialist countries’ treatment of China. Kang 
said that although China was nominally still an independent country, Chinese territory and major economic systems 
such as railways, shipping, trade, and banks were under the control of powers who could “grab whatever they like.” 
Kang argued that China was “really no longer independent although outwardly it remains so.” See Hu Sheng, 
Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1955; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 
1973, p. 123). Kang also pointed out that the unequal treaties imposed on China were a source of “an extreme 
national shame”. Also see Tung-ming Lee, The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question o f Hong Kong: A 
Political and Legal Perspective (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Okalahoma, 1985, p. 87)
47 Sun Yat-sen wrote: “The result is that China is everywhere becoming a colony of the Powers. The people of the 
nation still think we are only a ‘semi-colony’ and comfort themselves with this term, but in reality we are being 
crushed by economic strength of the powers to a greater degree than if we were a full colony. China is not the colony 
of one nation but of all, and we are not the slaves of one country but of all. I think we ought to be called a ‘hypo- 
colony.’” See Sun’s San Min Chu I: The Three Principles o f the People Frank W. Price translated, The Commission 
for the Compilation of the History of the Kuomintang (Taipei: China Publishing {no date}, p. 1 and p. 10)
48 As part of the KMT’s foreign policy as announced in its first National Congress in the 1924, it stated:
“(1) All unequal treaties such as those providing for leased territories, extraterritorial privileges, foreign control of 
the customs tariff, and exercise of political authority on Chinese territories which impair the sovereignty of the 
Chinese nation, should be abolished, and mutual respect of sovereign rights.
(2) All countries that are willing to abandon their special privileges in China and to abolish their treaties which impair 
Chinese sovereignty should be accorded most-favoured-nation treatment.
(3) All other treaties between China and the foreign powers which are in any way prejudicial to the interests of China 
should be revised according to the principle of non-infringement of each other’s sovereignty.” See Kuang-sheng 
Liao, Anti-foreignism and Modernisation in China, 1860-1980: Linkage between Domestic Politics and Foreign 
Policy (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984, pp. 82-83)
49 Sun Yat-sen, San min chu I: The Three Principles o f the People Frank W. Price translated, The Commission for the 
Compilation of the History of the Kuomintang (Taipei: China Publishing (no date), p. 11).
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When the KMT, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, broke off cooperation with 
the CCP in 1927 and established government in Nanjing, it continued the foreign policy 
principles laid down by Dr Sun Yat-sen. For example, the KMT announced in 1928 that 
it would recover all Chinese territories occupied by other powers.50 As a result of 
Chinese pressure and a stronger government under Chiang, the Western powers 
considered giving up part of their privileges in China, among them, extraterritoriality. 
By the end of 1928, the KMT government successfully terminated or modified some of 
the foreign powers’ privileges and recovered China’s tariff autonomy.51
The KMT’s diplomatic efforts to terminate foreign privileges in China were suspended 
after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931. Japan’s invasion of China in 
1937 and its occupation of major Chinese ports also weakened the Western
50 In June 1928, the KMT declared: “For 80 years China has been under the shackles of unequal treaties. These 
restrictions are a contravention of the principle in international law, of mutual respect and sovereignty and are not 
allowed by any sovereign state... Now that the unification of China is being consummated we think the time is ripe 
for taking further steps and begin at once to negotiate—in accordance with diplomatic procedure—new treaties on a 
basis of complete equality and mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty.” See Foreign Relations o f the United 
States The State Department of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Vol. 2, 1928, 
pp. 413-414). Chiang also asserted that China’s weakness was mainly a result of Western powers’ exploitation under 
unequal treaties. He stated that: “The implementation of unequal treaties constitutes a complete record of China’s 
national humiliation.” See Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory (New York: Roy 
Publishers, 1947, p. 44). At the 1931 National People’s Convention, the KMT government proclaimed the “Manifesto 
Concerning the Abrogation of Unequal Treaties” and concluded: “ 1) The Chinese people will not recognise all the 
past unequal treaties imposed by the Powers on China. 2) The National Government shall, in conformity with Dr Sun 
Yat-sen’s testamentary injunction, achieve with least possible delay China’s equality and independence in the Family 
of Nations. ‘Manifesto of the National People’s Convention Concerning the Abrogation of Unequal Treaties’ The 
Chinese Social and Political Science Review (Vol. 15, supplement, 1931-32, pp. 461-465)
51 Tung-ming Lee, The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question o f Hong Kong: A Political and Legal 
Perspective (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Okalahoma, 1985, pp. 249-257). Britain was also pressured to 
renounce its concessions at Hankou and Jiujiang in 1928 and to return the leased territory of Weihaiwei in 1930. But 
the British did not return Hong Kong, including the New Territories, to China. This was because by the 1920s Hong 
Kong was important to the British for its Far Eastern trade and it remained in Britain’s interests to continue to rule 
Hong Kong while relinquishing some other extraterritorial privileges in China. See Kevin Lane, Sovereignty and the 
Status Quo (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 44-45). Britain and other powers could not accept the Chinese 
government’s request that all extraterritorial privileges be terminated by January 1, 1930, even though the powers 
agreed to the principle of a gradual withdrawal after that date. For the KMT government, the existence of foreign 
extraterritoriality continued to be a symbol of Chinese humiliation, but it was not powerful enough to abrogate all the 
treaties in one move. See George Endacott, A History o f Hong Kong, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1973, pp. 42-43). Another reason why Chiang could not abolish all the treaties was the imminent Japanese threat to 
China. In 1931, Japan occupied Manchuria, and the next year attacked Shanghai. Japan’s rapid encroachment upon 
large Chinese territories threatened China’s survival, and a response to Japan was more urgent than the abolition of 
the unequal treaties with Western powers.
52 Tung-ming Lee, The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question o f Hong Kong: A Political and Legal 
Perspective (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Okalahoma, 1985, pp. 112-113)
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extraterritoriality system.53 After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour and Hong Kong 
in 1941, China became an ally of the United States and Great Britain against the 
Japanese; and the KMT took the opportunity to request Britain to give up colonial rule 
in Hong Kong, but without success.54
The Japanese defeat in 1945 aroused tensions between China and Britain over which 
country should accept Japan’s surrender at Hong Kong. When the British obtained 
support from United States President Harry Truman, Chiang’s government had to allow 
Britain to accept the Japanese surrender and continue its colonial rule.5:5 To assuage the 
Chinese people’s concern about the future of Hong Kong, Chiang promised that his 
government would continue to negotiate with the British for the settlement of the Hong 
Kong question through diplomatic channels.56 Chiang’s decision demonstrated that he 
could do little but accept the status quo. In 1949, the KMT was overthrown by the 
Chinese Communists, ending its opportunity to settle the Hong Kong issue.
The CCP was a strong anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist party from the time of its 
establishment in July 1921. The Manifesto of the Second Congress of the Party, 
published in 1922, used colourful and emotional language to denounce the Western 
powers’ violation of China’s sovereignty. For example, it stated that China was under 
“the domination of international imperialism” and had been “trampled underfoot by
53 ibid.
54 G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 277-304). In 
1942, the 100th anniversary of the signing the Treaty o f Nanking, the Nationalist government made a public appeal to 
abolish all unequal treaties. China’s position was supported by the Untied States, where anti-colonialism was strong. 
United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt clearly stated several times from 1943 to 1945 that Britain should 
return Hong Kong to China, because Clause Three o f the Atlantic Charter o f 1943 called for the liberation of all 
peoples and applied to the people overrun by the Germans and Japanese as well as to the people under British 
colonial rule. However, the British rejected the Chinese proposal and refused to relinquish Hong Kong. They did 
promise to reconsider the Hong Kong question when the war was over. See also Kevin Lane, Sovereignty and the 
Status Quo (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 46-53)
55 The Collected Wartime Messages o f Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937-1945 The Chinese Ministry of 
Information (New York: John Day, 1946, pp. 711-718)
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Britain, the United States, France and Japan,” 57 and that imperialist oppression of China 
and conflicts among imperialist powers for economic interests in China accounted for
58“China’s present special status in the field of international relations.”
Mao Zedong also offered his view on modem Chinese foreign relations. He argued that 
since the First Opium War of 1840, the Western powers had invaded China and forced 
open China’s door. The Chinese suddenly found that their country was much more 
backward than the Western countries.59 In his 1939 Essay, ‘The Chinese Revolution and 
the Chinese Communist Party’, Mao stated that the real motives of the ‘imperialist 
powers’ in invading China was not to replace feudal China with a capitalist system, but 
“to transform China into their semi-colony or colony”. The powers “forced China to 
conclude numerous unequal treaties.” They gained control of all the important “trading 
ports in China by such treaties, monopolised industries and banks in China and 
jeopardised the development of China’s own industry and banking system.”60 Mao 
further pointed out that imperialism controlled “not only China’s vital financial and 
economic arteries but also her political and military powers.”61 Mao concluded that “the 
contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation...is the principal one among 
the various contradictions”. Therefore, the primary task of the Chinese revolution was 
“the national revolution for the overthrow of imperialism.”
Mao viewed the Chinese revolution as the continuation of the nationalist movement
56 ibid.
57 Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Beijing: Foreign Language Press. 1955; reprint, Westport, Conn.: 
Hyperion Press, 1973, pp. 269-270)
58 ibid
59 Robert North, The Foreign Relations of China (Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978, pp. 80-84)
60 Mao Zedong, ‘On Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party’ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 3 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954, pp. 78-87)
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initiated by Dr Sun Yat-sen in fighting colonialism and imperialism. In his draft for 
the inscription on the Monument to the People’s Heroes erected in Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing, Mao wrote that the Chinese communists’ cause was to continue the struggle 
begun in 1840 to “resist the enemy, domestic and foreign, to strive for the independence 
of the nation and the freedom of the people.”64
In 1948, after three decisive victories over the KMT in China’s northeast battlefields, 
the communist forces were about to take power over all the mainland. When the 
People’s Liberation Army approached the border with Hong Kong, the total strength of 
forces available to the British to defend Hong Kong was reported to be at most 25,000.65 
It was believed initially that China was then determined to take military steps to recover 
Hong Kong. In the wake of the mainland’s liberation, it seemed perfectly logical that 
the next step was to take back Hong Kong, especially given the prevailing anti­
imperialist and anti-colonialist sentiments among the rank and file.66 Regarding itself as 
the genuine leading power in China’s anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements, 
the CCP had no conflict of principles towards a takeover of the British colony, which 
would have wiped out the humiliation that the three treaties represented.67 Because the 
CCP did not recognise the treaties bearing on Hong Kong, it did not consider itself 
bound by them.68 Thus, from a legal point of view, it could justify its actions, too. Given 
that there was no universally-accepted interpretation of international law and no 
sufficiently authoritative international body to inforce the law, China’s position was
63 Robert North, The Foreign Relations of China (Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978, p. 82)
64 Michael Kau and John Leung, eds. The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949-1976, Vol. 1 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 
1986, p. 5)
65 ‘Approach to Our Commonwealth Government Asking Support of Hong Kong Policy’ by Commonwealth 
Relations Office, 27 May 1949 (London Public Record Office, F0371 75873 F7961/B/G)
66 William Overholt, The Rise of China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993, pp. 225-267)
67 ibid.
68 Wesley Fishel, The End of Extraterritoriality in China (New York: Octagon Books, 1974, pp. 81-87)
Chapter Nine 339
consistent and would at least win support from the communist bloc.69 Moreover, a
70takeover could increase the new China’s prestige among Third World countries.
However, the CCP decided not to take over Hong Kong immediately after it claimed 
power in the mainland.71 It was clear that the CCP’s toleration of Hong Kong as a 
British colony was the decisive factor for the island’s survival until 1997. The CCP’s 
consent to Hong Kong’s colonial status, however, did not alter its principled stand over 
Hong Kong.72 The emergence of the People’s Republic as a military power after the 
Korean War strongly reinforced this point.73 In 1950, one year after the establishment of 
the PRC, China entered the Korean War and fought against the United Nations forces, 
which included the military forces of the United States and Great Britain. China’s
69 William McGum ed. Basic Law, Basic Questions (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Company, 1988, pp. 107-114)
70 ibid. In this context, a People 's China editorial stated in 1950 that the Chinese people’s victory not only provided 
indirect assistance to all colonially-exploited peoples by laying down a proven pattem for successful struggle, but 
also provided direct and concrete assistance to them, for it has shaken the whole colonial system to its foundations. 
People 's China (Vol. 1, No. 4, 16 February 1950, p. 3)
71 In November 1948, Qiao Mu, then the Chinese Communist spokesman in Hong Kong and the head of the Xinhua 
Office, in an interview with the Reuters correspondent in Hong Kong, H. C. Bough, assured the British government 
that a future Communist government in China would not cause any trouble in Hong Kong. He indicated that the 
Chinese Communists could have perfectly normal relations with the United Kingdom and suggested that the status of 
Hong Kong was only a minor diplomatic issue. Qiao also suggested that the Hong Kong question should be settled 
only at the highest level and that it would be considered by the Communists as an integral factor in Communist- 
British relations. ‘The Consul General of Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State’, 17 December 1948, Foreign 
Relations o f the United States (Washington: The United States Government Printing Office, Vol. VII, 1973, p. 66) 
Another source proved Qiao’s statement. The Consul-General at Beijing was informed on 24 September by L. K. Tao 
(known to Ambassador Stuart), that he had recently met with Lo Lung-chi who had a conversation on 20 September 
with Mao Zedong. Mao had told Lo that the position of Hong Kong could presently be considered safe, since it had 
been decided by the CCP that all treaties signed before the Nationalists came to power would be accepted, while 
those signed after that period would be made the subject of study, ibid. Vol. VIII, 1978, p. 539
12 On 8 March 1963, the People 's Daily, in response to criticisms from the Communist Party of the USA, announced 
that questions such as those of Hong Kong and Macao relate to the category of unequal treaties left over by history, 
treaties which the imperialists imposed on China.” See People's Daily 8 March 1963. In September 1964, at a World 
Youth Forum in Moscow, a resolution was passed calling for the elimination of colonies in Asia. Tabled by the 
Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) delegate, it put Hong Kong and Macao on a par with Timor Island, Papua, Oman and Aden, 
and demanded the end of colonial rule in these places in accordance with the Untied Nations declaration on 
decolonisation. The Chinese delegate condemned the resolution and pointed out that Hong Kong and Macao were 
Chinese territories occupied by British and Portuguese imperialists on the strength of unequal treaties. See People 's 
Daily, 27 September 1964. Again, on 10 March 1972, when the UN General Assembly’s Special Committee on 
Colonialism included Hong Kong and Macao in its list of colonial territories, Huang Hua, Beijing’s UN 
representative, handed a memorandum to the committee, stating: “As is known to all, the questions of Hong Kong 
and Macao belong to the category of questions resulting from the series of unequal treaties left over by history, 
treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. Hong Kong and Macao are part of the Chinese territory occupied 
by the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the question of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within 
China’s sovereignty and does not at all fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories.” See Joseph, Y. S. 
Cheng ed. Hong Kong, in Search of a Future (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 54)
73 Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, Chpt. 2)
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military capability, as demonstrated in the Korean War, proved that China had become a 
military power.74 It was not clear how the Korean War affected British foreign policy 
towards Asia and in particular towards Hong Kong. However, in 1952 Great Britain did 
change its position on Hong Kong and abandoned its plan to defend Hong Kong if it
7 Scame under a large-scale Chinese military attack.
After the Korean War, the PRC was more confident of its military capability and
1  f \demonstrated that it was willing to use force to take disputed border territories. 
China’s military capability could be one of the reasons that the Chinese leaders were 
firm about sovereignty over Hong Kong in the 1980s. The Qing Dynasty lost Hong 
Kong when the Chinese were defeated in the Opium Wars about 140 years earlier. But 
in the 1980s, although Great Britain was still one of the military powers in the world, it 
had lost its dominant position in relation to China. The Chinese military capability no 
doubt strengthened China’s negotiating position.77
In conclusion, politics of sovereignty and the issue of Hong Kong were closely linked in 
Chinese revolutionary historiography. Hong Kong was perceived as the living evidence 
of the imperialist, in particular the British imperialist, carving up of Chinese territory
74 ibid.
75 A British Cabinet Memorandum stated: “We do not consider that our strategy in Hong Kong should be changed by 
a French withdrawal from Indochina, although it may be necessary to maintain a larger garrison to ensure internal 
security and, if  attacked, to cover an orderly evacuation.” Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong 
Kong 4th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 233-246). This secret document revealed that in the 
early 1950s, Hong Kong’s status became uncertain and the British were prepared to withdraw from their colony if  
China determined to recover Hong Kong militarily.
76 Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, Chpts. 2 and 3). In 1962, 
China defeated its neighbour, India, in a war over a disputed border, and in 1969 fought with the Soviet Union for 
possession o f Zhenbao Island, located on the Ussuri River border. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese initiated 
several military attacks against the Vietnamese in the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, which both 
China and Vietnam claimed. Chinese military power could also be seen in its possession o f an atomic bomb in 1964, 
its production o f a hydrogen bomb in 1967 and in its launching of a satellite in 1970.
77 Ken Davies, Hong Kong to 1997: A Question o f Confidence (London: The Economic Intelligence Unit Ltd. 1990, 
pp. 70-73)
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when China was weak. Hong Kong was a symbol of national humiliation at the hands of 
Western powers. Though the CCP and the KMT differed fundamentally in ideology, 
their nationalistic sentiment over sovereignty issue tended to blur the distinction 
between them. It was unthinkable that during the Sino-British negotiations in the early 
1980s that policy makers in Beijing would risk agreeing to a continuation of Hong 
Kong’s British rule, because no Chinese leader would want to be labelled as a national 
traitor in history. Deng Xiaoping summed up the real feelings of the top CCP leaders in 
Beijing when he said that he would not want to be a second Li Hongzhang. Chinese 
nationalism and its passion on sovereignty were the historical crux of Chinese efforts 
leading to the 1984 Hong Kong settlement, and the motivation of such efforts could not 
be correctly explained without an understanding of that tradition.
Personality and Political Culture of ‘Rule by Man’
Relevance o f Leaders ’ Personality
Chapter Two showed that the impact of leadership personality on foreign policy 
decision making varied with political system and culture. The less open the decision 
making system was, the more likely personality would imprint on the policy.
In the case of Hong Kong transition, it was well-known that the Chinese paramount 
leader Deng Xiaoping weighed heavily on many of the Chinese Hong Kong policies. 
However, one level lower from Deng, how did the personality of other top leaders 
influence China’s Hong Kong policy?
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Some foreign observers believed that what would happen to Hong Kong after 1997 
depended on who were in power in Beijing. This was true to a point: when moderate 
leaders like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were running the party and the government 
in the 1980s, policy towards Hong Kong was not as harsh as it was in the early 1990s. 
Both of them were proteges of Deng, and yet both lost their top jobs within the CCP in 
the 1980s.
However, official policy towards Hong Kong was softer in the 1980s for a variety of 
reasons that were not directly related to top leaders like Hu and Zhao. One important 
thing was that the Tiananmen crisis had yet to occur, which meant the party felt more 
secure within China. Politics in Hong Kong was still largely ‘colonial’, meaning direct 
elections based on universal franchise and real political parties had yet to come into 
existence. And Beijing had yet to witness the spontaneous reaction in support of 
Beijing’s student movement.
While conceding that a paramount leader like Deng commanded high authority in 
making important Chinese foreign policies, or in this case, China’s Hong Kong policies, 
this line risked the danger of being proliferated into general understanding of the role of 
Chinese leadership. The limitations of the individual leader analysis became apparent 
from the fact that while Zhao Ziyang did not survive 1989, many of his close colleagues 
did, including Qiao Shi and Yao Yilin. And of course, so did Deng. So suggesting what 
would happen to Hong Kong after 1997 on the basis of who would hold which formal 
rank in Beijing begged the question: how widely should the net be cast? Policy was 
more moderate when Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng. Qiao Shi and Yao Yilin were in charge. 
Policy became conservative when Zhao left the scene but Li, Qiao and Yao were still
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around, plus a few new faces (including the new General Secretary Jiang Zemin)—all 
were supposed to be under the unified leadership of Deng. This seemed to support the 
conclusion that there were much more sophisticated factional models operating within 
the CCP leadership under Deng.
Therefore, there were two more relevant ways to understand the roles of personality in 
China’s policies towards Hong Kong. Firstly, Deng Xiaoping as paramount leader 
exercised extensive personal influence over China’s Hong Kong policy. Secondly, 
China’s core policies towards Hong Kong were basically a product of both the party’s 
collective mindset and its collegiate reactions to external pressures.
‘Rule by Man ’ as a Political Culture
The issues of ‘rule by man’ or rule by law went to the heart of the differences between 
Hong Kong and China. Beijing recognised this, which was why the Basic Law 
stipulated that the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and 
customary laws should be maintained in the new HKSAR. This seemed an 
extraordinary concession at that time since it meant that China, though delighted to be 
ridding Hong Kong of British colonial government, was willing to allow the
n o
fundamental legal precepts of English tradition to remain behind.
78 The common law owed its origin to the post-Norman Conquest period of English history (1066 onwards), when 
government became more centralised and judges developed a coherent body of legal principles applicable to the 
whole country—hence the word ‘common’—from England’s disparate local customary laws. As judges applied these 
precepts to new cases, a huge body of case law developed and the ‘doctrine of precedent’ evolved, binding courts in 
later cases to decisions made in similar earlier cases. Yet the common law could be inflexible and sometimes harsh: 
Justice was done as long as the proper legal processes were followed and the relevant law fully applied, even if the 
end result seemed unfair and wrong. So there developed another type of law designed to soften the common law and 
allow for some discretion by judges—the ‘rule of equity’. This meant that law was the antithesis of arbitrary political 
power; everyone should obey it, including government officials; everyone was equal before the law; law was 
impartially administered by independent judges; law was formal and rational; and law benefits the individual (who 
was presumed to be innocent in criminal cases until proven guilty). See Peter Wesley-Smith, An Introduction to the 
Hong Kong Legal System 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 32-36). Also Anne Carver, Hong
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As discussed in Chapter Five, China had a long and entrenched political tradition of 
relying on ‘rule by man’, rather than on rule by law, as a major operating apparatus in 
its domestic politics. As a natural extension of this tradition and practice, they also 
impacted on Chinese leaders’ anticipation and strategic thinking of how Hong Kong 
should be governed both before and after 1997. The CCP leadership’s this expectation, 
not surprisingly, was reflected in one of the most proclaimed slogans during the Hong 
Kong transitional period: ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong’ —vis-ä-vis the other 
option: ‘Hong Kong law rules Hong Kong’.
The following two excerpts of Deng Xiaoping’s speeches in 1987 demonstrated 
Beijing’s deep-rooted suspicion of possible political disturbance in Hong Kong in the 
future, and the necessity for China to adopt effective measures to prevent it from 
happening. It not only revealed Deng’s personal principled view on how Hong Kong 
should be managed, but also summarised the consensus of the party on the issue. On the 
occasion of meeting the drafters of the Basic Law, Deng said:
Don’t ever think that everything would be all right if Hong Kong affairs were 
administered solely by Hong Kong people while the Central Government had 
nothing to do with the matter. That simply wouldn’t work—it’s not a realistic 
idea. The Central Government certainly will not intervene in the day-to-day 
affairs of the special administrative region, nor is that necessary. But isn’t it 
possible that something could happen in the region that might jeopardise the 
fundamental interests of the country?... You should also consider a few other 
things, for example, after 1997 we shall still allow people in Hong Kong to
Kong Business Law 2nd. ed. (Hong Kong: Longman, 1994, Chpt. 1)
79 This apparently straightforward dictum was supposed to mean just what it said: that only Hong Kong people should 
be allowed to participate in government. But the notion of Hong Kong people changed during the transitional period. 
The Joint Declaration stated that the government... would be composed of ‘local inhabitants’. Article 3 of the Basic 
Law changed this to “the executive authorities and legislature...shall be composed of permanent residents of Hong 
Kong”. While local inhabitants implied people who were bom in Hong Kong, permanent residents only required 7 
years’ residency, hence many more people would be qualified. In theory, this would enable immigrants who were 
fairly recently from the mainland to enter HKSAR government, including Beijing’s fifth columnists. It was this shift 
to ‘permanent residents’ from ‘local inhabitants’ that allowed for a different view of political participation than the 
slogan ‘Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong’ seemed to imply.
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attack the Chinese Communist Party and China verbally, but what if they 
should turn their words into action, trying to convert Hong Kong into a base of 
opposition to the mainland under the pretext of ‘democracy’? Then we should
O A
have no choice but to intervene...
On another occasion, in commenting on the possibility of the Legislative Council 
becoming too fractured by party politics to allow the Executive to govern effectively, 
for example, the passage of important bills and legislation could be obstructed, Deng 
said:
Isn’t it possible that something could happen there that would jeopardise the 
fundamental interests of Hong Kong itself? Can anyone imagine that there are 
no forces that might engage in obstruction or sabotage? ...If the Central 
Government were to abandon all its power, there might be turmoil that would 
damage Hong Kong’s interests. Therefore it is to Hong Kong’s advantage, not 
its disadvantage, for the Central Government to retain some power there.81
As discussed in detail in Chapter Five, traditional Chinese social order was basically 
Confucian in nature. This order was based on a conception of human nature which not 
only allowed for the natural inequality of man, but also required a rationalised 
hierarchical order of status and roles.82 The legitimacy of the government in this society
01
was not contingent upon the consent of some higher institution. In traditional China, 
the government was the political institution, and politics was nothing other than politics 
within the government. All other social groups and institutions were subject to the
o  c
government, and no institutional or legal limits were set upon the power of the state.
Although the CCP claimed to have a fundamentally different ideology and political
80 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. Ill (1982-1992,) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994, pp. 219-220)
81 ibid. p. 220
82 Donald Munro, The Concept o f Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 23-24)
83 Lucian Pye, The Spirit o f Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968, pp. 88-101)
84 ibid.
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system from that of the traditional ruling classes, it could not escape the pervasiveness 
of such a political culture. In fact, more than three decades of single party rule had 
greatly reinforced this tradition. Deng’s second revolution in China did not alter this 
basic practice.
The above two quotations of Deng Xiaoping clearly argued for, from Beijing’s 
perspective, the raison d ’etre of why Hong Kong should be ruled by man after 1997. 
This was supported by the CCP’s assessment of Hong Kong as fundamentally a Chinese 
society with the same prevailing traditional values, which gave Beijing the confidence 
that Hong Kong could be ruled by man.
Unlike China, which until the late 1970s pursued a strategy of autarkical development, 
Hong Kong’s export-oriented industrialisation ineluctably exposed it to international
oz:
economic risks and fluctuations, which turned it into a prosperous and vibrant 
capitalist metropolis. The Chinese government played a dominant role in restructuring 
mainland Chinese society through a combination of political coercion, mass 
mobilisation, ideological inculcation and various other control measures. The Hong 
Kong government, on the other hand, under the guiding laissez-faire principle, had a 
much less direct role in the economic, social and cultural domains of Hong Kong
00
people’s lives. The ensuing rise of the living standards and emergence of a wealthy 
middle class in Hong Kong did not bring about a much predicted democratisation
85 Donald Munro, The Concept o f Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 23-24)
86 Kathleen Cheek-Milby and Miron Mushkat, Hong Kong: The Challenge o f  Transformation (Hong Kong: Centre of 
Asian Studies, University o f Hong Kong, 1989, pp. 45-63)
87 ibid.
88 Ming Chan and Gerard Postiglione, The Hong Kong Reader: Passage to Chinese Sovereignty (Armonk, New York: 
M. E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 38-71)
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process.89 On the contrary, the political beliefs and the ethos of many scholars, 
politicians and businessmen contributed to the maintenance of Hong Hong’s status quo 
and political stability.90
More than 140 years of British rule did not separate close cultural and social ties 
between the mainland and Hong Kong, although its unique colonial history and 
modernisation process made it a distinctive economic entity in its own right. Despite its 
commitment to capitalism, Hong Kong remained first and foremost a Chinese society, 
with well entrenched concepts of good politics and governance shared by many Hong 
Kong Chinese.91 Many of the traditional political values were retained throughout the 
British rule, such as the hierarchical ordering of political roles, the primary function of 
political authority to maintain social order, and a dependence on governmental authority 
for preserving both public and private interests.92 Lucian Pye observed that traditional 
Chinese generally lacked an abstract concept of government as a structural entity. 
Paternalism in traditional China was a political ideal upheld by both officials and 
people.93
This was certainly true for Hong Kong: the most intriguing aspect of colonial 
governance in Hong Kong Chinese society was the undeniable legitimacy of authority. 
The fact that Britain was able to maintain continuous and stable rule over Hong Kong 
for about 150 years (except for the brief period of Japanese occupation in the 1940s)
89 ibid. They argue that the rise of the middle class in Hong Kong did not lead to a stronger demand for 
democratisation, at least before 1989, which was a topical issue being discussed in many scholarly works.
90 Lau Siu-kai, Decolonisation Without Independence: The Unfinished Political Reforms o f the Hong Kong 
Government (Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, The Chinese University o f Hong Kong, 1987, pp. 53-71)
91 Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the World Trading System (London: Macmillan, 
1990, pp. 151-153)
92 ibid.
93 Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions o f Authority (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985, pp. 27-28)
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without suffering large-scale dislocation from nationalistic challenges showed that the 
colonial government managed to enjoy a certain level of legitimacy among the Hong 
Kong people.94 Although the establishment of colonial rule in Hong Kong was based on 
military and diplomatic coercion, maintaining such a rule throughout 150 years would 
have to depend more on law and order, the institutional power and importantly, the 
consent of the majority of Hong Kong people.95 Occasionally, some subtle reference to 
the doctrines of economic prowess and cultural superiority of British people emerged to 
justify colonial rule.96 However, there was never an elaborate, clearly articulated theory
Q7to buttress the British authority in Hong Kong.
This sense of ‘givenness’ of colonial authority and the surprising immunity of colonial 
legitimacy from nationalistic challenge lay in the very fact of prevailing political beliefs 
in power, authority and hierarchy held by the Hong Kong Chinese society. This could 
also be understood in terms of that the colonial rule created vested interest groups and 
the middle class who identified themselves with a continued colonial presence.99 The 
reluctance of the local Chinese elites to support the claims of the Nationalist 
government to sovereignty over Hong Kong in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
and the aversion of most of the Hong Kong people in the early 1980s towards the 
Chinese takeover in 1997, expressed their preference for the status quo as opposed to 
rule by uncertainty and the unknown.100 This political ‘givenness’ was not only an
94 Norman Miners, The Government and Politics o f  Hong Kong, 5 th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991, 
pp. 112-134)
9 Dick Wilson, Hong Kong! Hong Kong! (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990, pp. 121-125)
96 ibid.
97 ibid
98 Hungdah Chiu, Hong Kong’s Transition to 1997: Background, Problems and Prospects (Baltimore, MD.: 
University of Maryland, 1993, pp. 25-33)
99 ibid. pp. 91-102
100 ibid.
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important source of legitimacy for the British rule,101 but also fitted in well with the 
Chinese concept of pre-existing power and authority. In addition, British colonial 
system provided little support for participatory democratic forms, which, coupled with 
the political culture, provided a social acceptance for Beijing to practise ‘rule by man’ 
in Hong Kong.
Beijing’s Assessment of Changing Balance
Among all the compelling forces for the Chinese to regain Hong Kong, the sovereignty 
issue commanded the major focus, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter. 
This issue carried the historical weight that ran from China’s forced submission to 
‘unequal treaties’, to the KMT regime’s efforts to abrogate those treaties, and to the 
success of a communist movement that relied heavily on a nationalist appeal. The 
symbolism of Hong Kong’s return remained powerful, since the treaty that ceded Hong 
Kong island to the British initiated the painful course of foreign intrusions that turned 
China into a semi-feudalist and semi-colonialist country.103 Xiao Weiyun, a member of 
the Basic Law Drafting Committee and a law professor at Beijing University, was 
quoted as saying that for China it was a matter of sovereignty to determine Hong 
Kong’s post-1997 political structure.104
During the transitional period, the political forces in Hong Kong disintegrated, realigned
101 Yun-wing Sung, The China-Hong Kong Connection: The Key to China's Open-door Policy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 27-31)
102 Steve Shipp, Hong Kong, China: A Political History o f the British Colony's Transfer to Chinese Rule (Jefferson, 
N. C. McFarland, 1995, pp 208-214)
103 ibid.
104 ‘Sovereignty Seen by Professor Xiao’ South China Morning Post 6 January 1994, China News Digest (Internet), 7 
January 1994
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and converged with great fluidity. While the original motive of fifth column policy in 
Hong Kong was based on traditional revolutionary calculations, the subsequent political 
fluctuation in the transitional period served to either reduce or reinforce the motivation. 
This oscillation approximately corresponded to the dynamic political changes during 
1983-1997. If the whole transitional period could roughly be divided into two 
parts—before 1990 and after—then the first part with the increasing institutionalisation 
and Sino-British cooperation over a series of important issues tended to discount the 
original perceived political worthiness of the fifth column policy.105 The second part, 
however, the breakdown of consensus between the Chinese and British governments 
over the speed and scale of political reform in Hong Kong106 meant that the original 
motive was revived and reinforced by the CCP’s new policy commitment.
The changing political balance during this period could be seen as a result of last minute 
manoeuvres by both Chinese and British governments. On the British side, Chris Patten
105 The Chinese and British cooperation in the first part of transition period could be identified by the new airport 
agreement and the Court of Final Appeal agreement. These agreements demonstrated that how China and Britain 
could work hard together to solve the differences, even though they disagreed on the British proposal of right of 
abode in Britain and the colonial government’s introduction of a Bill of Rights. It was also under the auspices of this 
cooperative spirit that Hong Kong was able to join GATT (WTO), IMF and many other international organisations 
with independent status. Prior to 1990, Beijing and London even had reached agreements on the principle and speed 
of bringing in representative democracy before and after 1997. The concept of through train and convergence with 
the Basic Law were products of Sino-British cooperation in political matters. Guided by these concepts, the two 
countries consulted each other, mainly through the Joint Liaison Group, on major issues and sought mutually 
agreeable solutions. The Joint Liaison Group was able to provide a forum in which the both governments could 
consult, discuss and solve a number of issues which had previously been thought impossible. This development of 
cooperative relations between the Chinese and British governments through institutional avenues in the first part of 
the transition period somewhat made the practice of fifth column policy in Hong Kong less relevant, ibid. Also see 
Steve Shipp, Hong Kong, China: A Political History o f the British Colony's Transfer to Chinese Rule (Jefferson, N. 
C. McFarland, 1995, pp. 102-104).
106 The watershed of the breaking down of cooperation with confrontation and intensified contention between the two 
governments were the events of 1990. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as 
well as the pro-democracy student movement in 1989 critically affected Britain’s Hong Kong policy. It was the 
misjudgement of the then new administration under John Major that China would soon follow the same path of 
disintegration, or at least fatally wounded, that pushed the British government to expedite establishing a more 
representative system in Hong Kong before 1997—with the goal to extend the influence of the Westminster system 
by strengthening the hands of local democratic advocates. Chris Patten as the new governor to carry out Britain’s 
revised China and Hong Kong policies encountered strong opposition from Chinese government. The 1991 and 1995 
Legco elections were perceived by the Chinese government as well-orchestrated political blackmail by the British 
government to undermine Chinese authority in the territory. The vow by China in September 1995 to abolish the 
Legislative Council after 1997 was made more explicit on 24 March 1996 by the vote of the Preparatory Committee 
to scrap Legco and to replace it by an appointed ‘provisional’ legislature, ibid.
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pushed for a rapid democratisation in Hong Kong before 1997. On the Chinese side, 
more seemed to have been done. In addition to consolidating institutionalised 
mechanisms, Beijing was also engaged in an aggressive united front strategy to ‘win the 
numbers’, and a political asset stocktaking of its traditional allies such as the Hong 
Kong Federation of Trade Unions. These two moves were closely linked to China’s 
Hong Kong policy because Beijing could not realistically assess its relative strengths 
and weakness without also taking into account these two aspects.
Democratisation—Means or End?
i  r \n
Hong Kong’s political system was a product of British colonial rule, which heavily 
relied on bureaucrats, political institutional arrangements and law. The CCP, on the 
other hand, had always been suspicious of bureaucratic and institutional approaches, 
and was even more so in the case of Hong Kong. This was because the CCP had learnt 
that, as a late comer in the international politics, if it played only by the rules set by 
others, it would never gain an upper hand in the power game.
In the 1984 Sino-British agreement, China announced that after 1997 Hong Kong’s 
economic system, legal system and way of life would remain unchanged for fifty years. 
The basis for this confidence and generosity was China’s assumption of the continuation 
of Hong Kong in its early 1980s mode—an executive led political system with a
107 After Hong Kong was ceded to Britain in the 1842 Nanking Treaty, the British Crown issued the Letters Patent 
and the Royal Instructions in April 1843, which regulated the political system o f the new colony and consequently 
became the constitution o f the British colony o f Hong Kong for over 150 years. The Letters Patent stipulated the 
relationship between Hong Kong and London as well as the colony’s internal political system. The core of Hong 
Kong’s political system was the governor, who was appointed by the Queen o f the United Kingdom and was the 
representative o f the British Crown in Hong Kong. The governor was not only the highest authority o f the colony, but 
also the commander-in-chief o f British military forces in Hong Kong. He possessed the power to make laws for the 
colony. See Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty 1898-1997: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong's New Territories 
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1980)
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basically complacent population. The fluid political situation in Hong Kong during the 
transition period gathered a momentum that challenged Beijing to adjust its policy 
accordingly.108 This dynamic process brought changes to the transient and delicate 
political balance, which in turn impacted on Beijing’s assessment and adjustment of its 
Hong Kong policy.
It became clear in the early 1990s that Britain and China pursued different political 
agenda in the remaining years running up to 1997. For decades Hong Kong had been a 
politically inactive but economically dynamic city which was ruled and administered by 
a vast and efficient Weberian type of bureaucracy.109 The colonial government had 
never taken initiatives to instil political consciousness in the residents. The Hong Kong 
government had never seriously thought of transplanting British or other Western types 
of democracies into the colony, either.110 For decades, the Hong Kong government had 
deliberately created hundreds of consultative committees at various levels of the 
bureaucracy, through which the views and feelings of the industrial-business elites, 
professionals, and even ordinary people were fed back into the administrative 
decisionmaking process.* 111 Through this institutionalised process of consultation and 
absorption, Hong Kong developed a unique political system which was characterised by 
elitist politics.112 The essence of this political system was the bureaucratisation of 
politics. The efficiency and effectiveness of the system absorbed potential political 
elites into the administration, which made politics almost unnecessary outside
108 Steve Shipp, Hong Kong, China: A Political History o f the British Colony's Transfer to Chinese Rule (Jefferson, 
N. C. McFarland, 1995, pp. 127-129)
109 Ambrose Y. C. King, ‘The Political Culture of Kwun Tong: A Chinese Community in Hong Kong’ Ambrose Y. 
C. King and Ranee P. L. Lee eds. Social Life and Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
1981, pp. 147-168)
110 ibid.
111 ibid.
112 ibid.
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113government.
As 1997 drew near, Governor Chris Patten pushed to accelerate Hong Kong’s political 
reform process by installing a series of new rules, including such sensitive matters as a 
more representative form of government and an electoral system.114 For the Beijing 
authorities, Patten’s plan totally dismantled the Sino-British arrangement for the 
transition of sovereignty based on the concept of the ‘through train’, under which the 
colony’s last Legislative Council installed in 1995 would continue to work through to 
1 9 9 9  115 Basic Law confirmed this arrangement on the condition that the
composition of the last Legislative Council and its members met the requirements of the 
law. Patten’s change of the manner of election of Legislative Council members was 
seen as a deliberate defiance to Beijing, therefore a declaration of war to China.
For Beijing, the motive of Patten’s political ‘coup’ was to hastily prop up a de facto 
political reality and system prior to Hong Kong’s handover in 1997, which would give 
China little choice but to accept the fait accompli. Worse still, it was also considered to 
be a conspiracy by the old British colonists aiming to insult China.116 Because of this,
113 Ambrose Y. C. King, ‘Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots Level’ 
Asian Survey (Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1975, pp. 422-439)
114 There were several major reforms in the governor’s plan: (1) The Legco and the Exco should be separated, and no 
members of the Exco would also be members of the Legco. (2) All members of the Legco would be elected in 1995, 
and the governor would no longer appoint members of the Legco. (3) Most importantly, the way of filling the Legco 
seats returned by the Election Committee and the functional constituencies in the 1995 election would be rearranged, 
and those seats would be produced on a more open and democratic basis by a method of “one person, one vote”. 
Patten’s other proposals included reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 and encouraging the development of political 
parties before the 1995 Legco election. In addition, the governor would like to see that all members of the District 
Boards, the Urban Council, and the Regional Council be elected directly in the 1994 and 1995 elections. See ‘Hope 
for Hong Kong: Chris Patten on His Plans to Safeguard a Way of Life’ The Times 8 October 1992, p. 14. See also 
Michael Binyon and James Pringle, ‘Patten Move to Broaden Democracy Angers China’ The Times 8 October 1992, 
p. 11; Jesse Wong, ‘Hong Kong Governor’s Speech Raises Hackles in Beijing with Proposals for More Democracy’ 
The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly (No. 41, 12 October 1992, p. 5, 12); and Frank Ching, ‘Hong Kong: Cleared 
for Action’ Far Eastern Economic Review (22 October 1992, pp. 20-21); ‘Text of the Governor’s Televised Policy 
Speech’ FBIS, 8 October 1992, pp. 27-46.
115 Jamie Allen, Seeing Red: China's Uncompromising Takeover o f Hong Kong (Singapore: KHL Printing, 1997, pp. 
112-157)
'^Interviews with officials of the Xinhua Office, Hong Kong, December 1996, December 1997
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the Chinese government was furious over Patten’s reform proposals, and threatened to 
retaliate by ‘setting up another kitchen’.117 Beijing had two options: to accept Patten’s 
new arrangement for the transfer of sovereignty which breached the Basic Law; or to 
reject it and break China’s original promise to establish the first government of the 
HKSAR with a Provisional Legislature.118 Given the circumstances, Beijing seemed to 
have no choice but to reject Patten’s plan.
On the surface, the irony of Patten’s political reform in Hong Kong was that China tried 
to maintain Hong Kong’s status quo while Britain tore up its 150 years’ rule book to 
install a new order. China wanted to preserve the existing executive-led system, long in 
force under the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions, while Patten chose to change 150 
years’ practice and build a representative government. From China’s perspective, 
Patten’s reform would significantly expand the Hong Kong electoral base by 
patronising certain social (eg. the young) and other professional groups of voters, 
making it more difficult for China to extend its influence.
But in essence, Patten’s reform package to empower ordinary Hong Kong people with 
broader rights and to encourage their political participation could also be seen as the 
British government’s belated and desperate policy trying to recapture some ground that 
had been lost and infiltrated by Beijing’s fifth columnists in the previous decade. There 
was evidence that Patten had been warned of Beijing’s fifth column activities in Hong 
Kong,119 so it was possible that Pattern intended to, under the umbrella of 
democratisation, offset part of the CCP’s increasing influence in grassroots society. It
117 William Overholt, The Rise of China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993, pp. 311-145)
118 Ambrose Y. C. King, ‘Administrative Absorption o f Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots Level’ 
Asian Survey (Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1975, pp. 422-439)
119 Interviews with former senior adviser to Hong Kong government, London, December 1997
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could therefore be argued that Pattern’s democratisation was not a genuine proposal 
aiming to give Hong Kong people more democratic rights, but a deliberate act to thwart 
Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong. By the same token, it could also be said 
that Beijing’s predictable reaction to Patten’s proposal was no more than a routine 
exercise—the CCP did not suffer a terrible blow because of this, knowing that it had 
already been one step ahead of the game.
The CCP ’s United Front Work
As discussed above, under the British rule, Hong Kong’s power structure incorporated 
business sectors in the government’s administrative decisionmaking process. However, 
the system of appointment of local representatives gave rise to the specific problem of 
the exclusion of ethnic Chinese from the colonial government. Although ethnic Chinese 
accounted for 95 percent of the colony’s population, few were appointed to high-level 
administrative offices before the 1980s.120 As a consequence, in the early 1980s, China 
was relatively weak and lacked a strong network and representation in both the formal 
political system and business circles.
Britain’s sovereignty over Hong Kong was embodied in the appointment of the 
governor and major government officials, and in the colony’s foreign affairs and 
defence.121 Hong Kong had no independent diplomatic relations with any states. Its
120 Norman Miners, The Government and Politics o f Hong Kong, 4th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1986, pp. 168-179). Between 1947 and 1960 the colonial government appointed only seven Chinese as administrative 
officers, compared to forty-one expatriates. In the following decades, the proportion of Chinese in the directorate 
class was slowly increased. By 1970, Chinese comprised 19 percent and by 1980, 39.2 percent; and by 1985, 52.5 
percent.
121 Steve Shipp, Hong Kong, China: A Political History o f the British Colony's Transfer to Chinese Rule (Jefferson, 
N. C. McFarland, 1995, pp. 122-128)
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external relationships and negotiations were conducted on its behalf by Britain, and its
security was protected by British military forces stationed in Hong Kong. More
122importantly, the governor was sent to the colony to implement British policy.
One of the characteristics of Hong Kong’s colonial system was that although in the last 
decades of the British rule, Hong Kong people enjoyed a degree of Western-style 
political freedom—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and 
freedom of assembly—there was no Western-style democracy encapsulated in the 
representative government and competitive political parties.123 Before the Sino-British 
negotiations on Hong Kong in 1982, elections had been introduced but only for the 
Urban Council.124 During more than 140 years of the British rule in Hong Kong, no 
member of the Legislative Council was elected directly by the people until 1991. In 
the mid 1980s, the rapid increase in the number of Chinese in the senior civil service, 
professional organisations and other positions of similar status was due to political 
pressure from the transitional process and the weakening of the colonial government
1 96itself, rather than a voluntary concession of the British ruler.
Beijing noted that the British government’s motive in excluding ethnic Chinese 
participation in the political system was to instil its own proxies from the top down in 
order to consolidate and extend colonial rule. It was against this background that the 
CCP accelerated its united front work in Hong Kong during the transitional period.
122 ibid.
123 Hungdah Chiu, Y. C. Jao, and Yuanli Wu eds. The Future o f Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond (New York: 
Quorum Books, 1986, pp. 67-71)
124 ibid. But the franchise was highly restricted to voters who qualified in one of twenty-three categories by standards 
of education, tax paying, or membership in professional bodies. Of the estimated 440,000 eligible voters in a city of 
over five million, only 35,000 registered; and 6,195 actually voted. See Steve Shipp, Hong Kong, China: A Political 
History o f the British Colony's Transfer to Chinese Rule (Jefferson, N. C. McFarland, 1995, pp. 182-183)
125 Steve Shipp, Hong Kong, China: A Political History o f the British Colony's Transfer to Chinese Rule (Jefferson, 
N. C. McFarland, 1995, pp. 229-232)
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As Chapter Six discussed, the CCP did not stride to power in 1949 entirely on its own 
two feet. At critical moments, it deployed the united front tactics—a way of building 
alliances and relationships with sympathetic non-communist groups or individuals for 
the purpose of enhancing its power and popular support to defeat the enemy of the day. 
The economy and society of pre-1997 Hong Kong was admittedly very different from 
pre-liberation China, yet there remained some uncanny political similarities.
The CCP’s united front in Hong Kong could be seen to be a loosely-knit coalition, not a 
formal body and had no single organisational structure. Although this front comprised a 
fairly solid cadre of key people at the core, it was far more fluid around the edges—the 
zone occupied by less important individuals and community groups. It was essentially a 
strategy of divide and rule, one which played upon existing social and economic 
divisions for maximum political advantage.
Deng set the tone for the CCP’s Hong Kong united front work by stating that since the 
party’s policy on Hong Kong was different from the mainland—the maintenance of 
capitalism not the creation of socialism—the targets of the united front would have to be 
different too. He was quoted as saying that: “We don’t demand that they be in favour of
i ' j n
China’s socialism system; we only ask them to love the motherland and Hong Kong.”
The Xinhua Office started recruiting supporters from among the local business and 
political elite in addition to its traditional work with left-wing trade unions, intellectuals,
126 William Overholt, The Rise o f China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993 pp. 311-321)
127 Deng Xiaoping, ‘On the Issue of Hong Kong’, Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping, 1982-1992, Vol. Ill (Beijing: 
Foreign Language Press, 1992, pp. 70-71)
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newspapers and schools as early as in the 1950s.128 But it was the years of Xu Jiatun and 
Zhou Nan129 that were extremely productive in winning over the colony’s business elite 
to the united front.130 However, it was really in the early 1990s (following the 
Tiananmen Square Incident) that united front work began to be consolidated. The first 
China appointed committee was inaugurated in March 1992 and consisted of a group of 
44 prominent businessmen, pro-Beijing politicians and professionals, academics and 
unionists. They were called ‘Hong Kong Affairs Advisers’, a deliberately neutral term 
chosen to dampen alarm among the Hong Kong public and government officials that the 
group would function as a ‘second power centre’ alongside the colonial
1 T1administration.
Over the following three years, a further three groups of advisers from similarly diverse 
backgrounds were appointed—in March 1993, April 1994 and April 1995—taking the 
total number to 186 people.132 The significant point about this troop of local leaders was 
that, along with Hong Kong delegates to the National People’s Congress and the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, these people formed the long list 
from which Beijing chose the bulk of its appointees to subsequent committees. 
Equally important was the fact that Beijing went outside the Basic Law to create its 
Hong Kong Affairs Advisers—as it did when it established its next unilateral body, the 
Preliminary Working Committee (the Working Committee).
128 Li Knok-sing, China 's United Front (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995, p. 73)
129 Both were former directors of the Xinhua Office. Xu was from 1983-1989, and Zhou was from 1990-1997.
130 For example, it could count all the leading tycoons as members: Li Ka-shing (of Cheung Kong), Cheng Yu-tung 
(of New World) and Lee Shau-kee (of Henderson Land) appeared prominently on one or more of Beijing’s various 
committees. So did a younger generation of entrepreneurs like Tsui Tsin-tong (China Paint, Citybus, and the New 
China Hong Kong Group), Walter Kwok (Sun Hung Kai Properties) and Vincent Lo (Shui On).
131 ‘Beijing’s Advisers on Hong Kong Affairs’ South China Morning Post 23 March 1992
132 ‘Countdown to 1997’ Far Eastern Economic Review (21-28 April 1995)
133 ibid. For example, the Preliminary Working Committee and the Preparatory Committee
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Formed in July 1993, the Working Committee’s task was to examine political,
economic, legal, cultural and social/security issues and to decide whether or not they
accorded with the Basic Law, then to offer suggestions on what to do if they did not.134
In essence, it was established to do the legal and policy spade work for a more
important transitional body—the Preparatory Committee, which was appointed in
December 1995 and charged under the Basic Law with forming the first government of
1the Special Administrative Region.
The setting up of the Working Committee outside the Sino-British agreed framework 
was justified by Beijing on the ground that Chris Patten had violated the Basic Law with 
his proposals for an expedient democratic reform. An enraged China decided to go it 
alone by assembling the Working Committee, designed to leave British and Hong Kong 
officials out of the loop on key decisions affecting the shape of the Special
i T / r
Administrative Region.
One more institution of the united front is worth mentioning to complete the 
picture—the Provisional Legislature. Also not prescribed by the Basic Law, this body 
was formed by Beijing to replace Hong Kong’s last pre-reunification Legislative 
Council on 1 July 1997. The latter was elected in 1995 under Patten’s new democratic 
voting system, which Beijing angrily decided to disband. The Provisional Legislature 
was chosen in December 1996 and would cease to function in mid 1998, when a new
134 The Working Committee covered a range of transitional matters such as how to set up the first post-reunification 
government, how to manage the ‘tainted’ civil service, what the structure of the future electoral system should be, and 
how China’s Nationality Law should be applied to Hong Kong. The committee also examined civil and political 
rights, legislative amendments that would be necessary to stop Hong Kong laws conflicting with the Basic Law, and a 
raft o f ongoing economic issues. See Ming Chan and David Clark, The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for 
‘Stability and Prosperity' under Chinese Sovereignty? (Hong Kong: Hon g Kong University Press, 1991, pp. 78-85)
135 ibid.
136 ibid.
Chapter Nine 360
two-year Legislative Council was promised to take its place. 137
At a lower level, the non-elitist side of the CCP’s united front in Hong Kong included 
umbrella associations of various circles in different geographic, age and occupational 
areas, such as the Hong Kong Eastern District Association of Various Circles, the 
Kowloon Eastern District Association of Various Circles, and the Hong Kong Women’s 
Federation Association of Various Circles. One task of these groups was to mobilise 
support for China at the community level and to maintain links between district pro- 
China groups. The Xinhua Office kept in contact with all these grassroots groups 
through its three district offices in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New 
Territories. 138
From the above analysis, it can be seen that Beijing’s united front work succeeded in 
winning over a large number of business elite and local leaders from a broad spectrum 
of Hong Kong society, but such front work was restricted and failed to have a decisive 
impact on the hearts and minds of the general public. In other words, the united front 
was spread out yet shallow. It was full of generals, captains and lieutenants, but lacked 
for ordinary soldiers.
The CCP ’s Traditional Allies
Apart from using united front work to incorporate Hong Kong’s business and 
professional elites, Beijing also laid great emphasis on left-wing organisations such as
137 Simon Li, ‘PWC Moots Stopgap— Provisional Legco’ Eastern Express 6 September 1994
138 Dorothy Liu, ‘The Working of the United Front’ Hong Kong Standard 4 April 1995
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• 1 TQtrade unions, newspapers and schools, which formed the CCP’s power base at the 
grassroots Hong Kong society. China’s assessment of the transformation of these 
traditional allies directly affected its Hong Kong policy considerations during the 
transitional period, too.140
According to Marxist-Leninist theory, about 40 years of spectacular economic growth 
and rapid industrial development in Hong Kong should have provided objective 
conditions conducive to the development of labour unionism. However, contrary to this 
hypothesis, membership of Hong Kong trade unions dropped while industrialisation 
deepened.141 In 1991, about one-third of these 452 labour unions were affiliated with 
one of the two rival political federations—the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions 
(HKFTU) on the left and the Hong Kong and Kowloon Trade Union Council (HKTUC) 
on the right.142 Founded in 1948, the Pro-Beijing HKFTU had 82 affiliated unions with 
some 174,500 members in the early 1980s. Many of these leftist unions were industrial 
units covering workers in shipyards, textile mills, public transport, public utilities, and 
printing and construction industries.143 The pro-Taipei HKTUC, also founded in 1948, 
had 70 affiliated unions with a total membership of 31,000. Many of these were craft 
unions in the restaurant and building trades.144
The rivalry between the left and the right among the local labour unions had for a long
139 Ming Chan and Gerard Postiglione, The Hong Kong Reader: Passage to Chinese Sovereignty (Armonk, New 
York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 55-59)
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time afforded the Hong Kong government ample opportunities to play a balance of 
power game.145 The right-wing unions generally suffered from undersized membership 
while the left-wing unions had a much broader grassroots base, with a more substantial 
and stable source of members.146 In the 1970s, the right-wing of organised labour 
tended to collaborate much more with the colonial regime than did their leftist 
counterparts. There was always one or more representatives from the HKTUC-affiliated 
unions sitting on the government’s official consultative body and the Labour Advisory 
Board.147
Historically more militant, the left-wing unions suffered serious set-backs in the 
Cultural Revolution-inspired disturbances of 1967, both in public esteem and in the 
colonial regime’s tolerance. The 1967 disturbances marked a crucial turning point for 
the left-wing unions. They developed a relatively more enlightened social policy with 
greater concern for the grassroots, such as labour legislation and official measures for 
industrial welfare.149 These undertakings also had the effect of toning down vigorous 
unionism and radical collective action that might disrupt social stability and economic 
prosperity.150
The signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984 turned a new page 
in local union politics. The local labour leaders and unions played more active political 
roles in reforming themselves on the one hand, and in renewing their commitment to the
145 Jamie Allen, Seeing Red: China's Uncompromising Takeover of Hong Kong (Singapore: KHL Printing, 1997, pp. 
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transitional process on the other. To start with, the leftist HKFTU completely reversed 
its previous ‘abstentionist’ policy towards both the Hong Kong government and the 
local community.151 It no longer boycotted, instead it willingly participated in, the 
government’s labour consultative committees.152 The September 1985 election for 
Legislative Council saw the two seats allotted to organised labour in the ‘functional
i n
constituency’ categories split and shared by the left and right.
As discussed in the previous section, the CCP’s united front work was quite successful 
in building an extensive network that bound local business and professional interests 
with those of China’s. In this sense, it could well be argued that China could rely on 
them to mitigate part of the rising threat from the democratic lobby. But most of these 
big business and professional elites had only limited popular appeal and narrow 
constituencies.154 Furthermore, while some of these elites displayed pro-Beijing 
sentiments, many of them had in the past enjoyed special privileges under British 
patronage, too. They were of dubious allegiance to Beijing as their firm opposition to a 
more democratic political system had little to do with their adherence to the official 
Chinese principles but was based more on a self-centred desire to preserve the status 
quo.
Obviously, when Beijing assessed its overall strength in Hong Kong, political well-
151 ibid.
152 ibid.
153 A vice chairman o f the HKFTU, Tam Yiu-chung, and a leader of the HKTUC, Pang Chun-hoi, were both elected 
without contest. See Kathleen Cheek-Milby and Miron Mushkat, Hong Kong: The Challenge of Transformation 
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68- 111)
Chapter Nine 364
being of the CCP’s traditional allies was important to it, of which the HKFTU system 
was the undisputed flagship. However, with membership of about 174,500 among a 3 
million workforce, the CCP’s political influence on the working class through this 
channel could only be seen as marginal.155 The diminishing political clout of HKFTU 
was due partly to the ineffective support of Beijing and the functional restriction of the 
Coordination Department of the Xinhua Office to deliver it. The official status of the 
Xinhua Office as being the Chinese government’s representative greatly inconvenienced 
it to engage directly in grassroots united front work and to encourage openly left-wing 
trade union activities. In addition, shortage of resources also placed severe constraints 
on its ability to undertake this task.
Beijing ’s Assessm ent
How did the above analysis on Patten’s democratisation proposal in 1992, China’s 
united front work during the transitional period and the diminishing functional status of 
Beijing’s traditional allies in Hong Kong together contribute to Beijing’s motivation for 
a fifth column policy in Hong Kong? Strategically, the need to continue the fifth column 
operation in Hong Kong required Beijing to comprehensively assess and reassess its 
strength and inadequacy in Hong Kong’s whole political system. The assessment of the 
above three areas of concerns provided a reliable base for Beijing to do so.
It has been made clear in this Part that, during the transitional period, China 
passionately pursued its goals by maximising every option to advance its perceived 
interests—an institutional mechanism was fully installed; the united front was efficient
155 ibid.
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in the sense that it won crucial support from Hong Kong business and professional 
elites; traditional allies, such as the HKFTU, functioned but were weak. But judging 
from Chinese revolutionary experience, leadership in Beijing would note that something 
important was missing from this power structure, which might well constitute an 
obstacle to prevent the CCP from achieving its ultimate goal in Hong Kong. As 
identified in this chapter, in the mass-based grassroots Hong Kong society, the CCP’s 
influence was limited.
The outcome of the assessment of the changing political balance in Hong Kong during 
the 1980s and 1990s clearly pointed to a deficiency in the CCP’s representation in the 
lower strata of Hong Kong society, which, for the decision makers in Beijing, would 
jeopardise its long-term and overall objectives. This assessment provided one of the 
catalysts, and a constant justification, for Beijing to launch, and to continue, its fifth 
column policy in Hong Kong—as a way of compensating for its relatively weak ‘sphere 
of influence’ on Hong Kong’s political balance sheet.
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter showed that Beijing’s motivation for the fifth column policy 
in Hong Kong was a logical outcome of Beijing’s apprehensions about Hong Kong’s 
political future. These apprehensions were sourced from a mixed bag of considerations, 
including the burden of Hong Kong’s colonial history, its understanding of sovereignty, 
its political tradition of ‘rule by man’, and an assessment of changing political balance 
in Hong Kong during the transitional period, especially its political standing in 
grassroots society. Domestic politics and international forces determined not only that
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China would take Hong Kong back, but also, more importantly, the way in which the 
restoration would be accomplished.
This chapter demonstrated that although the CCP’s philosophical underpinning of the 
fifth column policy in Hong Kong, namely suspicion, distrust, political self-reliance and 
self-sufficiency, insecurity and fear, was consistent, the motives of the policy were 
adjusted several times to accommodate volatile political development in both China and 
Hong Kong. This dynamic nature of the policy operating environment reflected the 
enormous complexity, subtlety and rapid changes of Chinese foreign policy itself during 
this period. The British and local liberals’ push to hasten the democratisation process in 
the early 1990s finally vindicated China’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong.
It would be fair to ask whether Beijing’s use of such a covert policy was fundamental to 
the assertion of its sovereign rights in Hong Kong? The possibility of armed local 
resistance against the Chinese government had always been nil. Rural resistance in the 
New Territories? Pitched battles in the crowded streets of Kowloon? Scuba divers 
mining mainland ships in Victoria Harbour? Such scenarios were obviously 
preposterous. Yet if these scenarios sounded ridiculous and China was not fighting a 
civil war in Hong Kong, why the quasi-military tactics, then?
The answer to this was that, from the analysis of this chapter, for the Chinese 
government, effective sovereignty in Hong Kong must include formal recognition of 
Hong Kong as a part of China and the Chinese government’s autonomy to exercise 
ultimate authority there. This level of understanding of sovereignty empowered the CCP 
with almost absolute rights to use any means to achieve this end. Its deeply-entrenched
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concept of ‘rule by man’ provided a cultural justification for a policy such as the fifth 
column in Hong Kong. Given Beijing’s awareness in the early 1980s of its declining 
political base at the grassroots Hong Kong society (exemplified by the left-wing trade 
unions) and the enormous task ahead with the imminent return of Hong Kong in the mid 
1990s, a fifth column policy seemed to be a limited, yet rational choice for the CCP 
under the circumstances.
This chapter also demonstrated that the core value of the fifth column policy as political 
insurance was accomplished and preserved. For Beijing, Chris Patten’s radical reform 
package was only the tip of the iceberg of the complicated political and social relations 
in the future Hong Kong. For example, the most dangerous threat, or dilemma, lay in 
the scenario that through a gradual democratisation process, which China was obliged to 
implement, some prominent political figures hostile to Beijing might be popularly 
elected to high office. To effectively avoid this happening, the fifth column policy not 
only seemed highly appropriate, but also became an absolute necessity to reduce 
damage caused directly by Patten’s proposal, and to prepare for the more general trend 
of democratisation in the future.
Viewed from this perspective, it could be concluded that Beijing’s fifth column policy 
in Hong Kong during the transitional period was the continuation of a traditional siege 
mentality of wall-building in China’s foreign policy motivation. It was also a testimony 
to the enduring and pervasive political culture of ‘rule by man’ in the minds of the 
Chinese leadership, especially in its approaches to dealing with the unknown and 
uncertain. The effects of the structural/situational evolution and changes in the political 
environment on motivational intensity and direction of the fifth column policy
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reinforced the interactive and dynamic process of Chinese foreign policy.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this study strongly suggested that, despite the rapid emergence in China 
of a pragmatic and more flexible policy regime, despite the indisputable 
institutionalisation of the policy process and the weakening of personal intervention in 
it, and despite ‘sweeping’ changes in China’s strategic thinking and foreign policy 
considerations, the three core elements—perception, personalised politics and 
structural/situational constraints—that underpinned Chinese foreign policy motivation 
under Mao persisted in Deng’s reform era. The thesis also demonstrated that the 
intensity and domain of each core element in the motivation configuration varied 
according to the specific time and the specific foreign policy issue.
Classical international relations theories of realism, liberalism and Marxism were 
inadequate in explaining the complex and dynamic nature of motivation in foreign 
policy. These three main schools of thought addressed motivation in grossly simplified 
forms—using broad and general concepts such as power, modernity or class struggle, 
for example.
Scholars who went beyond these classical boundaries into the theoretical exploration of 
foreign policy motivation were able to abandon the simplified theoretical paradigms set 
by the classical schools. They have provided useful alternatives to penetrate and to 
expose the heterogeneous and constantly changing characteristics of foreign policy 
motives. The theories on foreign policy motivation analysed in this thesis were found to 
be highly complementary and often dependent on the similar sets of crucial variables.
The thesis was structured to first elucidate these three critical elements—perception,
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personality and structural/situational factors—and their interrelationship in the 
motivation process. It then tested their applicability to the problem of understanding the 
Chinese government’s foreign policy motivation. However, given the CCP’s inherited 
historical burden, the persistent political culture and value in the Chinese 
decisionmaking system, and the rapid changes in the last 20 years in China’s domestic 
and international settings, this thesis found that no single motivation theory seemed by 
itself to have the capacity to fully explain Chinese foreign policy motives. It was only 
with the combined strands of the different schools of foreign policy motivation theory 
that this task seemed to be attainable.
Politics, especially foreign policy, in China was always conducted in a highly protected 
and secretive manner. For scholars, this has meant incomplete evidence, unavailability 
of the actors and frequent irregularity of the decision mechanism, which in turn have 
created severe research barriers for them to hypothesise and prove a consistent policy 
tendency or preference. This thesis has argued that the motivation approaches could 
compensate for this deficiency and enrich the study of Chinese foreign policy by 
showing new ways of sifting through the scant information and to reach out to feel the 
real policy pulse. Indeed, another principal advantage of adopting motivation 
approaches was the opportunity to assess more accurately China’s future policy 
directions. The rising trend of taking motivation as the main focus in the study of 
Chinese foreign policy in the 1990s tended to confirm the practicality and relevance of 
these theories.
The investigation into the existing motivation theories in Part I of this thesis identified 
three major elements that were pertinent to Chinese foreign policymaking—perception,
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personality, and structural/situational constraints. In analytical chapters of Part II, the 
roles of these three elements and their variant forms were investigated in the context of 
the conception, articulation and implementation of Chinese foreign policy in both the 
Mao and the Deng eras. This exercise also tested the validity and effectiveness of these 
motivation theories in studying Chinese foreign policy.
The thesis confirmed that perception played a crucial role in Chinese foreign policy 
motivation. The political leaders’ views on political reality, whether simple and 
intuitive, or highly complex and formally articulated, set the reference points for policy 
deliberation and decisionmaking. These views also informed the leaders’ considerations 
of various courses of action and provided the motivation for foreign policy judgement 
and choice. Many Chinese leaders consciously or unconsciously brought to the foreign 
policy process a mixed system of ideas, values, assumptions and prejudices (such as 
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, Deng’s modernisation rationalisation, 
Confucian ‘rule by man’ philosophy and indigenous nationalism) and these acted as a 
constantly adjusting perceptual prism through which they looked at the world, filtered 
information and interpreted reality.
Richard Cottam divided the concept of perception into two aspects—perceptual 
components and patterns—in order to demonstrate the linkage between a concept and its 
origins. He argued that the determinants of perception included historical experience, 
community values, political relevance, role interests and idiosyncratic socialisation 
patterns. He also pointed out that a particular value and belief would become salient for 
an individual or a group if it was perceived either as a threat or as an opportunity. 
Furthermore, Cottam maintained that beliefs influenced perception through their
Conclusion 373
relation to expectations and interpretations.
In one form or another, perception played a role in the foreign policy of every state, and 
China was certainly no exception to this rule. What distinguished China, particularly in 
the early years of the People’s Republic, was the application of the highly articulated, 
systematic, formal ideology of Marxism-Leninism to the realm of foreign policy on the 
assumption that it could provide China’s leaders with an accurate guide to the choices 
they faced in the international arena. The behaviours of other states, including China’s 
formal ally the Soviet Union, often diverged, however, from what the predicates of 
ideology suggested, so gradually the function of formal ideology changed. But the 
concepts and language of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought continued to frame 
the thinking of Chinese political leaders, and they continued to justify their foreign 
policy choices in ideological terms whenever needs arose.
The analysis of the sources and role of perception in China’s foreign policy in this thesis 
has indicated how productive this approach could be. Chinese leaders saw the world in 
the rigid terms of the Cold War era as a dichotomous universe of faithful comrades and 
treacherous enemies locked in an historic struggle between opposing class forces. But 
the CCP’s own experience over time in both domestic politics and foreign relations 
revealed the world in fact to be much more complex and variegated.
The diminishing role of ideology in the Deng era allowed China to practise a more 
pragmatic foreign policy. The transformation from an enclosed, politically self- 
sufficient and ideologically driven foreign policy to a more open and flexible policy 
regime did not reduce the primary role of perception in the Chinese foreign policy
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motivation process. In general terms, perception continued to have both prescriptive and 
proscriptive functions in Chinese foreign policy, but the entire system of thought 
became so broad and adaptive that few foreign policy behaviours were excluded by it. 
This could be seen in China’s actual foreign relations in the reform era where the strict 
adherence to ideology varied with respect to country, issue, geographical area and time 
period.
Margaret Hermann and Richard Snyder and his colleagues discerned that the personality 
of individual leaders could play an important part in foreign policy motivation, and this 
role depended on the polity of the country in question. They believed that the more 
open, transparent and institutionalised the system was, the less likely the leaders’ 
personalities were to influence foreign policy outcomes. China’s unique political culture 
and practice, consolidated through the CCP’s cadre system and the party-state 
monopoly, were reviewed in the thesis to emphasise the role of eminent political leaders 
and the party elites in shaping Chinese foreign policy motivation. The deeply- 
entrenched concept of ‘rule by man’ as an art of governance as well as a political culture 
in the minds of the CCP leaders crystallised their mental inclination and practical 
expectation in handling China’s foreign relations. The extensive practice of ‘rule by 
man’ added one important characteristic to Chinese foreign policy motivation—an 
excessive dependence on political allegiances, party connections and the personal 
experience of the CCP cadres to achieve China’s foreign policy goals, instead of 
reliance on institutional and bureaucratic power which was limited by laws, regulations 
or more objective assessments.
This thesis found the two main attributes of foreign policy motivation—durability and
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persistence as highlighted by Richard Snyder and his colleagues—to be of particular 
interest in the Chinese case. It proved that being motivated was not a momentary event 
and that a particular motivation could be reinforced through the continued performance 
of a policy, program or plan. Reward, familiarity and feedback from previous success 
would strengthen motivational orientation. Decision makers had a tendency to keep 
their policies within this comfort zone. This last point was strongly supported by the 
case study on Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong from 1983 to 1997. Beijing’s 
deep suspicion and distrust of the British government in turn was directly translated into 
a policy that mobilised and transported a large force of CCP cadres to boost the party’s 
comparability with Hong Kong—and tying it directly through the fifth column to the 
true spirit of the CCP’s revolutionary tradition. The Hong Kong case demonstrated 
powerfully that the CCP was willing and ready to take a big risk and determined to 
employ every possible means to achieve its ultimate foreign policy objectives. 
Therefore, the argument that Chinese authorities would make all the concessions in 
order to retain Hong Kong’s economic prosperity was weak simply because it failed to 
take into account the critical role of sovereignty and the nationalistic dimensions of 
China’s politics, which acquired special salience as Deng Xiaoping’s reform deepened 
and the process of leadership succession intensified.
However, the durability and persistence of China’s foreign policy motivation did not 
equate to a monolithic set of static circumstances—durability would often encounter 
survival crises and persistence would often be challenged by the need for learning and 
adapting. This point was clearly demonstrated and emphasised in analysing the 
dynamics of Chinese foreign policy process in Part II.
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Walter Carlsnaes’ contribution brought into motivation study an indispensable 
variable—structural/situational elements, which could modify or accelerate the impact 
of both perception and personality on foreign policy motivation. Chinese international 
relations in the Deng era provided many practical examples to prove the value of 
considering this aspect. In light of this, this thesis treated each component of foreign 
policy motivation—whether historical, ideological, personal, cultural or institutional— 
in a relative and probabilistic rather than an absolute, deterministic manner in order to 
delineate the range of permissible and possible foreign policy choices that could be 
made at a given time on a specific issue according to the situational factors.
Relying on Carlsnaes’ approach, this thesis covered a range of changes in the 
organisational settings which acted as catalysts in Chinese foreign policy motivation. 
The central importance of perception and personality dimensions in Chinese foreign 
policy motivation notwithstanding, this thesis concurred with Carlsnaes’ theory that 
changes in objective conditions and organisational settings were the most active and 
dynamic agents affecting the configuration and final outcomes of foreign policy 
motivation. This proposition was proved positively by the drastic changes in China’s 
foreign policy decisionmaking, which, being under enormous domestic and international 
pressures, registered an exceptional degree of flexibility in order to achieve goals of 
Deng’s reform program.
Having made these observations about the core themes of China’s foreign policy under 
Deng, the thesis linked the interaction between perception, personality and 
structural/situational constraints in a case study of CCP’s fifth column policy in Hong
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Kong during the transitional period. Although migration from the mainland to Hong 
Kong had played a major role in Hong Kong’s industrialisation and the legendary 
emergence as an ‘economic tiger’ during the colonial rule, it was never carried out with 
such pervasiveness, vigour and covert purpose, nor was it as socioeconomically or 
politically significant, as during the transitional period from 1983 to 1997. Never before 
had ‘family reunion’ migration flow from China been so pertinent to Beijing’s projected 
future interests in Hong Kong and so closely connected to politics in China.
This thesis discovered that perception, the embedded practice of ‘rule by man’ and 
constant reassessment of the political balance in Hong Kong were the three main 
sources of this policy. Although the logic of Beijing’s fifth column policy stemmed 
from an underlying fear, suspicion and distrust, the immediate goals and 
implementation tactics of the policy had to be adjusted and modified several times to 
serve the ultimate objectives of China’s foreign policy. The evolution of China’s fifth 
column policy in Hong Kong demonstrated an important disposition of China’s foreign 
policy motivation—the absolute necessity to adapt to the vulnerability, volatility and 
dynamics of the policy environment.
The thesis found that Beijing’s passionate pursuit of the fifth column policy in Hong 
Kong was, in spite of some fluctuation, a consistent, not an aberrant, action. This, 
however, went hand in hand with China’s vigorous push for more constructive 
participation in institutional arrangements. While China’s successful exploration of 
institutional avenues to soothe Hong Kong’s transition might represent its willingness to 
adapt and learn, the operation of the fifth column in Hong Kong was a manifestation of 
the lingering legacy of traditional values of perception and political culture in Chinese
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foreign policy motivation. It also frustrated the expectation that adaptation might have 
become the dominant feature in China’s leadership decisionmaking under Deng. There 
was no better evidence of this than the resurgence of Beijing’s interest in the fifth 
column policy after democratic movements in Hong Kong boiled over in the wake of 
the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and after Governor Patten introduced his democratisation 
proposals for the Legislative Council in 1992—challenges which threatened what had 
until then been viewed by China as an increasingly favourable trend of developments 
achieved through reliance on an open, negotiated and institution-based approach.
Thus, integration of the three competing motivation theories and extensive empirical 
analysis of Chinese foreign policy allowed this conclusion to be drawn: despite being 
increasingly diversified by constant changes in global as well as national contexts, and 
despite impressive transformations in both scale and magnitude, Chinese foreign policy 
motivation could not, in the final analysis, transcend and overcome certain perceptual 
prejudices, political traditions and systemic limits imposed by the underlying doctrines 
and practice. Although certain motivation elements might have been temporarily 
weakened or dissipated under certain circumstance of motivation, the philosophical 
foundation of the three elements in Chinese foreign policy motivation persisted and the 
deeply entrenched political tradition was never far from the surface in the practice of 
Beijing’s fifth column policy in Hong Kong.
After the CCP’s Fifteenth Party Congress in September 1997 and the National People’s 
Congress in March 1998, a new Chinese leadership has emerged with Jiang Zemin 
having consolidated his power as the party’s General Secretary and Zhu Rongji 
replacing Li Peng as the state Premier. Would this high level personnel reshuffle affect
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China’s foreign policy motivation in the years ahead? Or to what extent would such an 
arrangement impact on the changing balance between the necessity to adapt and the 
persistence of tradition in China’s foreign policy decisionmaking? Obviously, these 
questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, what has been concluded in this 
thesis suggests strongly that, for a considerable period of time to come, the key elements 
that cast the Chinese foreign policy motivation framework would remain largely 
unchanged. As such, China’s foreign policy could be expected to continue to stake 
heavily on issues such as sovereignty and national reunification on the one hand, and 
embrace economic pragmatism and necessary political adjustment on the other.
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